- Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.details
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Debunking evolutionary debunking of ethical realism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):883-904.details
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A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement. [REVIEW]Nathan Ballantyne & Nathan L. King - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):808-812.details
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Grasping the Third Realm.John Bengson - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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But I Could Be Wrong.George Sher - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):64.details
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On the evolutionary debunking of morality.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):441-464.details
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.details
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The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral functionalism and moral motivation.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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(1 other version)Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.details
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Third factor explanations and disagreement in metaethics.Michael Klenk - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):427-446.details
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Disagreements in Moral Intution as Defeaters.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):282-302.details
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What Makes Evolution a Defeater?Matt Lutz - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1105-1126.details
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Objectivity and reliability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):841-855.details
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Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument.Tomas Bogardus - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):636-661.details
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Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion.Sanford Goldberg - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 167.details
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Who is an epistemic peer?Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.details
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Faultless Disagreement.Max Kolbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.details
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Positional objectivity.Amartya Sen - 1993 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (2):126-145.details
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(2 other versions)The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Can Moral Realists Deflect Defeat Due to Evolutionary Explanations of Morality?Michael Klenk - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):227-248.details
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Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.details
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Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):69-104.details
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Genealogical Explanations of Chance and Morals.Toby Handfield - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 54.details
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(1 other version)Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology.Neil Sinclair - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Reductionist Moral Realism and the Contingency of Moral Evolution.Max Barkhausen - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):662-689.details
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(1 other version)Belief Pills and the Possibility of Moral Epistemology.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Debunking and Disagreement.Folke Tersman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):754-774.details
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Survival of Defeat - Evolution, Moral Objectivity, and Undercutting.Michael Klenk - 2018 - Dissertation, Utrecht Universitydetails
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