- A Phenomenal Theory of Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2025 - In Andrei Ionuț Mărăşoiu & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Understanding and conscious experience: philosophical and scientific perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Moods and the Salience of Subjectivity.Anna Giustina - forthcoming - In Maik Niemeck & Stefan Lang (eds.), Self and Affect: Philosophical Intersections. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Are Phenomenal Theories of Thought Chauvinistic?Preston Lennon - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3):199-213.details
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The Horizonality of Visual Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps.Işık Sarıhan - 2024 - Ratio 37 (1):1-13.details
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Husserl, representationalism, and the theory of phenomenal intentionality.Chang Liu - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):67-84.details
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Non-personal immortality.Sebastian Gäb - 2023 - Religious Studies.details
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Perceptual Modes of Presentation as Object Files.Gabriel Siegel - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (6):2377 - 2395.details
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Husserl’s Dual Aspect Framework of Mind and the Rejection of Common Ground Mentality.Chang Liu - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (1):1-24.details
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Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists.Giulia Martina - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):138.details
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An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3831-3863.details
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(1 other version)The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Topoi 41 (1):195-205.details
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*Perception* (2021, preview).Adam Pautz - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co.details
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Imperative Transparency.Manolo Martínez - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):585-601.details
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(1 other version)The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Topoi 41 (1):1-11.details
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The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2635-2663.details
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Another Look at Mode Intentionalism.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2519-2546.details
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Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):210-232.details
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Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences.Douglas C. Wadle - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9841-9872.details
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Reducing Uncertainty: Understanding the Information-Theoretic Origins of Consciousness.Garrett Mindt - 2020 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
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Probabilistic representations in perception: Are there any, and what would they be?Steven Gross - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):377-389.details
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Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition.Tobias Schlicht & Tobias Starzak - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):89-113.details
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(1 other version)Are There Degreess of Self-Consciousness?R. Milliere - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):252-282.details
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Phenomenological approaches to non-conceptual content.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2017 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 6 (1):58-78.details
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Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.details
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Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2017 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.details
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Please mind the gappy content.Johan Gersel - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):219-239.details
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Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism.David Bourget - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268.details
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Are Introspective Beliefs about One’s Own Visual Experiences Immediate?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1).details
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Crossed Wires about Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error through Misidentification.Léa Salje - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):35-56.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):467-493.details
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Can Representationism Explain how Attention Affects Appearances?Sebastian Watzl - 2018 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. new york: MIT Press. pp. 481-607.details
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Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):41-59.details
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Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.details
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The Three Circles of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2023 - In M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 169-191.details
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(2 other versions)Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.details
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An Argument for Shape Internalism.Jan Almäng - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):819-836.details
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A Short History of the Philosophy of Consciousness in the Twentieth Century.Tim Crane - 2017 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge.details
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Recent Work on Naive Realism.James Genone - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1).details
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A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.Martina Fürst - 2013 - In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism: A Defense. New York: Routledge. pp. 112-135.details
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Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.details
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Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.details
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The epistemic force of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.details
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Constructing a World for the Senses.Katalin Farkas - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-115.details
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Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge. pp. 135-157.details
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Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of mind: the key thinkers. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 209-235.details
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What is the Problem of Non-Existence?Tim Crane - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.details
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Sniffing and smelling.Louise Richardson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):401-419.details
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Bodily Sensation and Tactile Perception.Louise Richardson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):134-154.details
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