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Value and the right kind of reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.details
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Scanlon versus Moore on goodness.Philip Stratton-Lake & Brad Hooker - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. pp. 149.details
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What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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Fitting Attitudes and Solitary Goods.Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):687-698.details
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Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.details
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Fittingness: The sole normative primitive.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.details
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No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails.Krister Bykvist - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):1-30.details
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Five Types of Ethical Theory.C. D. Broad - 1930 - Mind 39 (155):338-346.details
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The origin of our knowledge of right and wrong.Franz Brentano - 1889/1969 - New York,: Humanities Press. Edited by Oskar Kraus & Roderick M. Chisholm.details
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Moral valuation.Richard B. Brandt - 1945 - Ethics 56 (2):106-121.details
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Are all practical reasons based on value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:27-53.details
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Virtue, Vice and Value.Thomas Hurka - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):413-415.details
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Five Types of Ethical Theory.C. D. Broad - 1930 - New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.details
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The Definition of Good.Alfred C. Ewing - 1947 - Westport, Conn.: Routledge.details
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The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Richard Rowland - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming.Agnes Callard - 2018 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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Concern, Respect, and Cooperation.Garrett Cullity - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.details
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Précis of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):680-681.details
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Having Value and Being Worth Valuing.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (2):84-109.details
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Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding.Philip Stratton-Lake - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.details
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Feasibility as Deliberation‐Worthiness.Nicholas Southwood - 2022 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 50 (1):121-162.details
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Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame.David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (4):481-527.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
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Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Slaves of the passions * by mark Schroeder.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.details
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Reasons or Fittingness First?Richard Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.details
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Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.details
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Realism in Normative Political Theory.Enzo Rossi & Matt Sleat - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (10):689-701.details
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Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge.Jonas Olson - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365-378.details
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The fittingness of emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.details
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The fitting resolution of anger.Oded Na’Aman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2417-2430.details
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The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View.Oded Na'aman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):245-269.details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Barry Maguire - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):779-805.details
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The right and the wrong kind of reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.details
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The Fundamentality of Fit.Christopher Howard - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.details
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Articulating an uncompromising forgiveness.Pamela Hieronymi - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):529-555.details
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On Liking Aesthetic Value.Keren Gorodeisky - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):261-280.details
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A suggested non-naturalistic analysis of good.A. C. Ewing - 1939 - Mind 48 (189):1-22.details
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The Range of Reasons: In Ethics and Epistemology.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument.Bernard Williams - 2005 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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