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  1. The Source and Robustness of Duties of Friendship.Robbie Arrell - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):166-183.
    Certain relationships generate associative duties that exhibit robustness across change. It seems insufficient for friendship, for example, if I am only disposed to fulfil duties of friendship towards you as things stand here and now. However, robustness is not required across all variations. Were you to become monstrously cruel towards me, we might expect that my duties of friendship towards you would not be robust across that kind of change. The question then is this: is there any principled way of (...)
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  • Tropic of Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):389-403.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value, which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion pre-supposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a (...)
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  • Procedural Reasonableness and Normativity of Argumentation : Pragma-Dialectical Responses to Epistemologist Objections.Patrizio Lo Presti - unknown
    Pragma-dialectical argumentation theory has received criticism from epistemological argumentation theorists. While the former emphasizes argumentation as aimed at resolving differences of opinion through adequate procedures, the latter emphasizes that argumentation is aimed at reaching a justified conclusion of the argumentation. In this paper pragma-dialectics is analyzed and two objections considered. The first objection pertains to the pragma-dialectical definition of reasonable argumentation, the other to the lack of an account of normativity of argumentation in pragma-dialectics. It is argued that the objections (...)
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  • The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
    A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.
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  • Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds.Andrés G. Garcia & Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):155-167.
    Philosophers have applied the framework of constitutive grounds to make sense of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. The framework understands the two theories as being involved in a disagreement about the extent to which value is determined by attitudes. Although the framework affords us with some useful observations about how this should be interpreted, the question how value can be determined by attitudes in the first place is left largely unanswered. Here we explore the benefits of a positive interpretation (...)
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  • Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge.J. Adam Carter - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:115-133.
    The Neo-Moorean response to the radical skeptical challenge boldly maintains that we can know we’re not the victims of radical skeptical hypotheses; accordingly, our everyday knowledge that would otherwise be threatened by our inability to rule out such hypotheses stands unthreatened. Given the leverage such an approach has against the skeptic from the very start, the Neo-Moorean line is an especially popular one; as we shall see, though, it faces several commonly overlooked problems. An initial problem is that this particular (...)
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  • Bad by Nature, An Axiological Theory of Pain.Olivier Massin - forthcoming - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and argues that since (...)
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  • The Pen, the Dress, and the Coat: A Confusion in Goodness.Miles Tucker - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1911-1922.
    Conditionalists say that the value something has as an end—its final value—may be conditional on its extrinsic features. They support this claim by appealing to examples: Kagan points to Abraham Lincoln’s pen, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen to Lady Diana’s dress, and Korsgaard to a mink coat. They contend that these things may have final value in virtue of their historical or societal roles. These three examples have become familiar: many now merely mention them to establish the conditionalist position. But the widespread (...)
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  • Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
    According to Veritism, true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Epistemologists often take Veritism to entail that all other epistemic items can only have value by standing in certain instrumental relations—namely, by tending to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs or by being products of sources with this tendency. Yet many value theorists outside epistemology deny that all derivative value is grounded in instrumental relations to fundamental value. Veritists, I believe, can and should follow suit. After (...)
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  • On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - 2014 - Dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgers
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  • Justificatory Reasons for Action.Georg Spielthenner - 2012 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):56-72.
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  • Commodious Knowledge.Christoph9 Kelp & Mona3 Simion - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1487-1502.
    This paper offers a novel account of the value of knowledge. The account is novel insofar as it advocates a shift in focus from the value of individual items of knowledge to the value of the commodity of knowledge. It is argued that the commodity of knowledge is valuable in at least two ways: in a wide range of areas, knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact with the world and for us the good life is a life (...)
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  • The Moral Status of Nature : Reasons to Care for the Natural World.Lars Samuelsson - 2008 - Dissertation,
    The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct (...)
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  • Solving the Most Valuable Player Problem.Stephen Kershnar - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):141–159.
    In this essay, I argue for the claim that the MVP is the player who provides the greatest net benefit to his team. I then argued for the following model of a player’s net benefit to her team. (1) A person’s, X’s, net benefit to the team is a function of the difference in team success when X plays and when her actual or likely backup plays. I argued that this model best satisfies our intuitions, measures actual value rather than (...)
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  • Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen.Jonas Olson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):412–422.
    In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenable since different evaluative (...)
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  • The Value Problem of Knowledge.Anne Meylan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):261-275.
    The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the creditsolution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the already existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most important conclusion is that (...)
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  • The Experiential Thesis: Audi on Intrinsic Value.Stephen Barker - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):57-61.
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  • Review: Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. [REVIEW]Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):407 - 416.
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  • Holism About Value: Some Help for Invariabilists.Daniel Halliday - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.
    G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This paper is an attempt to (...)
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  • The Goodness of Means: Instrumental and Relational Values, Causation, and Environmental Policies.Patrik Baard - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (1):183-199.
    Instrumental values are often considered to be inferior to intrinsic values. One reason for this is that instrumental values are extrinsic and rely on two factors: a means–end relationship that is conducive to something of final or intrinsic value. In this paper, I will investigate the conditions under which bearers of instrumental value are given different value or owed different levels of respect. Such conditions include the number of means that are conducive to something of final or intrinsic value as (...)
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  • How to Overcome Strawson’s Point: Defending a Value-Oriented Foundation for Contractualism.Douglas Paletta - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):9-20.
    In The Second Person Standpoint, Darwall charges that all value-oriented foundations for ethics make a category mistake. Calling it Strawson’s point, he argues these foundations explain moral authority, which concerns whether someone has standing to hold another accountable, in terms of a value, which essentially concerns what makes the world go best. However, whether it would be good for me to blame you simply asks a different question than whether I have standing to blame you. I defend a valueoriented foundation (...)
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  • On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397-411.
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us, has recently been analysed in terms of so- called for-someone's-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone's-sake attitudes can be identified. Moreover, it is argued (...)
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  • Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW]Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2012 - Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.
    Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour (...)
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  • An Argument for Agent-Neutral Value.David Alm - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):249–263.
    This paper argues that to any agent‐relative value maker there will correspond an agent‐neutral value maker, and the latter explains the former; and that to each agent‐relative constitutive ground there corresponds a neutral one, and the latter explains the former. It follows from , if not from , that agent‐neutral value exists if agent‐relative value does.
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  • On Hatzimoysis on Sentimental Value.Guy Fletcher - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):149-152.
    Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53:373–379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard’s ideas on two distinctions in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard’s insight in his discussion of sentimental value. I begin by briefly summarising Korsgaard’s idea before showing how Hatzimoysis’ treatment of it is mistaken.
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  • Intrinsic Value, Alternative Possibilities, and Reason.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Journal of Ethics 14 (2):149-171.
    I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition that obligation (...)
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  • Getting It Right.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Stephen R. Grimm - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):329-347.
    Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is (...)
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  • Virtue -Based Epistemology and the Centrality of Truth (Towards a Strong Virtue-Epistemology).Nenad Miscevic - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):239--266.
    A strong, strictly virtue- based , and at the same time truth-centered framework for virtue epistemology (VE) is proposed that bases VE upon a clearly motivating epistemic virtue, inquisitiveness or curiosity in a very wide sense, characterizes the purely executive capacities-virtues as a means for the truth-goal set by the former, and, finally, situates the remaining, partly motivating and partly executive virtues in relation to this central stock of virtues. Character-trait epistemic virtues are presented as hybrids, partly moral, partly purely (...)
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  • Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge.Jonas Olson - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365-378.
    According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such (...)
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  • On Luck, Responsibility and the Meaning of Life.Berit Brogaard & Barry Smith - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (3):443-458.
    A meaningful life, we shall argue, is a life upon which a certain sort of valuable pattern has been imposed by the person in question?a pattern which involves in serious ways the person having an effect upon the world. Meaningfulness is thus a special kind of value which a human life can bear. Two interrelated difficulties face ths proposal. One concerns responsiblity: how are we to account for the fact that a life that satisfies the above criteria can have more (...)
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  • Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen, Personal Value, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 185 Pp., US$ 75 , ISBN 9780199603787. [REVIEW]Olivier Massin - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):221-231.
    Personal Values is a delightful and enlightening read. It is teeming with novel insights, ground-breaking distinctions, rich examples, new delineations of the field, refreshing historical reminders, inventive arguments, unprecedented connections, identifications of neglected difficulties, and pioneering proposals. I shall focus here on three of these insights, which are illustrative of the pervasive scrupulousness and inventiveness of the book. The first is that there is a distinction between the supervenience base of values and their constitutive grounds. The second is that FA (...)
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  • In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.
    Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for (...)
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  • How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist.David Matheson - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):391-405.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend an epistemic value pluralism according to which true belief, justified belief, and knowledge are all fundamental epistemic values. After laying out reasons to reject epistemic value monism in its central forms, I present my pluralist alternative and show how it can adequately explain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over both true belief and justified belief, despite their fundamentality. I conclude with a sketch of how this pluralism might be generalized beyond the epistemic domain (...)
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  • Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value?Leon Culbertson - 2008 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 2 (3):302 – 320.
    This paper considers the suggestion, central to McFee's (2004) moral laboratory argument, that sport is intrinsically valuable. McFee's position is outlined and critiqued and various interpretations of intrinsic value found in the philosophical literature are considered. In addition, Morgan's (2007) claim that sport is an appropriate final end is considered and partially accepted. The paper draws a number of terminological distinctions and concludes that sport does not have intrinsic value as traditionally conceived, but that this is of little consequence with (...)
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  • Sentimental Value.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):373–379.
    I analyse the concept of sentimental value, with a view to identifying its relations with the notions of intrinsic, final, extrinsic and instrumental value. The analysis explores issues arising in the understanding of an object as sentimentally valuable, and reveals a serious tension in the common sense extrinsic conception of sentimental value.
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  • Sick and Healthy: Benatar on the Logic of Value.Skott Brill - 2012 - South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):38-54.
    David Benatar, in Better Never to Have Been , sets out two arguments in support of the view that coming into existence is always a net harm. Remarkably, the first argument seems to imply that coming into existence would be a net harm even if the only bad we experienced in our lives were a ‘single pin-prick’. This argument hinges on a purported asymmetry: that whereas the absence of pains in non-existence is good, the absence of pleasures in non-existence is (...)
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