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Guilt Without Perceived Wrongdoing.Michael Zhao - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (3):285-314.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.details
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There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.Cameron Boult - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.details
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Folk psychology as mental simulation.Luca Barlassina & Robert M. Gordon - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Rational 'ought' implies 'can'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.details
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“Ought” Implies “Can” but Does Not Imply “Must”: An Asymmetry between Becoming Infeasible and Becoming Overridden.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):487-514.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Values and the heart's command.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):5-19.details
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The Best Argument for 'Ought Implies Can' Is a Better Argument Against 'Ought Implies Can'.Brian Talbot - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Theoretical terms without analytic truths.Michael Strevens - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):167-190.details
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'Ought' and 'can'.Michael Stocker - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):303 – 316.details
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Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):411-447.details
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Resolving epistemic dilemmas.Douglas Odegard - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):161 – 168.details
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Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View?Moti Mizrahi - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):829-840.details
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Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics.Terrance C. McConnell - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):269 - 287.details
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Moral dilemmas and consistency.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136.details
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Does 'Ought' Still Imply 'Can'?Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):821-828.details
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Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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Theories, theorists and theoretical change.Philip Kitcher - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (4):519-547.details
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Actions That We Ought, But Can't.Alex King - 2013 - Ratio 27 (3):316-327.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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“Cannot” implies “not ought”.Frances Howard-Snyder - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):233-246.details
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Reasoning with moral conflicts.John F. Horty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):557–605.details
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x2. Cantor's proof. The authors of these papers—henceforth let me call them just the authors—seem to have read Cantor's argument in a variety of places. In my records only one author refers directly to Cantor's own argument [7]. One quotes Russell's 'Principles of mathematics'[20] later. [REVIEW]Wilfrid Hodges - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (1):1-16.details
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