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Bad by Nature, An Axiological Theory of Pain

In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge (forthcoming)

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  1. A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - Mind 78 (310):292-301.
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  • Unfelt Pains.David Palmer - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (4):289-298.
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  • Are Qualia a Pain in the Neck for Functionalists?George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1):73-80.
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  • The Location of Pains.David Bain - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.
    Perceptualists say that having a pain in a body part consists in perceiving the part as instantiating some property. I argue that perceptualism makes better sense of the connections between pain location and the experiences undergone by people in pain than three alternative accounts that dispense with perception. Turning to fellow perceptualists, I also reject ways in which David Armstrong and Michael Tye understand and motivate perceptualism, and I propose an alternative interpretation, one that vitiates a pair of objections—due to (...)
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  • Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects.Kevin Mulligan - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):1 - 24.
    What is the relation between the intentionality of states and attitudes which can miss their mark, such as belief and desire, and the intentionality of acts, states and attitudes which cannot miss their mark, such as the different types of knowledge and simple seeing? Two theories of the first type of intentionality, the theory of correctness conditions and the theory of satisfaction conditions, are compared. It is argued that knowledge always involves knowledge of formal objects such as facts and values, (...)
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  • From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.
    ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the (...)
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  • Values and Intentions: A Study in Value-Theory and Philosophy of Mind.J. N. FINDLAY - 1961 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 17 (2):335-340.
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  • The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time.John Heil & E. J. Lowe - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):91.
    In case you hadn’t noticed, metaphysics is mounting a comeback. After decades of attempts to keep the subject at arm’s length, philosophers are discovering that progress on fundamental issues in, say, philosophy of mind, requires delving into metaphysics. Questions about the nature of minds and their contents, like those concerning free action, personal identity, or the existence of God, belong to applied metaphysics. They bear a relation to metaphysics proper analogous to the relation questions about abortion, affirmative action, or pornography (...)
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  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 27 (2):217-217.
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  • The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time.E. J. Lowe - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
    Jonathan Lowe argues that metaphysics should be restored to a central position in philosophy, as the most fundamental form of inquiry, whose findings underpin those of all other disciplines. He portrays metaphysics as charting the possibilities of existence, by identifying the categories of being and the relations between them. He sets out his own original metaphysical system, within which he seeks to answer many of the deepest questions in philosophy. 'a very rich book... deserves to be read carefully by anyone (...)
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  • Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28-41.
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  • Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Mind 88 (349):142-144.
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  • Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values.Max Scheler - 1973 - Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
    Introductory Remarks IN A MAJOR WORK planned for the near future I will attempt to develop a non-formal ethics of Values on the broadest possible basis of ...
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  • Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (38):147-153.
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  • The Varieties of Goodness.Georg Henrik von Wright - 1963 - Philosophical Review 74 (2):240-244.
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  • Values and Intentions: A Study in Value-Theory and Philosophy of Mind.J. N. FINDLAY - 1961 - Routledge.
    Professor Findlay in this book, originally published in 1961, set out to justify, and to some extent carry out, a ‘material value-ethic’, ie. A systematic setting forth of the ends of rational action. The book is in the tradition of Moore, Rashfall, Ross, Scheler and Hartmann though it avoids altogether dogmatic intuitive methods. It argues that an organised framework of ends of action follows from the attitude underlying our moral pronouncements, and that this framework, while allowing personal elaboration, is not (...)
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  • XIV—Ontological Dependence.Kit Fine - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):269-290.
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  • Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates.Christine Tappolet - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (2):207-221.
    What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as one between a (...)
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  • Understanding What’s Good for Us.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):429 - 439.
    The ancient question of what a good life consists in is currently the focus of intense debate. There are two aspects to this debate: the first concerns how the concept of a good life is to be understood; the second concerns what kinds of life fall within the extension of this concept. In this paper, I will attend only to the first, conceptual aspect and not to the second, substantive aspect. More precisely, I will address the preliminary, underlying question of (...)
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  • Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something?Murat Aydede - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine the (...)
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  • Distinguishing the Appearance From the Reality of Pain.Kevin Reuter - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):94-109.
    It is often held that it is conceptually impossible to distinguish between a pain and a pain experience. In this article I present an argument which concludes that people make this distinction. I have done a web-based statistical analysis which is at the core of this argument. It shows that the intensity of pain has a decisive effect on whether people say that they 'feel a pain'(lower intensities) or 'have a pain' (greater intensities). This 'intensity effect'can be best explained by (...)
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  • A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33 - 51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
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  • Objective Value and Subjective States.Joseph Mendola - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):695-713.
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  • Might a Tooth Ache but There Be No Toothache?James W. Cornman - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):27-40.
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  • On Viewing Pain as a Secondary Quality.Natika Newton - 1989 - Noûs 23 (5):569-98.
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  • Pain Perception.George Pitcher - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):368.
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  • Towards an Ontology of Pain.Barry Smith, Werner Ceusters, Louis J. Goldberg & Richard Ohrbach - 2011 - In Proceedings of the Conference on Ontology and Analytical Metaphysics. Keio University Press.
    We present an ontology of pain and of other pain-related phenomena, building on the definition of pain provided by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP). Our strategy is to identify an evolutionarily basic canonical pain phenomenon, involving unpleasant sensory and emotional experience based causally in localized tissue damage that is concordant with that experience. We then show how different variant cases of this canonical pain phenomenon can be distinguished, including pain that is elevated relative to peripheral trauma, (...)
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  • Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain.Bennett W. Helm - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.
    This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously con- (...)
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  • Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2004 - Clarendon Press.
    Fred Feldman's fascinating new book sets out to defend hedonism as a theory about the Good Life. He tries to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. Feldman begins by explaining the question about the Good Life. As he understands it, the question is not about the morally good life or about the beneficial life. Rather, the question concerns the general features of the life that is good in itself for (...)
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  • Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain.Brian Cutter & Michael Tye - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.
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  • Touch.Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin - 2013 - The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception.
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuitions about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some close relationship with bodily awareness. This chapter considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch and (...)
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  • Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions.Fabrice Correia - 2005 - Philosophia Verlag.
    The purpose of the book is to clarify the notion of existential dependence and cognate notions, such as supervenience and the notion of an internal relation. I defend the view that such notions are best understood in terms of the concept of metaphysical grounding, i.e. the concept of one fact obtaining in virtue of other facts, where ‘in virtue of’ has a distinctively metaphysical meaning.
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  • Shapelessness and the Thick.Debbie Roberts - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):489-520.
    This article aims to clarify the view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick. I do this by putting the disentangling argument in its place and then setting out what nonreductivists about the thick are committed to. To distinguish the view from possible reductive accounts, defenders of irreducible thickness are, I argue, committed to the claim that evaluative concepts and properties are nonevaluatively shapeless. This in turn requires a commitment to (radical) holism and particularism. Nonreductivists are also committed to the claim (...)
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  • Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States.Irwin Goldstein - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of (...)
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  • From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans.Daniel Y. Elstein & Thomas Hurka - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 515-535.
    Many philosophers of the last century thought all moral judgments can be expressed using a few basic concepts — what are today called ‘thin’ moral concepts such as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right,’ and ‘wrong.’ This was the view, fi rst, of the non-naturalists whose work dominated the early part of the century, including Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and C.D. Broad. Some of them recognized only one basic concept, usually either ‘ought’ or ‘good’; others thought there were two. But they (...)
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  • Personal Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a stimulating and vivid area of philosophical research, but it has tended to monopolize the notion of 'good-for', linking it necessarily to welfare or ...
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  • Ethics. By C. D. Burns. [REVIEW]Nicolai Hartmann - 1932 - Ethics 43:218.
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  • Pain and Suffering.Eric J. Cassell - 1995 - Encyclopedia of Bioethics 4:1897-1905.
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  • Ow! The Paradox of Pain.Christopher S. Hill - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
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  • Painfulness is Not a Quale.Austen Clark - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
    When you suffer a pain are you suffering a sensation? An emotion? An aversion? Pain typically has all three components, and others too. There is indeed a distinct sensory system devoted to pain, with its own nociceptors and pathways. As a species of somesthesis, pain has a distinctive sensory organization and its own special sensory qualities. I think it is fair to call it a distinct sensory modality, devoted to nociceptive somesthetic discrimination. But the typical pain kicks off other processes (...)
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  • Unpleasantness, Motivational Oomph, and Painfulness.Jennifer Corns - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):238-254.
    Painful pains are, paradigmatically, unpleasant and motivating. The dominant view amongst philosophers and pain scientists is that these two features are essentially related and sufficient for painfulness. In this article, I first offer scientifically informed characterizations of both unpleasantness and motivational oomph and argue against other extant accounts. I then draw on folk-characterized cases and current neurobiological and neurobehavioral evidence to argue that both dominant positions are mistaken. Unpleasantness and motivational oomph doubly dissociate and, even taken together, are insufficient for (...)
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  • The relation of sense-data to physics.Bertrand Russell - 1914 - Scientia 16 (16):1-27.
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