- Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.details
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Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.details
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Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech.John N. Williams - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):225-254.details
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(1 other version)Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.details
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Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
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A Moorean paradox of desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.details
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Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.details
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What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33 - 58.details
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(1 other version)Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.details
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(2 other versions)What Moore’s Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.details
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(2 other versions)What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.details
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(2 other versions)What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.details
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A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..details
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(1 other version)Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Moorean absurdity : an epistemological analysis.Claudio de Almeida - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person.Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Moore’s Paradoxes and Iterated Belief.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.details
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Moorean absurdity and showing what's within.Mitchell Green - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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The absurd.Thomas Nagel - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (20):716-727.details
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(1 other version)Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.details
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Moore’s Paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox.Timothy Chan - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.details
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Three Faces of Desire.Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.details
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Belief, Truth and Knowledge.D. M. Armstrong - 1973 - London,: Cambridge University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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On knowing one’s own mind.Sydney Shoemaker - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:183-209.details
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Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action.G. F. Schueler - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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Russell's "Theory of Descriptions.".G. E. Moore - 1944 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 9 (3):78-78.details
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Moral Reality and the End of Desire.Mark Platts - 1980 - In Mark de Bretton Platts (ed.), Reference, Truth, and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language. Boston: Routledge.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201-207.details
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Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis.Marian David - 2008 - In Matthias Steup, John Turri & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 363-377.details
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The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya.Bhikkhu Bodhi - 2001 - Wisdom.details
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Some Revisionary Proposals about Belief and Believing.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:133 - 153.details
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Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.details
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Moore’s Paradox, Truth and Accuracy: A Reply to Lawlor and Perry.John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.details
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Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.details
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(1 other version)Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1982 - In Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Moore’s Paradoxes and Iterated Belief.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.details
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Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional 'Structure' of Assertion.John N. Williams - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):160 - 166.details
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(4 other versions)The Rediscovery of the Mind, by John Searle. [REVIEW]Mark William Rowe - 1992 - Philosophy 68 (265):415-418.details
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I think, therefore I err.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2005 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 72 (1):1-24.details
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