- The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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(2 other versions)Learning from Words.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):572-574.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.details
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Philosophical Papers.Alice Ambrose, G. E. Moore & C. D. Broad - 1961 - Philosophical Review 70 (3):408.details
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Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.details
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Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech.Sanford Goldberg - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.Maria Alvarez - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts.Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish - 1979 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Selected writings.George Edward Moore - 1993 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Against Assertion.Herman Cappelen - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Self‐Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.details
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Defaults in update semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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My philosophical position says p and I don't believe p.Alan Hájek - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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A new solution to Moore's paradox.Anthony S. Gillies - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (3):237-250.details
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Moorean absurdities and the nature of assertion.John N. Williams - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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Information and Assertoric Force.Peter Pagin - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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Testimony and Assertion.David Owens - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):105-129.details
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Saying and Disbelieving.Max Black - 1952 - Analysis 13 (2):25-33.details
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Self-knowledge: Discovery, resolution, and undoing.Richard Moran - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):141-61.details
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Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant.Rachel McKinnon - 2015 - Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation.Gilbert Harman - 1968 - American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (3):164 - 173.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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Refutation by elimination.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):35-39.details
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How to Commit Moore’s Paradox.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (4):169-192.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Lamarque - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (105):369-371.details
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Blindspots.Michael Levin - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):389-392.details
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Self‐Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing.Richard Moran - 2002 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):141-161.details
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Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.details
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(1 other version)Philosophical Papers.G. E. Moore - 1960 - Philosophy 35 (135):358-359.details
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