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  1. (1 other version)Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
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  • Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • (6 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
    Russian translation of Gettier E. L. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? // Analysis, vol. 23, 1963. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.
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  • (2 other versions)How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?Susanna Siegel - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):127-142.
    How can we discover the contents of experience? I argue that neither introspection alone nor naturalistic theories of experience content are sufficient to discover these contents. I propose another method of discovery: the method of phenomenal contrast. I defend the method against skeptics who doubt that the contents of experience can be discovered, and I explain how the method may be employed even if one denies that experiences have contents.
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  • The Architecture of the Mind:Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    This book is a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. The Architecture of the Mind has three main goals. One is to argue for massive mental modularity. Another is to answer a 'How possibly?' challenge to any such approach. The first part of the book lays out the positive case supporting massive modularity. It also outlines how the thesis should best (...)
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  • Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception.Mohan Matthen - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain. Sensory systems are automatic sorting machines; they engage in a process of classification. Human vision sorts and orders external objects in terms of a specialized, proprietary scheme of categories - colours, shapes, speeds and directions of movement, etc. This 'Sensory Classification Thesis' implies that sensation (...)
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  • Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1407-1418.
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have (...)
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  • (1 other version)Neuropsychological inference with an interactive brain: A critique of the “locality” assumption.Martha J. Farah - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):43-61.
    When cognitive neuropsychologists make inferences about the functional architecture of the normal mind from selective cognitive impairments they generally assume that the effects of brain damage are local, that is, that the nondamaged components of the architecture continue to function as they did before the damage. This assumption follows from the view that the components of the functional architecture are modular, in the sense of being informationally encapsulated. In this target article it is argued that this “locality” assumption is probably (...)
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive Penetration and the Perception of Art (Winner of 2012 Dialectica Essay Prize).Dustin Stokes - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):1-34.
    There are good, even if inconclusive, reasons to think that cognitive penetration of perception occurs: that cognitive states like belief causally affect, in a relatively direct way, the contents of perceptual experience. The supposed importance of – indeed as it is suggested here, what is definitive of – this possible phenomenon is that it would result in important epistemic and scientific consequences. One interesting and intuitive consequence entirely unremarked in the extant literature concerns the perception of art. Intuition has it (...)
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  • Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
    Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the phenomenon, (...)
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  • The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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  • (3 other versions)What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
    The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
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  • Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience.Dustin Stokes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
    This paper considers an orectic penetration hypothesis which says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial and non-genuine instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic penetration is an interesting possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The orectic penetration hypothesis is thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively impenetrable. It is of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.Susanna Siegel - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2).
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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  • Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
    The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can (...)
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  • Cognitive impenetrability of early vision does not imply cognitive impenetrability of perception.Cathleen M. Moore - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):385-386.
    Pylyshyn argues that early vision is cognitively impenetrable, and therefore – contrary to knowledge-based theories of perception – that perception is noncontinuous with cognition. Those processes that are included in “early vision,” however, represent at best only one component of perception, and it is important that it is not the component with which most knowledge-based theories are concerned. Pylyshyn's analysis should be taken as a possible source of refinement of knowledge-based theories of perception, rather than as a condemnation of them.
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  • Is haptic perception continuous with cognition?Edouard Gentaz & Yves Rossetti - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):378-379.
    A further step in Pylyshyn's discontinuity thesis is to examine the penetrability of haptic (tactual-kinesthetic) perception. The study of the perception of orientation and the “oblique effect” (lower performance in oblique orientations than in vertical–horizontal orientations) in the visual and haptic modalities allows this question to be discussed. We suggest that part of the visual process generating the visual oblique effect is cognitively impenetrable, whereas all haptic processes generating the haptic oblique effect are cognitively penetrable.
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  • Us, them and it: Modules, genes, environments and evolution.Fiona Cowie - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):284–292.
    The Architecture of Mind is an ambitious and informative work, surveying an impressive range of empirical literature and arguing that the mind is massively modular. However, it suffers from two major theoretical flaws. First, Carruthers’ concept of a module is weak, so much so that it robs his thesis of massive modularity of any real substance. Second, his conception of how the mind’s modules evolved ignores the role of niche construction and cultural evolution to its detriment.
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  • Categories of Art.Kendall L. Walton - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):334-367.
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  • Nonconceptual content and the "space of reasons".Richard G. Heck - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.
    In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.
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  • On perceptual readiness.Jerome S. Bruner - 1957 - Psychological Review 64 (2):123-52.
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  • Anatomical and functional modularity in cognitive science: Shifting the focus.Vincent Bergeron - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):175 – 195.
    Much of cognitive science is committed to the modular approach to the study of cognition. The core of this approach consists of a pair of assumptions - the anatomical and the functional modularity assumptions - which motivate two kinds of inference: the anatomical and the functional modularity inferences. The legitimacy of both of these inferences has been strongly challenged, a situation that has had surprisingly little impact on most theorizing in the field. Following the introduction of an important, yet rarely (...)
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  • Separate visual pathways for perception and action.Melvyn A. Goodale & A. David Milner - 1992 - Trends in Neurosciences 15:20-25.
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  • Lesion studies, spared performance, and cognitive systems.Jack C. Lyons - 2003 - Cortex 39 (1):145-7.
    A short discussion piece arguing that the neuropsychological phenomenon of double dissociations is most revealing of underlying cognitive architecture because of the capacities that are spared, more than the capacities that are lost.
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  • Precis of the modularity of mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive (...)
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  • Computation and cognition: Issues in the foundation of cognitive science.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):111-32.
    The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach is that there is a natural domain of (...)
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  • The theory-ladenness of observation and the theory-ladenness of the rest of the scientific process.William F. Brewer & Bruce L. Lambert - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S176-S186.
    We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scientific process requires an examination (...)
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  • (1 other version)Is vision continuous with cognition?: The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it (...)
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  • Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.
    In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
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  • Nonconceptual mental content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Perception and conceptual content.Alex Byrne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs—that much seems obvious. As Brewer puts it, “sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs” (this volume, xx). In Mind and World McDowell argues that we can get from this apparent platitude to the controversial claim that perceptual experiences have conceptual content: [W]e can coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgement and belief, but only if we take it that spontaneity is already implicated in receptivity; that is, only if we take it that experiences have (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  • (1 other version)Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 229--258.
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  • Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind.Philip Gerrans & Valerie E. Stone - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):121-141.
    Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
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  • (1 other version)Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism.P. K. Feyerabend - 1967 - Critica 1 (2):103-106.
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  • (1 other version)The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
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  • Functional Independence and Cognitive Architecture.Vincent Bergeron - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):817-836.
    In cognitive science, the concept of dissociation has been central to the functional individuation and decomposition of cognitive systems. Setting aside debates about the legitimacy of inferring the existence of dissociable systems from ‘behavioural’ dissociation data, the main idea behind the dissociation approach is that two cognitive systems are dissociable, and thus viewed as distinct, if each can be damaged, or impaired, without affecting the other system’s functions. In this article, I propose a notion of functional independence that does not (...)
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  • Coin perception studies and the concept of schemata.Harold G. McCurdy - 1956 - Psychological Review 63 (3):160-168.
    The proposition that perception is in- fluenced by object value and perceiver need has enjoyed an exciting career since it was given prominence by Bruner and Goodman in an oral and, later, a printed report (3) of dramatic differ- ences between rich and poor children in their judgments of coin sizes. Whether that study or subsequent ones can be said to have upheld the proposition may be questionable; but the effect on psy- chologists is beyond doubt. They were refreshed and (...)
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  • Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Human Cognition.Edouard Machery - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):263-272.
    In The Architecture of the Mind, Carruthers proposes a new and detailed explanation for how human cognition could be both flexible and massively modular. The combinatorial nature of our linguistic faculty and our capacity to engage in inner speech are the cornerstones of this new explanation. Despite the ingenuity of this proposal, I argue that Carruthers has failed to explain how a massively modular mind could display the flexibility that is characteristic of human thought.
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  • In defense of massive modularity.Dan Sperber - 2001 - In Emmanuel Dupoux (ed.), Language, Brain, and Cognitive Development: Essays in Honor of Jacques Mehler. MIT Press.
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  • Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor.Paul M. Churchland - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.
    The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly (...)
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  • (1 other version)Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?Andy Clark - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):495.
    How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea is hostage to empirical fortune. (...)
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  • Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.H. Clark Barrett & Robert Kurzban - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (3):628-647.
    Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing (...)
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  • Dissociations in Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neuroscience.Edouard Machery - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):490-518.
    In this article, I compare the epistemic standing of the function-to-structure inferences found in cognitive neuroscience and of the inferences based on dissociations in neuropsychology. I argue that the former have a poorer epistemic standing than the latter.
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  • Visual spatial constancy and modularity: Does intention penetrate vision?Wayne Wu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):647-669.
    Is vision informationally encapsulated from cognition or is it cognitively penetrated? I shall argue that intentions penetrate vision in the experience of visual spatial constancy: the world appears to be spatially stable despite our frequent eye movements. I explicate the nature of this experience and critically examine and extend current neurobiological accounts of spatial constancy, emphasizing the central role of motor signals in computing such constancy. I then provide a stringent condition for failure of informational encapsulation that emphasizes a computational (...)
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  • The Organisation of Mind.Tim Shallice & Richard P. Cooper - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    To understand the mind, we need to draw equally on the fields of cognitive science and neuroscience. But these two fields have very separate intellectual roots, and very different styles. So how can these two be reconciled in order to develop a full understanding of the mind and brain.This is the focus of this landmark new book.
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  • Double Dissociation: Understanding its Role in Cognitive Neuropsychology.Martin Davies - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (5):500-540.
    The paper makes three points about the role of double dissociation in cognitive neuropsychology. First, arguments from double dissociation to separate modules work by inference to the best, not the only possible, explanation. Second, in the development of computational cognitive neuropsychology, the contribution of connectionist cognitive science has been to broaden the range of potential explanations of double dissociation. As a result, the competition between explanations, and the characteristic features of the assessment of theories against the criteria of probability and (...)
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