- Knowing Right From Wrong.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on moral realism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.details
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A Framework for the Psychology of Norms.Chandra Sripada & Stephen Stich - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), Innate Mind: Volume 2: Culture and Cognition. , US: Oup Usa.details
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence?Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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Person as scientist, person as moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.details
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Getting Rid of Racism: Assessing Three Proposals in Light of Psychological Evidence.Daniel Kelly, Luc Faucher & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (3):293-322.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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Rational disagreement as a challenge to practical ethics and moral theory : an essay in moral epistemology.Robert Audi - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 225419.details
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Moral epistemology.Karen Jones - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Fieldwork in familiar places: morality, culture, and philosophy.Michele M. Moody-Adams - 1997 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)In defense of future tuesday indifference: Ideally coherent eccentrics and the contingency of what matters.Sharon Street - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):273-298.details
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Social intuitionists answer six questions about morality.Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund - 2008 - In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology Vol. 2. MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Sensitivity, safety, and anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral realism and the argument from disagreement.D. Loeb - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (3):281-303.details
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(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.details
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(1 other version)Ethical absolutism and the ideal observer.Roderick Firth - 1951 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (3):317-345.details
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Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics.Norman Daniels - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (5):256-282.details
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Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness.David O. Brink - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.details
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(2 other versions)The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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(2 other versions)Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:87-108.details
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(1 other version)Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer.Roderick Firth - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Knowledge and the Genealogy of Error.Nicholas Smyth - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):455-474.details
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Michele M. Moody-Adams: Fieldwork in Familiar Places. Morality, Culture, & Philosophy.Michele M. Moody-Adams - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (4):427-432.details
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Moral Realism: Facts and Norms. [REVIEW]David O. BRINK - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):610-624.details
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Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Robert Shaver - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):458.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.details
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How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.details
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Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77-96.details
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Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement.David Enoch - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):953-997.details
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Consequentialism and Cluelessness.James Lenman - 2000 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4):342-370.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency.John M. Doris - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Disagreement among Philosophers.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-39.details
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NINETEEN. The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and the Ambitions of Ethics.Bernard Williams - 2006 - In The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 277-296.details
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Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.details
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Dehumanization, Essentialism, and Moral Psychology.David Livingstone Smith - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):814-824.details
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Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190.details
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Social psychology: handbook of basic principles.D. Miller, D. A. Prentice, T. Higgins & A. Kruglanski - 1996 - In E. E. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Guilford.details
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(1 other version)Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge?Alan Gewirth - 2000 - In Christopher W. Gowans (ed.), Moral Disagreements: Classic and Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 22-43.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms.David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23):1-37.details
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(1 other version)Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge?Alan Gewirth - 1994 - Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):22-43.details
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Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement.Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.details
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