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Why Panpsychism doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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Is there a fundamental level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.details
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Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?Janet Levin - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591.details
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Kantian humility: our ignorance of things in themselves.Rae Langton - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.details
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Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.details
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Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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What is a phenomenal concept?Janet Levin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.David Chalmers - 2009 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.details
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