- Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Lisa Bortolotti - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 153-73.details
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(1 other version)Another Defence of Owen’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):147-153.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.details
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Weighing the Aim of Belief Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):141-145.details
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Belief, Truth and Knowledge.David M. Armstrong - 1973 - London,: Cambridge University Press.details
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Imagination and the motivational view of belief.L. O'Brien - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):55-62.details
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The evolution of misbelief.Ryan McKay & Daniel Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493–510; discussion 510–61.details
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Belief and normativity.Pascal Engel - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):179-203.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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Success Semantics.J. T. Whyte - 1990 - Analysis 50 (3):149 - 157.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.details
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How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.details
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Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.details
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On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.details
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Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2014 - New York: Routledge.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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(1 other version)The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Edited by R. B. Braithwaite.details
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Malfunction Defended.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2501-2522.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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Explanation in biopsychology.Ruth G. Millikan - 1995 - In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press.details
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The status of teleosemantics, or how to stop worrying about swampman.David Papineau - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):279-89.details
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Aims and Exclusivity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):721-731.details
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Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.details
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How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief.Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.details
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The truth Norm of belief.Conor Mchugh - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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Does doxastic transparency support evidentialism?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):541-547.details
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No Norm needed: On the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.details
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Believe what you want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.details
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Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.details
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Belief and aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.details
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Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Kent Bach - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):477-478.details
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Weighing the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.details
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(1 other version)The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey, R. B. Braithwaite & G. E. Moore - 1931 - Mind 40 (160):476-482.details
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Naturalist Reflections on Knowledge.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4):315-334.details
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Frank Ramsey: truth and success.Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel - 2002 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Pascal Engel.details
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Does belief have an aim?David John Owens - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.details
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(1 other version)A defence of Owens' exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457.details
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Aiming at Truth: On The Role of Belief.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):137-162.details
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