Irregularity is fundamental to both Wright's and Peirce's positions but they interpret it in radically different ways. The occurrence of things by absolute chance, Peirce's tychism, is his explanation of irregularity; chance, for him, is ontologically irre- ducible--"an objective reality, operative in the cosmos." Wright, on the other hand, interpreted irregularity as a function of causal complexity; it does not constitute an abridgement of causality but only an abridgement of our knowledge of it.

The object of this paper is to show the predominance of the influence of geometrical ideas in Aristotle's account of first principles in the Posterior Analytics— to show that his analysis of first principles is in its essentials an analysis of the first principles of geometry as he conceived them. My proof of this falls into two parts. I. A consideration of the parallel between Aristotle's and Euclid's account of first principles. II. A comparison between the general movement of thought (...) in the Aristotelian παγωγ and πδειξις and in the δινοια and νησις of the Platonic dialectic. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to show the predominance of the influence of geometrical ideas in Aristotle's account of first principles in the Posterior Analytics— to show that his analysis of first principles is in its essentials an analysis of the first principles of geometry as he conceived them. My proof of this falls into two parts. I. A consideration of the parallel between Aristotle's and Euclid's account of first principles. II. A comparison between the general movement of thought (...) in the Aristotelian παγωγ and πδειξις and in the δινοια and νησις of the Platonic dialectic. (shrink)

This first quotation already calls into question many of the most often repeated and best known theses about Dilthey's position on the social and historiographical sciences. For example, what I quoted is not compatible with the widespread opinion that Dilthey made subjective empathy the foundation of interpretation, that he was psychologizing the "operation called Verstehen," or that he thought all historiography and social science must be based on psychology and must, in the last resort, rely on introspection or the so (...) called "subjective experience". This mistaken opinion has influenced Max Weber and has dominated one side of the whole dispute about the methodological character of historiography, psychology, and the social sciences even up to the present writings of men like T. Abel and P. Winch. A quite different picture of Dilthey's position will have emerged at the end of this paper. (shrink)

Die von Jens Timmermann besorgte Neuausgabe innerhalb der Philosophischen Bibliothek bietet den vollständigen Wortlaut der beiden Originalausgaben von 1781 und 1787. Der Kantische Text wurde unter Wahrung der Interpunktion und sprachlicher Eigenheiten sehr behutsam an die heutigen orthographischen Regeln angeglichen. Die semantisch bedeutenden Korrekturvorschläge späterer Herausgeber (nicht nur der Akademie-Ausgabe) sind, wo sie nicht in den Text Aufnahme gefunden haben, am Fuß der Seite verzeichnet. Alle wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen den Originalausgaben sind durch Kursivdruck hervorgehoben, größere Abweichungen ganzer Textstücke - etwa (...) in der Einleitung und im Kapitel über Phaenomena und Noumena - wurden synoptisch gegenübergestellt, so daß Art und Umfang der Umarbeitung unmittelbar abgelesen werden können. Die durchgängig neu bearbeitete Studienausgabe folgt in den Grundprinzipien der seit 1926 in Forschung und Lehre maßgeblichen Ausgabe von Raymund Schmidt, die hiermit abgelöst wird. Sie wird ergänzt durch eine umfangreiche Bibliographie von Heiner Klemme sowie durch einen ausführlichen Personen- und Sachindex. (shrink)