überall einen richtigen Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft giebt, in welchem Fall es auch einen Canon derselben geben muß, so wird dieser nicht den speculativen, sondernden pr.ntischen Vernunftgebrauch betreffen, den wir also iezt ...

Written by one of the pre-eminent interpreters of Heidegger, this book is an important statement about the basis of human sociability that is a major contribution to the continuing debates about Heidegger in particular, and ethics in general. Existential philosophy is often thought to promote moral nihilism in which everything is permitted. This book demonstrates that, in the case of Martin Heidegger, any such accusation is unjust. On the contrary, Heidegger thought seriously about the implications of human co-existence, and this (...) book shows that conceptions of trust and responsibility that lie at the very heart of morality are to be found in the sketch of Mitsein - our being together with one another in the world - offered in Being and Time. That Heidegger never developed these conceptions may explain why they have been overlooked, but renders them no less important for that. (shrink)

Heidegger hielt die unter dem Titel Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs angekundigte Vorlesung im Sommer-Semester 1925 in der Marburger Universitat. Er gelangte jedoch nicht mehr zur Ausfuhrung der zentralen Thematik. Der Themenkreis der Vorlesung ist mit der Nennung des Untertitels abgesteckt: Prolegomena zu einer Phanomenologie von Geschichte und Natur. Heideggers thematische Uberlegungen beginnen mit einer Kennzeichnung der Situation von Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der zweiten Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts und stellen das seiner Deutung nach entscheidende Ereignis dieser Zeit heraus: den Durchbruch der (...) Phanomenologie als philosophische Forschung. Er untersucht ihre wesentlichen Entdeckungen, verteidigt sie gegen Missverstandnisse, um dann seinerseits Kritik vorzubringen, wo die Phanomenologie ihrer Forderung zu den Sachen selbst nicht gerecht wird. (shrink)

In dieser Marburger Vorlesung aus dem Wintersemester 1924/25 stellt sich Heidegger die Aufgabe, Platons Spatdialog "Sophistes" im Ausgang von Aristoteles verstandlich zu machen. Zentrum des einleitenden Aristoteles-Teils ist die Folge der dianoethischen Tugenden im VI. Buch der "Nikomachischen Ethik", in der Heidegger die sich aufsteigernde Stufenfolge eines Entbergens erkennt und demgemass den Primat der "Physis" aus der Uberlegenheit ihres Entbergens begrundet. Damit legt Heidegger die Zusammengehorigkeit von Sein und Wahrheit als Horizont des aristotelisch-griechischen Philosophierens frei und gewinnt so den "Boden", (...) aus dem die platonische Seinsforschung, wie sie im "Sophistes" vorliegt, erwachsen ist. Dementsprechend stellt sich Heidegger im Hauptteil die Aufgabe, in fortlaufender Interpretation des "Sophistes" konkret zu zeigen, dass und wie Platons Ontologie aus dem Entbergen erwachsen ist. Die Vorlesung bezeugt, dass Heidegger die in seinem fruhen Hauptwerk "Sein und Zeit" gestellte Frage nach dem "Sinn von Sein", d.h. nach der Un-verborgenheit des Seins in der Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen Uberlieferung gewonnen hat. (shrink)

"A magisterial accomplishment that will be the standard in this field for years to come."--John D. Caputo, Villanova University "Outstanding, entirely original, absolutely groundbreaking.... It is quite simply the best account to date--and the best we can expect for decades in the future--of the philosophical development of Heidegger's early thought."--Thomas Sheehan, Loyola University "A magisterial accomplishment that will be the standard in this field for years to come."--John D. Caputo, Villanova University.

It is often held that, in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger's account of intentionality makes no essential reference to the first- person stance. This paper argues, on the contrary, that an account of the first- person, or 'subjectivity', is crucial to Heidegger's account of intelligibility and so of the intentionality, or 'aboutness' of our acts and thoughts, that rests upon it. It first offers an argument as to why the account of intelligibility in Division I of Being and Time, based on (...) a form of third- person self-awareness, provides a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for intentionality. It then shows that Heidegger provides a further necessary condition in his analysis of the collapse of the one-self in Division II. This condition is 'conscience', which is both a genuine first- person mode of self-awareness and, it is argued, the origin of reason as that which distinguishes factic 'grounds' from normative 'justifications'. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo principal del artículo es terminar quién es el Dasein desde el aparecer del mundo en la obra de Martin Heidegger Ser y tiempo. Para ello, se plantea la posibilidad de aprehensión del horizonte del sí mismo del Dasein, en contra de los propios análisis heideggerianos sobre el uno, y, también, se muestra de qué manera la mismidad del Dasein se presupone ya en el modo de aparición del mundo-entorno a través del existenciario significatividad. La conclusión del artículo (...) intentará descubrir los posibles rendimientos fenomenológicos de la apertura del horizonte del sí-mismo del Dasein.The main goal of the paper is to determine who is the Dasein itself from the appearance of the world in the Book of Martin Heidegger Being and time. For this, it raises the possibility of understanding the horizon of the self of Dasein itself differently to Heidegger’s analysis about the they and also it shows how the Selfhood of Dasein is presupposed already in the appearance of the world-environment through the existential meaningfulness. The conclusion of this paper will try to discover the phenomenological yields of Dasein’s openness as horizon of its Selfhood. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone indagar en la praxis de extrañamiento que lleva acabo Gómez de la Serna en El Rastro (1914), praxis que será esencial de cara a comprender uno de los vectores fundamentales de la (ulterior) objetología surrealista. Dicha praxis comprende al menos ocho prácticas o posibilidades de deshacer que afectan al Límite (que discrimina y jerarquiza), al Futuro (ingenuo y dictatorial), a la familiaridad hogareña burguesa (que encarcela y amodorra), a la funcionalidad utilitaria (que banaliza), a la (...) idealidad falsa (de los prestigios de la ciudad), a la propiedad (de nuestras cosas), a uno mismo (praxis de desasimiento), y al propio texto. Estas prácticas configuran un extrañamiento masivo, aunque sereno, con una clara proyección de trascendencia poética, existencial y metafísica. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In order to get access to the specific way of being of Dasein, and from a certain radicalization of the existential "being-in", this meditation constitutes a phenomenological attempt to analyze Spatiality in Heidegger's Being and Time. In this sense, it tries to develop this question in such a way that makes possible for the way of being of Dasein, which is often hidden by its own factual tendency to be understood as an intermundane entity, to show itself. This paper (...) will show why the question concerning Spatiality in Being and Time was an indispensable one, although it was covered up by Temporality. The question concerning Spatiality is important because it is the first form of giving meaning to one's own being. Because of the friction between the medial horizon and the existential constitution of "being-in", the spatiality of Dasein played a leading role in making Dasein's way of being transparent. This transparency of Spatiality, which is based on Dasein's possibility of un-distancing, was a first mode of Dasein's having its own place in the world. RESUMEN Este artículo constituye un esfuerzo fenomenológico por pensar la espacialidad en la obra Ser y Tiempo, desde una cierta radicalización del existenciario ser-en, a fin de ganar un ámbito de acogida y mostración del específico modo de ser del Dasein, su mismidad. En este sentido, se ha tratado de preparar la pregunta que hendiera el terreno para una mostración del aparecer del modo de ser del Dasein, muchas veces encubierto por su propia tendencia fáctica a comprenderse como ente intramundano. A propósito de tal finalidad, se entendió que la cuestión espacial, soterrada por mor de la temporalidad del ser, era indispensable, pues la espacialidad fue entendida como la primera forma de dotación de sentido del propio ser del Dasein, a saber, la espacialidad jugaba, en fricción con el horizonte medial impuesto por la constitución existencial del "ser-en", un papel protagonista a la hora de lograr la transparencia del modo de ser de este mismo Dasein. Esta transparencia espacial, basada en una capacidad hermenéutica des-alejante, era la primera forma de tener un lugar en el mundo por parte del Dasein. (shrink)

It is a question of thinking, with the help of the phenomenological attitude, the phenomenon of religion, understood as an experience of religiosity. The experience of religiosity points to a radical and limiting experience: it shows our historical constitution. For this reason, and with the help of Heidegger in his Phenomenology of Religion, it was thought that this historical being, characteristic of each existence, founds a clear representation in the living spirit of the primitive Christianity mentioned in the Pauline Epistles, (...) especially in the phenomenon of the Proclamation of Christ, in its transforming experience. Finally, a mode of conclusion, the meditation addresses the theme of temporality, which was opened by the Pauline experience of the Proclamation, understanding that there is a principle to think the most peculiar of ourselves, our selfhood. The experience of religiosity would open this time horizon that we are ourselves: I-am-been. (shrink)