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Infinite Ethics.Nick Bostrom - 2011 - Analysis and Metaphysics 10:9–59.details
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(1 other version)Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu - 2014 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 152-185.details
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Vague Value.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):352-372.details
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(1 other version)Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning.Larry S. Temkin - 2012 - , US: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2000 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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The Very Repugnant Conclusion.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University. pp. 29-44.details
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Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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In defence of repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.details
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(1 other version)Trading Quality for Quantity.Christopher Knapp - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (1):211–33.details
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(1 other version)Future generations: A challenge for moral theory.Gustaf Arrhenius - manuscriptdetails
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An impossibility theorem for welfarist axiologies.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):247-266.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)What Should We Do About Future Generations? Impossibility of Parfit’s Theory X.Yew-Kwang Ng - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (2):235--253.details
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(1 other version)The Impossibility of a Satisfactory Population Ethics.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2011 - In Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov & Lacey Perry (eds.), Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior. World Scientific Publishing Company. pp. 1–26.details
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Topics in Population Ethics.Teruji Thomas - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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(1 other version)Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9.details
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(6 other versions)Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 2008 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Seven Masterpieces of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 337--383.details
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(1 other version)Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.details
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Weighing Lives.Daniel M. Hausman - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):718-722.details
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(1 other version)Trading Quality for Quantity.Christopher Knapp - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:211-233.details
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(5 other versions)Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1863 - Cleveland: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Geraint Williams.details
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Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?Derek Parfit - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):110-127.details
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The Value of Existence.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Gustaf Arrhenius - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 424-444.details
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Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness.Miriam Schoenfield - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):257-282.details
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Critical Notices.Rosanna Keefe - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):491-500.details
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Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):460-462.details
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(5 other versions)Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1864 - Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle. Edited by Geraint Williams.details
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Transitivity and vagueness.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):109-131.details
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(1 other version)Defending transitivity against zeno’s paradox.Ken Binmore & Alex Voorhoeve - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):272–279.details
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(1 other version)Population Ethics and Different‐Number‐Based Imprecision.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):166-181.details
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(1 other version)Population Ethics and Different-Number-Based Imprecision.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):166-181.details
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(1 other version)John Broome, Weighing Lives. [REVIEW]Jacob Ross - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):663-666.details
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Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Value Superiority.Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225-248.details
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Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion.Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (3):339.details
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Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics.Erik Carlson - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):283.details
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Vagueness by Degrees.Dorothy Edgington - 1996 - In Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Repugnance or Intransitivity: A Repugnant But Forced Choice.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - In Torbjörn Tännsjö & Jesper Ryberg (eds.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 163--86.details
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On Some Impossibility Theorems in Population Ethics.Erik Carlson - 2022 - In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)What Should We Do About Future Generations?Yew-Kwang Ng - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (2):235.details
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One more axiological impossibility theorem.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2009 - In Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Ethics and all that Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. pp. 23-37.details
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The paradoxes of future generations and normative theory.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2004 - In Torbjörn Tännsjö & Jesper Ryberg (eds.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 201-218.details
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(1 other version)Population ethics: On parfit’s views concerning future generations.W. Robert Pulvertaft - 1991 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 26 (1):33.details
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(1 other version)Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning.Larry S. Temkin - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Higher Values and Non-Archimedean Additivity.Erik Carlson - 2007 - Theoria 73 (1):3-27.details
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Parfit’s Puzzle.Philip Kitcher - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):550–577.details
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Antiprioritarianism.Hilary Greaves - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (1):1-42.details
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Separability in Population Ethics.Teruji Thomas - 2022 - In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 271-295.details
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