- The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.details
|
|
The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
|
|
Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.details
|
|
Advantages of Propositionalism.Neil Sinhababu - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):165-180.details
|
|
Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge. pp. 135-157.details
|
|
Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.details
|
|
Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
|
|
Intentionality without exotica.R. M. Sainsbury - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.details
|
|
Belief De Re.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (6):338-362.details
|
|
Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
|
|
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.details
|
|
(1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.details
|
|
Intentional Psychologism.David Pitt - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117-138.details
|
|
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.details
|
|
Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation.Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):57-92.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.details
|
|
Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of mind: the key thinkers. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 209-235.details
|
|
Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.details
|
|
Objects of thought.Arthur Norman Prior - 1971 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by P. T. Geach & Anthony Kenny.details
|
|
Against propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.details
|
|
(1 other version)Desires are not propositional attitudes.Paul Thagard - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):151-156.details
|
|
(1 other version)Desires Are Not Propositional Attitudes.Paul Thagard - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):151-156.details
|
|
Objects of Thought. [REVIEW]Pierre Dubois - 1971 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 165 (1):85-86.details
|
|
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Kenneth Taylor - 1990 - Noûs 24 (1):181-184.details
|
|
Three dogmas of desire.Talbot Brewer - 2006 - In Timothy Chappell (ed.), Values and virtues: Aristotelianism in contemporary ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The intentionality of cognitive states.Fred I. Dretske - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294.details
|
|
Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.details
|
|