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  1. Transformative experiences, rational decisions and shark attacks.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1619-1639.
    How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul (2014) has argued that many decisions involving transformative experiences cannot be rational. However, Paul acknowledges that some traumatic events can be transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rational decision-making. For instance, being attacked by hungry sharks would be a transformative experience, and yet, deciding not to swim with hungry sharks is rational. Paul has tried (...)
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  • Informed Consent: What Must Be Disclosed and What Must Be Understood?Joseph Millum & Danielle Bromwich - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 21 (5):46-58.
    Over the last few decades, multiple studies have examined the understanding of participants in clinical research. They show variable and often poor understanding of key elements of disclosure, such as expected risks and the experimental nature of treatments. Did the participants in these studies give valid consent? According to the standard view of informed consent they did not. The standard view holds that the recipient of consent has a duty to disclose certain information to the profferer of consent because valid (...)
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  • Pandemic ethics: the case for risky research.Richard Yetter Chappell & Peter Singer - 2020 - Research Ethics 16 (3-4):1-8.
    There is too much that we do not know about COVID-19. The longer we take to find it out, the more lives will be lost. In this paper, we will defend a principle of risk parity: if it is permissible to expose some members of society (e.g. health workers or the economically vulnerable) to a certain level of ex ante risk in order to minimize overall harm from the virus, then it is permissible to expose fully informed volunteers to a (...)
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  • Informed Consent, Disclosure, and Understanding.Tom Dougherty - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (2):119-150.
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  • What Imagination Teaches.Amy Kind - 2020 - In John Schwenkler & Enoch Lambert (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. Oxford University Press.
    David Lewis has argued that “having an experience is the best way or perhaps the only way, of coming to know what that experience is like”; when an experience is of a sufficiently new sort, mere science lessons are not enough. Developing this Lewisian line, L.A. Paul has suggested that some experiences are epistemically transformative. Until an individual has such an experience it remains epistemically inaccessible to her. No amount of stories and theories and testimony from others can teach her (...)
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  • The problems of transformative experience.Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1065-1084.
    Laurie Paul has recently argued that transformative experiences pose a problem for decision theory. According to Paul, agents facing transformative experiences do not possess the states required for decision theory to formulate its prescriptions. Agents facing transformative experiences are impoverished relative to their decision problems, and decision theory doesn’t know what to do with impoverished agents. Richard Pettigrew takes Paul’s challenge seriously. He grants that decision theory cannot handle decision problems involving transformative experiences. To deal with the problems posed by (...)
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  • Knowing What It is Like and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):105-120.
    It is often said that ‘what it is like’-knowledge cannot be acquired by consulting testimony or reading books [Lewis 1998; Paul 2014; 2015a]. However, people also routinely consult books like What It Is Like to Go to War [Marlantes 2014], and countless ‘what it is like’ articles and youtube videos, in the apparent hope of gaining knowledge about what it is like to have experiences they have not had themselves. This article examines this puzzle and tries to solve it by (...)
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  • Reframing Consent for Clinical Research: A Function-Based Approach.Scott Y. H. Kim, David Wendler, Kevin P. Weinfurt, Robert Silbergleit, Rebecca D. Pentz, Franklin G. Miller, Bernard Lo, Steven Joffe, Christine Grady, Sara F. Goldkind, Nir Eyal & Neal W. Dickert - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics 17 (12):3-11.
    Although informed consent is important in clinical research, questions persist regarding when it is necessary, what it requires, and how it should be obtained. The standard view in research ethics is that the function of informed consent is to respect individual autonomy. However, consent processes are multidimensional and serve other ethical functions as well. These functions deserve particular attention when barriers to consent exist. We argue that consent serves seven ethically important and conceptually distinct functions. The first four functions pertain (...)
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  • The impossibility of reliably determining the authenticity of desires: implications for informed consent.Jesper Ahlin - 2018 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 21 (1):43-50.
    It is sometimes argued that autonomous decision-making requires that the decision-maker’s desires are authentic, i.e., “genuine,” “truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. In this article, it is argued that a method to reliably determine the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of a desire cannot be developed. A taxonomy of characteristics displayed by different theories of authenticity is introduced and applied to evaluate such theories categorically, in contrast to the prior approach of treating them individually. The conclusion is drawn that, (...)
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  • The Moral Magic of Consent: Heidi M. Hurd.Heidi Hurd - 1996 - Legal Theory 2 (2):121-146.
    We regularly wield powers that, upon close scrutiny, appear remarkably magical. By sheer exercise of will, we bring into existence things that have never existed before. With but a nod, we effect the disappearance of things that have long served as barriers to the actions of others. And, by mere resolve, we generate things that pose significant obstacles to others' exercise of liberty. What is the nature of these things that we create and destroy by our mere decision to do (...)
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  • (1 other version)Altruistic Surrogacy and Informed Consent.Justin Oakley - 2007 - Bioethics 6 (4):269-287.
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  • Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life‐Sustaining Treatment.Julian Savulescu - 2007 - Bioethics 8 (3):191-222.
    ABSTRACT It is accepted that treatment of previously competent, now incompetent patients can be limited if that is what the patient would desire, if she were now competent. Expressed past preferences or an advance directive are often taken to constitute sufficient evidence of what a patient would now desire. I distinguish between desires and rational desires. I argue that for a desire to be an expression of a person's autonomy, it must be or satisfy that person's rational desires. A person (...)
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  • Relevant Information and Informed Consent in Research: In Defense of the Subjective Standard of Disclosure.Vilius Dranseika, Jan Piasecki & Marcin Waligora - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (1):215-225.
    In this article, we seek to contribute to the debate on the requirement of disclosure in the context of informed consent for research. We defend the subjective standard of disclosure and describe ways to implement this standard in research practice. We claim that the researcher should make an effort to find out what kinds of information are likely to be relevant for those consenting to research. This invites researchers to take empirical survey information seriously, attempt to understand the cultural context, (...)
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  • What You Can Expect When You Don't Want to be Expecting.Elizabeth Barnes - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):775-786.
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  • Transformative Experience and Decision Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):766-774.
    This paper is part of a book symposium for L. A. Paul (2014) Transformative Experience (OUP).
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  • (1 other version)Trans*formative Experiences.Rachel McKinnon - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):419-440.
    What happens when we consider transformative experiences from the perspective of gender transitions? In this paper I suggest that at least two insights emerge. First, trans* persons’ experiences of gender transitions show some limitations to L.A. Paul’s (forthcoming) decision theoretic account of transformative decisions. This will involve exploring some of the phenomenology of coming to know that one is trans, and in coming to decide to transition. Second, what epistemological effects are there to undergoing a transformative experience? By connecting some (...)
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  • How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You're Expecting.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-12.
    L.A. Paul has argued that an ordinary, natural way of making a decision -- by reflecting on the phenomenal character of the experiences one will have as a result of that decision -- cannot yield rational decision in certain cases. Paul's argument turns on the (in principle) epistemically inaccessible phenomenal character of certain experiences. In this paper I argue that, even granting Paul a range of assumptions, her argument doesn't work to establish its conclusion. This is because, as I argue, (...)
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  • What You Can't Expect When You're Expecting'.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.
    It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...)
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  • Rethinking informed consent in bioethics.Neil C. Manson - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
    Informed consent is a central topic in contemporary biomedical ethics. Yet attempts to set defensible and feasible standards for consenting have led to persistent difficulties. In Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics Neil Manson and Onora O'Neill set debates about informed consent in medicine and research in a fresh light. They show why informed consent cannot be fully specific or fully explicit, and why more specific consent is not always ethically better. They argue that consent needs distinctive communicative transactions, by which (...)
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  • Familiar transformative experiences.Petronella Randell - 2023 - Synthese 202 (2):1-16.
    On the standard Paulian definition of epistemically transformative experiences (ETE), we can’t know what an ETE is like before we have it. ETEs are new kinds of experiences and, importantly, can’t be imagined—this is why they have a unique ability to teach us what a particular experience is like. Contra Paul, some philosophers (Sharadin, 2015; Wilkenfeld, 2016; Ismael, 2019; Kind, 2020; Daoust, 2021; Cath, 2022) have argued that transformative experiences can be imagined. A neglected consequence of this argument is that (...)
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  • Journeying to Ixtlan: Ethics of Psychedelic Medicine and Research for Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Dementias.Andrew Peterson, Emily A. Largent, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Jason Karlawish & Dominic Sisti - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 14 (2):107-123.
    In this paper, we examine the case of psychedelic medicine for Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias (AD/ADRD). These “mind-altering” drugs are not currently offered as treatments to persons with AD/ADRD, though there is growing interest in their use to treat underlying causes and associated psychiatric symptoms. We present a research agenda for examining the ethics of psychedelic medicine and research involving persons living with AD/ADRD, and offer preliminary analyses of six ethical issues: the impact of psychedelics on autonomy and consent; (...)
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  • Mother Knows Best: Pregnancy, Applied Ethics, and Epistemically Transformative Experiences.Fiona Woollard - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (1):155-171.
    L.A. Paul argues that interesting issues for rational choice theory are raised by epistemically transformative experiences: experiences which provide access to knowledge that could not be known without the experience. Consideration of the epistemic effects of pregnancy has important implications for our understanding of epistemically transformative experiences and for debate about the ethics of abortion and applied ethics more generally. Pregnancy is epistemically transformative both in Paul’s narrow sense and in a wider sense: those who have not been pregnant face (...)
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  • Informed consent to HIV cure research.Danielle Bromwich & Joseph R. Millum - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (2):108-113.
    Trials with highly unfavourable risk–benefit ratios for participants, like HIV cure trials, raise questions about the quality of the consent of research participants. Why, it may be asked, would a person with HIV who is doing well on antiretroviral therapy be willing to jeopardise his health by enrolling in such a trial? We distinguish three concerns: first, how information is communicated to potential participants; second, participants’ motivations for enrolling in potentially high risk research with no prospect of direct benefit; and (...)
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  • Transformative Choice: Discussion and Replies.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):473-545.
    In “What you can’t expect when you’re expecting,” I argue that, if you don’t know what it’s like to be a parent, you cannot make this decision rationally—at least, not if your decision is based on what you think it would be like for you to become a parent. My argument hinges on the idea that becoming a parent is a transformative experience. This unique type of experience often transforms people in a deep and personal sense, and in the process, (...)
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  • Modeling Authenticity.Daniel A. Wilkenfeld - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):245-268.
    In this paper, we explore the link between understanding and transformative decisions. Paul (2014) suggests that one important aspect of making some decisions is that we make them not just on the basis of what data from other people tell us, but based on our own acquaintance with how the decision affects us. In this paper, we draw out a parallel between the sort of reasoning that Paul argues is required for authentic decision making and the sort of epistemic grasp (...)
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  • Should informed consent be based on rational beliefs?J. Savulescu & R. W. Momeyer - 1997 - Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (5):282-288.
    Our aim is to expand the regulative ideal governing consent. We argue that consent should not only be informed but also based on rational beliefs. We argue that holding true beliefs promotes autonomy. Information is important insofar as it helps a person to hold the relevant true beliefs. But in order to hold the relevant true beliefs, competent people must also think rationally. Insofar as information is important, rational deliberation is important. Just as physicians should aim to provide relevant information (...)
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  • Undermining autonomy and consent: the transformative experience of disease.Bjørn Hofmann - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (3):195-200.
    Disease radically changes the life of many people and satisfies formal criteria for being a transformative experience. According to the influential philosophy of Paul, transformative experiences undermine traditional criteria for rational decision-making. Thus, the transformative experience of disease can challenge basic principles and rules in medical ethics, such as patient autonomy and informed consent. This article applies Paul’s theory of transformative experience and its expansion by Carel and Kidd to investigate the implications for medical ethics. It leads to the very (...)
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  • Transformative Experiences, Cognitive Modelling and Affective Forecasting.Marvin Https://Orcidorg Mathony & Michael Https://Orcidorg Messerli - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):65-87.
    In the last seven years, philosophers have discussed the topic of transformative experiences. In this paper, we contribute to a crucial issue that is currently under-researched: transformative experiences' influence on cognitive modelling. We argue that cognitive modelling can be operationalized as affective forecasting, and we compare transformative and non-transformative experiences with respect to the ability of affective forecasting. Our finding is that decision-makers’ performance in cognitively modelling transformative experiences does not systematically differ from decision-makers’ performance in cognitively modelling non-transformative experiences. (...)
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  • Ethics and ego dissolution: the case of psilocybin.William R. Smith & Dominic Sisti - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (12):807-814.
    Despite the fact that psychedelics were proscribed from medical research half a century ago, recent, early-phase trials on psychedelics have suggested that they bring novel benefits to patients in the treatment of several mental and substance use disorders. When beneficial, the psychedelic experience is characterized by features unlike those of other psychiatric and medical treatments. These include senses of losing self-importance, ineffable knowledge, feelings of unity and connection with others and encountering ‘deep’ reality or God. In addition to symptom relief, (...)
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  • Principles of Biomedical Ethics.Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress - 1995 - Hastings Center Report 25 (4):37.
    Book reviewed in this article: Principles of Biomedical Ethics. By Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.
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  • The impossibility of informed consent?Kenneth Boyd - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (1):44-47.
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  • (2 other versions)Surrogacy and Autonomy.Karen Jones Susan Dodds - 1989 - Bioethics 3 (1):1-17.
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  • “The Moral Magic of Consent.Larry Alexander - 1996 - Legal Theory 2 (3):165-174.
    I begin my analysis of consent by agreeing with Professor Hurd that consent functions as a “moral transformative” by altering the obligations and permissions that determine the Tightness of others' actions. I further agree with her that consent is intimately related to the capacity for autonomous action; one who cannot alter others' obligations through consent is not fully autonomous. I cannot improve on her elaboration of these points.
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  • Forced to be free? Increasing patient autonomy by constraining it.Neil Levy - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (5):293-300.
    It is universally accepted in bioethics that doctors and other medical professionals have an obligation to procure the informed consent of their patients. Informed consent is required because patients have the moral right to autonomy in furthering the pursuit of their most important goals. In the present work, it is argued that evidence from psychology shows that human beings are subject to a number of biases and limitations as reasoners, which can be expected to lower the quality of their decisions (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Surrogacy and Autonomy.Karen Jones Susan Dodds - 1989 - Bioethics 3 (1):1-17.
    Book reviewed in this article: Beginning Lives, by Rosalind Hursthouse. On Moral Medicine:Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics, edited by Stephen E. Lammers and Allen Verhey. Quantitative Risk Assessment, edited by James M. Humber and Robert F. A Theory of Value and Obligation, by Robin Attfield. Ethical Issues at the Outset of Life, edited by William B. Weil Jr. and Martin Benjamin. Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying by Norman L. Cantor Having Your Baby By Donor Insemination:A Complete Resource Guide, by (...)
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  • Body Integrity Identity Disorder Beyond Amputation: Consent and Liberty.Amy White - 2014 - HEC Forum 26 (3):225-236.
    In this article, I argue that persons suffering from Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) can give informed consent to surgical measures designed to treat this disorder. This is true even if the surgery seems radical or irrational to most people. The decision to have surgery made by a BIID patient is not necessarily coerced, incompetent or uninformed. If surgery for BIID is offered, there should certainly be a screening process in place to insure informed consent. It is beyond the scope (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Surrogacy and autonomy.Susan Dodds & Karen Jones - 1989 - Bioethics 3 (1):1–17.
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  • Informed consent.Nir Eyal - 2017 - In Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. New York, NY: Routledge.
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  • Informed Consent Conversations: Neither the Beginning nor the End.Liza-Marie Johnson & Barclay R. Rogers - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 21 (5):76-78.
    Informed Consent: What Must Be Disclosed and What Must Be Understood seeks to challenge the “standard view” of consent. It seeks to do so by segregating the “disclosure function” from the “understa...
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  • Cognitive Transformation, Dementia, and the Moral Weight of Advance Directives.Emily Walsh - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (8):54-64.
    Dementia patients in the moderate-late stage of the disease can, and often do, express different preferences than they did at the onset of their condition. The received view in the philosophical literature argues that advance directives which prioritize the patient’s preferences at onset ought to be given decisive moral weight in medical decision-making. Clinical practice, on the other hand, favors giving moral weight to the preferences expressed by dementia patients after onset. The purpose of this article is to show that (...)
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  • The Role of Regret in Medical Decision-making.Paddy McQueen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):1051-1065.
    In this paper, I explore the role that regret does and should play in medical decision-making. Specifically, I consider whether the possibility of a patient experiencing post-treatment regret is a good reason for a clinician to counsel against that treatment or to withhold it. Currently, the belief that a patient may experience post-treatment regret is sometimes taken as a sufficiently strong reason to withhold it, even when the patient makes an explicit, informed request. Relatedly, medical researchers and practitioners often understand (...)
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  • The Concept of Voluntary Consent.Robert M. Nelson, Tom Beauchamp, Victoria A. Miller, William Reynolds, Richard F. Ittenbach & Mary Frances Luce - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics 11 (8):6-16.
    Our primary focus is on analysis of the concept of voluntariness, with a secondary focus on the implications of our analysis for the concept and the requirements of voluntary informed consent. We propose that two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must be satisfied for an action to be voluntary: intentionality, and substantial freedom from controlling influences. We reject authenticity as a necessary condition of voluntary action, and we note that constraining situations may or may not undermine voluntariness, depending on the (...)
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  • A rational route to transformative decisions.Daniel Https://Orcidorg624X Villiger - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14535-14553.
    According to Paul (Transformative experience, 1st edn, Oxford University Press, 2014), transformative experiences pose a challenge to decision theory since their value cannot be anticipated. Building on Pettigrew’s (in: Lambert, Schwenkler (eds) Becoming someone new: essays on transformative experience, choice, and change, Oxford University Press, pp 100–121, 2020) redescription, this paper presents a new approach to how and when transformative decisions can nevertheless be made rationally. Thanks to fundamental higher-order facts that apply to any kind of experience, an agent always (...)
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  • Uncertain preferences in rational decision.Moritz Schulz - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (6):605-627.
    ABSTRACT Is uncertainty about preferences rationally possible? And if so, does it matter for rational decision? It is argued that uncertainty about preferences is possible and should play the same role in rational decision-making as uncertainty about worldly facts. The paper develops this hypothesis and defends it against various objections.
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  • Rational transformative decision-making.Daniel Https://Orcidorg624X Villiger - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3):1-20.
    According to L. A. Paul (2014), transformative experiences pose a challenge for decision theory, as their subjective value is not epistemically accessible. However, several authors propose that the subjective values of options are often irrelevant to their ranking; in many cases, all we need for rational transformative decision-making are the known non-subjective values. This stance is in conflict with Paul’s argument that the subjective value can always swamp the non-subjective value. The approach presented in this paper takes Paul’s argument into (...)
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  • Valid consent.Emma C. Bullock - 2017 - In Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. New York, NY: Routledge.
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  • Transformative Decisions.Kevin Reuter & Michael Messerli - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (6):313-335.
    Some decisions we make—such as becoming a parent or moving to a different part of the world—are transformative. According to L. A. Paul, transformative decisions pose a major problem to us because they fall outside the realm of rationality. Her argument for that conclusion rests on the premise that subjective value is central in transformative decisions. This paper challenges that premise and hence the overall conclusion that transformative decisions usually are not rational. In the theoretical part of the paper, we (...)
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  • Patient competence and surrogate decision making.Dan Brock - 2007 - In Rosamond Rhodes, Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 128--140.
    The prelims comprise: References Additional Reading.
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  • The Silent World of Doctor and Patient.Daniel Callahan & Jay Katz - 1984 - Hastings Center Report 14 (6):47.
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  • Justifying a principle of informed consent: A case study in autonomy-based ethics.Martin Gunderson - 1990 - Public Affairs Quarterly 4 (3):249-265.
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