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Either / or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 57-94.details
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Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Attention and mental paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks.Keith A. Wilson - 2018 - In John Collins & Tamara Dobler (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 199-221.details
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The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.details
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Visual Experience & Demonstrative Thought.Thomas Raleigh - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (30):69-91.details
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Phenomenology without Representation.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1209-1237.details
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Phenomenology without Representation.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):1209-1237.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation.Walter Ott - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145.details
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Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem.Alex Moran - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):368-382.details
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Revisiting Phenomenal Intentionality.Farid Masrour - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):99-107.details
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The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.details
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What should the naïve realist say about total hallucinations?Heather Logue - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):173-199.details
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Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.details
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The intuitive case for naïve realism.Harold Langsam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):106-122.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.details
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Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.details
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Color Illusion.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):751-775.details
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VII—Naive Realism and Diaphaneity.Craig French - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):149-175.details
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Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.William Fish - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Better than mere knowledge? The function of sensory awareness.Mark Johnston - 2006 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. Oxford University Press.details
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
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Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation.Heather Logue - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press.details
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Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):191-194.details
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A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.George Berkeley - 1901 - The Monist 11:637.details
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Introduction.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2009 - In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.details
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Integrated Information Theory: From Consciousness to Its Physical Substrate.Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch - 2016 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17 (7):450--461.details
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Better Than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness.Mark Johnston - 2006 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 260--290.details
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Merleau-Ponty and Naïve Realism.Keith Allen - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Beyond dispute: Sense-data, intentionality, and the mind-body problem.Michael G. F. Martin - 2000 - In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.details
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