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Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 2009 - New York, USA: Simon and Schuster.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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The Case for Closure.John Hawthorne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 26-43.details
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Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure.Fred Dretske - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 13-26.details
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Reply to hawthorne.Fred Dretske - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 43--46.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.details
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Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1948 - London and New York: Routledge.details
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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Proof of an External World.G. E. Moore - 1939 - H. Milford.details
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Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof.Crispin Wright - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):140-63.details
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Cogency and Question‐Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof.Crispin Wright - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):140-163.details
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Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof.Crispin Wright - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):140-163.details
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The Contingent A Priori: Has It Anything to Do with Indexicals?Timothy Williamson - 1986 - Analysis 46 (3):113 - 117.details
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When epistemic closure does and does not fail: a lesson from the history of epistemology.T. A. Warfield - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):35-41.details
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Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.details
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Subjunctivitis.Jonathan Vogel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.details
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Dogmatism repuzzled.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):307 - 321.details
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Selective Confirmation and the Ravens: A Reply to Foster.Israel Scheffler & Nelson Goodman - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):78.details
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A strategy for assessing closure.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):365 - 383.details
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Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Closure matters: Academic skepticism and easy knowledge.Peter Klein - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165–184.details
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Studies in the logic of confirmation (I.).Carl Gustav Hempel - 1945 - Mind 54 (213):1-26.details
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Studies in the logic of confirmation (II.).Carl Gustav Hempel - 1945 - Mind 54 (214):97-121.details
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Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1965 - New York: The Free Press.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.details
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.details
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In defence of closure.Richard Feldman - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):487-494.details
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Personal and doxastic justification in epistemology.Mylan Engel - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):133-150.details
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Information and Closure.Fred Dretske - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):409-413.details
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Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.details
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Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.Martin Davies - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 321-363.details
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Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):417-430.details
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Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.details
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Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.details
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The Logical Foundations of Probability. [REVIEW]Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (13):362-364.details
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Skepticism and Epistemic Closure.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.details
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Skepticism and Epistemic Closure.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.details
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Anti-Individualism and Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2004 - MIT Press.details
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Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Reliabilism leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.details
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