- Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
|
|
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
|
|
Epistemic dimensions of personhood.Simon Evnine - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
|
|
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
|
|
A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
|
|
Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge, Pragmatics, and Error.Dirk Kindermann - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3):429-57.details
|
|
A Review of the Lottery Paradox.Gregory Wheeler - 2007 - In William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. College Publications.details
|
|
Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
|
|
A Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology.Wesley Buckwalter - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Preface Writers are Consistent.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381.details
|
|
Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
|
|
Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
|
|
Wahrheit.Dirk Kindermann - 2015 - In Nikola Kompa (ed.), Handbuch Sprachphilosophie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 91-99.details
|
|
Are there counterexamples to the consistency principle?Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.details
|
|
A "purist" feminist epistemology?Emily Tilton - 2023 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
|
|
Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr & Matthew Brandon Lee - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
|
|
The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.details
|
|
Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
|
|
Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
|
|
Two Kinds of Stakes.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324.details
|
|
Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
|
|
Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
|
|
Hierarchical Propositions.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):215-231.details
|
|
Belief, information and reasoning.Bruno Whittle - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446.details
|
|
Entrepreneurial Beliefs and Agency under Knightian Uncertainty.Randall E. Westgren & Travis L. Holmes - 2021 - Philosophy of Management 21 (2):199-217.details
|
|
Entrepreneurial beleifs and agency under Knightian uncertainty.Randall Westgren & Travis Holmes - 2021 - Philosophy of Management 22 (2):199-217.details
|
|
Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
|
|
Reply to Blackson.Brian Weatherson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:73-75.details
|
|
Stalnaker on sleeping beauty.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):445-456.details
|
|
Margins and Errors.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):63-76.details
|
|
Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
|
|
Defending interest-relative invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):591-609.details
|
|
Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
|
|
In the Space of Reasonable Doubt.Marion Vorms & Ulrike Hahn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3609-3633.details
|
|
Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology.John Turri & Wesley Buckwalter - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):25-46.details
|
|
Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments.John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter & David Rose - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):212-222.details
|
|
The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief.Paul D. Thorn - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5389-5409.details
|
|
Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
|
|
Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
|
|
The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
|
|
Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.details
|
|
Rational stability under pragmatic encroachment.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):297-312.details
|
|
Partial Reliance.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):436-451.details
|
|
Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
|
|