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‘True’ as Polysemous

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):542-569 (2021)

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  1. (1 other version)The nature of judgment.G. E. Moore - 1899 - Mind 8 (2):176-193.
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  • Semantic defectiveness and the liar.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
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  • Distinctions Without a Difference.Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):203-251.
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  • (1 other version)Facts and Propositions.Frank P. Ramsey - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-170.
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  • The Deflationary Conception of Truth.Hartry Field - 1986 - In Graham Macdonald & Crispin Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality: Essays on A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. Blackwell. pp. 55-117.
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  • Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):211-244.
    According to the principle of bivalence, truth and falsity are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive options for a statement. It is either true or false, and not both, even in a borderline case. That highly controversial claim is central to the epistemic theory of vagueness, which holds that borderline cases are distinguished by a special kind of obstacle to knowing the truth-value of the statement. But this paper is not a defence of the epistemic theory. If bivalence holds, it presumably (...)
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  • “True” as Ambiguous.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.
    In this paper, I argue (a) that the predicate "true" is ambiguously used to express a deflationary and a substantial concept of truth and (b) that the two concepts are systematically related in that substantial truths are deflationary truths of a certain kind. Claim (a) allows one to accept the main insights of deflationism but still take seriously, and participate in, the traditional debate about the nature of truth. Claim (b) is a contribution to that debate. The overall position is (...)
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  • Relatively Unrestricted Quantification.Kit Fine - 2006 - In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), Absolute generality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 20-44.
    There are four broad grounds upon which the intelligibility of quantification over absolutely everything has been questioned—one based upon the existence of semantic indeterminacy, another on the relativity of ontology to a conceptual scheme, a third upon the necessity of sortal restriction, and the last upon the possibility of indefinite extendibility. The argument from semantic indeterminacy derives from general philosophical considerations concerning our understanding of language. For the Skolem–Lowenheim Theorem appears to show that an understanding of quanti- fication over absolutely (...)
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  • The concept of truth and the semantics of the truth predicate.Kirk Ludwig & Emil Badici - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):622-638.
    We sketch an account according to which the semantic concepts themselves are not pathological and the pathologies that attend the semantic predicates arise because of the intention to impose on them a role they cannot fulfill, that of expressing semantic concepts for a language that includes them. We provide a simplified model of the account and argue in its light that (i) a consequence is that our meaning intentions are unsuccessful, and such semantic predicates fail to express any concept, and (...)
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  • Everything.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.
    On reading the last sentence, did you interpret me as saying falsely that everything — everything in the entire universe — was packed into my carry-on baggage? Probably not. In ordinary language, ‘everything’ and other quantifiers (‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘every dog’, ...) often carry a tacit restriction to a domain of contextually relevant objects, such as the things that I need to take with me on my journey. Thus a sentence of the form ‘Everything Fs’ is true as uttered in a (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
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  • Assertion, denial, and the liar paradox.Terence Parsons - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):137 - 152.
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  • Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  • Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
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  • Theory change and the indeterminacy of reference.Hartry Field - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.
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  • (1 other version)The iterative conception of set.George Boolos - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (8):215-231.
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  • How to be a meaning holist.Eric Lormand - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):51-73.
    Meaning holists hold, roughly, that each representation in a linguistic or mental system depends semantically on every other representation in the system. The main difficulty for holism is the threat it poses to meaning stability--shared meaning between representations in two systems. If meanings are holistically dependent, then semantic differences anywhere seem to balloon into semantic differences everywhere. My positive aim is to show how holism, even at its most extreme, can accommodate and also increase meaning stability. My negative aim is (...)
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  • Against Disquotation.Andrew Bacon & Jeremy Goodman - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):711-726.
    We argue against the disquotational meaning schema—‘φ’ means that φ—and suggest that rejecting it is the key to resolving further intensional paradoxes about the limits of thought.
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  • What is Conceptual Engineering and What Should it Be?David Chalmers - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63.
    Conceptual engineering is the design, implementation, and evaluation of concepts. Conceptual engineering includes or should include de novo conceptual engineering (designing a new concept) as well as conceptual re-engineering (fixing an old concept). It should also include heteronymous (different-word) as well as homonymous (same-word) conceptual engineering. I discuss the importance and the difficulty of these sorts of conceptual engineering in philosophy and elsewhere.
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  • (2 other versions)Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference.Saul A. Kripke - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):255-276.
    am going to discuss some issues inspired by a well-known paper ofKeith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions,”2 but the interest—to me—of the contrast mentioned in my title goes beyond Donnellan's paper: I think it is of considerable constructive as well as critical importance to the philosophy oflanguage. These applications, however, and even everything I might want to say relative to Donnellan’s paper, cannot be discussed in full here because of problems of length. Moreover, although I have a considerable interest in (...)
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
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  • Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
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  • Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):394-397.
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  • Applying Kripke's Theory of Truth.Vann McGee - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (10):530-539.
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  • Dialetheism, logical consequence and hierarchy.Bruno Whittle - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):318-326.
    I argue that dialetheists have a problem with the concept of logical consequence. The upshot of this problem is that dialetheists must appeal to a hierarchy of concepts of logical consequence. Since this hierarchy is akin to those invoked by more orthodox resolutions of the semantic paradoxes, its emergence would appear to seriously undermine the dialetheic treatments of these paradoxes. And since these are central to the case for dialetheism, this would represent a significant blow to the position itself.
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  • Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes?Andrew Bacon - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):299-352.
    Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No proposition” views are paradigm examples of linguistic theories, although practically all accounts of the paradoxes subscribe to some kind of linguistic theory. This essay shows that linguistic accounts of the paradoxes endorsing classical logic are subject to a particularly (...)
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  • Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (3):281-338.
    Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is (...)
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  • Varieties of Indefinite Extensibility.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2015 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (1):147-166.
    We look at recent accounts of the indefinite extensibility of the concept set and compare them with a certain linguistic model of indefinite extensibility. We suggest that the linguistic model has much to recommend over alternative accounts of indefinite extensibility, and we defend it against three prima facie objections.
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  • The Iterative Conception of Set: a (Bi-)Modal Axiomatisation.J. P. Studd - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):1-29.
    The use of tensed language and the metaphor of set ‘formation’ found in informal descriptions of the iterative conception of set are seldom taken at all seriously. Both are eliminated in the nonmodal stage theories that formalise this account. To avoid the paradoxes, such accounts deny the Maximality thesis, the compelling thesis that any sets can form a set. This paper seeks to save the Maximality thesis by taking the tense more seriously than has been customary (although not literally). A (...)
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  • The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of Semantic Change and Variation.Ingo Brigandt - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):19-40.
    The discussion presents a framework of concepts that is intended to account for the rationality of semantic change and variation, suggesting that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these components, and that change in the concept’s inferential role and reference can be accounted for as being rational relative (...)
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  • Predicate meets property.Mark Wilson - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):549-589.
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  • Tarskian and Kripkean truth.Volker Halbach - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):69-80.
    A theory of the transfinite Tarskian hierarchy of languages is outlined and compared to a notion of partial truth by Kripke. It is shown that the hierarchy can be embedded into Kripke's minimal fixed point model. From this results on the expressive power of both approaches are obtained.
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  • (1 other version)The semantic paradoxes: A diagnostic investigation.Charles Chihara - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):590-618.
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  • Posthumous Writings.Gottlob Frege - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 172 (1):101-103.
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  • There is no set of all truths.Patrick Grim - 1984 - Analysis 44 (4):206-208.
    A Cantorian argument that there is no set of all truths. There is, for the same reason, no possible world as a maximal set of propositions. And omniscience is logically impossible.
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  • VI.—Symposium: “Facts and Propositions.”.F. P. Ramsey & G. E. Moore - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-206.
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  • Pointers to Truth.Haim Gaifman - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (5):223.
    If we try to evaluate the sentence on line 1 we ¯nd ourselves going in an unending cycle. For this reason alone we may conclude that the sentence is not true. Moreover we are driven to this conclusion by an elementary argument: If the sentence is true then what it asserts is true, but what it asserts is that the sentence on line 1 is not true. Consequently the sentence on line 1 is not true. But when we write this (...)
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  • Absolute Generality.Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano Cruz - 2009 - Critica 41 (121):67-84.
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  • ReWrighting Pluralism.Michael P. Lynch - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):63–84.
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  • Naive semantics and the liar paradox.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):479-497.
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  • Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
    Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
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  • (1 other version)Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics.Michael DUMMETT - 1991 - Philosophy 68 (265):405-411.
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  • (2 other versions)Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language. [REVIEW]Hidé Ishiguro - 1974 - Philosophy 49 (190):438-442.
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  • Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):460-462.
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  • Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language.Scott Soames - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
    The two volumes of Philosophical Essays bring together the most important essays written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of language. Scott Soames has selected thirty-one essays spanning nearly three decades of thinking about linguistic meaning and the philosophical significance of language. A judicious collection of old and new, these volumes include sixteen essays published in the 1980s and 1990s, nine published since 2000, and six new essays. The essays in Volume 1 investigate what linguistic meaning is; how the (...)
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  • On some difficulties in the theory of transfinite numbers and order types.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 4 (14):29-53.
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  • Context and unrestricted quantification.Michael Glanzberg - 2006 - In Peter Smith (ed.), Absolute Generality. Jstor. pp. 45--74.
    Quantification is haunted by the specter of paradoxes. Since Russell, it has been a persistent idea that the paradoxes show what might have appeared to be absolutely unrestricted quantification to be somehow restricted. In the contemporary literature, this theme is taken up by Dummett (1973, 1993) and Parsons (1974a,b). Parsons, in particular, argues that both the Liar and Russell’s paradoxes are to be resolved by construing apparently absolutely unrestricted quantifiers as appropriately restricted.
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  • Quantification and realism.Michael Glanzberg - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):541–572.
    This paper argues for the thesis that, roughly put, it is impossible to talk about absolutely everything. To put the thesis more precisely, there is a particular sense in which, as a matter of semantics, quantifiers always range over domains that are in principle extensible, and so cannot count as really being ‘absolutely everything’. The paper presents an argument for this thesis, and considers some important objections to the argument and to the formulation of the thesis. The paper also offers (...)
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  • The liar paradox.Charles Parsons - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.
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  • (1 other version)Deflationist views of meaning and content.Hartry Field - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):249-285.
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