- The Value of Knowledge and Other Epistemic Standings: A Case for Epistemic Pluralism.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1829-1847.details
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باور امن: بررسی روایت سوسا از شرط امنیت باور.Peyman Jabbari - 2014 - NAQD VA NAZAR 19 (1):94-119.details
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Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.details
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Insensitivity is back, baby!Keith DeRose - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):161-187.details
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Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals.Juan Comesaña - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):781-791.details
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Difference‐Making in Epistemology.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):368-387.details
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A debunking explanation for moral progress.Nathan Cofnas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3171-3191.details
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How hard are the sceptical paradoxes?Alex Byrne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):299–325.details
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Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1123-1152.details
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Sensitivity Actually.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):606-625.details
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Margins for error and sensitivity: What Nozick might have said. [REVIEW]Kelly Becker - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.details
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Epistemic luck and the generality problem.Kelly Becker - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.details
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Sensitivity, safety, and impossible worlds.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):713-729.details
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When to Dismiss Conspiracy Theories Out of Hand.Ryan Ross - 2023 - Synthese 202 (3):1-26.details
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Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.details
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Induction, Conjunction Introduction, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2023 - Philosophy 98 (4):477-483.details
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Can Sensitivity Preserve Inductive Knowledge?Haicheng Zhao - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1865-1882.details
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Possibility, Necessity and Probability: A Meditation on Underdetermination and Justification. [REVIEW]Elia Zardini - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):639-667.details
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Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth.José L. Zalabardo - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):147-171.details
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Open knowledge and changing the subject.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1047-1071.details
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Sensitivity hasn’t got a Heterogeneity Problem - a Reply to Melchior.Kevin Wallbridge - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):835-841.details
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Sensitivity, Induction, and Miracles.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):118-126.details
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Sensitivity and Higher-Order Knowledge.Kevin Wallbridge - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Skeptical arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.details
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Subjunctivitis.Jonathan Vogel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.details
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Scepticism, context and modal reasoning.Andrej Ule - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):9-30.details
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Saving Sensitivity.Brett Topey - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):177-196.details
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Debunking and fully apt belief.Joshua C. Thurow - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3).details
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Does cognitive science show belief in god to be irrational? The epistemic consequences of the cognitive science of religion.Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):77-98.details
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The heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts.Guido Melchior - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):479-496.details
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Skepticism: The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitivity Accounts.Guido Melchior - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):45-54.details
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Précis on Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):1-13.details
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A modal theory of discrimination.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Synthese 198 (11):10661-10684.details
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The lack of structure of knowledge.Arthur Viana Lopes - 2018 - Aufklärung 5 (2):21-38.details
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Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.details
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Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious.Tim Kraft - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2617-2632.details
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Taking things for granted: comments on Harman and Sherman.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):141-147.details
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Reliabilism and safety.Kelly Becker - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (5):691-704.details
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Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.details
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Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge.Yacin Hamami - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):77-89.details
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Corroboration: Sensitivity, Safety, and Explanation.David Godden - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):15-38.details
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Impossible Worlds and the Safety of Philosophical Beliefs.Zack Garrett & Zachariah Wrublewski - 2022 - Metaphilosophy (2-3):1-18.details
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Do Safety Failures Preclude Knowledge?J. R. Fett - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (2):301-319.details
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Baseless Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (50):211-231.details
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Epistemic luck and logical necessities: armchair luck revisited.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In Smiljana Gartner Bojan Borstner (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 137-150.details
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A generality problem for bootstrapping and sensitivity.Guido Melchior - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):31-47.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Andreas Lech Mogensen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge.Kevin T. Kelly - 2014 - In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Springer International Publishing. pp. 289-337.details
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My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive.Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 14 (3):469-489.details
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