- Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.details
|
|
Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalism.Michael Tye - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.details
|
|
Experience and representation.Joseph Levine - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Propositional Objects.W. V. O. Quine - 1969 - In Willard van Orman Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press. pp. 139-160.details
|
|
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
A Mathematical Theory of Communication.Claude Elwood Shannon - 1948 - Bell System Technical Journal 27 (April 1924):379–423.details
|
|
The Analysis of Matter.Bertrand Russell - 1927 - London: Kegan Paul.details
|
|
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
|
|
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
|
|
Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
|
|
Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
|
|
Consciousness and Cognition.Michael Thau - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Philosopher’s Projective Error.Bernard W. Kobes - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):581-593.details
|
|
I_— _Robert Stalnaker.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):141-156.details
|
|
On Considering a Possible World as Actual.Robert Stalnaker & Thomas Baldwin - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75:141-174.details
|
|
I_— _Robert Stalnaker.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):141-156.details
|
|
Indexical belief.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):129-151.details
|
|
Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2004 - In Garc (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 293-309.details
|
|
Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):299-322.details
|
|
XI*—Perception, Vision and Causation.Paul Snowdon - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1):175-192.details
|
|
Perception, vision, and causation.Paul Snowdon - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:175-92.details
|
|
Introspection and Phenomenal Character.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247-273.details
|
|
Introspection and phenomenal character.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.details
|
|
The Nature of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 2004 - Mind 113 (451):581-588.details
|
|
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.details
|
|
The refutation of idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Mind 12 (48):433-453.details
|
|
On the sense and reference of a proper name.John McDowell - 1977 - Mind 86 (342):159-185.details
|
|
Meaning, knowledge, and reality.John Henry McDowell - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
De re senses.John Mcdowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.details
|
|
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.details
|
|
Phenomenal content.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198.details
|
|
Words.David Kaplan - 1990 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1):93-119.details
|
|
Experiences.J. M. Hinton - 1967 - Philosophical Quarterly 17 (66):1-13.details
|
|
Experiences.J. M. Hinton - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (1):134-135.details
|
|
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
|
|
If You Can’t Make One, You Don’t Know How It Works.Fred Dretske - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.details
|
|
The Nature of Perception.John Foster - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Appearance properties?Andy Egan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):495-521.details
|
|
Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.details
|
|
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Stanford, CA: MIT Press.details
|
|
Conscious experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.details
|
|
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.details
|
|
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.details
|
|
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.details
|
|
Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.details
|
|
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.details
|
|
A Theory of Sentience.J. L. Bermudez - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):653-657.details
|
|
A Theory of Sentience.Austen Clark (ed.) - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|