- Separability in Population Ethics.Teruji Thomas - 2022 - In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 271-295.details
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Are Spectrum Arguments Defused by Vagueness?Teruji Thomas - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):743-757.details
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Many-valued logic and sequence arguments in value theory.Simon Knutsson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10793-10825.details
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Can Parfit’s Appeal to Incommensurabilities Block the Continuum Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion?Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2019 - In Paul Bowman & Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (eds.), Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations, Vol. 1. Institute for Futures Studies.details
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What Should We Do About Future Generations? Impossibility of Parfit’s Theory X.Yew-Kwang Ng - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (2):235--253.details
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Critical Levels, Critical Ranges, and Imprecise Exchange Rates in Population Axiology.Elliott Thornley - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (3):382–414.details
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The impossibility of a satisfactory population prospect axiology (independently of Finite Fine-Grainedness).Elliott Thornley - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3671-3695.details
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Weak Superiority, Imprecise Equality and the Repugnant Conclusion.Karsten Klint Jensen - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (3):294-315.details
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Totalism without Repugnance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Timothy Campbell, Ketan Ramakrishnan & Jimmy Goodrich (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 200-231.details
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(1 other version)The Impossibility of a Satisfactory Population Ethics.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2011 - In Hans Colonius & Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov (eds.), Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior, Advanced Series on Mathematical Psychology.details
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(1 other version)Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.Derek Parfit - 2013 - In Muresan Valentin & Majima Shunzo (eds.), Applied Ethics: Perspectives from Romania. Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University. pp. 145-164.details
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Population Axiology and the Possibility of a Fourth Category of Absolute Value.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):81-110.details
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Vagueness and Thought.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Some Possibilities in Population Axiology.Teruji Thomas - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):807-832.details
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Incommensurability and vagueness in spectrum arguments: options for saving transitivity of betterness.Toby Handfield & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2373-2387.details
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On the survival of humanity.Johann Frick - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2-3):344-367.details
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(4 other versions)Well-Being. Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance.James Griffin - 1990 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 180 (4):730-731.details
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Millian superiorities.Gustaf Arrenhuis & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - Utilitas 17 (2):127-146.details
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The Good and the True.Ronald B. De Sousa - 1974 - Mind 83:534.details
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Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics.Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert & David J. Donaldson - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.details
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VII*—Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 (1):117-134.details
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Value Superiority.Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225-248.details
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Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?Derek Parfit - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):110-127.details
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(1 other version)Parity, Imprecise Comparability, and the Repugnant Conclusion.Ruth Chang - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):183-215.details
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(1 other version)Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning.Larry S. Temkin - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(2 other versions)Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2000 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics.Erik Carlson - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):283.details
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Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance.James Griffin - 1986 - Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press.details
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(2 other versions)Future generations: A challenge for moral theory.Gustaf Arrhenius - manuscriptdetails
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Millian superiorities.Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - Utilitas 17 (2):127-146.details
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Value and population size.Thomas Hurka - 1982 - Ethics 93 (3):496-507.details
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The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.details
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Parity, interval value, and choice.Ruth Chang - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):331-350.details
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(1 other version)Broome and the intuition of neutrality.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):389-411.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Population Ethics and Different-Number-Based Imprecision.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):166-181.details
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(1 other version)Population Ethics and Different‐Number‐Based Imprecision.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):166-181.details
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Infinite Ethics.Nick Bostrom - 2011 - Analysis and Metaphysics 10:9–59.details
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Value Relations Revisited.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):133-164.details
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(1 other version)Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning.Larry S. Temkin - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press.details
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What Should We Do About Future Generations?Yew-Kwang Ng - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (2):235.details
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(1 other version)Overpopulation and the quality of life.Derek Parfit - 2008 - In Jesper Ryberg (ed.), The repugnant conclusion. pp. 7-22.details
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Transitivity and vagueness.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):109-131.details
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Anonymous welfarism, critical-level principles, and the repugnant and sadistic conclusions.Walter Bossert - 2022 - In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
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Higher Goods and the Myth of Tithonus.Noah M. Lemos - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (9):482-496.details
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The Value of Existence.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Gustaf Arrhenius - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 424-444.details
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Value relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.details
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(1 other version)Repugnance or Intransitivity: A Repugnant But Forced Choice.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - In Torbjörn Tännsjö & Jesper Ryberg (eds.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 163--86.details
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