Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Rationalization in Philosophical and Moral Thought.Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Ellis - 2017 - In Jean-François Bonnefon & Bastien Trémolière (eds.), Moral Inferences. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Rationalization, in our intended sense of the term, occurs when a person favors a particular conclusion as a result of some factor (such as self-interest) that is of little justificatory epistemic relevance, if that factor then biases the person’s subsequent search for, and assessment of, potential justifications for the conclusion. Empirical evidence suggests that rationalization is common in people’s moral and philosophical thought. We argue that it is likely that the moral and philosophical thought of philosophers and moral psychologists is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Same‐Saying, Pluri‐Propositionalism, and Implicatures.Eros Corazza - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):546-569.
    In combining a pluri‐propositionalist framework (Bach‐style) concerning alleged conventional implicatures, and a pluri‐propositionalist framework (Perry‐style) distinguishing various levels of content associated with a single utterance, I defend a Grice‐inspired model of communication. In so doing, I rely on the distinction between what is said, i.e. what is semantically encoded, and what is pragmatically implicated. I show how the notion of same‐saying plays a central role in dealing with problems pertaining to communication insofar as it permits us to posit a stability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Constitution of Liberty.Friedrich von Hayek - 1998 - Law and Philosophy 17 (1):77-109.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   274 citations  
  • A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism.Justin Morton - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):233-253.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments claim that evolution has influenced our moral faculties in such a way that, if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. I present several popular objections to the standard version of this argument, then give a new EDA that has clear advantages in responding to these objections. Whereas the Standard EDA argues that evolution has selected for many moral beliefs with certain contents, this New EDA claims that evolution has selected for one belief: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • How irrelevant influences bias belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • (1 other version)Ethics and Intuitions.Peter Singer - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331-352.
    For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it is not clear why we should (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   309 citations  
  • Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141 (C):127-137.
    We examined the effects of framing and order of presentation on professional philosophers’ judgments about a moral puzzle case (the “trolley problem”) and a version of the Tversky & Kahneman “Asian disease” scenario. Professional philosophers exhibited substantial framing effects and order effects, and were no less subject to such effects than was a comparison group of non-philosopher academic participants. Framing and order effects were not reduced by a forced delay during which participants were encouraged to consider “different variants of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  • Markets without Symbolic Limits.Jason Brennan & Peter Martin Jaworski - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1053-1077.
    Semiotic objections to commodification hold that buying and selling certain goods and services is wrong because of what market exchange communicates or because it violates the meaning of certain goods, services, and relationships. We argue that such objections fail. The meaning of markets and of money is a contingent, socially constructed fact. Cultures often impute meaning to markets in harmful, socially destructive, or costly ways. Rather than semiotic objections giving us reason to judge certain markets as immoral, the usefulness of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
    We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar-sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   219 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.Joshua Greene - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):695-726.
    In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   143 citations  
  • (1 other version)Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144-1154.
    Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   198 citations  
  • Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
    In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   163 citations  
  • There is no Fallacy of Arguing from Authority.Edwin Coleman - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (3).
    I argue that there is no fallacy of argument from authority. I first show the weakness of the case for there being such a fallacy: text-book presentations are confused, alleged examples are not genuinely exemplary, reasons given for its alleged fallaciousness are not convincing. Then I analyse arguing from authority as a complex speech act. Rejecting the popular but unjustified category of the "part-time fallacy", I show that bad arguments which appeal to authority are defective through breach of some felicity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The Epistemological Theory of Argument--How and Why?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (3):213-243.
    The article outlines a general epistemological theory of argument: a theory that regards providingjustified belief as the principal aim of argumentation, and defends it instrumentalistically. After introducing some central terms of such a theory (2), answers to its central questions are proposed: the primary object and structure of the theory (3), the function of arguments, which is to lead to justified belief (4), the way such arguments function, which is to guide the addressee's cognizing (5), objective versus subjective aspects of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • (1 other version)A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2013 - Ratio 26 (3):373-390.
    This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Debunking arguments are arguments that aim to undermine some range of beliefs by showing that those beliefs are not appropriately connected to their subject matter. Arguments of this sort rear their heads in a wide variety of domains, threatening beliefs about morality, mathematics, logic, color, and the existence of God. Perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects, however, are widely thought to be invulnerable to such arguments. I will show that this is a mistake. I articulate a debunking argument that purports to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • On the normative significance of experimental moral psychology.Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):311-330.
    Experimental research in moral psychology can be used to generate debunking arguments in ethics. Specifically, research can indicate that we draw a moral distinction on the basis of a morally irrelevant difference. We develop this naturalistic approach by examining a recent debate between Joshua Greene and Selim Berker. We argue that Greene's research, if accurate, undermines attempts to reconcile opposing judgments about trolley cases, but that his attempt to debunk deontology fails. We then draw some general lessons about the possibility (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1583 citations  
  • Debunking Arguments and the Genealogy of Religion and Morality.Kelby Mason - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (9):770-778.
    Debunking arguments are an important species of undermining argument, in which facts about the origins of a judgement are used to explain away that judgement. There is a long history of debunking arguments in the domains of moral judgement and religious belief, from the early Christian fathers to Sigmund Freud and beyond. Debunking arguments work by offering a truth-mooting genealogy of the judgement in question, where the truth of the judgement doesn’t play a role in generating the judgement, nor does (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience.Folke Tersman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.
    A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in certain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
    Contemporary realist theories of value claim to be compatible with natural science. In this paper, I call this claim into question by arguing that Darwinian considerations pose a dilemma for these theories. The main thrust of my argument is this. Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes. The challenge for realist theories of value is to explain the relation between these evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes, on the one hand, and the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   622 citations  
  • (1 other version)If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich.Gerald Cohen - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (1-2):1-26.
    Many people, including many egalitarian political philosophers, professa belief in equality while enjoying high incomes of which they devotevery little to egalitarian purposes. The article critically examinesways of resolving the putative inconsistency in the stance of thesepeople, in particular, that favouring an egalitarian society has noimplications for behaviour in an unequal one; that what''s bad aboutinequality is a social division that philanthropy cannot reduce; thatprivate action cannot ensure that others have good lives; that privateaction can only achieve a ``drop in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   220 citations  
  • (1 other version)Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
    Reviews evidence which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Ss are sometimes unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, unaware of the existence of the response, and unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1527 citations  
  • Solving the Trolley Problem.Joshua D. Greene - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 173–189.
    The Trolley Problem arises from a set of moral dilemmas, most of which involve tradeoffs between causing one death and preventing several more deaths. The normative and descriptive Trolley Problems are closely related. The normative Trolley Problem begins with the assumption that authors' natural responses to these cases are generally, if not uniformly, correct. Thus, any attempt to solve the normative Trolley Problem begins with an attempt to solve the descriptive problem, to identify the features of actions that elicit their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • First‐Person Authority: An Epistemic‐Pragmatic Account.Neil C. Manson - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):181-199.
    Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim here is to offer a novel account of this kind of first-person authority. The account is a development of Robert Gordon's ascent routine theory but is framed in terms of our ability to bring it about that others know of our attitudes via speech acts which do not deploy attitudinal vocabulary but which nonetheless ‘show’ our attitudes to others. Unlike Gordon's ascent routine theory, the theory readily applies (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Jonathan D. Cohen Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   158 citations  
  • Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement.Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.
    Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Does cognitive science show belief in god to be irrational? The epistemic consequences of the cognitive science of religion.Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):77-98.
    The last 15 years or so has seen the development of a fascinating new area of cognitive science: the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Scientists in this field aim to explain religious beliefs and various other religious human activities by appeal to basic cognitive structures that all humans possess. The CSR scientific theories raise an interesting philosophical question: do they somehow show that religious belief, more specifically belief in a god of some kind, is irrational? In this paper I investigate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Does neuroscience undermine deontological theory?Richard Dean - 2009 - Neuroethics 3 (1):43-60.
    Joshua Greene has argued that several lines of empirical research, including his own fMRI studies of brain activity during moral decision-making, comprise strong evidence against the legitimacy of deontology as a moral theory. This is because, Greene maintains, the empirical studies establish that “characteristically deontological” moral thinking is driven by prepotent emotional reactions which are not a sound basis for morality in the contemporary world, while “characteristically consequentialist” thinking is a more reliable moral guide because it is characterized by greater (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):167-171.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   247 citations  
  • (5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   709 citations  
  • Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies.Harvey Siegel & John Biro - 1997 - Argumentation 11 (3):277-292.
    In Biro and Siegel we argued that a theory of argumentation mustfully engage the normativity of judgments about arguments, and we developedsuch a theory. In this paper we further develop and defend our theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies.Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):207-236.
    We examine in detail three classic reasoning fallacies, that is, supposedly ``incorrect'' forms of argument. These are the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument. In each case, the argument type is shown to match structurally arguments which are widely accepted. This suggests that it is not the form of the arguments as such that is problematic but rather something about the content of those examples with which they are typically justified. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Confabulating the Truth: In Defense of “Defensive” Moral Reasoning.Patricia Greenspan - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (2):105-123.
    Empirically minded philosophers have raised questions about judgments and theories based on moral intuitions such as Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium. But they work from the notion of intuitions assumed in empirical work, according to which intuitions are immediate assessments, as in psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s definition. Haidt himself regards such intuitions as an appropriate basis for moral judgment, arguing that normal agents do not reason prior to forming a judgment and afterwards just “confabulate” reasons in its defense. I argue, first, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Reconsidering the ad hominem.Christopher M. Johnson - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (2):251-266.
    Ad hominem arguments are generally dismissed on the grounds that they are not attempts to engage in rational discourse, but are rather aimed at undermining argument by diverting attention from claims made to assessments of character of persons making claims. The manner of this dismissal however is based upon an unlikely paradigm of rationality: it is based upon the presumption that our intellectual capacities are not as limited as in fact they are, and do not vary as much as they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The case for ad hominem arguments.Lawrence M. Hinman - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):338 – 345.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Morally irrelevant factors: What's left of the dual process-model of moral cognition?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):783-811.
    Current developments in empirical moral psychology have spawned a new perspective on the traditional metaethical question of whether moral judgment is based on reason or emotion. Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists such as Joshua Greene argue that there is empirical evidence that emotion is essential for one particularly important subclass of moral judgments: so-called ?deontological judgments.? In this paper, I scrutinize this claim and argue that neither the empirical evidence for Greene's dual process-theory of moral judgment nor the normative conclusions it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • A Defense of Retributivism.Stephen Kershnar - 2000 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1):97-117.
    The moral theory justifying punishment will shape the debate over numerous controversial issues such as the moral permissibility of the death penalty, probation, parole, and plea bargaining, as well as issues about conditions in prison and access to educational opportunities in prison. In this essay I argue that the primary goal of the criminal justice system is to inflict suffering on, and only on, those who deserve it. If I am correct, the answer to issues involving the criminal justice system (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Moral Psychology And Moral Intuition: A Pox On All Your Houses.Kelby Mason - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):441-458.
    Peter Singer has argued for a radical anti-intuitionism on the basis of recent empirical research into the psychological and evolutionary origins of moral intuition. There is, however, a gap between the putative genealogy of moral intuition that Singer offers and his desired methodological claim. I explore three ways to bridge the gap, and argue that the promising way is to construe the genealogy as a debunking genealogy. I sketch an account of how debunking arguments work, and then show that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • (1 other version)When psychology undermines beliefs.Derek Leben - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (3):328-350.
    This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • (1 other version)When psychology undermines beliefs.Derek Leben - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-23.
    This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • (1 other version)Socratic Puzzles.Robert Nozick - 1997 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (2):418-418.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • (1 other version)Cognitive Primitives of Collective Intentions: Linguistic Evidence of Our Mental Ontology.Daniel Harbour Natalie Gold - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):109-134.
    Theories of collective intentions must distinguish genuinely collective intentions from coincidentally harmonized ones. Two apparently equally apt ways of doing so are the ‘neo-reductionism’ of Bacharach (2006) and Gold and Sugden (2007a) and the ‘non-reductionism’ of Searle (1990, 1995). Here, we present findings from theoretical linguistics that show that we is not a cognitive primitive, but is composed of notions of I and grouphood. The ramifications of this finding on the structure both of grammatical and lexical systems suggests that an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A Causal Model of Intentionality Judgment.Steven A. Sloman, Philip M. Fernbach & Scott Ewing - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):154-180.
    We propose a causal model theory to explain asymmetries in judgments of the intentionality of a foreseen side-effect that is either negative or positive (Knobe, 2003). The theory is implemented as a Bayesian network relating types of mental states, actions, and consequences that integrates previous hypotheses. It appeals to two inferential routes to judgment about the intentionality of someone else's action: bottom-up from action to desire and top-down from character and disposition. Support for the theory comes from three experiments that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • (1 other version)Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective.Nicolas Baumard Dan Sperber - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):495-518.
    From an evolutionary point of view, the function of moral behaviour may be to secure a good reputation as a co‐operator. The best way to do so may be to obey genuine moral motivations. Still, one's moral reputation maybe something too important to be entrusted just to one's moral sense. A robust concern for one's reputation is likely to have evolved too. Here we explore some of the complex relationships between morality and reputation both from an evolutionary and a cognitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation–A Map.Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (3):189-212.
    The article outlines a general epistemological theory of argument: a theory that regards providingjustified belief as the principal aim of argumentation, and defends it instrumentalistically. After introducing some central terms of such a theory, answers to its central questions are proposed: the primary object and structure of the theory, the function of arguments, which is to lead to justified belief, the way such arguments function, which is to guide the addressee's cognizing, objective versus subjective aspects of argumentation, designing different types (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • (1 other version)Introduction: The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation--A Map.Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (3):189-212.
    An overview of the epistemological approach to argumentation, explaining what it is, justifying it as better than a rhetorical or a consensual ist approach.systematizing the main directions and theories according to their criteria for good argumentation and presenting their contributions to major topics of argumentation theory. Also. an introduction to the articles of the two special issues of Informal Logic about the epistemological approach to argumentation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • (1 other version)Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy.Kevin Korb - 2003 - Informal Logic 23 (1).
    Bayesian reasoning has been applied formally to statistical inference, machine learning and analysing scientific method. Here I apply it informally to more common forms of inference, namely natural language arguments. I analyse a variety of traditional fallacies, deductive, inductive and causal, and find more merit in them than is generally acknowledged. Bayesian principles provide a framework for understanding ordinary arguments which is well worth developing.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Equivocating the ad hominem.Daniel Putman - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (4):551-555.
    Christopher Johnson argued in 'Reconsidering the Ad Hominem' that, in certain exceptional cases, appealing to ad hominem considerations is logically justifiable. My argument is that ad hominem considerations are no different than other evidential considerations. The evidential links may be strong, weak or nonexistent but there is nothing special in itself about considering ad hominem factors when weighing evidence. Like all the informal fallacies, simply because a claim has the signature of being 'ad hominem' does not make it irrelevant. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (2 other versions)Revolutionary Expressivism.Michael Ridge Sebastian Köhler - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):428-449.
    While the meta‐ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become expressivists. Additionally, the paper explores certain important but largely ignored methodological issues that arise for reforming definitions generally and with a vengeance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations