Switch to: Citations

References in:

Why cognitivism?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244 (2018)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Knowing What I Am Doing.Keith S. Donnellan - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (14):401-409.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Speaking My Mind.Dorit Bar-On - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):1-34.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   679 citations  
  • Practical Reflection.Michael H. Robins - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):949-952.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • Instrumental Rationality: A Reprise.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):1-20.
    The paper distinguishes between instrumental reasons and instrumental rationality. It argues that instrumental reasons are not reasons to take the means to our ends. It further argues that there is no distinct form of instrumental reasoning or of instrumental rationality. In part the argument proceeds through a sympathetic examination of suggestions made by M. Bratman, J. Broome, and J. Wallace, though the accounts of instrumental rationality offered by the last two are criticised.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Synthese 84 (1):153-161.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   457 citations  
  • The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.Neil Sinhababu - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):680-696.
    I argue that one intends that ϕ if one has a desire that ϕ and an appropriately related means-end belief. Opponents, including Setiya and Bratman, charge that this view can't explain three things. First, intentional action is accompanied by knowledge of what we are doing. Second, we can choose our reasons for action. Third, forming an intention settles a deliberative question about what to do, disposing us to cease deliberating about it. I show how the desire- belief view can explain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Knowledge in Intention.Kevin Falvey - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):21-44.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Partial Belief, Partial Intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.
    Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial belief stands to all-out belief. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  • Against Cognitivism About Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.
    Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions. This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions involve beliefs and focuses instead on this second part of the Cognitivist approach, where I think Cognitivism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Studies in the Way of Words.D. E. Over - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (160):393-395.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   428 citations  
  • Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   417 citations  
  • How to Be a Cognitivist About Practical Reason.Jacob Ross - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:243-281.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
    Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. I ask how the normativity of rationality—the sense in which we ‘ought’ to comply with requirements of rationality—is related to the normativity of reasons—the sense (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   321 citations  
  • Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome - 2013 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Rationality Through Reasoning_ answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us Gives (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   177 citations  
  • Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   520 citations  
  • Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.
    Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  • Normativity, Commitment and Instrumental Reason.R. Jay Wallace - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-26.
    This paper addresses some connections between conceptions of the will and the theory of practical reason. The first two sections argue against the idea that volitional commitments should be understood along the lines of endorsement of normative principles. A normative account of volition cannot make sense of akrasia, and it obscures an important difference between belief and intention. Sections three and four draw on the non-normative conception of the will in an account of instrumental rationality. The central problem is to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   199 citations  
  • Essays on Actions and Events.Tyler Burge - 1980 - Ethics 93 (3):608-611.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   165 citations  
  • Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447-453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Against Internalism About Reasons—Gert’s Rational Options. [REVIEW]David Copp - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):455–461.
    The contemporary debate about the relation between reasons and motivation is partly driven by the problem of explaining the “normativity” of reasons. Reasons are “prescriptive”. They direct us how to act. They are “apt” to guide our choices. Moreover, reasons are “action guiding”. Insofar as we are rational, we let them guide our choices, for we accept their instructions. These formulations are metaphorical, however, and the problem is to explain precisely what they mean. One strategy for explaining normativity, an “internalist” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-35.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I’m thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-335.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." If I now said: "I have a headache," or "I'm thinking about Venice," I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy.Crispin Wright - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 101-122.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy: Crispin Wright.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:101-122.
    It is only in fairly recent philosophy that psychological self-knowledge has come to be seen as problematical; once upon a time the hardest philosophical difficulties all seemed to attend our knowledge of others. But as philosophers have canvassed various models of the mental that would make knowledge of other minds less intractable, so it has become unobvious how to accommodate what once seemed evident and straightforward–the wide and seemingly immediate cognitive dominion of minds over themselves.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person.Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Clarendon Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Essay 1.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   648 citations  
  • Gert on the Limits of Morality’s Requirements.Dan W. Brock - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):435-440.
    There is much to admire and agree with in Bernard Gert’s book, Morality: Its Nature and Justification. Few philosophers have even attempted to provide the systematic account of the content of morality, what Gert calls the moral system, together with its justification that this book contains. In the brief space available here, I want to focus on a central feature of his account of the moral system of common morality and challenge, first, whether it is in fact a feature of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Intention as Faith: Rae Langton.Rae Langton - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:243-258.
    What, if anything, has faith to do with intention? By ‘faith’ I have in mind the attitude described by William James: Suppose … that I am climbing in the Alps, and have had the illluck to work myself into a position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Being without similar experience, I have no evidence of my ability to perform it successfully; but hope and confidence in myself make me sure I shall not miss my aim, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge’.Richard Moran - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:43-68.
    Among the legacies of Elizabeth Anscombe's 1957 monograph Intention are the introduction of the notion of ‘practical knowledge’ into contemporary philosophical discussion of action, and her claim, pursued throughout the book, that an agent's knowledge of what he is doing is characteristically not based on observation. Each idea by itself has its own obscurities, of course, but my focus here will be on the relation between the two ideas, how it is that the discussion of action may lead us to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):509-510.
    Reasons without Rationalism has two related parts, devoted to action theory and ethics, respectively. In the second part, I argue for a close connection between reasons for action and virtues of character. This connection is mediated by the idea of good practical thought and the disposition to engage in it. The argument relies on the following principle, which is intended as common ground: " Reasons: The fact that p is a reason for A to ϕ just in case A has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   122 citations  
  • The Logic of Aspect: An Axiomatic Approach.Antony Galton - 1984 - Clarendon Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Philosophical perplexity about intention begins with its appearance in three guises: intention for the future, as when I intend to complete this entry by the end of the month; the intention with which someone acts, as I am typing with the further intention of writing an introductory sentence; and intentional action, as in the fact that I am typing these words intentionally. As Elizabeth Anscombe wrote in a similar context, ‘it is implausible to say that the word is equivocal as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?1.John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321-337.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Moore's Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach.Jane Heal - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):5-24.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Anscombe on 'Practical Knowledge'.Richard Moran - 2004 - In J. Hyman & H. Steward (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 43-68.
    Among the legacies of Elizabeth Anscombe's 1957 monograph Intention are the introduction of the notion of 'practical knowledge' into contemporary philosophical discussion of action, and her claim, pursued throughout the book, that an agent's knowledge of what he is doing is characteristically not based on observation.' Each idea by itself has its own obscurities, of course, but my focus here will be on the relation between the two ideas, how it is that the discussion of action may lead us to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Practical Knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):388-409.
    Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge-how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Varieties of Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On & James Sias - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):699-713.
    After offering a characterization of what unites versions of ‘expressivism’, we highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism – a positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis, and a negative semantic thesis – and describe how traditional expressivists have attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Practical Knowledge Revisited.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):128-137.
    Argues that the view propounded in "Practical Knowledge" (Ethics 118: 388-409) survives objections made by Sarah Paul ("Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking," Ethics 119: 546-557). The response gives more explicit treatment to the nature and epistemology of knowing how.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking: Setiya on “Practical Knowledge”.Sarah K. Paul - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):546-557.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Cognitivism About Instrumental Reason.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Ethics 117 (4):649-673.
    Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • How We Know What We're Doing.Sarah K. Paul - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-24.
    G.E.M. Anscombe famously claimed that acting intentionally entails knowing "without observation" what one is doing. Among those that have taken her claim seriously, an influential response has been to suppose that in order to explain this fact, we should conclude that intentions are a species of belief. This paper argues that there are good reasons to reject this "cognitivist" view of intention in favor of the view that intentions are distinctively practical attitudes that are not beliefs and do not constitutively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Intention and Uncertainty.H. P. Grice - 1971 - Proceedings of the British Academy 57:263-279.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • The Logic of Aspect: An Axiomatic Approach.Johan van Benthem & Antony Galton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):434.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge.Dorit Bar-on - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):303-306.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason.Jay Wallace - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1.
    This paper addresses some connections between conceptions of the will and the theory of practical reason. The first two sections argue against the idea that volitional commitments should be understood along the lines of endorsement of normative principles. A normative account of volition cannot make sense of akrasia, and it obscures an important difference between belief and intention. Sections three and four draw on the non-normative conception of the will in an account of instrumental rationality. The central problem is to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.N. Sinhababu - unknown
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Why Be Rational&Quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   135 citations