- Rationalization in Philosophical and Moral Thought.Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Ellis - 2017 - In Jean-François Bonnefon & Bastien Trémolière (eds.), Moral Inferences. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Same‐Saying, Pluri‐Propositionalism, and Implicatures.Eros Corazza - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):546-569.details
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The Constitution of Liberty.Friedrich von Hayek - 1998 - Law and Philosophy 17 (1):77-109.details
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A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism.Justin Morton - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):233-253.details
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How irrelevant influences bias belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.details
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(1 other version)Ethics and Intuitions.Peter Singer - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331-352.details
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Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141 (C):127-137.details
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Markets without Symbolic Limits.Jason Brennan & Peter Martin Jaworski - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1053-1077.details
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Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.details
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(2 other versions)Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.Joshua Greene - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):695-726.details
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(1 other version)Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144-1154.details
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Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.details
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There is no Fallacy of Arguing from Authority.Edwin Coleman - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (3).details
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The Epistemological Theory of Argument--How and Why?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (3):213-243.details
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(1 other version)A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2013 - Ratio 26 (3):373-390.details
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Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.details
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On the normative significance of experimental moral psychology.Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):311-330.details
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The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.details
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Debunking Arguments and the Genealogy of Religion and Morality.Kelby Mason - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (9):770-778.details
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The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience.Folke Tersman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.details
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A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.details
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(1 other version)If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich.Gerald Cohen - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (1-2):1-26.details
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(1 other version)Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.details
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Solving the Trolley Problem.Joshua D. Greene - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 173–189.details
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First‐Person Authority: An Epistemic‐Pragmatic Account.Neil C. Manson - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):181-199.details
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(1 other version)Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Jonathan D. Cohen Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144.details
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Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement.Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.details
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Does cognitive science show belief in god to be irrational? The epistemic consequences of the cognitive science of religion.Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):77-98.details
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Does neuroscience undermine deontological theory?Richard Dean - 2009 - Neuroethics 3 (1):43-60.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):167-171.details
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(5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.details
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Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies.Harvey Siegel & John Biro - 1997 - Argumentation 11 (3):277-292.details
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A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies.Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):207-236.details
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Confabulating the Truth: In Defense of “Defensive” Moral Reasoning.Patricia Greenspan - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (2):105-123.details
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Reconsidering the ad hominem.Christopher M. Johnson - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (2):251-266.details
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The case for ad hominem arguments.Lawrence M. Hinman - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):338 – 345.details
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Morally irrelevant factors: What's left of the dual process-model of moral cognition?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):783-811.details
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A Defense of Retributivism.Stephen Kershnar - 2000 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1):97-117.details
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Moral Psychology And Moral Intuition: A Pox On All Your Houses.Kelby Mason - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):441-458.details
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(1 other version)When psychology undermines beliefs.Derek Leben - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (3):328-350.details
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(1 other version)When psychology undermines beliefs.Derek Leben - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-23.details
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(1 other version)Socratic Puzzles.Robert Nozick - 1997 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (2):418-418.details
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(1 other version)Cognitive Primitives of Collective Intentions: Linguistic Evidence of Our Mental Ontology.Daniel Harbour Natalie Gold - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):109-134.details
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A Causal Model of Intentionality Judgment.Steven A. Sloman, Philip M. Fernbach & Scott Ewing - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):154-180.details
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(1 other version)Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective.Nicolas Baumard Dan Sperber - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):495-518.details
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(1 other version)The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation–A Map.Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (3):189-212.details
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(1 other version)Introduction: The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation--A Map.Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (3):189-212.details
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(1 other version)Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy.Kevin Korb - 2003 - Informal Logic 23 (1).details
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Equivocating the ad hominem.Daniel Putman - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (4):551-555.details
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(2 other versions)Revolutionary Expressivism.Michael Ridge Sebastian Köhler - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):428-449.details
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