Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Nozick analyzes fundamental issues, such as the identity of the self, knowledge and skepticism, free will, the foundations of ethics, and the meaning of life.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1098 citations  
  • Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
    Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   274 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2383 citations  
  • (6 other versions)Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 47.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   685 citations  
  • Testimony: a philosophical study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Our trust in the word of others is often dismissed as unworthy, because the illusory ideal of "autonomous knowledge" has prevailed in the debate about the nature of knowledge. Yet we are profoundly dependent on others for a vast amount of what any of us claim to know. Coady explores the nature of testimony in order to show how it might be justified as a source of knowledge, and uses the insights that he has developed to challenge certain widespread assumptions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   327 citations  
  • (1 other version)Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   656 citations  
  • (1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.
    In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   235 citations  
  • (1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
    A rational person doesn’t believe just anything. There are limits on what it is rational to believe. How wide are these limits? That’s the main question that interests me here. But a secondary question immediately arises: What factors impose these limits? A first stab is to say that one’s evidence determines what it is epistemically permissible for one to believe. Many will claim that there are further, non-evidentiary factors relevant to the epistemic rationality of belief. I will be ignoring the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   336 citations  
  • (1 other version)What is a Conspiracy Theory?M. Giulia Https://Orcidorg Napolitano & Kevin Https://Orcidorg Reuter - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2035-2062.
    In much of the current academic and public discussion, conspiracy theories are portrayed as a negative phenomenon, linked to misinformation, mistrust in experts and institutions, and political propaganda. Rather surprisingly, however, philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to incorporate a negatively evaluative aspect when either analyzing or engineering the concept conspiracy theory. In this paper, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept conspiracy theory from five studies designed to test the existence, prevalence and exact form (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
    find myself believing all sorts 0f things for which I d0 not possess evidence: that smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer, that my car keeps stalling because the carburetor needs LO be rebuilt, that mass media threaten democracy, that slums cause emotional disorders, that my irregular heart beat is premature ventricular contraction, that students} grades are not correlated with success in the ncmacadcmic world, that nuclear power plants are not safe (enough) . . . The list 0f things I believe, though (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   351 citations  
  • Relying on others: an essay in epistemology.Sanford Goldberg - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations  
  • Against Gullibility.Elizabeth Fricker - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   193 citations  
  • (1 other version)How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):141-153.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   351 citations  
  • Conspiracy Theories.Quassim Cassam - 2019 - Polity Press.
    9/11 was an inside job. The Holocaust is a myth promoted to serve Jewish interests. The shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School were a false flag operation. Climate change is a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese government. These are all conspiracy theories. A glance online or at bestseller lists reveals how popular some of them are. Even if there is plenty of evidence to disprove them, people persist in propagating them. Why? Philosopher Quassim Cassam explains how conspiracy theories are different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Of conspiracy theories.Brian Keeley - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):109-126.
    As the end of the Millennium approaches, conspiracy theories are increasing in number and popularity. In this short essay, I offer an analysis of conspiracy theories inspired by Hume's discussion of miracles. My first conclusion is that whereas Hume can argue that miracles are, by definition, explanations we are not warranted in believing, there is nothing analytic that will allow us to distinguish good from bad conspiracy theories. There is no a priori method for distinguishing warranted conspiracy theories (say, those (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   148 citations  
  • The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories.Matthew R. X. Dentith - 2014 - London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Conspiracy theories are a popular topic of conversation in everyday life but are often frowned upon in academic discussions. Looking at the recent spate of philosophical interest in conspiracy theories, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories looks at whether the assumption that belief in conspiracy theories is typically irrational is well founded. -/- The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories is aimed at both the philosopher and the non-philosopher. It is a qualified defence of belief in conspiracy theories: belief in conspiracy theories can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories.Neil Levy - 2007 - Episteme 4 (2):181-192.
    Abstract The typical explanation of an event or process which attracts the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is an explanation that conflicts with the account advanced by the relevant epistemic authorities. I argue that both for the layperson and for the intellectual, it is almost never rational to accept such a conspiracy theory. Knowledge is not merely shallowly social, in the manner recognized by social epistemology, it is also constitutively social: many kinds of knowledge only become accessible thanks to the agent's embedding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Knowing Our Limits.Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Changing our minds isn't easy. Even when we recognize our views are disputed by intelligent and informed people, we rarely doubt our rightness. Why is this so? How can we become more open-minded, putting ourselves in a better position to tolerate conflict, advance collective inquiry, and learn from differing perspectives in a complex world? -/- Nathan Ballantyne defends the indispensable role of epistemology in tackling these issues. For early modern philosophers, the point of reflecting on inquiry was to understand how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Expertise and Conspiracy Theories.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (3):196-208.
    Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call `conspiracy theories,' but that the conspiracy theorist has good reason to be suspicious of the role of expert endorsements when it comes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • What's Epistemically Wrong with Conspiracy Theorising?Keith Harris - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:235-257.
    Belief in conspiracy theories is often taken to be a paradigm of epistemic irrationality. Yet, as I argue in the first half of this paper, standard criticisms of conspiracy theorising fail to demonstrate that the practice is invariably irrational. Perhaps for this reason, many scholars have taken a relatively charitable attitude toward conspiracy theorists and conspiracy theorising in recent years. Still, it would be a mistake to conclude from the defence of conspiracy theorising offered here that belief in conspiracy theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Scientific Testimony. Its roles in science and society.Mikkel Gerken - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Scientific Testimony concerns the roles of scientific testimony in science and society. The book develops a positive alternative to a tradition famously expressed by the slogan of the Royal Society Nullius in verba ("Take nobody's word for it"). This book argues that intra-scientific testimony—i.e., testimony between collaborating scientists—is not in conflict with the spirit of science or an add-on to scientific practice. On the contrary, intra-scientific testimony is a vital part of science. This is illustrated by articulating epistemic norms of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):287 - 313.
    Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such an approach, in terms of the context-sensitive 'all cases', in the spirit of David Lewis's contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data, resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, necessary conditions on knowledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom.Charles Pigden - 2007 - Episteme 4 (2):219-232.
    Abstract Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic “oughts” that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. But the beliefforming strategy of not believing conspiracy theories would be a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of selfmutilation. I discuss several variations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Do Conspiracies Tend to Fail? Philosophical Reflections on a Poorly Supported Academic Meme.Kurtis Hagen - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):429-448.
    Critics of conspiracy theories often charge that such theories are implausible because conspiracies of the kind they allege tend to fail. Thus, according to these critics, conspiracy theories that have been around for a while would have been, in all likelihood, already exposed if they had been real. So, they reason, they probably are not. In this article, I maintain that the arguments in support of this view are unconvincing. I do so by examining a list of four sources recently (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)Why We Should Be Suspicious of Conspiracy Theories: A Novel Demarcation Problem.Maarten Boudry - 2022 - Episteme 20 (3):611-631.
    What, if anything, is wrong with conspiracy theories (CTs)? A conspiracy refers to a group of people acting in secret to achieve some nefarious goal. Given that the pages of history are full of such plots, however, why are CTs often regarded with suspicion and even disdain? According to “particularism,” the currently dominant view among philosophers, each CT should be evaluated on its own merits and the negative reputation of CTs as a class is wholly undeserved. In this paper, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Are Conspiracy Theorists Irrational?David Coady - 2007 - Episteme 4 (2):193-204.
    Abstract It is widely believed that to be a conspiracy theorist is to suffer from a form of irrationality. After considering the merits and defects of a variety of accounts of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, I draw three conclusions. One, on the best definitions of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. Two, there may be occasions on which we should settle for an inferior definition which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories.David Coady - 2003 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2):197-209.
    Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation. This is especially true in the academy and in the media. Within these institutions, to describe someone as a conspiracy theorist is often to imply that his or her views should not be taken seriously. Perhaps this accounts for the fact that philosophers have tended to ignore the topic, despite the enduring appeal of conspiracy theories in popular culture. Recently, however, some philosophers have at least treated conspiracy theorists respectfully enough to try to articulate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Tracking, closure, and inductive knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 197--215.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • (1 other version)Experts: which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • Complots of Mischief.Charles Pigden - 2006 - In David Coady (ed.), Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Routledge. pp. 139-166.
    In Part 1, I contend (using Coriolanus as my mouthpiece) that Keeley and Clarke have failed to show that there is anything intellectually suspect about conspiracy theories per se. Conspiracy theorists need not commit the ‘fundamental attribution error’ there is no reason to suppose that all or most conspiracy theories constitute the cores of degenerating research programs, nor does situationism - a dubious doctrine in itself - lend any support to a systematic skepticism about conspiracy theories. In Part 2. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data.Joel Buenting & Jason Taylor - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (4):567-578.
    We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call "fortuitous data"—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Counterfact Conspiracy Theories.Susan Feldman - 2011 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (1):15-24.
    Recent philosophical treatment of conspiracy theories supposes them all to be explanatory, thus overlooking those conspiracy theories whose major purpose is the assertion of ‘hidden facts’ rather than explanation of accepted facts. I call this variety of non-explanatory conspiracy theories “counterfact theories”. In this paper, through the use of examples, including the Obama birth certificate conspiracy theory, I uncover the distinctive reasoning pattern and dialectical strategy of counterfact theories, highlighting their epistemic flaws.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Malevolent global conspiracy.Lee Basham - 2003 - Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (1):91–103.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • (1 other version)On Political Conspiracy Theories.Juha Räikkä - 2009 - Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2):185-201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Can You Keep a Secret? BS Conspiracy Theories and the Argument from Loose Lips.Ryan Ross - 2022 - Episteme 21 (2):545 - 564.
    According to an argument that I will call the argument from loose lips, we can safely reject certain notorious conspiracy theories because they posit conspiracies that would be nearly impossible to keep secret. I distinguish between three versions of this argument: the epistemic argument, the alethic argument, and the statistical argument. I, then, discuss several limitations of the argument from loose lips. The first limitation is that only the statistical argument can be applied to new conspiracy theories. The second limitation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)The Safety Condition for Knowledge.Danin D. Rabinowitz - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This entry examines in detail the safety condition for knowledge as found in the work of Ernest Sosa, Duncan Pritchard, and Timothy Williamson.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • (1 other version)Re-thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony.Joel Buenting - 2006 - Episteme 2 (2):129-134.
    Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation