- A Comprehensive Account of Blame: Self-Blame, Non-Moral Blame, and Blame for the Non-Voluntary.Douglas W. Portmore - 2022 - In Andreas Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Enforcing social norms: The morality of public shaming.Paul Billingham & Tom Parr - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):997-1016.details
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Moral Worth, Credit, and Non-Accidentality.Keshav Singh - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press, Usa.details
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Blaming.Leonhard Menges - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge.details
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Explaining Loss of Standing to Blame.Justin Snedegar - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-29.details
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Praise.Daniel Telech - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (10):1-19.details
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Online Public Shaming: Virtues and Vices.Paul Billingham & Tom Parr - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (3):371-390.details
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Explaining away epistemic skepticism about culpability.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Shoemaker David (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 141–164.details
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Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties.P. F. Strawson - 1985 - New York: Routledge.details
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Fitting Attitudes and Solitary Goods.Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):687-698.details
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Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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The Smart theory of moral responsibility and desert.Richard Arneson - 2003 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and justice. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Taking Affective Explanations to Heart.Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2009 - Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.details
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VIII. The significance of recalcitrant emotion.Justin D'arms - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:127-145.details
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Sentiment and value.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Ethics 110 (4):722-748.details
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Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.details
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Value, reasons and the structure of justification: how to avoid passing the buck.R. Crisp - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):80-85.details
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Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?G. A. Cohen - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 58:113-136.details
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Being More Blameworthy.D. Justin Coates - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):233-246.details
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Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.details
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No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails.Krister Bykvist - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):1-30.details
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Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing.Daniele Bruno - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Blaming for Unreasonableness: Accountability without Ill Will.Alisabeth A. Ayars - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (1).details
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Agency and answerability: selected essays.Gary Watson - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Worth.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):223.details
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The Epistemic Condition.Daniel J. Miller - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge.details
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Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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The Metaphysics of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 255-274.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The strike of the demon: On fitting pro‐attitudes and value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):391-423.details
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On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love.Berislav Marušić - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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The Ethics of Blame: A Primer.D. Justin Coates - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 192-214.details
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Sentiments.Hichem Naar - 2018 - In Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), The Ontology of Emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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What We Owe to Each Other.T. M. Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Harvard University Press.details
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Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Value, and Reasons.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility.Elinor Mason - 2019 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction.Helen Frowe - 2011 - New Abington: Routledge.details
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Partiality and Intrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):447-483.details
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Moral responsibility and ignorance.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1997 - Ethics 107 (3):410-426.details
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Luck and moral responsibility.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1987 - Ethics 97 (2):374-386.details
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An essay on moral responsibility.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1988 - Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.details
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The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):384-399.details
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Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons.R. Jay Wallace - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (4):307-341.details
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Hate: Toward a Four-Types Model.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.details
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Subjective Proportionality.Patrick Tomlin - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):254-283.details
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