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Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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Essays in quasi-realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Oxford,: Blackwell.details
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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology.Robert Campbell Roberts - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(2 other versions)The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being.Daniel M. Haybron - 2008 - Oxford University Press.details
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Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.details
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Fellow Creatures. Our Obligations to the Other Animals.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):165-168.details
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What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.details
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(1 other version)Essays on Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):96-99.details
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(1 other version)Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):386-405.details
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The Meaning of 'Ought': Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics.Matthew Chrisman - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(1 other version)Emotions as Attitudes.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.details
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More of me! Less of me!: Reflexive Imperativism about Affective Phenomenal Character.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1013-1044.details
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Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.details
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Tempered expressivism.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics (1).details
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Valence and Value.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):658-680.details
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The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire.Chris Heathwood - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.details
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Tracking representationalism and the painfulness of pain.Brian Cutter & Michael Tye - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.details
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Pains that Don't Hurt.David Bain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):305-320.details
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Thinking and doing: the philosophical foundations of institutions.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1975 - Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co..details
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Imperative content and the painfulness of pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.details
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An Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (10):517-532.details
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Pains as reasons.Manolo Martínez - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274.details
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Felt evaluations: A theory of pleasure and pain.Bennett W. Helm - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.details
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The feels good theory of pleasure.Aaron Smuts - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.details
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Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals.Christine Marion Korsgaard - 2018 - Oxford University Press.details
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The Content–Force Distinction.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):141-164.details
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Do theories of consciousness rest on a mistake?Adam Pautz - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.details
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Killing the Messenger: Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain.Hilla Jacobson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):509-519.details
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The Imperative View of Pain.David Bain - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.details
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Pains and reasons: Why it is rational to kill the Messenger.Brian Cutter & Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):423-433.details
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Not Only a Messenger: Towards an Attitudinal‐Representational Theory of Pain.Hilla Jacobson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):382-408.details
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Believing in Expressivism.T. Toppinen - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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Imperativism and Pain Intensity.Colin Klein & Manolo Martínez - 2018 - In David Bain & Michael Brady (eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance. New York: Routledge. pp. 13-26.details
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The World According to Suffering.Antti Kauppinen - 2019 - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. London: Routledge.details
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On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2018 - Synthese 197 (7):3087-3111.details
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The Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description.Jean-Paul Sartre - 2004 - Routledge.details
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Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory.Fabrice Teroni & Julien Deonna - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 102-123.details
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Valence, Bodily (Dis)Pleasures and Emotions.Fabrice Teroni - 2019 - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. London: Routledge. pp. 103-122.details
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Thinking and Doing: The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1976 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 9 (4):254-257.details
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