- Knowledge claims and context: loose use.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395-438.details
|
|
Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.details
|
|
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know.Baron Reed - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 2--95.details
|
|
Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
|
|
10. Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness (pp. 632-637). [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder, Jonathan Way, Gregg Strauss, Tim Willenken, Matthew Talbert, Angela M. Smith, James A. Montmarquet, Nicole Hassoun, Virginia Held & Nicholas Wolterstorff - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3).details
|
|
Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and epistemic agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.details
|
|
A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
|
|
Knowing Without Evidence.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):309-331.details
|
|
Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
|
|
Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
|
|
Do Judgments Screen Evidence?Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
|
|
(1 other version)Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
|
|
On Intellectualism in Epistemology.Stephen R. Grimm - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):705-733.details
|
|
Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
|
|
Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
|
|
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
|
|
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
|
|
Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
|
|
A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.details
|
|
How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):573-599.details
|
|
(1 other version)Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.details
|
|
Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
|
|
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
|
|
Reasons to Not Believe (and Reasons to Act).Blake Roeber - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):439-48.details
|
|
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
|
|
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
|
|
(1 other version)Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):179-192.details
|
|
Practial reasoning, decision theory and anti-intellectualism.Jessica Brown - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):1-20.details
|
|
Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.details
|
|
Review: Replies to Brown, Pritchard and Conee. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):427 - 440.details
|
|
Review: Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. [REVIEW]Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):407 - 416.details
|
|
Acting on knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.details
|
|
The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
|
|
A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
|
|
Knowledge and credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.details
|
|
Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Paul K. Moser - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):670-673.details
|
|
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
|
|
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
(1 other version)Contextualism and the Problem of the External World.Ram Neta - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):1-31.details
|
|
Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? [REVIEW]Stewart Cohen - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):447-455.details
|
|
Resisting Encroachment. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):465-472.details
|
|
Akratic believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.details
|
|
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl and Matthew Mcgrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
|
|