- Can the Reasonable Doubt Standard be Justified? A Reconstructed Dialogue.Federico Picinali - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 31 (2):365-402.details
|
|
"How to Think Several Thoughts at Once: Content Plurality in Mental Action".Antonia Peacocke - 2019 - In Michael Brent & Lisa Miracchi Titus (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 31-60.details
|
|
Junk, Numerosity, and the Demands of Epistemic Consequentialism.Michal Masny - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
|
|
Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
|
|
In Defense of Clutter.Brendan Balcerak Jackson, DiDomenico David & Kenji Lota - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
|
|
Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
|
|
Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
|
|
An instrumentalist unification of zetetic and epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
|
|
Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
|
|
The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.details
|
|
Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.details
|
|
The procreation asymmetry : The existence-requirement strategy and some concerns on incompatibility.Jepser Söderstedt - unknowndetails
|
|
The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.James Fritz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1191-1210.details
|
|
Negation, expressivism, and intentionality.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):246-267.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Boulesic-Doxastic Logic.Daniel Rönnedal - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (3):83-132.details
|
|
Instrumental Rationality.Markos Valaris - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):443-462.details
|
|
Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: A Murdochian constitutivist account.Evgenia Mylonaki - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):349-388.details
|
|
Belief and Difficult Action.Berislav Marušić - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12:1-30.details
|
|
Contractualism for Us As We Are.Nicholas Southwood - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):529-547.details
|
|
On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
|
|
Motor Intentions and Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story.Olle Blomberg & Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):137-146.details
|
|
Why cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.details
|
|
Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.details
|
|
Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
|
|
Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):88-115.details
|
|
Reasoning under Scarcity.Jennifer M. Morton - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):543-559.details
|
|
Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default.Thomas Schmidt - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):17-27.details
|
|
Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Aims as reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2011 - In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 43-78.details
|
|
Instrumental reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.details
|
|
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
|
|
(1 other version)Weakness of the Will as Furtive Irrationality.Monika Betzler - 2009 - Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):191–215.details
|
|
Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.details
|
|
What is reliance?Facundo M. Alonso - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):163-183.details
|
|
The Rational Significance of Desire.Avery Archer - 2013 - Dissertation, Columbia Universitydetails
|
|
Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Choice.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Agency and Self‐Sufficiency in Fichte's Ethics.Michelle Kosch - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):348-380.details
|
|
Instrumental Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2013 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philsophy. Routledge.details
|
|
Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.details
|
|
Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 130–145.details
|
|
The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives.Camillia Kong - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):661-690.details
|
|
Moral and Rational Commitment.Sam Shpall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):146-172.details
|
|
Introduction.Michelle Kosch - 2012 - Philosophical Forum 43 (3):243-246.details
|
|