- How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.details
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Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):179-192.details
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Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.Jessica Brown - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):179-192.details
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Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Dogmatism.Peter Baumann - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):1-19.details
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
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Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
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Resisting Encroachment. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):465-472.details
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A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
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The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'.Michael Pace - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):239-268.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
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Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
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On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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A Solution to Knowledge’s Threshold Problem.Michael Hannon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):607-629.details
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On Intellectualism in Epistemology.Stephen R. Grimm - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):705-733.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.details
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Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment: A Reply to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne on Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Jeremy Fanti & Matthew McGrath - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Noûs 11 (4):421-430.details
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Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Knowledge in Action.Jonathan Weisberg - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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