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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Defeat reconsidered.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):49-51.details
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Pollock and Sturgeon on defeaters.Albert Casullo - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2897-2906.details
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Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Defeaters and higher-level requirements.Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.details
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Process reliabilism's troubles with defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.details
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On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):449-470.details
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What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1–25.details
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Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - London: Hutchinson.details
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Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 223–246.details
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Undercutting Defeat: When it Happens and Some Implications for Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 201-222.details
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Reasons, Justification, and Defeat.Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.) - 2021 - Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Defending interest-relative invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):591-609.details
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Pollock on defeasible reasons.Scott Sturgeon - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-14.details
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The Merits of Incoherence.James Pryor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):112-141.details
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Knowledge and Justification.John L. Pollock - 1974 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Edited by John Pollock.details
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Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.details
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Understanding undermining defeat.Giacomo Melis - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):433-442.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Memory as a generative epistemic source.Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):636–658.details
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Certainty, a refutation of scepticism.Peter David Klein - 1981 - Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.details
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Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2006 - Philosophy Compass.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Reliabilism and the problem of defeaters.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):65-76.details
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Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.details
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.T. Paxson & K. Lehrer - 1969 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.details
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Undermining Defeat and Propositional Justification.Giacomo Melis - 2016 - Argumenta 1 (2):271-280.details
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