- Permissive Divergence.Simon Graf - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):240-255.details
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Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited).Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (3):243-259.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
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Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.details
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Grit.Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):175-203.details
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Arbitrariness and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):665-685.details
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EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.details
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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Kierkegaard on the Relationship between Practical and Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Perspectival Skeptical Theism.Jonathan Curtis Rutledge - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):244-264.details
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Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Lanham, Md: Rowman & LIttlefield. pp. 201-215.details
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Religious Disagreement.Dormandy Katherine - 2023 - In John Greco, Tyler Dalton McNabb & Jonathan Fuqua (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 208-223.details
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Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions.Manhal Hamdo - 2023 - Springer Verlag.details
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Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 6: The Pattern Stops Here?Guy Axtell - 2019 - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement. Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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Preemptive Authority: The Challenge From Outrageous Expert Judgments.Thomas Grundmann - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):407-427.details
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Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.details
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Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
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Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett (ed.) - 2021 - Rebus Community.details
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From values to probabilities.Wlodek Rabinowicz - unknowndetails
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Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Do great minds really think alike?Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
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Against the Doctrine of Infallibility.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa082.details
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On value-laden science.Zina B. Ward - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:54-62.details
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Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement.Mark Walker - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):285-309.details
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Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.details
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Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology.Briana Toole - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):47-65.details
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Hybrid Impermissivism and the Diachronic Coordination Problem.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):267-285.details
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Continuing on.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):670-691.details
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Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926.details
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How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Curiosity and Zetetic Style in ADHD.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Perception and the external world.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.details
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Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.details
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Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic.Nader Shoaibi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1:1-10.details
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Permissivism and Intellectual Virtue.Troy Seagraves - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
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