- Knowledge Closure and Knowledge Openness: A Study of Epistemic Closure Principles.Levi Spectre - 2009 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.details
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Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.Helen Steward - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (1):1-20.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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Subjective Externalism.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (1):4-22.details
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On Being Internally the Same.Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. Oxford University Press.details
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Contrastive self-knowledge and the McKinsey paradox.Sarah Sawyer - 2015 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 75-93.details
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What's Wrong with McKinsey-style Reasoning?James Pryor - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200.details
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Persons and their underpinnings.Martin Davies - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62.details
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Interaction without reduction: The relationship between personal and sub-personal levels of description.Martin Davies - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):87-105.details
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The Basis of Debasing Scepticism.Joe Cunningham - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):813-833.details
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Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws.Sean Crawford - 2003 - Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.details
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Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory.Sean Crawford - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):439-457.details
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Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission: what else?!).Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):235-254.details
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Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects.Annalisa Coliva - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.details
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The transmission of support: a Bayesian re-analysis.Jake Chandler - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):333-343.details
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Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.details
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Wright on the McKinsey Problem.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):385-391.details
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Internal identity is (partly) dispositional identity.Michael Bruckner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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VI-Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content.Jessica Brown - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-135.details
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Doubt, circularity and the Moorean response to the sceptic.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):1–14.details
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Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e42186.details
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Knowing the World by Knowing One's Mind.Sven Bernecker - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):1-34.details
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Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism.Helen Beebee - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.details
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Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2):415-428.details
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Knowledge across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Peter Baumann - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (2):363-380.details
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Contextualism and the Factivity Problem.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580-602.details
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Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):430-55.details
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A Problem for the Closure Argument.Philip Atkins & Ian Nance - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):36-49.details
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The Price of Twin Earth.Brandon James Ashby - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):689-710.details
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When warrant transmits.James Pryor - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent.Michael McKinsey - 2023 - In Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.details
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Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2011 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Putnam on Brains-in-Vats and Radical Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Putnam on Brains in Vats. Cambridge University Press.details
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The semantic basis of externalism.Michael McKinsey - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Pro Universitaria.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem.José Zalabardo - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):615-627.details
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Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism.Åsa Wikforss - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):158-181.details
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On the metaphysics of internalism and externalism.Alberto Voltolini - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (18):1 - 24.details
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Contrastive Hinge Epistemology.Giorgio Volpe - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1222-1249.details
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Merely superficially contingent a priori knowledge and the McKinsey paradox.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-15.details
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Transmission Failure Explained.Martin Smith - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):164-189.details
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Transmission Failure Failure.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71-102.details
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Evidence and the openness of knowledge.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1001-1037.details
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On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):647-665.details
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Confirmation, transitivity, and Moore: the Screening-Off Approach.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-21.details
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Confirmation, transitivity, and Moore: the Screening-Off Approach.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):797-817.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.details
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Hyper-reliability and apriority.James Pryor - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344.details
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Highlights of recent epistemology.James Pryor - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.details
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