Equality and identity. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 (2013) 255-6. (Coauthor: Anthony Ramnauth) Also see https://www.academia.edu/s/a6bf02aaab This article uses ‘equals’ [‘is equal to’] and ‘is’ [‘is identical to’, ‘is one and the same as’] as they are used in ordinary exact English. In a logically perfect language the oxymoron ‘the numbers 3 and 2+1 are the same number’ could not be said. Likewise, ‘the number 3 and the number 2+1 are one number’ is just as bad from a logical point (...) of view. In normal English these two sentences are idiomatically taken to express the true proposition that ‘the number 3 is the number 2+1’. Another idiomatic convention that interferes with clarity about equality and identity occurs in discussion of numbers: it is usual to write ‘3 equals 2+1’ when “3 is 2+1” is meant. When ‘3 equals 2+1’ is written there is a suggestion that 3 is not exactly the same number as 2+1 but that they merely have the same value. This becomes clear when we say that two of the sides of a triangle are equal if the two angles they subtend are equal or have the same measure. -/- Acknowledgements: Robert Barnes, Mark Brown, Jack Foran, Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Forest Hansen, David Hitchcock, Spaulding Hoffman, Calvin Jongsma, Justin Legault, Joaquin Miller, Tania Miller, and Wyman Park. -/- ► JOHN CORCORAN AND ANTHONY RAMNAUTH, Equality and identity. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: [email protected] The two halves of one line are equal but not identical [one and the same]. Otherwise the line would have only one half! Every line equals infinitely many other lines, but no line is [identical to] any other line—taking ‘identical’ strictly here and below. Knowing that two lines equaling a third are equal is useful; the condition “two lines equaling a third” often holds. In fact any two sides of an equilateral triangle is equal to the remaining side! But could knowing that two lines being [identical to] a third are identical be useful? The antecedent condition “two things identical to a third” never holds, nor does the consequent condition “two things being identical”. If two things were identical to a third, they would be the third and thus not be two things but only one. The plural predicate ‘are equal’ as in ‘All diameters of a given circle are equal’ is useful and natural. ‘Are identical’ as in ‘All centers of a given circle are identical’ is awkward or worse; it suggests that a circle has multiple centers. Substituting equals for equals [replacing one of two equals by the other] makes sense. Substituting identicals for identicals is empty—a thing is identical only to itself; substituting one thing for itself leaves that thing alone, does nothing. There are as many types of equality as magnitudes: angles, lines, planes, solids, times, etc. Each admits unit magnitudes. And each such equality analyzes as identity of magnitude: two lines are equal [in length] if the one’s length is identical to the other’s. Tarski [1] hardly mentioned equality-identity distinctions (pp. 54-63). His discussion begins: -/- Among the logical concepts […], the concept of IDENTITY or EQUALITY […] has the greatest importance. -/- Not until page 62 is there an equality-identity distinction. His only “notion of equality”, if such it is, is geometrical congruence—having the same size and shape—an equivalence relation not admitting any unit. Does anyone but Tarski ever say ‘this triangle is equal to that’ to mean that the first is congruent to that? What would motivate him to say such a thing? This lecture treats the history and philosophy of equality-identity distinctions. [1] ALFRED TARSKI, Introduction to Logic, Dover, New York, 1995. [This is expanded from the printed abstract.] . (shrink)

Since the stone age humankind has created masterworks which possess a mysterious quality of solidity and grandeur or monumentality. A Paleolithic Venus and a still life by Cezanne both share this monumentality. Michelangelo likened monumentality to sculptural relief, Braque called monumentality 'space', and Hans Hoffman, himself one of the masters, called monumentality 'pictorial depth.' The masters agreed on the import of monumentality, but none of them left a clear explanation of it. In 1943 Earl Loran published his classic book (...) on Cezanne's pictorial structure but, as I demonstrate, his explanation was misleading. This book provide a clear explanation, as did an earlier book by Robert Casper. This book also traces some history of monumentality with reproductions. It also explains how some painters achieved monumentality and how a student can attempt it. Pictorial space is created in the tension between pairs of opposing planes. Opposing planes pull against each other, each containing the other, paradoxically, within the flat surface of the canvas. Sculpture also can be 'plastic': opposing masses pull against each other, each containing the other and creating tension in the space which lies between them. Painting has other aspects like subject matter, expression, style and technique but pictorial space does not depend on these. Monumentality moves us profoundly and apparently has done so since the Paleolith. Using patients' vignettes, I show that there are profound parallels between the structure of a monumental work of art and the structure of an evolving personality. In Winnicott's words, such a personality has 'depth ... an interior space to put beliefs in ... an inside ... a space where things can be held ... the capacity to accept paradox [to contain opposites] ... room and strength ... and originality and the acceptance of tradition as the basis for invention'. A monumental painting also meets this description. I argue that monumental art provides a visual portrait of an evolving personality just as myth, as Freud and Jung both showed, provides a narrative portrait of an evolving personality. An evolving personality is perhaps humankind's most important creation; an underlying purpose of both myth and art is to help us achieve it. I demonstrate in this book that monumental art represented the evolving personality since at least 35,000 BC. Thus to understand monumentality is to better understand the personality and its history. (shrink)

REPRODUÇÃO EM NOVILHAS LEITEIRAS -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- O principal objetivo da criação de substitutos em gado leiteiro é produzir uma novilha que tenha seu parto aos dois anos de idade (23 a 25 meses) e com um peso de 550 a 580 kg. O manejo reprodutivo das novilhas começa quando estas atingem 14 ou 15 meses de idade e um peso de 350 a 370 kg. A produção de novilhas deve ser suficiente para substituir as vacas descartadas anualmente (25 a (...) 35%), e para contribuir com o crescimento do rebanho. Espera-se que em um gado leiteiro deva haver uma população de animais de reposição, desde um dia de vida até à fase de novilha ao parto, correspondendo pelo menos a 70 % do total das vacas (figura 1). -/- Figura 1: A meta do programa de produção de substitutos ou fêmeas de reposição consiste em uma novilha que chegue ao seu primeiro parto aos 24 ou 25 meses de idade, entre um peso de 550 a 580 kg. Elaborado pelo autor. -/- A produção de novilhas depende basicamente de três fatores: da fertilidade das vacas, ou seja, do número de bezerras nascidas anualmente; da mortalidade durante a criação e desenvolvimento; e da eficiência reprodutiva das novilhas. O manejo reprodutivo moderno das novilhas é orientado para a utilização da inseminação artificial, seja em um estro natural ou sincronizado. As novilhas representam a população animal geneticamente mais avançada no rebanho, portanto, o mérito genético de suas crias obtidas por inseminação é maior do que o das crias das vacas adultas. Além disso, as crias das novilhas obtidas mediante a inseminação aceleram o avanço genético, uma vez que contribuem com uma proporção maior de substituições do rebanho em comparação com as crias das vacas de outras faixas etárias. Além disso, as novilhas são as fêmeas mais férteis do rebanho (porcentagem de concepção: 60 a 70% vs 30 a 40% em vacas), pelo que o custo do sêmen por gestação é menor em comparação com as vacas adultas, o que permite investir em melhores touros e em sêmen sexado. -/- 1. PUBERDADE -/- A puberdade é definida como a fase de desenvolvimento em que a fêmea apresenta o seu primeiro estro fértil. Regularmente as novilhas leiteiras, sob condições ótimas de manejo, chegam à puberdade entre 11 e 12 meses de idade, ou seja, antes de alavancar o peso recomendado para receber o primeiro serviço. Vale salientar que as novilhas podem ficar gestantes após a puberdade; no entanto, isto não é conveniente porque ainda não completou-se o seu desenvolvimento. Se ficarem gestantes nos primeiros ciclos estrais, as novilhas poderiam chegar ao parto com pouco desenvolvimento físico, o que provocaria distocias e baixa produção de leite (figura 2). A ativação do sistema neuroendócrino para que a bezerra atinja a puberdade é regulada principalmente pelo estado nutricional (condição corporal). A transição do anestro pré-puberal à ciclicidade puberal coincide com um aumento da condição corporal e das concentrações de insulina, IGF-I e leptina. Estes hormônios agem como sinais metabólicos no hipotálamo e hipófise que modificam a frequência de secreção das gonadotropinas, resultando na maturação folicular e ovulação. O atraso em relação à puberdade está diretamente relacionado com deficiências na alimentação; esta condição verifica-se em criações pouco tecnificadas, principalmente de pequenos e médios produtores. As novilhas que já atingiram o peso para receber o primeiro serviço e não apresentaram estro, devem ser examinadas por via retal para excluir possíveis anormalidades do desenvolvimento, tais como freemartinismo ou hipoplasia genital. -/- Figura 2: O fator mais importante que determina a puberdade é a nutrição. Bezerras bem alimentadas apresentam ciclos estrais aos 11 meses de idade e devem ser inseminadas aos 14 ou 15 meses de idade, com um peso de 350 a 370 kg. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- 2. DETECÇÃO DE ESTRO E INSEMINAÇÃO ARTIFICIAL -/- A baixa eficiência na detecção de estros é o problema que mais afeta a eficiência reprodutiva das novilhas. De acordo com a duração do estro (8 a 18 horas), a observação das novilhas em períodos de 30 minutos durante a manhã e à tarde, permite detectar em estro até 70% das fêmeas, enquanto a observação contínua (24 horas) aumenta a eficiência na detecção até 95% (figuras 3 e 4). No manejo tradicional dos rebanhos leiteiros, as novilhas recebem pouca atenção por parte dos trabalhadores, o que resulta em baixa eficiência na detecção de estros (50 a 60%). Em diferença das vacas adultas em lactação, as novilhas estão menos expostas a fatores que diminuem a expressão do estro, portanto, com uma rotina de observação, de pelo menos duas horas na manhã (6h a 8h da manhã) e duas horas pela tarde até a noite (17h da tarde a 19h da noite), pode-se detectar até 90% das fêmeas no estro (figura 5). -/- Figura 3: O fator que mais influencia a idade ao primeiro parto é a baixa eficiência na detecção de estros, pelo que é recomendável a observação de estros com pessoal qualificado, em períodos de pelo menos duas horas pela manhã e duas à tarde. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- Figura 4: Com a observação contínua é possível alcançar de 90 a 95% de eficiência na detecção de estros. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- Figura 5: A inseminação deve ser realizada durante o período de receptividade sexual. Com boa eficiência na detecção de estros, a inseminação pode ser praticada no programa AM-PM e PM-AM, ou em apenas um turno de inseminação pela manhã (10:00), com bons resultados. -/- 3. TAXA DE PRENHEZ -/- O melhor indicador de eficiência reprodutiva é a taxa de prenhez. Este indicador refere-se à proporção de animais gestantes do total elegível para inseminação, num período equivalente a um ciclo estral. Como já se descreveu no trabalho Fisiologia do Estro e do Serviço na Reprodução Bovina, este indicador considera a eficiência na detecção de estros e a porcentagem de concepção, e reflete com maior objetividade a eficácia do manejo reprodutivo. Este parâmetro pode ser melhorado através de um aumento da proporção de novilhas detectadas em estro, o que se obtém aumentando o tempo de observação e aplicando técnicas de sincronização do estro (figura 6). -/- 4. INSEMINAÇÃO DE NOVILHAS COM SÊMEN SEXADO -/- A utilização de sêmen sexado é uma boa opção para a produção de novilhas de reposição. Com a nova tecnologia disponível para a separação de espermatozoides com o cromossomo x, é possível alcançar até 90% de crias fêmeas; no entanto, o processo de separação de espermatozoides tem baixa eficiência, o que limita o número de espermatozoides por palheta. As palhetas de inseminação com sêmen sexado contém de dois a três milhões de espermatozoides (doses de sêmen não sexado têm de 20 a 30 milhões). De acordo com os dados de fertilidade de gados comerciais, as novilhas inseminadas com sêmen sexado mostram de 10 a 20% menor concepção que novilhas inseminadas com sêmen não sexado, o que desencoraja o seu uso. Causas de baixa fertilidade não são conhecidas, no entanto, estão associadas com a menor concentração espermática e com alguns danos nos espermatozoides provocados pelo processo de separação. No entanto, o uso de sêmen sexado é uma opção viável para aumentar a produção de novilhas no rebanho, e com o melhoramento dos processos de separação espermática em pouco tempo se converterá em uma prática de rotina nos estábulos (figura 7). -/- Figura 6: Uma técnica que aumenta a eficiência na detecção dos estros consiste em pintar a região da grupa. Quando esta pintura desaparece ou se nota que as novilhas estão "talhadas", devem ser apalpadas via retal para determinar se existem sinais genitais de estro. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- Figura 7: As novilhas são as fêmeas mais férteis do rebanho, por isso o custo do sêmen por gestação é menor em comparação com as vacas adultas, o que permite investir em melhores touros e em sêmen sexado. Acervo pessoal do autor. 5. MONTA DIRIGIDA -/- A monta dirigida ou direta é uma opção prática e eficaz para emprenhar as novilhas. Neste sistema se introduz um touro com um grupo de novilhas, para que ele se encarregue de encontrar as fêmeas em estro e proceder a monta. Em rebanhos comerciais, o ideal é a utilização de um touro para 25 fêmeas. No entanto, com este manejo perde-se a oportunidade de utilizar a inseminação artificial e, com isso, a possibilidade de melhoria genética. -/- 6. PROGRAMAS DE SINCRONIZAÇÃO DE ESTROS -/- Os tratamentos para sincronizar o estro das novilhas possuem os mesmos fundamentos que os utilizados nas vacas. -/- 6.1 Prostaglandina F2a -/- A PGF2α é utilizada para a sincronização de estros em grupos de novilhas, e também é utilizada para a indução do estro individualmente, nas fêmeas que são examinadas por via retal e têm um corpo lúteo. A resposta dos animais tratados é variável; em novilhas pode-se alcançar até 95% de animais em estro. O tempo de manifestação do estro após a injeção é de 48 a 120 horas. -/- 6.1.1 Dupla injeção de PGF2a -/- Além da sincronização dos animais selecionados pela presença de um corpo lúteo diagnosticado por palpação retal, existem dois programas que não incluem a palpação retal. Por exemplo, na segunda-feira, ou no dia preferido, injeta-se PGF2α em todas as novilhas que se deseja inseminar. Cerca de 50% das novilhas manifestarão estro nas próximas 48 a 120 horas. As fêmeas que não mostrarem estro receberão uma segunda injeção na segunda-feira seguinte (intervalo de sete dias). As que apresentaram estro com a primeira injeção teriam um corpo lúteo nesse momento, enquanto as que não o manifestaram estavam em estro ou em metaestro; assim, ao repetir o tratamento sete dias depois, estas últimas novilhas teriam um corpo lúteo e responderiam à PGF2α (figura 8). No outro programa, é administrada duas doses de PGF2α com 11 dias de separação/intervalo. As novilhas podem ser inseminadas no estro observado, após qualquer uma das duas injeções. Este programa oferece uma boa sincroniza- ção após a segunda injeção e é o programa de escolha na sincronização das novilhas receptoras de embriões (figura 9). -/- Figura 8: Sincronização do estro com dupla injeção de PGF2a com 7 dias de diferença/intervalo. Elaborado pelo autor. -/- Figura 9: Sincronização do estro com dupla injeção de PGF2a com 11 dias de diferença/intervalo. Elaborado pelo autor. -/- 6.2 Progestágenos -/- Existe um tratamento que consiste na inserção, na parte externa da orelha, de um implante que contém norgestomet, que permanece na região auricular por nove dias. Além disso, o tratamento é complementado com a injeção intramuscular de valerato de estradiol e norgestomet, no momento da colocação do implante. O tempo de apresentação do estro a partir da remoção do implante é de 48 a 72 horas e a proporção de animais em estro muitas vezes se torna maior do que 80%. Outro tratamento é baseado na inserção intravaginal de dispositivos de liberação de progesterona. O dispositivo pode ser utilizado durante 12 dias ou o período de exposição pode ser encurtado, desde que seja acompanhado da injeção de uma dose luteolítica de PGF2α, um dia antes ou no momento da remoção do dispositivo. A fertilidade global conseguida após o serviço no estro sincronizado é similar à obtida no estro natural; porém, algumas novilhas são menos férteis, o que está associado com alterações no desenvolvimento folicular e alterações na relação temporal entre o estro e a ovulação. Observou-se que o tratamento com implantes de norgestomet combinados com a injeção de valerato de estradiol pode induzir comportamento estral em animais que não estão ciclando normalmente. Isso ocorre porque os níveis de estradiol, administrados no primeiro dia, persistem até o momento da remoção do implante. Assim, ao remover a fonte do progestágeno e ao haver concentrações altas de estradiol se desencadeia o estro, o qual em novilhas anéstricas não é acompanhado de ovulação, enquanto que em novilhas ciclando se altera a relação temporal entre o estro, pico pré-ovulatório de LH e ovulação. Bons resultados são alcançados quando o valerato de estradiol não é administrado e é substituído por uma injeção de PGF2α no momento da remoção do implante. Outro fator que tem sido associado com baixa fertilidade é o dia do ciclo em que o tratamento começa. Observou-se que quando coincide com a presença de um corpo lúteo (diestro), a porcentagem de concepção é maior do que quando não há um corpo lúteo (proestro). Isto ocorre porque a concentração sérica do progestágeno, por si só, não é capaz de suprimir a secreção pulsátil de LH, o que faz com que o folículo dominante presente no momento de iniciar o tratamento não sofra atresia e persista até o dia da retirada do progestágeno, convertendo-se no folículo ovulatório. Com isso, o folículo já envelheceu e o ovócito já sofreu alterações que reduzem o seu potencial para desenvolver um embrião viável. Quando o tratamento coincide com a presença de um corpo lúteo, a secreção de LH é efetivamente suprimida devido ao efeito aditivo da progesterona secretada pelo corpo lúteo e do progestágeno exógeno, inserido na vaca, o que provoca a reposição folicular. Em condições de campo, a seleção das vacas pela presença de um corpo lúteo antes de iniciar o tratamento com progestágenos é impraticável, uma vez que não é possível visualizá-lo, além disso essa prática/seleção não faria sentido, já que seria mais fácil tratar estes animais com dose ou doses de PGF2α. Atualmente existem tratamentos para eliminar folículos dominantes e promover uma nova onda folicular. -/- 6.3 Progestágenos orais -/- O acetato de melengestrol (MGA) é um progestágeno administrado por via oral. Em fêmeas bovinas é utilizado para melhorar a eficiência alimentar nos currais de engorda, o que se consegue através da inibição da apresentação do estro. Como todos os progestágenos, o MGA inibe a secreção de LH, eliminando assim a maturação do folículo e a ovulação. Após a remoção do MGA, o folículo dominante termina o seu desenvolvimento e as fêmeas apresentam estro em forma sincronizada. A dose de MGA por novilha é de 0,5 a 1 mg por dia, em tratamentos que variam de 9 a 14 dias. A apresentação comercial de MGA contém 0,22 mg do hormônio por 1 g do produto. O MGA pode ser facilmente misturado com qualquer concentrado ou grão moído. Após o último dia de tratamento, o estro se apresenta de dois a seis dias. O intervalo de remoção do MGA ao estro é mais longo quando comparado com outros progestágenos. Isto deve-se ao tempo de remoção do MGA, uma vez que enquanto um implante ou dispositivo intravaginal é removido abruptamente, o MGA pode continuar a ser absorvido enquanto é removido do trato gastrointestinal. Com tratamentos de 14 dias podem-se obter porcentagens de concepção menores em comparação com o estro natural, o que se deve em grande parte à ovulação de folículos persistentes. Um tratamento eficaz, que também melhora a fertilidade, consiste na administração de MGA durante 14 dias, seguido de uma injeção de PGF2α 15 ou 17 dias após a remoção do progestágeno. Com este programa, uma alta proporção de fêmeas teriam um corpo lúteo no momento da injeção da PGF2α e apresentariam estro com boa sincronização. Outro tratamento eficaz consiste na administração do MGA durante nove dias, mais uma dose de PGF2α ao nono dia; com este programa também se obtêm bons resultados em sincronização do estro e fertilidade. Este tratamento foi avaliado com novilhas holandesas e a porcentagem de fêmeas sincronizadas é elevada (95%). A porcentagem de concepção é semelhante à obtida no estro natural. Estes resultados são comparáveis aos obtidos com outros programas, como implantes de norgestomet ou dispositivos intravaginais de liberação de progesterona, mas com um custo significativamente menor (figura 10). -/- 6.4 Sincronização da ovulação e inseminação em tempo fixo -/- Em contraste com o observado em vacas em lactação, a resposta das novilhas aos programas de sincronização da ovulação e inseminação a tempo fixo é deficiente, o que se reflete em porcentagens de concepção de 20 a 35% menores que as novilhas inseminadas no estro natural. A causa desta resposta está relacionada com diferenças no desenvolvimento folicular; assim, nas novilhas o tempo de desenvolvimento do folículo dominante é mais rápido e o tempo de domínio é mais curto do que nas vacas em lactação. Desta forma, o folículo da onda folicular sincronizada com a injeção de GnRH sofre atresia antes da injeção de PGF2α, de tal forma que quando se induz a ovulação com a segunda injeção de GnRH, as novilhas têm folículos em diferentes estádios de desenvolvimento, o que provoca assincronia entre a ovulação e a inseminação artificial. -/- Figura 10: Programa de sincronização do estro com Acetato de Melengestrol (MGA). Elaborado pelo autor. -/- 7. MANEJO DO ANESTRO -/- Uma vez que as novilhas atingem a puberdade, apresentam ciclos estrais em intervalos de 21 dias que só são interrompidos pela gestação ou por alguma patologia. O anestro patológico é raro em novilhas; no entanto, surgem casos de piometra e cistos luteinizados, que são tratados com uma dose de PGF2α. Também se observam anormalidades de desenvolvimen- to, tais como freemartinismo e hipoplasia genital, patologias que não têm tratamento; somente 8% das novilhas freemartin são férteis. O anestro funcional (as novilhas manifestam estro, mas não são detectadas) é frequen- te e está diretamente relacionado com a eficiência na detecção de estros. As novilhas com idade e peso para se integrarem no programa reprodutivo e não apresentarem sinais de estro devem ser examinadas retalmente para diagnosticar a causa do anestro. Se, durante a palpação retal, as novilhas tiverem um corpo lúteo são tratadas nesse momento com PGF2α, os animais sem corpo lúteo podem receber uma injeção de PGF2α, sete dias depois. Este programa sincroniza o estro e aumenta a probabilidade de o detectar (figura 11). -/- Figura 11: As novilhas com idade e peso para se integrarem no programa reprodutivo e não mostrarem sinais de estro devem ser verificadas via retal para diagnosticar a causa do anestro. Arquivo pessoal do autor. -/- 8. MANEJO DA NOVILHA INFÉRTIL -/- A fertilidade das vacas leiteiras diminuiu nos últimos 30 anos, enquanto a fertilidade das novilhas não se alterou; após a primeira inseminação, entre 60 e 70% das novilhas emprenham. O objetivo do programa reprodutivo é conseguir que 90% das novilhas gestem nos primeiros três serviços. Desta forma, esta proporção de animais daria à luz antes dos 25 meses de idade. É comum que 10% das novilhas se transformem em animais repetidores, ou seja, novilhas com mais de três serviços inférteis. A causa da falha na concepção de novilhas deve-se principalmente à morte embrionária precoce. Uma causa importante da falha na concepção das novilhas repetidoras são as patologias adquiridas no aparelho reprodutivo; é comum encontrar aderências ovarianas e salpingite. Provavelmente, esses problemas são consequência de alguma infecção adquirida durante a criação. Diversos tratamentos hormonais têm sido testados para resolver o problema de infertilidade em novilhas repetidoras e os resultados obtidos ainda são deficientes. Como estes tratamentos não apresentam resultados consistentes, a melhor forma de mitigar o problema de infertilidade nas novilhas é melhorando as práticas de inseminação, ou seja, o momento da inseminação, o manejo do sêmen e a técnica de inseminação empregada. Além disso, a melhor técnica para aumentar a proporção de novilhas prenhes no rebanho é aumentar a eficiência da detecção de estros. -/- 9. RESUMO -/- As novilhas devem parir aos dois anos de idade (23 a 25 meses). O peso ao parto deve ser de 550 a 580 kg. O manejo reprodutivo começa aos 14 ou 15 meses de idade, com um peso de 350 a 370 kg. As palhetas de sêmen sexado contêm de 2 a 3 milhões de espermatozoides. As doses de sêmen não sexado contêm de 20 a 30 milhões de espermatozoides. A porcentagem de concepção das novilhas inseminadas com sêmen sexado é 10 a 20% menor do que com sêmen não sexado. Com sêmen sexado se obtém entre 90 e 95% de fêmeas. A porcentagem de concepção com programas de IATF é de 20 a 35% menor que nas novilhas inseminadas no estro natural. Cerca de 90% das novilhas devem ficar prenhes nos primeiros três serviços. Devem ser produzidas novilhas para substituir as vacas que são descartadas anualmen- te (25 a 35%). Espera-se que um gado leiteiro tenha ao dispor uma população de animais de reposição, desde um dia de vida até a etapa de novilha ao parto, correspondente a, pelo menos, 70 % do total das vacas. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- AUAD, Alexander Machado et al. Manual de bovinocultura de leite. Brasília: LK Editora, 2010. BRICKELL, J. S.; MCGOWAN, M. M.; WATHES, D. C. Effect of management factors and blood metabolites during the rearing period on growth in dairy heifers on UK farms. Domestic animal endocrinology, v. 36, n. 2, p. 67-81, 2009. DE VRIES, A. et al. Exploring the impact of sexed semen on the structure of the dairy industry. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 91, n. 2, p. 847-856, 2008. Fertilidade em Vacas Leiteiras: Fisiologia e Manejo. Fisiologia do Estro e do Serviço na Reprodução Bovina. FERREIRA, A. M. Manejo reprodutivo de bovinos leiteiros: práticas corretas e incorretas, casos reais, perguntas e respostas. Edição do autor, Juiz de Fora, 2012. FERREIRA, A. de M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora: Minas Gerais–Brasil, p. 422, 2010. GALINA, Carlos; VALENCIA, Javier. Reproducción de los animales domésticos. 2006. GONÇALVES, J. N. Manual do produtor de leite. Viçosa, MG: Aprenda Fácil, 2012. HEINRICHS, A. J. Raising dairy replacements to meet the needs of the 21st century. Journal of dairy science, v. 76, n. 10, p. 3179-3187, 1993. HOFFMAN, P. C. Optimum body size of Holstein replacement heifers. Journal of Animal Science, v. 75, n. 3, p. 836-845, 1997. NEIVA, R. S. Criação eficiente de bezerros e novilhas. Lavras: Autor, 2013. NEIVA, Rogério Santoro. Produção de bovinos leiteiros. Lavras: UFLA, 1998. PEREIRA, E. S. et al. Novilhas leiteiras. Graphiti Gráfica e Editora LTDA, Fortaleza, Ceará, 2010. CARVALHO, B. C. Manejo reprodutivo de novilhas leiteiras. In. SENAR. Curso de reprodução e genética em bovinocultura de leite. Coronel Pacheco: Senar, 2021. YOUNGQUIST, Robert S.; THRELFALL, W. R. Large animal theriogenology. 2007. (shrink)

Inflicting harm is generally preferable to inflicting death. If you must choose between the two, you should generally choose to harm. But prenatal harm seems different. If a mother must choose between harming her fetus or aborting it, she may choose either, at least in many cases. So it seems that prenatal harm is particularly objectionable, sometimes on a par with death. This paper offers an explanation of why prenatal harm seems particularly objectionable by drawing an analogy to the all-or-nothing (...) problem. It then argues that this analogy offers independent support for the ‘voluntarist’ view that at least some parental role obligations are grounded in the choice to be a parent. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives towards building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the (...) study of “mindreading” and debates on emotions. We claim that the current practice in cognitive (neuro)science has undergone, in effect, a silent mechanistic revolution, and has turned from initial binary oppositions and abstract proposals towards the integration of wide perspectives with the rest of the cognitive (neuro)sciences. (shrink)

Some moral theorists argue that being an innocent beneficiary of significant harms inflicted by others may be sufficient to ground special duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims, at least when it is impossible to extract compensation from those who perpetrated the harm. This idea has been applied to climate change in the form of the beneficiary-pays principle. Other philosophers, however, are quite sceptical about beneficiary pays. Our aim in this article is to examine their critiques. We conclude (...) that, while they have made important points, the principle remains worthy of further development and exploration. Our purpose in engaging with these critiques is constructive — we aim to formulate beneficiary pays in ways that would give it a plausible role in allocating the cost of addressing human-induced climate change, while acknowledging that some understandings of the principle would make it unsuitable for this purpose. (shrink)

While it is tempting to suppose that an act has moral worth just when and because it is motivated by sufficient moral reasons, philosophers have, largely, come to doubt this analysis. Doubt is rooted in two claims. The first is that some facts can motivate a given act in multiple ways, not all of which are consistent with moral worth. The second is the orthodox view that normative reasons are facts. I defend the tempting analysis by proposing and defending a (...) heterodox account of both normative and motivating reasons that is inspired by Donald Davidson’s primary reasons. We should adopt the heterodox view, I argue, because it addresses an overlooked but fatal defect in the orthodox conception of reasons, of which challenges to the tempting analysis are a special case. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems have demonstrated impressive performance across a variety of clinical tasks. However, notoriously, sometimes these systems are 'black boxes'. The initial response in the literature was a demand for 'explainable AI'. However, recently, several authors have suggested that making AI more explainable or 'interpretable' is likely to be at the cost of the accuracy of these systems and that prioritising interpretability in medical AI may constitute a 'lethal prejudice'. In this paper, we defend the value of interpretability (...) in the context of the use of AI in medicine. Clinicians may prefer interpretable systems over more accurate black boxes, which in turn is sufficient to give designers of AI reason to prefer more interpretable systems in order to ensure that AI is adopted and its benefits realised. Moreover, clinicians may be justified in this preference. Achieving the downstream benefits from AI is critically dependent on how the outputs of these systems are interpreted by physicians and patients. A preference for the use of highly accurate black box AI systems, over less accurate but more interpretable systems , may itself constitute a form of lethal prejudice that may diminish the benefits of AI to - and perhaps even harm - patients. (shrink)

Knowledge implies the presence of a positive relation between a person and a fact. Factual ignorance, on the other hand, implies the absence of some positive relation between a person and a fact. The two most influential views of ignorance hold that what is lacking in cases of factual ignorance is knowledge or true belief, but these accounts fail to explain a number of basic facts about ignorance. In their place, we propose a novel and systematic defense of the view (...) that factual ignorance is the absence of awareness, an account that both comes apart from the dominant views and overcomes their deficiencies. Given the important role that ignorance plays in moral and legal theory and our understanding of various epistemic injustices, a precise and theoretically unproblematic account of the nature of ignorance is important not only for normative epistemology, but also for law, ethics, and applied epistemology. (shrink)

A far-reaching and influential view in evolutionary biology claims that species are cohesive units held together by gene flow. Biologists have recognized empirical problems facing this view; after sharpening the expression of the view, we present novel conceptual problems for it. At the heart of these problems is a distinction between two importantly different concepts of cohesion, what we call integrative and response cohesion. Acknowledging the distinction problematizes both the explanandum of species cohesion and the explanans of gene flow that (...) are central to the view we discuss. We conclude by tracing four broader implications for the study and conceptualization of species. (shrink)

This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as in (...) Condorcet's paradox) are in large electorates. (shrink)

The 1994 US spectrum auction is now a paradigmatic case of the successful use of microeconomic theory for policy-making. We use a detailed analysis of it to review standard accounts in philosophy of science of how idealized models are connected to messy reality. We show that in order to understand what made the design of the spectrum auction successful, a new such account is required, and we present it here. Of especial interest is the light this sheds on the issue (...) of progress in economics. In particular, it enables us to get clear on exactly what has been progressing, and on exactly what theory has – and has not – contributed to that. This in turn has important implications for just what it is about economic theory that we should value. (shrink)

Objectives: Machine learning (ML) has the potential to facilitate “continual learning” in medicine, in which an ML system continues to evolve in response to exposure to new data over time, even after being deployed in a clinical setting. In this article, we provide a tutorial on the range of ethical issues raised by the use of such “adaptive” ML systems in medicine that have, thus far, been neglected in the literature. -/- Target audience: The target audiences for this tutorial are (...) the developers of ML AI systems, healthcare regulators, the broader medical informatics community, and practicing clinicians. -/- Scope: Discussions of adaptive ML systems to date have overlooked the distinction between 2 sorts of variance that such systems may exhibit—diachronic evolution (change over time) and synchronic variation (difference between cotemporaneous instantiations of the algorithm at different sites)—and underestimated the significance of the latter. We highlight the challenges that diachronic evolution and synchronic variation present for the quality of patient care, informed consent, and equity, and discuss the complex ethical trade-offs involved in the design of such systems. (shrink)

Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a factive mental state that comes in degrees. We (...) will explore a range of structural questions that have been overlooked in regard to our awareness of facts, showing that the degreed structure of awareness has significant implications for our understanding of knowledge. (shrink)

Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) was an Italian Jesuit and one of the first Christian missionaries to China in the modern era. He was a genuine polymath—a translator, cartographer, mathematician, astronomer, and musician. Above all, Ricci was a missionary for the gospel. As we briefly examine his 1603 seminal work, The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, our hope is that we, as evangelical educators, will perceive some of the deeper principles necessary for our own missionary work among unreached people.

There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable (...) for someone in a similar position have a totally different set of political commitments. This chapter examines three explanatory theses that might be used to make sense of this difference: (1) that practical commitments are desire dependent in a way that beliefs are not; (2) that there are reasons to be resolute in practical commitments, but not in beliefs; and (3) that compromise in the face of practical political disagreement doesn’t mitigate controversy, whereas compromise in the face of disagreement about mere beliefs does mitigate controversy. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently come to focus on explaining the phenomenon of ​bad beliefs,​ beliefs that are apparently true and well-evidenced but nevertheless objectionable. Despite this recent focus, a consensus is already forming around a particular explanation of these beliefs’ badness called ​moral encroachment​, according to which, roughly, the moral stakes engendered by bad beliefs make them particularly difficult to justify. This paper advances an alternative account not just of bad beliefs but of bad attitudes more generally according to which bad (...) beliefs’ badness originates not in a failure of sufficient evidence but in a failure to respond adequately to reasons. I motivate this alternative account through an analogy to recent discussions of moral worth centered on the well-known grocer case from Kant’s ​Groundwork​, and by showing that this analogy permits the proposed account to generalize to bad attitudes beyond belief. The paper concludes by contrasting the implications of moral encroachment and of the proposed account for bad attitudes’ blameworthiness. (shrink)

I propose and defend a novel view called “de se consequentialism,” which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it demonstrates—contra Doug Portmore, Mark Schroeder, Campbell Brown, and Michael Smith, among others—that agent-neutral consequentialism is consistent with agent-centered constraints. Second, it clarifies the nature of agent-centered constraints, thereby meriting attention from even dedicated nonconsequentialists. Scrutiny reveals that moral theories in general, whether consequentialist or not, incorporate constraints by assessing states in a first-personal guise. Consequently, de se consequentialism enacts constraints through the (...) very same feature that nonconsequentialist theories do. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the "Normativity Objection," that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non-reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. (...) We argue that the exclusively negative attention that the objection has received has been a mistake. On our reading, Parfit's Normativity Objection poses a serious threat to reductivism, as it exposes the uneasy relationship between our a priori knowledge of a range of distinctly normative truths and the typical package of semantic commitments that reductivists have embraced since the Kripkean revolution. (shrink)

This article offers a comprehensive and critical analysis of Eric Heinze’s book Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2016). Heinze’s project is to formulate and defend a more theoretically complex version of the idea (also defended by people like Ronald Dworkin and James Weinstein) that general legal prohibitions on hate speech in public discourse compromises the state’s democratic legitimacy. We offer a detailed synopsis of Heinze’s view, highlighting some of its distinctive qualities and strengths. We then develop a (...) critical response to this view with three main focal points: (1) the characterisation of democratic legitimacy as something distinct from (and whose demands aren’t identical with those of) legitimacy per se; (2) the claim that the requirements of democracy are hypothetical, rather than categorical, imperatives; and relatedly (3) the question of how we should reconcile the requirements of democratic legitimacy with the costs that may follow from prioritising democratic legitimacy. We argue that there are significant difficulties for Heinze’s account on all three fronts. (shrink)

Majority cycling and related social choice paradoxes are often thought to threaten the meaningfulness of democracy. But deliberation can prevent majority cycles – not by inducing unanimity, which is unrealistic, but by bringing preferences closer to single-peakedness. We present the first empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness. The increases are greater for lower versus higher salience issues and for individuals who seem to have (...) deliberated more versus less effectively. They are not merely a byproduct of increased substantive agreement. Our results both refine and support the idea that deliberation, by increasing proximity to single-peakedness, provides an escape from the problem of majority cycling. (shrink)

Philosophical exploration of individualism and externalism in the cognitive sciences most recently has been focused on general evaluations of these two views (Adams & Aizawa 2008, Rupert 2008, Wilson 2004, Clark 2008). Here we return to broaden an earlier phase of the debate between individualists and externalists about cognition, one that considered in detail particular theories, such as those in developmental psychology (Patterson 1991) and the computational theory of vision (Burge 1986, Segal 1989). Music cognition is an area in the (...) cognitive sciences that has received little attention from philosophers, though it has relatively recently been thrown into the externalist spotlight (Cochrane 2008, Kruger 2014, Kersten forthcoming). Given that individualism can be thought of as a kind of paradigm for research on cognition, we provide a brief overview of the field of music cognition and individualistic tendencies within the field (sections 2 and 3) before turning to consider externalist alternatives to individualistic paradigms (section 4-5) and then arguing for a qualified form of externalism about music cognition (section 6). (shrink)

Claims about what justice “requires” and the “requirements” of justice are pervasive in political philosophy. However, there is a highly significant ambiguity in such claims that appears to have gone unnoticed. Such claims may pick out either one of two categorically distinct and noncoextensive kinds of requirement that we call 1) requirements-as-necessary-conditions for justice and 2) requirements-as-demands of justice. This is an especially compelling instance of an ambiguity that John Broome has famously observed in the context of claims about other (...) requirements (notably the requirements of rationality and morality). But it appears to have been overlooked by political philosophers in the case of claims about the requirements of justice. The ambiguity is highly significant inasmuch as failing to notice it is liable to distort our normative thinking about politics and make us vulnerable to certain kinds of normatively consequential errors: both mistakenly drawing inferences about what justice demands of us from claims that certain states or societies are not just; and mistakenly drawing inferences about what states or societies are or would be just from claims that justice does not demand of states or societies that they do certain things. Paying greater attention to the distinction between these two different kinds of requirements and the ways in which they come apart is helpful, not merely in avoiding these distortions and errors, but also in resolving, or at least clarifying, a number of other notoriously murky meta-normative debates, especially various important debates about realism and idealism in political philosophy. (shrink)

The wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem is a problem for attempts to analyze normative properties using only facts about the balance of normative reasons, a style of analysis on which the ‘Reasons First’ programme depends. I argue that this problem cannot be solved if the orthodox view of reasons is true --- that is, if each normative reason is numerically identical with some fact, proposition, or state-of-affairs. That’s because solving the WKR problem requires completely distinguishing between the right- and (...) wrong-kind reasons for an attitude. I argue that some facts give both right- and wrong-kind reasons for an attitude. Consequently, no such distinction between the two types of reasons is complete if reasons are facts or the like. I conclude by suggesting that reasons and facts are related by constitution, not identity. (shrink)

Is simulation some new kind of science? We argue that instead simulation fits smoothly into existing scientific practice, but does so in several importantly different ways. Simulations in general, and computer simulations in particular, ought to be understood as techniques which, like many scientific techniques, can be employed in the service of various and diverse epistemic goals. We focus our attentions on the way in which simulations can function as (i) explanatory and (ii) predictive tools. We argue that a wide (...) variety of simulations, both computational and physical, are best conceived in terms of a set of common features: initial or input conditions, a mechanism or set of rules, and a set of results or output conditions. Studying simulations in these terms yields a new understanding of their character as well as a body of normative recommendations for the care and feeding of scientific simulations. (shrink)

MMA fighting in a competition is not necessarily wrong and is often, as far as we can tell, permissible. Our argument has two premises. First, if an act does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint, then it is morally permissible. Second, MMA-violence does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint. The first premise rested on two assumptions. First, if a person does a wrong act, then he wrongs someone. Second, if one person wrongs (...) a second, then the first infringes on the second’s right. We then looked at Nicholas Dixon’s powerful Kantian argument that MMA fighting is wrong. (shrink)

We attempt here to trace the evolution of Frege’s thought about truth. What most frames the way we approach the problem is a recognition that hardly any of Frege’s most familiar claims about truth appear in his earliest work. We argue that Frege’s mature views about truth emerge from a fundamental re-thinking of the nature of logic instigated, in large part, by a sustained engagement with the work of George Boole and his followers, after the publication of Begriffsschrift and the (...) appearance of critical reviews by members of the Boolean school. (shrink)

Depuis Kant, les philosophes ont appris à parler, avec prudence, du surnaturel et de sa relation avec la nature. En général le surnaturel n’est même pas reconnu comme faisant partie de la philosophie. La situation n’aurait pu être plus différente aux XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles, lorsque les philosophes comprenaient la relation entre Dieu et le monde comme l’un des problèmes les plus importants que la philosophie fût censé résoudre. Les solutions étaient bien sûr extrêmement diverses : Spinoza niera même que l’on puisse (...) faire la distinction entre principe créateur et création, tandis que d’autres, tel Robert Boyle, s’imagineront un maître horloger créant une machine absolument parfaite, qui depuis sa création ne requiert aucun acte supplémentaire de la part de son créateur. Jusque dans la pensée du jeune Kant, cette idée se rencontrera sous des formes diverses. Tous convenaient, tout de même, qu’il fallait rejeter l’ancien modèle aristotélicien d’une nature désirante, reconstruisant la nature comme un système reposant sur quelques lois fondamentales et repensant à nouveaux frais le rôle que Dieu peut, ou doit, jouer dans un tel système. Les contributions du présent volume traitent d’aspects historiques et systématiques des théories modernes de la nature et du surnaturel, tout en essayant de comprendre, dans ce contexte, l’importance des théories de la relation entre Dieu et le monde. (shrink)

Some types of solar radiation management (SRM) research are ethically problematic because they expose persons, animals, and ecosystems to significant risks. In our earlier work, we argued for ethical norms for SRM research based on norms for biomedical research. Biomedical researchers may not conduct research on persons without their consent, but universal consent is impractical for SRM research. We argue that instead of requiring universal consent, ethical norms for SRM research require only political legitimacy in decision-making about global SRM trials. (...) Using Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane's model of global political legitimacy, we examine several existing global institutions as possible analogues for a politically legitimate SRM decision-making body. (shrink)

One critique of experimental philosophy is that the intuitions of the philosophically untutored should be accorded little to no weight; instead, only the intuitions of professional philosophers should matter. In response to this critique, “experimentalists” often claim that the intuitions of professional philosophers are biased. In this paper, we explore this question of whose intuitions should be disqualified and why. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the question of whether the intuitions of professional philosophers are reliable. In (...) contrast, we instead focus on the idea of “muddled” intuitions—i.e. intuitions that are misdirected and about notions other than the ones under discussion. We argue that the philosophically untutored are likely to have muddled intuitions and that professional philosophers are likely to have unmuddled intuitions. Although being umuddled does not, by itself, establish the reliability of the intuitions of professional philosophers, being muddled is enough to disqualify the intuitions of the philosophically untutored. We then turn to the charge that, despite being unmuddled, professional philosophers still have biased intuitions. To evaluate this charge, we switch focus from the general notion of biased intuition to the more specific notion of theory-laden intuition. We argue that there is prima facie evidence—in the form of the presence of conflicts of intuition—for thinking that at least some of the intuitions of professional philosophers are theory-laden. In summary, we conclude that that there is no clean and easy answer to the question of whose intuitions should matter. (shrink)

Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative (...) normativity”: (1) that motivation for it originates in a parochial conception of “normative flavours”; (2) that arguments against alternative ways of explaining e.g., morality’s importance are overblown; and (3) that there are strong reasons against theorizing in terms of “authoritative normativity”. The overarching aim is not to show that “authoritative normativity” is incoherent or entirely unmotivated. Rather, it is to discuss some of “authoritative normativity’s” deeper commitments to correct the impression that is it largely benign or that it is entailed by familiar and popular “metanormative” positions. Authoritative normativity, it seems to us, is a solution in search of a problem. (shrink)

A growing body of work in free speech theory is interested in the nature of counterspeech, i.e. speech that aims to counteract the effects of harmful speech. Counterspeech is usually defined in opposition to legal responses to harmful speech, which try to prevent such speech from occurring in the first place. In this paper we challenge this way of carving up the conceptual terrain. Instead, we argue that our main classificatory division, in theorising responses to harmful speech, should be between (...) pro-discursive and anti-discursive responses. Some legal responses to harmful speech, so we argue, make a positive discursive contribution in their own right. That is, legal restrictions on harmful speech can have a function that is importantly similar to speech that aims at countering the effects of harmful speech. (shrink)

This essay takes a critical look at aesthetics as the basis for nature preservation, presenting three reasons why we should not rely on aesthetic foundations to justify the environmentalist program. First, a comparison to other kinds of aesthetic value shows that the aesthetic value of nature can provide weak reasons foraction atbest. Second, not everything environmentalists want to protect has positive aesthetic qualities. Attempts have been made to get around this problem by developing a reformist attitude towards natural aesthetics. I (...) argue that these approaches fail. Third, development can be as aesthetically positive as nature. If it is simply beauty we are looking for, why can't the beauty of a wellconstructed dam or a magnificent skyscraper suffice? (shrink)

The discussions of conatus – force, tendency, effort, and striving – in early modern metaphysics have roots in Aristotle’s understanding of life as an internal experience of living force. This paper examines the ways that Spinoza’s conatus is consonant with Aristotle on effort. By tracking effort from his psychology and ethics to aesthetics, I show there is a conatus at the heart of the activity of the ψυχή that involves an intensification of power in a way which anticipates many of (...) the central insights of early modern and 20th century European philosophy. The first section outlines how Aristotle’s developmental conception of the soul as geometrically ordered lays the foundation for his understanding of effort. The developmental series of powers of the soul are analogous to the series of shapes in mathematics. The second section links the striving of the soul to the gradual acquisition of virtues as a directed activity unifying multiplicity. The third examines the paradigm of self-awareness that Aristotelian effort involves. In the final section I show how ancient Greek theories of music were founded on the experience of striving. The “nature” of music is defined by Aristoxenus, and Theophrastus, in relation to the passion and intentionality of the soul. The geometrical order, as a synthesis of elements in geometry, music, or ethics, is a generative process in which past elements are retained and reintegrated in later stages of development. It requires effort to think geometrically, and the progress of knowledge itself is an integral aspect of all effort. Effort is the lived and self-aware cause which, moving step by step in an orderly and deliberate way, grows and advances upon itself. For both Spinoza and Aristotle, effort is the immanent intelligence which accomplishes what is in the purview of its understanding. Thus, will, in this conception of effort, is not something we already possess innately, but emerges gradually by an effort aimed at improvement. (shrink)

: The current difference in attitude toward germ-line enhancement in humans and nonhumans is unjustified. Society should be more cautious in modifying the genes of nonhumans and more bold in thinking about modifying our own genome. I identify four classes of arguments pertaining to germ-line enhancement: safety arguments, justice arguments, trust arguments, and naturalness arguments. The first three types are compelling, but do not distinguish between human and nonhuman cases. The final class of argument would justify a distinction between human (...) and nonhuman germ-line enhancement; however, this type of argument fails and, therefore, the discrepancy in attitude toward human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement is unjustified. (shrink)

The goal of the article is to show that a complete answer to the title question can be given only in the context of the natural sciences. We believe that the group of cognitive sciences are the most reliable source of information about cognitive mental processes is. Making use of their achievements, we present a series of criteria for possessing a mind. We distinguish between many kinds of minds. We attempt to outline the conditions that must be fulfilled by an (...) adequate model of the mind. In our opinion, such a model must make use of all available empirical data and of scientific theories constructed on the basis of such data. From the point of view of philosophy, the requirements placed upon such theories by ontology are especially important. Their reconstruction can be a prolegomenon to a future integrated ontology of the mind. We emphasize that the mind is not an independent thing. In speaking about the mind we have in mind states, events, processes, functions, and dispositions that are derivative with respect to processes of a lower order. We assume that an adequate model of the mind is multi-dimensional, taking into account several mutually interacting levels of organization. We interpret the psychophysical problem as one of the relation between levels of organization, a relation that is constitutive for the actualization of mental states. Psychophysical relations turn out to be a particular case of the broader issue of relations between levels. In carrying out a preliminary conceptualization we make use of the notion of emergence; this is why our position, which is mainly in opposition to substantial dualism, may be termed emergent monism or naturalism. (shrink)

Applied ontologies have been used more and more frequently to enhance systems engineering. In this paper, we argue that adopting principles of ontological realism can increase the benefits that ontologies have already been shown to provide to the systems engineering process. Moreover, adopting Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), an ISO standard for top-level ontologies from which more domain specific ontologies are constructed, can lead to benefits in four distinct areas of systems engineering: (1) interoperability, (2) standardization, (3) testing, and (4) data (...) exploitation. Reaping these benefits in a model-based systems engineering (MBSE) context requires utilizing an ontology’s vocabulary when modeling systems and entities within those systems. If the chosen ontology abides by the principles of ontological realism, a semantic standard capable of uniting distinct domains, using BFO as a hub, can be leveraged to promote greater interoperability among systems. As interoperability and standardization increase, so does the ability to collect data during the testing and implementation of systems. These data can then be reasoned over by computational reasoners using the logical axioms within the ontology. This, in turn, generates new data that would have been impossible or too inefficient to generate without the aid of computational reasoners. (shrink)

There’s a long but relatively neglected tradition of attempting to explain why many researchers working on the nature of phenomenal consciousness think that it’s hard to explain.1 David Chalmers argues that this “meta-problem of consciousness” merits more attention than it has received. He also argues against several existing explanations of why we find consciousness hard to explain. Like Chalmers, we agree that the meta-problem is worthy of more attention. Contra Chalmers, however, we argue that there’s an existing explanation that is (...) more promising than his objections suggest. We argue that researchers find phenomenal consciousness hard to explain because phenomenal concepts are complex demonstratives that encode the impossibility of explaining consciousness as one of their application conditions. (shrink)

Convergence research is driven by specific and compelling problems and requires deep integration across disciplines. The potential of convergence research is widely recognized, but questions remain about how to design, facilitate, and assess such research. Here we analyze a seven-year, twelve-million-dollar convergence project on sustainable climate risk management to answer two questions. First, what is the impact of a project-level emphasis on the values that motivate and tie convergence research to the compelling problems? Second, how does participation in convergence projects (...) shape the research of postdoctoral scholars who are still in the process of establishing themselves professionally? We use an interview-based approach to characterize what the project specifically enabled in each participant’s research. We find that (a) the project pushed participants’ research into better alignment with the motivating concept of convergence research and that this effect was stronger for postdoctoral scholars than for more senior faculty. (b) Postdocs’ self-assessed understanding of key project themes, however, appears unconnected to metrics of project participation, raising questions about training and integration. Regarding values, (c) the project enabled heightened attention to values in the research of a large minority of participants. (d) Participants strongly believe in the importance of explicitly reflecting on values that motivate and pervade scientific research, but they question their own understanding of how to put value-focused science into practice. This mismatch of perceived importance with poor understanding highlights an unmet need in the practice of convergence science. (shrink)

A large body of research has found that people judge bad foreseen side effects to be more intentional than good ones. While the standard interpretation of this Side-Effect Effect takes it to show that the ordinary concept of intentionality is influenced by normative considerations, a competing account holds that it is the result of pragmatic pressure to express moral censure and, thus, that the SEE is an experimental artifact. Attempts to confirm this account have previously been unsuccessful, but Lindauer and (...) Southwood :181–186, 2021) present a study that appears to provide support for it, by cancelling the SEE. We are not convinced. Here, we detail three studies testing their interpretation. The results indicate that it is the purported cancellation, rather than the SEE, that is an experimental artifact. (shrink)

So-called “ugly laws” were mostly municipal statutes in the United States that outlawed the appearance in public of people who were, in the words of one of these laws, “diseased, maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed, so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object” (Chicago City Code 1881). Although the moniker “ugly laws” was coined to refer collectively to such ordinances only in 1975 (Burgdorf and Burgdorf 1975), it has become the primary way to refer to such laws, (...) which targeted the overlapping categories of the poor, the homeless, vagrants, and those with visible disabilities. Enacted and actively enforced between the American Civil War (1867) and World War I (1918), such laws and their enforcement can tell us much about the very sorts of people who were also, a generation later, subject to explicitly eugenic laws, such as sterilization legislation. And like eugenic laws and policies, such laws continue to affect the lives of people with disabilities to this day (Schweik 2011). (shrink)

The open borders view is frequently dismissed for making infeasible demands. This is a potent strategy. Unlike normative arguments regarding open borders, which tend to be relatively intractable, the charge of infeasibility is supposed to operate as what we call a "normative argument-stopper." Nonetheless, we argue that the strategy fails. Bringing about open borders is perfectly feasible on the most plausible account of feasibility. We consider and reject what we take to be the only three credible ways to save the (...) charge of infeasibility: by proposing an alternative account of feasibility; by proposing an alternative, more circumscribed interpretation of the subject-matter of feasibility claims; and by proposing a more expansive account of the addressees of the demand for open borders. The first fails to vindicate the claim that infeasibility is a normative argument-stopper. The second does not provide an argument against open borders at all. The third underestimates the power of at least some non-state actors. We conclude by drawing some lessons for the open borders view and the use of feasibility in politics more generally. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to point out the modelling choices that lead to different systems of deontic action logic. A kind of a roadmap is presented. On the one hand it can help the reader to find the deontic logic appropriate for an intended application relying on the information considering the way in which a deontic logic represents actions and how it characterises deontic properties in relation to (the representation of) actions. On the other hand it is a (...) guideline how to build a deontic action logic which satisfies the desired properties. (shrink)

This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the problems (...) raised against them are presented. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss some problems and prospects of interdisciplinary encounters by focusing on philosophy of science as a case study. After introducing the case, we give an overview about the various ways in which philosophy of science can be interdisciplinary in Section 2. In Section 3, we name some general problems concerning the possible points of interaction between philosophy of science and the sciences studied. In Section 4 we compare the advantages and risks of interdisciplinarity for individual researchers (...) and institutions. In Section 5, we discuss interdisciplinary PhD programs, in particular concerning two main problems: increased workload and the quality of supervision. In the final Section 6, we look at interdisciplinary careers beyond the PhD. (shrink)

For academics and students, Education Management in Managerialist Times offers a critical guide to existing educational management texts and makes a strong case for redefining educational management along more socially and politically informed lines. The book also offers practitioners alternative management strategies intended to contest, rather than support, managerialism, while being realistic about the context within which those who lead and manage schools currently have to work.

This study analyzed the utilization of social media platforms and university students' attitudes towards academic activities in Cross River State. A descriptive survey research design was adopted for the study. The population of this study comprised all the private and public university students in Cross River State. A sample of 1,600 students, which cuts across the three universities in the area of study, was selected using the convenience sampling technique. A questionnaire (r=.849) and a rating scale (r=.786) were used as (...) the instruments for data collection. Findings emerged amongst others that the utilization status of social media platforms by university students is generally high; the utilization of Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Twitter, WeChat, Skype, Snapchat, Eskimi, Telegram and YouTube social media platforms has a significant composite influence (F=52.453, p<.05) on university students' attitudes towards academic activities. Relatively, utilization of Facebook was the highest predictor (t=11.222, β=.232, p<.05), followed by the utilization of WhatsApp (t=11.068, β=.229, p<.05), utilization of Twitter (t=5.977, β=.118, p<.05), and the utilization of Instagram (t=2.772, β=.056, p<.05), in that order. It was recommended that secondary school students should develop positive attitudes towards their academic activities and abhor activities that will lead to a decline in the learning outcomes. (shrink)

I claim that differences in the importance attached to economic liberty are more important in debates over the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture than disagreements about the precautionary principle. I will argue this point by considering a case study: the decision by the U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to grant nonregulated status to Roundup Ready soy. I will show that the unregulated release of this herbicide-resistant crop would not be acceptable morally unless one places (...) a very high premium on economic liberty. This is true even if one takes a sound science attitude to unknown risks, rather than a precautionary attitude. I concede that it may not have been within APHIS’s legislative mandate to regulate Roundup Ready soy further, but for those of us who do not put a high premium on economic liberty, this only calls for extending regulatory oversight of GMOs. (shrink)