- What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The emotions: a philosophical introduction.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Fabrice Teroni.details
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Action, Emotion And Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.details
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(1 other version)The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Upheavals of Thought.Martha Nussbaum - 2001 - Journal of Religious Ethics 31 (2):325-341.details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value.Bennett W. Helm - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Moralistic Fallacy.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.details
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Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.details
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(1 other version)The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.details
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The right and the wrong kind of reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.details
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The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Cham, Schweiz: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.details
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There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Barry Maguire - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):779-805.details
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Emotions in the Moral Life.Robert Campbell Roberts - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Action, Emotion and Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Philosophy 39 (149):277-278.details
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Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.Sabine A. Döring - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.details
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Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.details
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How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously.Michael Milona - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):897-915.details
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The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Things That Make Things Reasonable.John Gibbons - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):335-361.details
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We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.David Faraci - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):225-234.details
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(2 other versions)Emotion: More like Action than Perception.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2715-2744.details
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Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections.Robert Cowan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.details
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Emotions and Process Rationality.Oded Na’Aman - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):531-546.details
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Fitting belief.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):167-187.details
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Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice.Robert C. Solomon - 2003 - New York, US: Oup Usa.details
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Skepticism about reasons for emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):108-123.details
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Emotions and Values.Kevin Mulligan - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Virtue, emotion and attention.Michael S. Brady - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):115-131.details
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How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):577-599.details
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Value Theory.Francesco Orsi - 2015 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Emotion, evaluative perception, and epistemic justification.Adam C. Pelser - 2014 - In Sabine Roeser & Cain Samuel Todd (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):355-364.details
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