- Foundations of evidence law.Alex Stein - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self‐Defense.Seth Lazar - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):699-728.details
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(1 other version)The probable and the provable.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1977 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.details
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Knowledge and Legal Proof.Sarah Moss - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.details
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Recent work on the proof paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12667.details
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The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.details
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Against the Alleged Insufficiency of Statistical Evidence.Sam Fox Krauss - 2020 - Florida State University Law Review 47:801-825.details
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Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.details
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Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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Imposing Risk: A Normative Framework.John Oberdiek - 2017 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):197-224.details
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Against legal probabilism.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.details
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Corrective justice.Ernest Joseph Weinrib - 2012 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Exploring the proof paradoxes.Mike Redmayne - 2008 - Legal Theory 14 (4):281-309.details
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(1 other version)The Probable and the Provable.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1977 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Legal risk, legal evidence and the arithmetic of criminal justice.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Jurisprudence 9 (1):108-119.details
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Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology.Larry Laudan - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Legal Probabilism: A Qualified Defence.Brian Hedden & Mark Colyvan - 2019 - Journal of Political Philosophy 27 (4):448-468.details
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Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts.John Oberdiek (ed.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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In Defence of Reasonable Doubt.Georgi Gardiner - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):221-241.details
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Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?Marcello Di Bello - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1045-1084.details
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Statistical evidence and individual litigants.Amit Pundik - manuscriptdetails
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