Pierre-Sylvain Régis’s Cartesianism is quite singular in seventeenth-century French philosophy. Though, can we speak of a form of experimental science in Régis’s work? After exploring his notions of ‘system’ and ‘hypothesis’, I will define his position in relation to Claude Perrault, Jacques Rohault, and the Royal Society. I argue, first, that the contrasts which traverse French science are not so much about the use of experiments but about whether or not observational data can be traced back (...) to hypotheses and to a coherent system. Secondly, that we can detect a significant similarity between Boyle’s positions and the views expressed by Perrault and also by Régis. Lastly, that French science, even in its Cartesian version, is much more probabilistic than English experimental philosophy. (shrink)

L’usage de la raison et de la foy ou l’accord de la foy et de la raison (1704) by Pierre-Sylvain Régis can be considered his last attempt to defend the ‘new philosophy’ of René Descartes by vindicating its agreement with faith and protecting it from censorship. This contribution offers an analysis of the theories expounded by Régis in this treatise, showing how these evolved from those of his earlier Système de philosophie (1690), and arguing that both (...) are characterized by a reinterpretation of the Cartesian metaphysics on an empirical basis. In particular, Régis offered an empirical interpretation of the relations between substances, attributes and modes, by which he criticized Spinoza’s metaphysics and attempted to solve the riddle of Descartes’ dualism. (shrink)

One of the most mature achievements of the Cartesian philosophy is the aim to diffuse Descartes’ thought among a wider audience by presenting his philosophy in an encyclopedic way. A relevant contribution in this field is Pierre Sylvain Régis’s Système. Régis’s contribution consists both in reconciling the new scientific discoveries with les principes de Monsieur Descartes by combining them into a scholarly manual whose aim is to stimulate the ars inveniendi and in recognizing the relevance of (...) Arnauld’s and Nicole’s L’art de penser as manual of Cartesian logic. In an article published on the «Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa», pp. 517-55: L’«Art de penser» nella logica del «Système» di Régis) I analysed Régis’s logic in order to point out that, even if L’art de penser represents its only source, La logique of the Système has not to be considered as a mere compendium of the Port-Royal Logique, but as a revision of the latter according to a specific philosophical system, characterized by the empirical interpretation of Descartes’s philosophy. In this paper I provide a synopsis of the comparison between the logic of the Système and the Logique of Port-Royal, in order to resume in a schematic way the results of my research. (shrink)

This work takes into account three Cartesian manuals diffused in 17th century France ; Jacques Rohault, Traité de physique ; Pierre-Sylvain Régis, Cours entier de philosophie, ou système general selon les principes de M. Descartes contenant la logique, la metaphysique, la physique et la morale ) in order to question if the development of an empirical attitude in the scientific research influenced their approaches to the study of motion. The article intends to deepen the role that these (...) authors give to God in the physical structure of the universe with the purpose of investigating whether their analysis of motion is untainted by the metaphysical component or on what terms it remains linked to it. (shrink)

The Système de philosophie by Pierre Sylvain Régis can be considered as the achievement both of the scientific liveliness of the Académie des Sciences in the 17th century and of its fruitful relationship with the Royal Society. Since it aims to shape the new conception of the universe in terms of a system, the Système represents one of the most mature achievements of Cartesian philosophy and it is characterized by an empirical interpretation of Descartes’ thought. The Système (...) therefore reflects two important phenomena occurring in the Europe of the 17th century: the scientific revolution and the proliferation of Academies. In fact, this ambitious work could be undertaken with the support of the Académie des Sciences and the Journal des Sçavants. My paper will analyse the French context by focusing to outline the role which the Académie de France had both in France, as the medium of dissemination of the new philosophy despite censorship, and abroad, in particular through the relationship with the Royal Society in England. I aim to analyse the role of the Journal des Sçavants as a means to share ideas other than by correspondence and as a trait d’union between “rationalist France” and “empiricist England”. I intend to question whether it is possible to establish a connection between the empirical interpretation of French Cartesianism, the consolidation of the Académie de France and the employment of new means of academic communication. The paper will show that the second half of 17th century France represents a remarkable exception to the conventional picture, which states that in 17th century Europe, following the success of a mechanistic interpretation of reality, two philosophical school clashed: rationalism, predominating on the continent, and empiricism, in England. (shrink)

Unlike many of Descartes’s other followers, Pierre-Sylvain Re´gis resists the temptations of occasionalism. By marrying the ontology of mechanism with the causal structure of concurrentism, Re´gis arrives at a novel view that both acknowledges God’s role in natural events and preserves the causal powers of bodies. I set out Re´gis’s position, focusing on his arguments against occasionalism and his responses to Malebranche’s ‘no necessary connection’ and divine concursus arguments.

Today’s debates present ”occasionalism’ as the position that any satisfying account of divine action must avoid. In this paper I discuss how a leading Cartesian author of the end of the seventeenth century, Pierre-Sylvain Régis, attempted to avoid occasionalism. Régis’s case is illuminating because it stresses both the difficulties connected with the traditional alternatives to occasionalism and also those aspects embedded in the occasionalist position that should be taken into due account. The paper focuses on (...) class='Hi'>Régis’s own account of secondary causation in order to show how the challenge of avoiding occasionalism can lead to the development of new accounts of divine action. (shrink)

This volume takes cue from the idea that the thought of no philosopher can be understood without considering it as the result of a constant, lively dialogue with other thinkers, both in its internal evolution as well as in its reception, re-use, and assumption as a starting point in addressing past and present philosophical problems. In doing so, it focuses on a feature that is crucially emerging in the historiography of early modern philosophy and science, namely the complexity in the (...) production of knowledge. The book explores the applicability of this approach to a long-considered armchair philosopher, namely René Descartes, who is now more and more understood as a full-blown scientist, networker, and intellectual éminence grise rather than as the mere philosopher of the cogito, as well as the originator of different ‘Cartesianisms’ which encompassed many ideas and approaches for long captured by dichotomic historiographical categories as rationalism and empiricism, or speculative and experimental philosophy. The essays gathered in the volume aim to address the ways in which Descartes’s philosophy evolved and was progressively understood by scientists, philosophers, and intellectuals from different contexts and eras, either by considering direct interlocutors of Descartes such as Isaac Beeckman and Elisabeth of Bohemia, early modern thinkers who developed upon his ideas and on particular topics as Nicolas Malebranche or Thomas Willis, those who adapted his overall methodology in developing new systems of knowledge as Johannes Clauberg and Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and contemporary thinkers from continental and analytic traditions like Emanuele Severino and Peter Strawson. (shrink)

Henri Lelevel’s La philosophie moderne par demandes et réponses is a very interesting as well as pretty neglected attempt to disseminate the new philosophy among a larger audience, including the non specialists. Either the style of presentation or the oversimplification of the topics discussed is clearly intended to reach people interested to a smattering of philosophy. More than the comparisons between the traditional and the new philosophy and the compendia, this work vouches for the great interest toward the new philosophy. (...) In this particular case the model is the philosophy of Malebranche, whose interpretation of Descartes thought is preferred by Lelevel, worried by the excessive twist given toward empiricism in P.-S. Régis rendering of Cartesian philosophical system. Lelevel’s logic is directed to eliminate the confusion between sense data and knowledge, echoing also Malebranche’s notion of éténdue idéale, one of the major contribution to the reconsideration of Descartes’ thought. This paper aims to sketch the mains topics discussed in the four sections of Lelevel’s work, with some cross-references to Malebranche’s writings. (shrink)

Kuhn (1962) proposed an evolutionary model to explain how scientific knowledge is built, based on the concept of paradigm. Even though Kuhn’s model is general, it has been applied to only a few topics in evolutionary biology, almost exclusively to broad-based paradigms. We analyze here, through the lens of Kuhn’s theory, a small-scale paradigm change that occurred with the resolution of the controversy about the mating system of a Mediterranean shrub Phillyrea angustifolia (Oleaceae). We first summarize the different steps of (...) the paradigm change and replace them in the more general context of sex ratio theory. Second, we show how the different steps of the paradigm change can be interpreted by Kuhnian concepts and tools. Finally, we discuss the actual and future status of the new paradigm. (shrink)

On peut identifier deux principales caractéristiques de Wikipédia pour expliquer son succès et sa spécificité. La première est sa liberté de modification et d’accès. La deuxième réside dans le système organisationnel ascendant (bottom-up) et égalitaire où les articles ne proviennent plus d’experts sélectionnés pour être ensuite distribués à la foule mais sont, au contraire, produits par une base composée d’amateurs inconnus. Ces deux caractéristiques, associées au succès populaire et qualitatif de l’encyclopédie, laissent peu de place à l’expertise individuelle (en particulier (...) à l’expertise académique et scientifique). De plus, le constat de l’auto-correction dynamique de l’encyclopédie a effacé l’idée d’une vérification a posteriori des articles par un ou plusieurs experts du domaine. La force de Wikipedia semble alors résider dans une harmonie systématique inhérente à sa forme. -/- Dans cet article, je tente de montrer qu’il faut dépasser l’antagonisme entre amateurs et experts (crowds versus experts) et que c’est justement le caractère libre et égalitaire de Wikipedia qui rend nécessaire une réflexion épistémologique sur l’expertise au sein de cette encyclopédie. Je prends l’exemple du problème du novice et des deux experts théorisé par Alvin Goldman (2001). Appliqué à Wikipédia, ce problème pose la question des options épistémiques disponibles pour les wikipédiens confronté à une guerre d’édition. Outre les solutions classiques (recours à des meta-experts, décision majoritaire, discussion), Goldman avance l’idée d’une prise en compte, par le novice, des (in)succès épistémiques précédents des différents experts en désaccord. Un expert s’étant majoritairement trompé par le passé en devient ainsi moins crédible et inversement. Même si cette solution pose un certain nombre de problèmes, elle semble particulièrement propice à étudier l’expertise au sein de Wikipédia. Elle permet de comprendre (1.) qu’il existe déjà une expertise wikipedienne régie par certaines règles et (2.) qu’il est possible d’aménager une place aux experts (en particulier scientifiques) dans cette encyclopédie libre. Au final, pour comprendre et améliorer la place de l’expertise dans Wikipedia, il semble qu’il faille adopter une certaine conception de l’expertise, centrée sur l’agent plus que sur le contenu épistémique. Cette conclusion soulève un paradoxe, Wikipedia s’étant construite sur l’anonymat des auteurs et la primauté du contenu. (shrink)

An English translation of Pierre Bayle's posthumous last book, Entretiens de Maxime et de Themiste (1707), in which Bayle defends his skeptical position on the problem of the evil. This book is often cited and attacked by G.W. Leibniz in his Theodicy (1710). Over one hundred pages of original philosophical and historical material introduce the translation, providing it with context and establishing the work's importance.

This paper analyzes Paul of Venice’s theory of measurement of natural properties and changes. The main sections of the paper correspond to Paul’s analysis of the three types of accidental changes, for which the Augustinian philosopher sought to provide rules of measurement. It appears that Paul achieved an original synthesis borrowing from both Parisian and Oxfordian sources. It is also argued that, on top of this theoretical synthesis, Paul managed to elaborate a quite original theory of intensive properties that marks (...) him out not only from the nominalist framework of his Parisian sources but also from the usual realist treatments of the problem. Finally, it is shown that, to a certain extent, Paul undertook to apply the mathematical and logical tools inherited from the Calculatores tradition to empirical problems of natural philosophy, leading to reevaluate his role in the evolution of scientific thought in early 15th-century Italy. (shrink)

A version of the growing block theory of time is developed based on the choice of both consciousness and mathematics as fundamental substances, while dismissing the reality/semantics distinction usually assumed by works on time theory. The well-analyzable growing block structure of mathematical ontology revealed by mathematical logic, is used as a model for a possible deeper working of conscious time. Physical reality is explained as emerging from a combination of both substances, with a proposed specific version of the Consciousness Causes (...) Collapse interpretation. This leads to new solutions to old problems, including the epistemic problem and issues with Relativity. (shrink)

On abordera ici l'échec du pseudo-théologien Heidegger à venir se saisir de l'irrationnel augustinien et soulignerons la différence entre l'irrationnel dorien (au bout du langage) et l'irrationnel ionien (au bout du monde) autour de la mesure.

This study of Greek time before Aristotle’s philosophy starts with a commentary on his first text, the Protrepticus. We shall see two distinct forms of time emerge: one initiatory, circular and Platonic in inspiration, the other its diametrical opposite, advanced by Aristotle. We shall explore this dichotomy through a return to poetic conceptions. The Tragedians will give us an initial outline of the notion of time in the Greek world (Fate); we shall then turn to Homer in order to better (...) grasp the complex relations between time and the religious sphere (the Hero); the work of the great theologian Hesiod will confirm this initiatory vision, later set out in remarkable fashion by Nietzsche (Myths); we shall then dive deep into Pythagoreanism to complete our account (Mysteries). Having understood this current of thought, powerfully influenced by the Iranian theogony, we shall be able to discern its clear differences from the so-called “Ionian” current, and thus to move away from Plato (Ideology). Lastly, we shall return to the early Ionian thinkers Thales and Anaximander to analyse whether this really was the vision of the world that Aristotle adopted in developing the first model of time (Science). In the second volume we shall see the return of the thought of the theologoi within the Aristotelian corpus itself, and will question our distinction between the being and existence of time. Régis Laurent is a philosopher and member of the association Kairos Kai logos (Centre for the study of ancient philosophy). This book is the first part of his doctoral thesis in philosophy, undertaken under the aegis of three French universities (Grenoble, Clermont-Ferrand and Rennes). In addition to his philosophical training, the author is also qualified to Masters level in linguistics and in general psychology, and studied theology at the Thomist University in Paris (ULSH) and at the CEJ of the EHESS. (shrink)

Notre étude sur le temps grec précédant la pensée d Aristote commencera d'abord par un commentaire de son premier texte, le Protreptique. Nous verrons se dégager deux temps distincts : l'un initiatique, circulaire et d'inspiration platonicienne, et l'autre diamétralement opposé dont Aristote serait le défenseur. Afin d'interroger cette dichotomie, nous retournerons aux conceptions poétiques. Les Tragiques nous permettront d'offrir une première esquisse de cette notion dans l'univers grec (Du destin...). Ensuite, l'oeuvre épique d'Homère sera l'occasion de mieux saisir le nouage (...) existant entre le temps et la sphère religieuse (Des héros...). Le travail du grand théologue Hésiode viendra confirmer cette vision initiatique, comme l'avait déjà remarquablement exposée F. Nietzsche (Des mythes...). C'est alors que nous plongerons au sein du pythagorisme afin de parachever cette vision (Des mystères...). Notre compréhension de ce courant, traversé par la théogonie iranienne, nous permettra, ensuite, de bien le distinguer de celui dit «ionien» et ainsi de s'éloigner de la parole platonicienne (De l'idéologie...). Enfin, en revenant aux premiers penseurs ioniens que furent Thalès et Anaximandre, nous analyserons si c'est effectivement cette vision du monde qui a été retenue par le Stagirite afin de fonder la première modélisation du concept de temps (De la science...). -/- Dans le deuxième volume, nous verrons revenir la pensée des théologoï au sein même du corpus aristotélicien et c'est alors que nous interrogerons notre division entre être et existence du temps. -/- Régis LAURENT est philosophe, membre de l'association Kairos kai logos (Centre d'études sur la pensée antique).Ce livre est le premier volet de son travail de thèse de doctorat en philosophie effectué au sein de trois Universités françaises (Grenoble, Clermont-Ferrand et Rennes).Outre cette formation philosophique,l'auteur est également diplômé en sciences humaines (Maîtrise des sciences du langage et maîtrise de psychologie). Par ailleurs, sa formation en théologie a été effectuée à l'Université thomiste de Paris (U.L.S.H = CEPHI) et au C.E.J de l'E.H.E.S.S. (shrink)

Is calculation possible without language? Or is the human ability for arithmetic dependent on the language faculty? To clarify the relation between language and arithmetic, we studied numerical cognition in speakers of Mundurukú, an Amazonian language with a very small lexicon of number words. Although the Mundurukú lack words for numbers beyond 5, they are able to compare and add large approximate numbers that are far beyond their naming range. However, they fail in exact arithmetic with numbers larger than 4 (...) or 5. Our results imply a distinction between a nonverbal system of number approximation and a language-based counting system for exact number and arithmetic. (shrink)

La division entre "Intellect Agent" (intellectus agens) et "intellect Patient" (noûs pathêtikos) est-elle historique et donc culturelle ? Si oui , y a-t-il un intellect Uni-versel entre les deux ?

Rejet de la dialectique comme objet pouvant rentrer au sein de la logique. Refoulement de la dialectique dans l'histoire. Or si la dialectique est historique alors nous pouvons la situer spatialement dans l'histoire.

Le structuralisme, en le rapprochant du langage, a détruit le concept freudien de "Verdichtung" (condensation). Il s'agissait chez Freud d'un mouvement irrationnel dont la rationalité ne venait que de la cause finale qu'était le désir (inconscient). Avec sa notion de "Volonté de Puissance" (Der Wille zur Macht), Nietzsche tente de la même manière de déterminer l'intention et l’extension de ce mouvement de sens sans introduire la cause finale comme le fit Freud. Il s'approche alors de la dialectique platonicienne et de (...) son fondement, avant de plonger dans l'abyme de la source iranienne (perse). L'échec de la métabiologie de Nietzsche sera le départ de notre approche métabiologique appuyée sur la métaphysique d'Aristote et Kant. (shrink)

Puisque nous n'avons pu trouver un fondement logique à la dialectique, nous avons alors compris que la dialectique était historique. Il ne restait plus alors qu'à trouver la culture d'origine que nous avons localisée en Perse. -/- Since we could not find a logical foundation for the dialectic, we then understood that the dialectic was historical. All that remained was to find the culture of origin, which we located in Persia.

Comment l'Etre s'ouvre-t-il ? Réponse définitive au sophiste Heidegger.

This is a response to Jerry Fodor’s article, Fodor, J. (1980). "Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 63-109.

Premier ouvrage de l’histoire de la philosophie à être totalement consacré au concept d’entéléchie, il ne s’agira pas de proposer un essai historique allant de la mise en place de cette notion chez Aristote jusqu’à la conception biologique développée par Hans Driesch. Inscrit dans un projet plus global de compréhension du temps aristotélicien, c’est à une véritable refondation métaphysique du concept que ce travail nous convie. Si Kant, à l’ultime fin de sa première critique, avait admis qu’il n’existait que deux (...) voies possibles de fondation de l’a priori - la voie historique (platonicienne) empruntée par Hegel et la voie physiologique (aristotélicienne) qui sera la nôtre - la première partie de ce second volume prendra pour acquis qu’il n’existe pas de théorie qui puisse unifier ces deux pôles du savoir. Cela impliquera une scission entre deux mouvements irrationnels que sont le mouvement entéléchique aristotélicien et le mouvement dialectique platonicien. A partir du corps a priori du surhomme, le premier mouvement sera à la racine de la théorie de la connaissance (De la science) alors que le second sera au fondement de la théorie des valeurs (De l’Idéologie). En circonscrivant le mouvement dialectique dorien autour du noûs perse (iranien), ce travail offrira une première définition totalement négative du mouvement entéléchique appuyé, lui, sur le noûs ionien (« phénicien ») dont la seconde partie sera l’objet. De l’analyse de la substance première en passant par l’étude phénoménologique des schèmes de la camusité et du membre moteur, cette étude reviendra sur l’élasticité du tendon afin d’approcher non-phénoménalement le concept lui-même et tenter ainsi une première symphyse avec les rythmes circadiens de la biologie contemporaine. (shrink)

The mapping of numbers onto space is fundamental to measurement and to mathematics. Is this mapping a cultural invention or a universal intuition shared by all humans regardless of culture and education? We probed number-space mappings in the Mundurucu, an Amazonian indigene group with a reduced numerical lexicon and little or no formal education. At all ages, the Mundurucu mapped symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers onto a logarithmic scale, whereas Western adults used linear mapping with small or symbolic numbers and logarithmic (...) mapping when numbers were presented nonsymbolically under conditions that discouraged counting. This indicates that the mapping of numbers onto space is a universal intuition and that this initial intuition of number is logarithmic. The concept of a linear number line appears to be a cultural invention that fails to develop in the absence of formal education. (shrink)

ARISTOTE contre LEIBNITZ : En quoi le concept d'Entéléchie aristotélicien est-il totalement opposé au concept d'Harmonie platonicien et leibnitzien ?

Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb 'intentionally'. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb 'intentionally' has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications (...) of our account for folk psychology. (shrink)

In this essay we will consider another basic topic: the problem of the nature of the distinctions between Sitte, Brauch, Wert, Mode, and Recht, on which Weber's discussion relies. These discussions typically involved the untranslatable concept of Sitte, which marks a contrast between practices or customs with normative force and “mere practice.” There is a close parallel to this distinction in American social thought in W. G. Sumner's latinate distinction between the mores and folkways of a society. In what follows (...) we shall simply use the German term as a reminder of its long history in German philosophy. Weber was obviously aware of this history, as was Jhering. Our aim will be to examine Weber's modifications of the received version of these distinctions and to consider the Implications of these modifications. As we shall see, what Weber represents as an innocuous classificatory problem contains a much more significant conceptual transformation, which bears on the general image of modernity as rationalization constructed by Weber. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of somatic evolution by natural selection to our understanding of cancer development. I do so in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I ask to what extent cancer cells meet the formal requirements for evolution by natural selection, relying on Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) framework of Darwinian populations. I argue that although they meet the minimal requirements for natural selection, cancer cells are not paradigmatic Darwinian populations. In the second (...) part of the paper, I examine the most important examples of adaptation in cancer cells. I argue that they are not significant accumulations of evolutionary changes, and that as a consequence natural selection plays a lesser role in their explanation. Their explanation, I argue, is best sought in the previously existing wiring of the healthy cells. (shrink)

I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limitations are (...) here taken as opportunities for reflecting on the fate of enactivism in its relations with representationalism and anti-representationalism. (shrink)

We describe an ontology of philosophy that is designed to aid navigation through philosophical literature, including literature in the form of encyclopedia articles and textbooks and in both printed and digital forms. The ontology is designed also to serve integration and structuring of data pertaining to the philosophical literature, and in the long term also to support reasoning about the provenance and contents of such literature, by providing a representation of the philosophical domain that is oriented around what philosophical literature (...) is about. (shrink)

We propose a modular ontology of the dynamic features of reality. This amounts, on the one hand, to a purely spatial ontology supporting snapshot views of the world at successive instants of time and, on the other hand, to a purely spatiotemporal ontology of change and process. We argue that dynamic spatial ontology must combine these two distinct types of inventory of the entities and relationships in reality, and we provide characterizations of spatiotemporal reasoning in the light of the interconnections (...) between them. (shrink)

Kant argued that Euclidean geometry is synthesized on the basis of an a priori intuition of space. This proposal inspired much behavioral research probing whether spatial navigation in humans and animals conforms to the predictions of Euclidean geometry. However, Euclidean geometry also includes concepts that transcend the perceptible, such as objects that are infinitely small or infinitely large, or statements of necessity and impossibility. We tested the hypothesis that certain aspects of nonperceptible Euclidian geometry map onto intuitions of space that (...) are present in all humans, even in the absence of formal mathematical education. Our tests probed intuitions of points, lines, and surfaces in participants from an indigene group in the Amazon, the Mundurucu, as well as adults and age-matched children controls from the United States and France and younger US children without education in geometry. The responses of Mundurucu adults and children converged with that of mathematically educated adults and children and revealed an intuitive understanding of essential properties of Euclidean geometry. For instance, on a surface described to them as perfectly planar, the Mundurucu's estimations of the internal angles of triangles added up to ∼180 degrees, and when asked explicitly, they stated that there exists one single parallel line to any given line through a given point. These intuitions were also partially in place in the group of younger US participants. We conclude that, during childhood, humans develop geometrical intuitions that spontaneously accord with the principles of Euclidean geometry, even in the absence of training in mathematics. (shrink)

Pierre Bayle’ın Tarihsel ve Eleştirel Sözlük adlı eserindeki “Spinoza” maddesi, Spinoza felsefesinin temel meselelerine dair genel bir bakış sunar. Söz konusu maddenin burada çevirisi sunduğumuz “N Çıkması”nda ise Bayle, özellikle Spinoza’nın Ethica adlı eserine odaklanarak kip, değişiklik, töz ve Tanrı gibi Spinoza metafiziğinin temel kavramlarına yönelik eleştiriler getirir.

French text publication of the manuscript of the English article en-titled "Physics, History of" and published by Duhem in Volume 12 of the 1911 "Catholic Encyclopedia".

Organismal death is foundational to the evolution of life, and many biological concepts such as natural selection and life history strategy are so fashioned only because individuals are mortal. Organisms, irrespective of their organization, are composed of basic functional units—cells—and it is our understanding of cell death that lies at the heart of most general explanatory frameworks for organismal mortality. Cell death can be exogenous, arising from transmissible diseases, predation, or other misfortunes, but there are also endogenous forms of death (...) that are sometimes the result of adaptive evolution. These endogenous forms of death—often labeled programmed cell death, PCD—originated in the earliest cells and are maintained across the tree of life. Here, we consider two problematic issues related to PCD (and cell mortality generally). First, we trace the original discoveries of cell death from the nineteenth century and place current conceptions of PCD in their historical context. Revisions of our understanding of PCD demand a reassessment of its origin. Our second aim is thus to structure the proposed origin explanations of PCD into coherent arguments. In our analysis we argue for the evolutionary concept of PCD and the viral defense-immunity hypothesis for the origin of PCD. We suggest that this framework offers a plausible account of PCD early in the history of life, and also provides an epistemic basis for the future development of a general evolutionary account of mortality. (shrink)

Résumé Charles Wolfe vient de publier Lire le matérialisme (ENS Éditions, 2020), où il esquisse une histoire des différentes formes de matérialisme, y compris le matérialisme vitaliste et les versions du XXe et du XXIe siècle. Pierre-François Moreau, auteur de la préface de l’ouvrage, entame ici une discussion sur les problèmes et les ressources d’une telle histoire.

Why would a philosopher choose to convey his ideas in the form of Manga? This discussion between Masahiro Morioka, author of Manga Introduction to Philosophy, and the translator of its French edition, Pierre Bonneels, shows how philosopher and artist Morioka became acquainted, through images, with fundamental abstract notions. After a short historical analysis of the aesthetic advantages of Manga, consideration is given to this unique way of provoking thought. On this basis, theoretical aspects of “time” and the “I” proposed (...) by Ōmori Shōzō are compared with Morioka’s Manga presentation. Although the questions raised are universal, the authors note that the use of Japanese metaphors enables these two thinkers to draw on a concrete understanding of notions like temporality and identity. (shrink)

We aim to provide the ontological grounds for an adequate account of persistence. We defend a perspectivalist, or moderate pluralist, position, according to which some aspects of reality can be accounted for in ontological terms only via partial and mutually complementary ontologies, each one of which captures some relevant aspect of reality. Our thesis here is that this is precisely the sort of ontological account that is needed for the understanding of persistence, specifically an account involving two independent ontologies, one (...) for continuants, and one for occurrents. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the innovative character of the approach to metaethics underlying John Dewey’s pragmatism. Dewey's theory of evaluation is contrasted with one of the most dominant contemporary metaethical theses: constructivism. I show that the insistence placed by metaethical constructivists on the actor’s practical point of view, on the rejection of the subjective preferences model, and on a specific form of ethical antirealism and naturalism echoes some of the most crucial claims made by Dewey. This argumentation leads to my main (...) hypothesis: an analysis of Dewey's conception of evaluation allows us to highlight the groundbreaking character of its metaethical approach—an approach that will be characterized as fairly constructivist. (shrink)

Trotz anhaltender Debatten über Determinismus und Freiheit ist der Sinn von Freiheit weit davon entfernt, ein klar umrissenes philosophisches Problem darzustellen. Betrachtet man Versuche, menschliche Freiheit zu beweisen, und Diskussionen um die soziale Normierung von Freiheit, so ist selten klar, ob hier von einem einheitlichen Phänomen die Rede ist. Aufgrund der Komplexität der Debatten und der historischen Tiefe des Problems lässt sich die Freiheit nicht einer einzelnen Teildisziplin der Philosophie zuordnen. Wer sich auf einen Bestimmungsversuch des Begriffs einlässt, muss zugleich (...) das Verhältnis von Theorie und Praxis klären. Die Untersuchung der Freiheit führt daher nicht zuletzt zu einer immer wieder neu zu vollziehenden Selbstverortung der Philosophie. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Adorno’s controversial claim that human rationality is inherently mimetic. To do so, I break this claim down into three puzzles (the natural historical puzzle, the metaphysical puzzle, and the epistemic puzzle) and consider each in turn. The first puzzle originates in Adorno’s assertion that in the course of human history the mimetic moment of human thought “is melted together with the rational moment”. So whereas, on his narrative, mimesis has become an intrinsic component of human (...) rationality, it appears that we are oblivious to this state of affair and unable to recognize the workings of mimesis in what we otherwise refer to as rationality. The second puzzle concerns the traditional metaphysical question regarding the possibility of knowledge. Adorno holds that the key to this question lies in the “mimetic moment of knowledge”, which he characterizes as the “moment of the elective affinity between the knower and the known.” The third puzzle concerns his views on how the mimetic moment of thought plays out in our epistemic practices. As he puts it, “consciousness knows of its other as much as it resembles that other,” which seems to entail that our very efforts to conceptualize objects somehow rely on imitative processes. I work out what I take to be the basics of Adorno’s understanding of mimesis and use them to make sense of each puzzle. I argue that Adorno’s insistence on the mimetic component of human rationality isn’t meant to promote more mimetic modes of comportment, but a reflexive awareness of the extent to which our rational activities already rely on imitative (or immersive) processes, even those we view as embodying the strongest claims to the contrary. (shrink)

In this paper, we evaluate the project of resurgence of metaphysics based on the pecularity of the quantum domain, a project that is supported by some contemporary philosophers. Beyond the general arguments against scientific realism that are still applicable here, we show that this project is faced with the three following issues that, we believe, make it unrealizable: (a) the problem raised by the realistic interpretation of the wave function, as a description of a ‘concrete physical fact’ of the independent (...) reality; (b) the lack of any experimental counterpart of the (non-local) hidden variables quantum theories, and, in some cases, their incompatibility with the quantum predictions; and (c) the fact that the key-properties of quantum phenomena, like their non-locality, essentially depend on the observables that are used for their description and cannot then be assigned to any ‘independent’ reality. (shrink)

Developing earlier studies of the system of numbers in Mundurucu, this paper argues that the Mundurucu numeral system is far more complex than usually assumed. The Mundurucu numeral system provides indirect but insightful arguments for a modular approach to numbers and numerals. It is argued that distinct components must be distinguished, such as a system of representation of numbers in the format of internal magnitudes, a system of representation for individuals and sets, and one-to-one correspondences between the numerosity expressed by (...) the number and its metrics. It is shown that while many-number systems involve a compositionality of units, sets and sets composed of units, few-number languages, such as Mundurucu, do not have access to sets composed of units in the usual way. The nonconfigurational character of the Mundurucu language, which is related to a property for which we coin the term 'low compositionality power', accounts for this and explains the curious fact that Mundurucus make use of marked one-to-one correspondence strategies in order to overcome the limitations of the core system at the perceptual/motor interface of the language faculty. We develop an analysis of a particular construction, parallel numbers, which has not been studied before, elucidating the whole system. This analysis, we argue, sheds new light on classical philosophical, psychological and linguistic debates about numbers and numerals and their relation to language, and more particularly, sheds light on few-number languages. (shrink)

Mon objectif dans cet article est de mieux cerner les contours d’une conception institutionnelle de la corruption. Je tenterai de contribuer à ce programme de recherches sur la corruption institutionnelle d’une double façon. Premièrement, j’essaierai de clarifier le concept de « corruption institutionnelle » en mettant en lumière quatre de ses principales caractéristiques et certains de ses avantages. Deuxièmement, je tenterai d’exposer trois problèmes auxquels sont confrontés ses partisans : les problèmes de la portée, du faux-diagnostic et de l’essentialisme. Malgré (...) la sympathie que j’ai pour cette approche, j’espère montrer qu’elle recèle certains points problématiques. Je tenterai essentiellement de montrer que les « institutionnalistes » risquent de faire de la corruption un concept normativement surchargé. (shrink)

Cet article défend une définition de l’exploitation, restreinte aux relations de travail, en tentant d’une part d’expliciter une certaine compréhension de sens commun du concept (rémunération inéquitable en fonction du travail presté), et d’autre part d’échapper aux difficultés qui ont affecté la définition marxiste traditionnelle de l’exploitation comme extorsion de la plus-value (dans ses diverses variantes). Il explore ainsi le lien entre l’exploitation et l’obligation matérielle de travailler pour subvenir à ses besoins fondamentaux. Après avoir mis en garde contre les (...) politiques d’activation des chômeurs, il conclut que l’exploitation est un phénomène contre lequel on peut lutter à l’aide de mécanismes relativement simples, même dans les sociétés capitalistes. Il rappelle toutefois que cela ne suffit pas à réaliser la justice sociale, resituant l’exploitation parmi d’autres enjeux fondamentaux pour une philosophie politique égalitariste. (shrink)