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Remarks on the philosophy of psychology.Ludwig Wittgenstein (ed.) - 1980 - Oxford: Blackwell.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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G.E. Moore: Selected Writings.Thomas Baldwin (ed.) - 1993 - Routledge.details
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G.E. Moore.Thomas Baldwin (ed.) - 1990 - New York: Routledge.details
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Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Prompting challenges.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):456-462.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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The Logic of Conditionals.[author unknown] - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (1):155-158.details
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Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568–580.details
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Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Probability, Induction and Statistics: The Art of Guessing.Bruno De Finetti - 1972 - New York: John Wiley.details
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What Moore’s Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.details
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What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.details
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Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility.Claudio de Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.details
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I Falsely Believe That P.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Analysis 52 (3):191.details
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Moore's paradox and epistemic risk.Arthur W. Collins - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):308-319.details
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Mr. O'Connor's "pragmatic paradoxes".L. Jonathan Cohen - 1950 - Mind 59 (233):85-87.details
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Moore’s Paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox.Timothy Chan - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.details
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Aristotle on consciousness.Victor Caston - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):751-815.details
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On Believing You Believe.James Cargile - 1967 - Analysis 27 (6):177 - 183.details
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On believing you believe.James Cargile - 1967 - Analysis 27 (6):177-183.details
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More on justification and Moore's paradox.Anthony Brueckner - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):497-499.details
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Justification and Moore's paradox.Anthony Brueckner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):264–266.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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“P and I Will Believe that not-P”: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief.Luc Bovens - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):737-760.details
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Mr. Deutscher on Saying and Disbelieving.W. L. Bonney - 1965 - Analysis 26 (1):17 - 20.details
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Saying and Disbelieving.Max Black - 1952 - Analysis 13 (2):25-33.details
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Reinforcing the knowledge account of assertion.Martijn Blaauw - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):105-108.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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Two more for the knowledge account of assertion.Matthew Benton - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):684-687.details
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Assertion, knowledge and predictions.Matthew Benton - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):102-105.details
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The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300.details
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Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.details
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Some Paradoxes of Counterprivacy.André Gombay - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (244):191 - 210.details
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Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility.Claudio Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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The logic of conditionals: an application of probability to deductive logic.Ernest Wilcox Adams - 1996 - Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co..details
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A Moorean paradox of desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.details
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Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Norm of Belief.Michael Huemer - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
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A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..details
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Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546.details
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Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir.Norman Malcolm - 1958 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. Edited by G. H. von Wright & Ludwig Wittgenstein.details
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