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Why cognitivism?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244 (2018)

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  1. Partial Belief, Partial Intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.
    Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial belief stands to all-out belief. (...)
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  • Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
    Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. I ask how the normativity of rationality—the sense in which we ‘ought’ to comply with requirements of rationality—is related to the normativity of reasons—the sense (...)
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  • Blackburn's Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
    Moral properties would supervene upon non‐moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non‐moral properties entail (...)
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  • Postmodernism's Use and Abuse of Nietzsche.Ken Gemes - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):337-360.
    I focus on Nietzsche's architectural metaphor of self‐construction in arguing for the claim that postmodern readings of Nietzsche misunderstand his various attacks on dogmatic philosophy as paving the way for acceptance of a self characterized by fundamental disunity. Nietzsche's attack on essentialist dogmatic metaphysics is a call to engage in a purposive self‐creation under a unifying will, a will that possesses the strength to reinterpret history as a pathway to “the problem that we are”. Nietzsche agrees with the postmodernists that (...)
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  • Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman & Michael E. Bratman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277.
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  • Moore's Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach.Jane Heal - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):5-24.
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  • Practical Knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):388-409.
    Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge-how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.
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  • Against Cognitivism About Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.
    Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions. This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions involve beliefs and focuses instead on this second part of the Cognitivist approach, where I think Cognitivism (...)
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  • Instrumental Rationality: A Reprise.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):1-20.
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  • Varieties of Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On & James Sias - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):699-713.
    After offering a characterization of what unites versions of ‘expressivism’, we highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism – a positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis, and a negative semantic thesis – and describe how traditional expressivists have attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for (...)
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  • The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.Neil Sinhababu - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):680-696.
    I argue that one intends that ϕ if one has a desire that ϕ and an appropriately related means-end belief. Opponents, including Setiya and Bratman, charge that this view can't explain three things. First, intentional action is accompanied by knowledge of what we are doing. Second, we can choose our reasons for action. Third, forming an intention settles a deliberative question about what to do, disposing us to cease deliberating about it. I show how the desire- belief view can explain (...)
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  • Practical Knowledge Revisited.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):128-137.
    Argues that the view propounded in "Practical Knowledge" (Ethics 118: 388-409) survives objections made by Sarah Paul ("Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking," Ethics 119: 546-557). The response gives more explicit treatment to the nature and epistemology of knowing how.
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  • Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking: Setiya on “Practical Knowledge”.Sarah K. Paul - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):546-557.
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  • Cognitivism About Instrumental Reason.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Ethics 117 (4):649-673.
    Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
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  • How We Know What We're Doing.Sarah K. Paul - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-24.
    G.E.M. Anscombe famously claimed that acting intentionally entails knowing "without observation" what one is doing. Among those that have taken her claim seriously, an influential response has been to suppose that in order to explain this fact, we should conclude that intentions are a species of belief. This paper argues that there are good reasons to reject this "cognitivist" view of intention in favor of the view that intentions are distinctively practical attitudes that are not beliefs and do not constitutively (...)
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  • Intention and Uncertainty.H. P. Grice - 1971 - Proceedings of the British Academy 57:263-279.
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  • How to Be a Cognitivist About Practical Reason.Jacob Ross - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:243-281.
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  • Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):509-510.
    Reasons without Rationalism has two related parts, devoted to action theory and ethics, respectively. In the second part, I argue for a close connection between reasons for action and virtues of character. This connection is mediated by the idea of good practical thought and the disposition to engage in it. The argument relies on the following principle, which is intended as common ground: " Reasons: The fact that p is a reason for A to ϕ just in case A has (...)
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  • Against Internalism About Reasons—Gert’s Rational Options. [REVIEW]David Copp - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):455–461.
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  • The Logic of Aspect: An Axiomatic Approach.Johan van Benthem & Antony Galton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):434.
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  • Gert on the Limits of Morality's Requirements.Dan W. Brock - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):435-440.
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  • Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447-453.
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  • Why Be Rational&Quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
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  • Knowledge in Intention.Kevin Falvey - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):21-44.
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  • Knowing What I Am Doing.Keith S. Donnellan - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (14):401-409.
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  • Humean Intentions.Michael Ridge - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):157-178.
    Many hold that the differences between intentions and desires are so significant that, not only can we not identify intentions with desires simpliciter, but that intentions are irreducible to any subclass of desires. My main aim is to explain why we should reject the irreducibility thesis in both forms, thereby defending the Humean view of action explanation.
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  • Avowals and First‐Person Privilege.Douglas C. Long Dorit Bar‐on - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-335.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first‐person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio‐linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
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  • Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
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