- (1 other version)Internalism Defended.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.details
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(1 other version)Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (1):25-56.details
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What difference does it make whether moral realism is true?Nicholas Sturgeon - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):115-141.details
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Harman on moral explanations of natural facts.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):69-78.details
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(2 other versions)Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.details
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(2 other versions)Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.details
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Highlights of recent epistemology.James Pryor - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.details
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Epistemic value.William G. Lycan - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):137 - 164.details
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Non-cogntivism, normativity, belief.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):420–435.details
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The emotive meaning of ethical terms.Charles Leslie Stevenson - 1937 - Mind 46 (181):14-31.details
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Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.details
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Ascriptivism.P. T. Geach - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.details
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Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.details
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Disquotational truth and factually defective discourse.Hartry Field - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):405-452.details
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The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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Epistemic obligations.Richard Feldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:235-256.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Moral vision: seeing the world with love and justice.David Matzko McCarthy - 2018 - Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.details
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(2 other versions)Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic obligation and the possibility of internalism.Hilary Kornblith - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 231--248.details
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(1 other version)Voluntary belief and epistemic evaluation.Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 77--92.details
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Critical Study. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1995 - Noûs 29 (3):402-24.details
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Externalist moral realism.David O. Brink - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.details
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Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):433-457.details
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A priority as an evaluative notion.Hartry Field - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Virtues and rules in epistemology.John Greco - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 117--141.details
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The deontic conception of epistemic justification.Matthias Steup - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (1):65 - 84.details
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Deontologism and internalism in epistemology.Anthony Brueckner - 1996 - Noûs 30 (4):527-536.details
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(2 other versions)What is Naturalized Epistemology?Jaegwon Kim - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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