- (4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
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Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments against Physicalism.Richard Brown - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):47-69.details
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There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
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The modal argument improved.Brian Cutter - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):629-639.details
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The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Modal arguments against materialism.Michael Pelczar - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):426-444.details
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Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201-207.details
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(2 other versions)The Harder Problem of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2003 - Disputatio 1 (15):5-49.details
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Zombies versus materialists: The battle for conceivability.Peter Marton - 1998 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):131-138.details
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Concepts and Consciousness.Stephen Yablo - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):455-463.details
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(2 other versions)In defense of the phenomenal concepts strategy.Katalin Balog - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Zombies and Consciousness.Robert Kirk - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.details
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Sniffing the Camembert: On the Conceivability of Zombies.Allin Cottrell - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):4-12.details
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(1 other version)Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):81-93.details
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Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.details
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Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism.Derk Pereboom - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press.details
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Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World.Jack C. Lyons - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jack Lyons.details
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(1 other version)Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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Physicalism and the necessary A Posteriori.Daniel Stoljar - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):33-55.details
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Psychologism and behaviorism.Ned Block - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.details
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Armstrong on the mind.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (July):394-403.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.details
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(1 other version)Absent qualia and the mind-body problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.details
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Powers and the mind–body problem.István Aranyosi - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):57 – 72.details
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Is conceivability a guide to possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.details
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What is it like to be a zombie?Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 385--400.details
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Zombie killer.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & Alwyn Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press.details
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The inconceivability of zombies.Robert Kirk - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):73-89.details
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(2 other versions)Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (285):337-52.details
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Qualia and analytical conditionals.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):111-135.details
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Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.details
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The unimagined preposterousness of zombies.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26.details
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Conceivability and Possibility.Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem.Christopher S. Hill - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.details
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(1 other version)Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.details
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(2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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(1 other version)Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.details
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Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates.Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.) - 1997 - MIT Press.details
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The anti-zombie argument.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666.details
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Functionalism and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.details
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Are absent qualia impossible?Ned Block - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.details
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