- Valuing Stillbirths.John Phillips & Joseph Millum - 2014 - Bioethics 29 (6):413-423.details
|
|
Accounting for the Harm of Death.Duncan Purves - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):89-112.details
|
|
Whole-Life Welfarism.Ben Bramble - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.details
|
|
The Epicurean View of Death.Eric T. Olson - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):65-78.details
|
|
The Misfortunes of the Dead.George Pitcher - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):183 - 188.details
|
|
Deathly Harm.Stephen Hetherington - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):349 - 362.details
|
|
Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Died.David B. Suits - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):69 - 84.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.details
|
|
Well‐Being And Time.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):48-77.details
|
|
The lucretian argument.Jeff McMahan - unknowndetails
|
|
Heller død enn udødelig.Heine Holmen - 2017 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 52 (1-2):40-56.details
|
|
Mortal harm.Steven Luper - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):239–251.details
|
|
The asymmetry of early death and late birth.Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (3):327-331.details
|
|
Why is death bad?Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.details
|
|
When is death bad for the one who dies?Ben Bradley - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):1–28.details
|
|
The symmetry argument: Lucretius against the fear of death.Stephen E. Rosenbaum - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):353-373.details
|
|
Mortal immortals: Lucretius on death and the voice of nature.Martha C. Nussbaum - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):303-351.details
|
|
Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.details
|
|
(1 other version)Death and the value of life.Jeff McMahan - 1988 - Ethics 99 (1):32-61.details
|
|
The Worst Time to Die.Ben Bradley - 2008 - Ethics 118 (2):291-314.details
|
|
Epicurus and the harm of death.William Grey - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):358 – 364.details
|
|
The termination thesis.Fred Feldman - 2000 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):98–115.details
|
|
(1 other version)Some puzzles about the evil of death.Fred Feldman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):205-227.details
|
|
Disappointment, sadness, and death.Kai Draper - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):387-414.details
|
|
The harm of death, time-relative interests, and abortion.David Degrazia - 2007 - Philosophical Forum 38 (1):57–80.details
|
|
Being born earlier.Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):110 – 114.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2009 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Creation ethics: reproduction, genetics and quality of life.David DeGrazia - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (5):415-416.details
|
|
VIII—Epicurus on Pleasure, a Complete Life, and Death: A Defence.Alex Voorhoeve - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):225-253.details
|
|
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.details
|
|
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.details
|
|
The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics.Martha C. Nussbaum - 1996 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (4):646-650.details
|
|
Age and Death: A Defence of Gradualism.Joseph Millum - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (3):279-297.details
|
|
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.details
|
|
How Should We Feel About Death?Ben Bradley - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (1):1-14.details
|
|
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1983 - Religious Studies 19 (1):96-99.details
|
|
Why abortion is immoral.Don Marquis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.details
|
|
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Sentient Nonpersons and the Disvalue of Death.David DeGrazia - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (7):511-519.details
|
|
Principles for allocation of scarce medical interventions.Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer & Ezekiel J. Emanuel - 2009 - The Lancet 373 (9661):423--431.details
|
|
Comparative Harm, Creation and Death.Neil Feit - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.details
|
|
Life and death.Ken Binmore - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):75-97.details
|
|
Valuing Lives and Allocating Resources: A Defense of the Modified Youngest First Principle of Scarce Resource Distribution.Ruth Tallman - 2012 - Bioethics 28 (5):207-213.details
|
|
Death's Distinctive Harm.Stephan Blatti - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):317-30.details
|
|
Fearing Death.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1983 - Philosophy 58 (224):175 - 188.details
|
|
Imagination and the self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 26-45.details
|
|
How bad is death?Ben Bradley - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):111-127.details
|
|
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence.David Benatar - 2009 - Human Studies 32 (1):101-108.details
|
|
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.details
|
|
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1980 - Critica 12 (34):125-133.details
|
|