- (2 other versions)A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 18-30.details
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(4 other versions)Moral Luck.Thomas Nagel - 1993 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck. SUNY Press. pp. 141--166.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge: By Examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1.details
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Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.Alessandra Tanesini - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):303-306.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, truth and evidence.Keith Lehrer - 1965 - Analysis 25 (5):168.details
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Unnatural Doubts.Michael Williams - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):533-547.details
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(5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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(6 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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The Meno.Tim Addey - 2013 - Westbury, Wiltshire: The Prometheus Trust. Edited by Floyer Sydenham.details
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(1 other version)Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis.Edward Craig - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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Unsafe Knowledge.Juan Comesaña - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):395-404.details
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Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism.Hilary Kornblith (ed.) - 2001 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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(3 other versions)Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.) - 2005 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Knowledge and the State of Nature.Edward Craig - 1990 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 183 (3):620-621.details
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Justification is internal.Richard Feldman - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 270--84.details
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(4 other versions)Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50:115 - 151.details
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Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.details
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The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1992 - Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.details
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``Knowledge is Accurate and Comprehensive Enough True Belief".Richard F. Foley - 1996 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.details
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Moral and epistemic luck.Daniel Statman - 1991 - Ratio 4 (2):146-156.details
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A defence of common sense.George Edward Moore - 1925 - In J. H. Muirhead (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy, Second Series. George Allen and Unwin.details
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Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Joe Salerno (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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The deflationary theory of truth.Daniel Stoljar - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Luminosity and the safety of knowledge.Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.details
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(1 other version)Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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An analysis of factual knowledge.Peter Unger - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.details
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Internalist Reliabilism.Matthias Steup - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):403-425.details
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(1 other version)Reliability and the value of knowledge.Wayne D. Riggs - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):79-96.details
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(2 other versions)A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.details
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On the logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem.L. Floridi - 2004 - Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.details
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Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.details
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(1 other version)The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology.Paul K. Moser (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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Intellectual Virtue.Linda Zagzebski & Michael Depaul - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):791-794.details
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(1 other version)Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1948 - New York, USA: Simon and Schuster.details
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On the Gettier problem problem.William G. Lycan - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 148--168.details
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Unnatural Doubts.Christopher Hookway - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (172):389.details
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Is epistemic luck compatible with knowledge?Mylan Engel - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):59-75.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Luck.William Harper - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):273-283.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Operators.Fred Dretske - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Does the Gettier problem rest on a mistake?Richard Kirkham - 1984 - Mind 93 (372):501-513.details
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(2 other versions)Contrastive Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):157-165.details
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