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On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.details
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A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press.details
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Structural Irrationality.Thomas Scanlon - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.details
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Consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection.Michael Smith - 2008 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.details
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Introduction.Ruth Chang - 1997 - In Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard. pp. 1-34.details
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What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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What does it take to "have" a reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.details
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Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly.Ralph Wedgwood - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--229.details
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Reasons: A Puzzling Duality?T. M. Scanlon - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Impartial reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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Two ways of explaining actions.Jonathan Dancy - unknowndetails
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Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
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Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.details
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Williamson on the primeness of knowing.A. Brueckner - 2002 - Analysis 62 (3):197-202.details
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The scope of rational requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.details
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Knowledge, evidence, and skepticism according to Williamson. [REVIEW]Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436–443.details
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Instrumental rationality, symmetry and scope.John Brunero - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.details
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Are intentions reasons?John Brunero - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):424–444.details
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Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.details
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Reply to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity.John Broome - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):96-108.details
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Reasons and motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.details
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Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.details
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Is Rationality Normative?John Broome - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):161-178.details
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Have we reason to do as rationality requires? - a comment on Raz.John Broome - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (Symposium):1-10.details
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Does rationality give us reasons?John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.details
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Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?John Broome - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.details
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Intention, practical rationality, and self‐governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):411-443.details
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Developmental Process Reliabilism: on Justification, Defeat, and Evidence.Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):1 - 17.details
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Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance.George Bealer - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-125.details
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A Rationale for Reliabilism.Kent Bach - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):246-263.details
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Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2010 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oup Usa. pp. 194-214.details
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Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World.Jack C. Lyons - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jack Lyons.details
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Deliberation and Acting for Reasons.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.details
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Some Evidence is False.Alexander Arnold - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172.details
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An internalist externalism.William P. Alston - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.details
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Reasonology and False Beliefs.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):91-118.details
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Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Niko Kolodny - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):437-463.details
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What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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Judgement and justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - London: Hutchinson.details
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Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification.Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):309-338.details
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Toward a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism? Or: evidentialism's troubles, reliabilism's rescue package.Alvin I. Goldman - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 254-280.details
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Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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