This is an edited transcription of Thomas S. Kuhn’s “Does Knowledge ‘Grow’?”.

According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; (...) ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn’un 1962 yılında yayımlamış olduğu “Bilimsel Devrimlerin Yapısı” adlı kitabı bilimsel gelişme, bilimin doğası ve bilimsel bilginin özerkliği gibi çeşitli bilim felsefesi konularında alanında rölativist ya da göreci bir anlayışa katkıda bulunarak bilimin sarsılmaz statüsüne zarar verip vermediğine yöneliktir. Kuhn’un rölativistlikle suçlanmasına yol açan argümanlardan ön plana çıkan ikisi; iki farklı rakip paradigmaya bağlı olan kuramların kıyaslanmasının mümkün olmadığını ileri süren metodolojik eşölçülemezlik argümanı ile kuramdan bağımsız nötr gözlem önermelerinin olamayacağını belirten gözlemlerin kuram yüklü olduğu savıdır. (...) Kuhn bu argümanlar çerçevesinde kendisine getirilen görecilik iddialarına karşı çıkar ve bilim felsefecilerinin ona yöneltmiş olduğu eleştirilere yıllar içerisinde “Bilimsel Devrimlerin Yapısı” kitabının ek bölümlerinde cevap vermektedir. Bu bağlamda, Kuhn’un bu iddialara ikna edici bir cevap verip vermediğini tespit edebilmek ve onun gerçekten bilim ve bilimsel bilginin statüsü konusunda rölativist olup olmadığını soruşturmak için ortaya konulan eleştirilerin etraflıca ele alınması gerekliliği ortaya çıkmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, Kuhn'un görecilik konusu ile ilgili bir neticeye varabilmek amacıyla onun bütün bilim anlayışının göz önünde bulundurulması önemlidir. Dolayısıyla Kuhn'un genel bilim tasviri bu çalışmanın odağını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bakımdan çalışmada, ilk olarak kısaca “göreciliğin” ne anlama geldiği ortaya konulacak, ardından Kuhn’un eşölçülemezlik ve kuram yüklülük tezleri ayrıntılandırılarak, bu çerçeve içerisinde neden rölativist olarak kabul edildiği serimlenecektir. Nihai olarak, Kuhn'un kendisine getirilen eleştirilere karşı ortaya koyduğu cevapların rölativist suçlamalardan sıyrılması için sağlam gerekçeleri sağlayamadığı ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

O objetivo deste breve artigo é o estudo da confiabilidade alcançada pela ciência (natural) com o exame da contribuição para este fenômeno encontrada no trabalho de Filósofo da Ciência Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996). Busca-se compreender a contribuição, a partir da construção conceitual proposta por Kuhn em “A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas”, à noção de que a ciência se movimenta a partir de paradigmas e que o sentido de (in) evolução, nas ciências naturais, sempre possui relevância histórica por se (...) tratar de uma experiência agregada, o que colocou a ciência em um patamar diferenciado dos demais conhecimentos humanos, gerando maior confiabilidade e certeza, onde se supõe que, mesmo quando diagnósticos ou assertivas ditas científicas se provem equivocados fatidicamente, são sempre proveitosos da perspectiva histórica. Há aqui uma isenção (absolvição) de qualquer possibilidade de falácia ou erro e uma enorme contribuição para a inequívoca confiabilidade popular à ciência. Tudo parece ser compreendido a partir da noção de “experiência”. (shrink)

Fen eğitimi ve öğretiminin anahtar unsurlarından bir tanesi bilimin doğasının ve özelliklerinin doğru bir şekilde tespit edilmesidir. Bilimin doğasına yönelik tespitler fen eğitimi yöntemlerini birçok açıdan etkilemektedir. Fen eğitimi ve fen öğretimi ile ilgili olan kişiler bilimin doğasının açık bir şekilde öğretilmesi gerektiğini kabul etmektedir. Thomas Kuhn’un bilim tarihi, bilim felsefesi ve bilim sosyolojisi alanlarını içeren incelemeleri neticesinde ileri sürdüğü bilimin yapısına, işleyişine ve doğasına yönelik tezleri (paradigma, olağan bilim, bilimsel devrimler, eşölçülemezlik, bulmaca çözme, kuram seçimi, keşif ve (...) gerekçelendirme ayrımı) fen eğitimi ve öğretimi alanında sıklıkla başvurulan kaynaklar olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda makalede mantıkçı pozitivist bilim anlayışının bilimin nesnel, evrensel, kesin gerçekleri ortaya çıkaran, sosyal-kültürel değerlerden ve ön yargılardan bağımsız, bilimsel bilginin birikimsel bir şekilde ilerlediği yönündeki iddiası bilimin gerçek doğasını yansıtamadığı düşüncesiyle Kuhn’un görüşleri çerçevesinde tartışılmaktadır. Makalenin temel savı Kuhn’un bilime ve bilimin doğasına yönelik tespitlerinin bilimin gelişen, dönüşen ve değişen yapıdaki gerçek doğasına vurgu yaptığı ve böylece fen eğitiminde sıklıkla başvurulan bilimin doğasına yönelik kavrayışı dönüştürdüğüdür. (shrink)

Bu makalede, bilim felsefecisi kimliğiyle tanınan Thomas Kuhn’un eğitim ve özellikle fen eğitimi alanındaki görüşlerine değinilmektedir. Fen eğitimi, bilim, bilimin doğası ve bilim uygulamaları hakkında düşünceler geliştirmeye odaklanarak fen öğrenimi için gerekli olan beceri ve anlayışın geliştirilmesini amaçlamaktadır. Fen eğitiminin temel amaçlarından biri bilimin gerçek doğasının tespit edilmesi ve bu doğrultuda bir eğitim modelinin belirlenmesidir. Bu çerçevede Kuhn’un bilim tarihine yönelik incelemeleri neticesinde ileri sürdüğü paradigma kavramı bilimin doğası ve fen eğitimi konusundaki görüşlerin değişimine yol açmıştır. (...) class='Hi'>Kuhn açısından fen eğitimi yürürlükteki bilim yapma tarzının temelinde yatan paradigma ve öğretilerinin bilim insanlarına ve öğrencilere aktarılması sürecidir, bu nedenle fen eğitimi yalnızca olağan bilim döneminde mümkündür. Kuhn’un eğitim modeli, mevcut paradigmayla ilişkili olarak karşılaşılan bulmaca ya da sorunları çeşitli örneklerden hareketle tekrar tekrar çözmeye çalışan öğrenciler aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilir. Kuhn’un olağan bilimin sınırları içerisinde kalarak değerlendirdiği fen eğitimi anlayışı eleştirel düşünceyi engellediği iddiasıyla Karl Popper, John Watkins ve Richard Bailey tarafından katı, tutucu, dogmatik ve endoktrinasyonu vurgulayan bir eğitim anlayışı olarak görülmektedir. Bu çerçevede makalede, öncelikli olarak Kuhn’un bilimin doğası ve bilimin gelişim tarzına yönelik belirlemeleri doğrultusunda fen eğitimine yönelik düşünceleri ve bu düşüncelerin eğitim alanındaki yansımaları incelenmektedir. Ardından, Kuhn’un fen eğitimi üzerine görüşlerinin iddia edildiği gibi dogmatik bir yapıda olmadığı, endoktrinasyonu ya da zorla öğretimi vurgulamadığı, bu tür yorumların radikal bir yaklaşımdan öteye gidemediği ileri sürülmektedir. Son olarak makalede, Kuhn’un fen eğitimi anlayışının yalnızca bir durum tespiti ya da bir fen eğitimi tasviri olarak değerlendirilmesi gerektiği düşüncesi ön plana çıkarılmaktadır. -/- In this article, Thomas Kuhn’s impact, who is known as a philosopher of science, on science education are mentioned. Science education aims to develop the skills and understanding necessary for science learning, with a focus on developing ideas about science and the nature of science. One of the main purposes of science education is to determine the true nature of science and to determine an education model in this direction. In this context, the concept of paradigm, which Kuhn put forward as a result of his studies on the history of science, has led to a change in views on the nature of science and science education. For Kuhn, science education is the process of conveying the paradigm underlying the current way of doing science to scientists and students because science education is possible only in the normal science period. Kuhn’s educational model is carried out through students who repeatedly try to solve puzzles or problems encountered in relation to the current paradigm. Kuhn’s understanding of science education is seen by Karl Popper, John Watkins and Richard Bailey as a rigid, conservative, dogmatic and indoctrinational education approach with the claim that it prevents critical thinking. In this context, the article primarily examines Kuhn’s thoughts on science education and the reflections of these thoughts in the field of education. Then, it is argued that Kuhn’s views on science education are not dogmatic as claimed, he does not emphasize indoctrination, and that such interpretations cannot go beyond a radical approach. Finally, in the article, it is emphasized that Kuhn’s understanding of science education should be evaluated only as a description of science education. (shrink)

The work of Thomas Kuhn has been very influential in Anglo-American philosophy of science and it is claimed that it has initiated the historical turn. Although this might be the case for English speaking countries, in France an historical approach has always been the rule. This article aims to investigate the similarities and differences between Kuhn and French philosophy of science or ‘French epistemology’. The first part will argue that he is influenced by French epistemologists, but by (...) lesser known authors than often thought. The second part focuses on the reactions of French epistemologists on Kuhn’s work, which were often very critical. It is argued that behind some superficial similarities there are deep disagreements between Kuhn and French epistemology. This is finally shown by a brief comparison with the reaction of more recent French philosophers of science, who distance themselves from French epistemology and are more positive about Kuhn. Based on these diverse appreciations of Kuhn, a typology of the different positions within the philosophy of science is suggested. (shrink)

This study investigates Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy that had broad influence in philosophy of science by his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and the contributions of his philosophy to Turkish philosophical literature. Kuhnian part of the picture of science debates brings to light considering the works done in Turkey upon the philosophy of Kuhn. In the first part of the thesis, T. Kuhn's life and works are mentioned. The second part focuses on Kuhn's philosophy of (...) science and the concept of paradigm. In the third part, publications on the Kuhnian understanding of science are determined and in the fourth part, finally, general evaluations are made on these publications and studies. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) is widely considered as one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century, while his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) is regarded as one of the most influential works in the philosophy ofscience. At the same time, however, his place within philosophy of science remains ambiguous. On the one hand, despite the popularity of SSR, there is no proper ‘Kuhnian school of thought’ in HPS. On the other hand, the interest towards (...) Kuhn does not seem to fade away and the number of publications about his work does not seem to decrease. We suggest that there are at least three different ways to go ‘beyond SSR’: (i) by scrutinising the development of Kuhn’s thought, from his pre- to his post-SSR writings; (ii) by contextualising Kuhn in the philosophical milieu of his time, thus interpreting his view as emerging from the intellectual exchanges he had with contemporary philosophers; (iii) by reinterpreting and developing some of his most known ideas, in ways that perhaps Kuhn himself was not able to contemplate. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolution, distinguishes between two types of sciences-one, normal; the other, revolutionary. However, the transition from normal to revolutionary science (what he calls paradigm-shift) is initiated by anomaly. This anomaly arises when the paradigm guiding a particular community of scientists malfunctions, thus resisting all efforts to reposition it. Hence, science for Kuhn, grows through the paradigm-shift initiated by tension. However, Kuhn argues that the process of choosing another paradigm that will (...) guild scientific practices requires a thorough debate among a community of scientists. In this debate, a new paradigm is selected out of numerous competing others by the method of elimination. This selection is based on their ability to solve problems and to guide research work without developing further faults. Nevertheless, in this understanding of scientific growth, in our view, inheres some contradictions. In the first places, Kuhn attributes growth to paradigm-shift through tension and anomaly but argues that a new paradigm must be selected based on its ability not to develop fault. It is not, however clear how paradigm-shift can occur if there is no fault, tension or anomaly in research. Secondly, he bases the selection of a new paradigm on the inarticulate aesthetic sentiments, faith and destiny, which contradicts the initial argument that it must be selected based on its observed inherent problem-solving ability out of the numerous others. We shall discuss these notable flaws in Kuhn's view of scientific growth, using the method of critical argumentation and conceptual clarification. (shrink)

The theory of science that Thomas Kuhn built in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions was considered as a hypothetical framework in this study. Since the publication of the work, many questions have arisen that call for a psychology of science. These questions are moved to another dimension through the knowledge of the decision made within Galileo Affair, which occupies an important place in modern science, fundamentally arising from an epistemic struggle and emerging out of an unscientific base rather (...) than the charge of unholiness. Abandoning the perspective which evaluates these questions within a historical process as a weak side of the Kuhnian theory of science, this study challenges the current approaches with an alternative approach. The epistemic complexity in the Kuhnian theory of science is an imperative complexity caused by human factors. From this perspective, there are potential questions for psychology of science as a field of study based on Kuhnian epistemology and it can be assumed that new problems may appear when the other epistemological questions which assumed as “answered” are reviewed in the scope of this study. The main thesis of this study is that psychology of science is possible as a valid and operationalizable research program based on Kuhnian theory of science. (shrink)

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions represented a milestone in the attempt to understand scientific development based on empirical observations. However, in the next decades after the publication of his book, history, psychology, and sociology became increasingly marginal in Kuhn’s discussions. In his last articles, Kuhn even suggested that philosophers should pay less attention to empirical data and focus more on “first principles.” The purpose of this article is, first, to describe this radical transformation in Kuhn’s methodological approach, (...) from his initial naturalism to his later and more strict philosophical stance. Next, I present some of the alleged justifications for explaining this transition, such as his interest in problems more firmly attached to the philosophical tradition and a desire for greater acceptance within this community. Although these factors certainly played a role in explaining Kuhn’s change, I also believe that an important theoretical component exerts a fundamental function in this transition: the idea that scientific development is a kind of evolutionary process, which is better understood through the use of abstract theoretical models, instead of sparse observations of scientific activity. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical logical empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of logical empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called struc- turalist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. Finally, we (...) will deal with Friedman’s proposal to apply Kuhn’s ideas to the formulation of a modernized, historically enlightened Kantian approach that is based on the concept of a non-apodictic constitutive and historically moving a priori. (shrink)

This document briefly summarizes several objections to Thomas Kuhn on science, including by Feyerabend, Davidson, and Fodor.

One of the main purposes of science is to explain natural phenomena by increasing our understanding of the physical world and to make predictions about the future based on these explanations. In this context, scientific theories can be defined as large-scale explanations of phenomena. In the historical process, scientists have made various choices among the theories they encounter at the point of solving the problems related to their fields of study. This process, which can be called ‘theory choice’, is one (...) of the most debated issues in the field of philosophy of science in the twentieth century, because this discussion is a very comprehensive problem because it includes important issues such as the use of logical arguments and the determination of the scientific method. At the point of solving this problem, members of the Vienna Circle and Karl Popper think that an objective criterion can be determined by which scientists can apply for theory choice. While the Vienna Circle emphasizes that the best-confirmed theory should be chosen among competing theories, Popper states that competing theories or theories should be tested ruthlessly with appropriate methods, and that successful or corroborated theories should be selected as a result of these tests. Contrary to these views Kuhn states that there are some non-obligatory subjective elements that scientists should follow at the point of theory choice. Accordingly, in this study, the problem of how scientists make their choices among competing theories will be discussed by highlighting Kuhn’s arguments regarding the subjective nature of theory selection. (shrink)

Abstract. In Dynamics of Reason Michael Friedman proposes a kind of synthesis between the neokantianism of Ernst Cassirer, the logical empiricism of Rudolf Carnap, and the historicism of Thomas Kuhn. Cassirer and Carnap are to take care of the Kantian legacy of modern philosophy of science, encapsulated in the concept of a relativized a priori and the globally rational or continuous evolution of scientific knowledge,while Kuhn´s role is to ensure that the historicist character of scientific knowledge is (...) taken seriously. More precisely, Carnapian linguistic frameworks, guarantee that the evolution of science procedes in a rational manner locally,while Cassirer’s concept of an internally defined conceptual convergence of empirical theories provides the means to maintain the global continuity of scientific reason. In this paper it is argued that Friedman’s neokantian account of scientific reason based on the concept of the relativized a priori underestimates the pragmatic aspects of the dynamics of scientific reason. To overcome this short-coming, I propose to reconsider C.I. Lewis’s account of a pragmatic the priori, recently modernized and elaborated by Hasok Chang. This may be<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br&g t;<br><br><br><br><br><br>Keywords: Dynamics of reason, Paradigms, Logical Empiricism,Neokantianism, Pragmatism, Mathematics, Communicative Rationality. (shrink)

This is a review of Alexander Bird's book on Thomas Kuhn.

My essay will be divided as follows: -/- #1 Analysis of Thomas Kuhn's notion of scientific revolutions; #2 Critical soft spots found in both Kuhn and Polanyi; #3 How Polanyi can enrich Kuhn's description of scientific discoveries.

Recent years saw the rise of an interest in the roles and significance of thought experiments in different areas of human thinking. Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope is no doubt one of the most famous examples of a thought experiment in physics. Nevertheless, this particular thought experiment has not received much detailed attention in the philosophical literature on thought experiments up to date, maybe because of its often claimed inadequacies. In this paper, I try to do two things: to provide an (...) interesting interpretation of the roles played by Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope in interpreting quantum mechanics – partly based on Thomas Kuhn’s views on the function of thought experiments – and to contribute to the ongoing discussions on the roles and significance of thought experiments in physics. (shrink)

This volume of essays about Thomas Kuhn contains new work by key figures in the area of Kuhn-studies. The essays treat Kuhn primarily as a philosopher rather than historian of science. They analyze the background setting of Kuhn’s ideas, and cover such topics as his account of scientific practice, cognitive aspects of scientific reasoning and conceptual change, and Kuhn’s influence on feminist philosophy of science. While the volume is principally conceived as an introduction to (...) Kuhn for the generalist, it contains much that will be of interest to specialists. The essays combine criticism with exposition. But the volume also has a prospective orientation. For it seeks to place Kuhn’s ideas within the frame of ongoing and future developments in the philosophy of science. The volume opens with an Introduction by the Editor, Thomas Nickles, and closes with a select bibliography of English-language literature relating to Kuhn. (shrink)

This thesis study is about the leading philosophers of philosophy of science of the twentieth century Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn and their asserted views about science and scientific knowledge and the method, standard and limit of science. Popper who emphasises the deductive method of science and its standard which should be falsifiable indicates that scientific knowledge should have a testable and falsifiable pattern. Kuhn, on the other hand, discusses the standard of scientificity connected to the existing (...) paradigm and its emerging problem solving in other words he accepts it as a "puzzle solving activity" and terminatively associates scientificity with sociological factors. Accordingly, in this thesis study by taking into consideration Popper and Kuhn's differences of opinion aimed at science and its knowledge, the arguments of development and scientific progress within the frame of their own terminology is being evaluated. Then, Popper and Kuhn's thoughts considering the standards of science and the arguments about progress and development of scientific knowledge is being transferred in a comparable and analytical manner. As a result it is advocated that Popper and Kuhn accept the existence of the change of scientific knowledge based on scientific progress and development and that this change is a change of opinion which is continuing nonstop. (shrink)

Since Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), historians and philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the implications of disciplinarity. In this chapter we consider restrictions posed to interdisciplinary exchange between ecology and economics that result from a particular kind of commitment to the ideal of disciplinary purity, that is, that each discipline is defined by an appropriate, unique set of objects, methods, theories, and aims. We argue that, when it comes to the objects of (...) study in ecology and economics, ideas of disciplinary purity have been underwritten by the artificial-natural distinction. We then problematize this distinction, and thus disciplinary purity, both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, the distinction is no longer tenable. Empirically, recent interdisciplinary research has shown the epistemological and policy-oriented benefits of dealing with models which explicitly link anthropogenic (i.e., “artificial”) and non-anthropogenic factors (i.e., “natural”). We conclude that, in the current age of the Anthropocene, it is to be expected that without interdisciplinary exchange, ecology and economics may relinquish global relevance because the distinct and separate systems to which each “pure” science was originally made to apply will only diminish over time. (shrink)

“Pick a card, any card. This has to be a completely free choice.” the magician tells you. But is it really? Although we like to think that we are using our free will to make our decisions, research in psychology has shown that many of our behaviours are automatic and unconsciously influenced by external stimuli (Ariely, 2008; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Newell & Shanks, 2014; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and that we are often oblivious to the cognitive mechanisms that underpin (...) our decision (Wegner, 2002, 2003). Magicians have exploited this illusory sense of agency for a long time, and have developed a wide range of techniques to influence and control spectators’ choices of such things as card, word, or number (Annemann, 1933; Banachek, 2002a; Jones, 1994; Turner, 2015). These techniques are instances of what is called forcing. -/- Many forces are extremely effective, illustrating various weaknesses in our sense of control over decisions and their outcomes. Researchers have started to investigate them in various ways (Kuhn, Pailh s, & Lan, 2020; Olson, Amlani, Raz, & Rensink, 2015; Pailhes & Kuhn, 2020b, 2020c; Shalom et al., 2013) and are beginning to obtain valuable insights into decision-making processes as well as a better understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that lead people to experience an illusory sense of free will and of agency. -/- Although magicians have acquired large amounts of knowledge in covertly controlling people’s choices, much of this knowledge is only discussed in the context of individual magic tricks, or in books that are not readily accessible to non-magicans. As we and others have argued elsewhere (Ekroll, Sayim, & Wagemans, 2017; Kuhn, 2019; Kuhn, Amlani, & Rensink, 2008; Kuhn, Caffaratti, Teszka, & Rensink, 2014; Macknik et al., 2008; Olson et al., 2015; Olson, Landry, Appourchaux, & Raz, 2016; Shalom et al., 2013; Thomas, Didierjean, Maquestiaux, & Gygax, 2015), a particularly effective way of making this knowledge more available is via the creation of taxonomies centered around psychological mechanisms (Rensink & Kuhn, 2015). For example, the psychologically based taxonomy of misdirection (Kuhn et al., 2014) helps draw links between misdirection and formal theories of perception and cognition. -/- Our aim here is to apply a similar process to the knowledge magicians have about forcing. The present paper develops a psychologically based taxonomy of forcing techniques with two goals in mind. Firstly, it should help uncover the various psychological mechanisms that underlie forcing techniques. Secondly, it should facilitate knowledge transfer between magicians and psychologists. Among other things, this knowledge will allow researchers to gain new insights into the mechanisms underlying decision-making, and the feeling of free will and of agency over choice. We start by defining the magician’s force and then look at some of the past classifications of forcing. (shrink)

This is a book review of Paul Horwich (ed.) World Changes.

At first glance there seem to be many similarities between Thomas S. Kuhn’s and Ludwik Fleck’s accounts of the development of scientific knowledge. Notably, both pay attention to the role played by the scientific community in the development of scientific knowledge. But putting first impressions aside, one can criticise some philosophers for being too hasty in their attempt to find supposed similarities in the works of the two men. Having acknowledged that Fleck anticipated some of Kuhn’s later (...) theses, there seems to be a temptation in more recent research to equate both theories in important respects. Because of this approach, one has to deal with the problem of comparing the most notable technical terms of both philosophers, namely ‘‘thought style’’ and ‘‘paradigm’’. This paper aims at a more thorough comparison between Ludwik Fleck’s concept of thought style and Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm. Although some philosophers suggest that these two concepts are essentially equal in content, a closer examination reveals that this is not the case. This thesis of inequality will be defended in detail, also taking into account some of the alleged similarities which may be responsible for losing sight of the differences between these theories. (shrink)

Thomas S. Kuhn’s The structure of scientific revolutions is a classic text in the history and philosophy of science. It is one of the best known works in the field outside this area of academic specialization. One need only mention the term ‘paradigm’ to register the extent to which Kuhn’s ideas have entered the vernacular. Traditionally, philosophers of science have tended to focus on questions about the nature of scientific method. Kuhn brought a historical orientation to (...) bear on such questions. Structure opens with the words, ‘History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chron- ology could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed’ (p.1). Kuhn proposed a model of scientific change, that empha- sizes historical development. As Kuhn foresaw, reflection on its history has transformed our image of science. Science is now seen as a developing process, practised by humans in a variety of shifting historical and social circumstances. (shrink)

Alexander Bird indicates that the significance of Thomas Kuhn in the history of philosophy of science is somehow paradoxical. On the one hand, Kuhn was one of the most influential and important philosophers of science in the second half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, nowadays there is little distinctively Kuhn’s legacy in the sense that most of Kuhn’s work has no longer any philosophical significance. Bird argues that the explanation of the paradox (...) of Kuhn’s legacy is that Kuhn took a direction opposite to that of the mainstream of the philosophy of science in his later academic career. This paper aims to provide a new way to understand and develop Kuhn’s legacy by revisiting the development of Kuhn’s philosophy of science in 1970s and proposing a new account of exemplar. Firstly, I propose my diagnosis of Kuhn’s “wrong turning” by identifying Kuhn’s two novel contributions: the introduction of paradigm and the proposal of the incommensurability thesis. Secondly, I argue that Kuhn made a conceptual/terminological turn from paradigm to theory, which undermined Kuhn’s novel contributions. Thirdly, I propose a new articulation of exemplar and propose an exemplar-based approach to analysing the history of science. Finally, I show how the exemplar-based approach can be applied to analyse the history of science by my case study of the early development of genetics. (shrink)

Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged the ‘received view’ on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting that there is a close affinity (rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this revisionist view, I argue that the philosophical relationship between Carnap and Kuhn should be regarded as opposed rather (...) than complementary. In particular, I argue that a consideration of the fundamentally disparate nature of the broader philosophical projects of Carnap (logic of science) and Kuhn (providing a theory of scientific revolutions)renders the alleged similarities between their views superficial in comparison to their fundamental differences. In defense of the received view, I suggest that Carnap and Kuhn are model representatives of two contrasting styles of doing philosophy of science, viz., logical analysis and historical analysis respectively. This analysis clarifies the role played by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the demise of logical empiricism in the second half of the twentieth-century. (shrink)

Kuhn's alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill defined notion of untranslatability and is hence radically incomplete. To supplement it, I reconstruct Kuhn's taxonomic interpretation on the basis of a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy, a semantic theory of truth-value, and a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication. According to the reconstruction, two scientific languages are incommensurable when core sentences of one language, which have truth values when considered within its own context, lack truth values when (...) considered within the context of the other due to the unmatchable taxonomic structures underlying them. So constructed, Kuhn's mature interpretation of incommensurability does not depend upon the notion of truth-preserving translatability, but rather depends on the notion of truth-value-status-preserving cross-language communication. The reconstruction makes Kuhn's notion of incommensurability a well grounded, tenable and integrated notion.Author Keywords: Incommensurability; Thomas Kuhn; Taxonomic structures; Lexicons; Truth-value; Untranslatability; Cross-language communication. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to explore Thomas Kuhn’s notion of “scientific crisis” and indicate some difficulties with it. First, Kuhn defines “crisis” through the notion of “anomaly” but distinguishes these concepts in two different ways: categorically and quantitatively. Both of these alternatives face considerable problems. The categorical definition relies on a distinction between “discoveries” and “inventions” that, as Kuhn himself admits, is artificial. The quantitative definition states that crises are a deeper, more profound type (...) of anomaly. Kuhn, however, does not offer any criteria for objectively defining this “severity” of the crises. The second kind of problem is related to the application of the concept of “crisis.” Apparently, Kuhn attributes crises to individuals as much as to communities. Lastly, there is the problem of the function of crises. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, they are presented as a precondition to scientific revolutions. In later articles, however, Kuhn seems to see them only as a common antecedent to revolutions. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere[1], is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science (...) is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. [Back to Top]. (shrink)

El impacto de la obra de Thomas Samuel Kuhn se debe, en gran parte, al énfasis con que este autor destacó la relevancia de factores externos al conocimiento científico en el desarrollo de la práctica científica. Pero también las consecuencias relativistas y subjetivistas que se desprenden de muchas de las posiciones que defendió en sus primeras publicaciones contribuyeron con la amplia difusión de sus ideas. No obstante, en sus últimos escritos, Kuhn parece haber matizado algunas de sus (...) concepciones más radicales. En este trabajo, se formulan algunas observaciones críticas sobre su obra. Se argumenta, además, que las modificaciones posteriormente introducidas por este autor sólo constituyen alteraciones parciales de las tesis más extremas que caracterizan su obra. (shrink)

Moti Mizrahi has argued that Thomas Kuhn does not have a good argument for the incommensurability of successive scientific paradigms. With Rouse, Andersen, and others, I defend a view on which Kuhn primarily was trying to explain scientific practice in Structure. Kuhn, like Hilary Putnam, incorporated sociological and psychological methods into his history of science. On Kuhn’s account, the education and initiation of scientists into a research tradition is a key element in scientific training and (...) in his explanation of incommensurability between research paradigms. The first part of this paper will explain and defend my reading of Kuhn. The second part will probe the extent to which Kuhn’s account can be supported, and the extent to which it rests on shaky premises. That investigation will center on Moti Mizrahi’s project, which aims to transform the Kuhnian account of science and of its history. While I do defend a modified kind of incommensurability, I agree that the strongest version of Kuhn’s account is steadfastly local and focused on the practice of science. (shrink)

Relativism in the philosophy of science is widely associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. Kuhn and Feyerabend espoused views about conceptual change and variation of scientific method that have apparent relativistic implications. Both held that scientific theories or paradigms may be incommensurable due to semantic variation. Two ways that truth may be relative because of semantic incommensurability will be distinguished. Davidson’s criticism of the idea of an untranslatable language will be discussed, as well (...) as a response to incommensurability based on the causal theory of reference of Kripke and Putnam. A form of relativism with respect to epistemic rationality may also be derived from the claims of Kuhn and Feyerabend about methodological variation. Kuhn’s initial suggestions about paradigm-dependent standards and absence of extra-paradigmatic standards give rise to a view on which rationality is relative to paradigm. Kuhn’s later view that there is a stable set of shared scientific values is less prone to relativistic interpretation. Feyerabend’s claim that “anything goes” suggests an extreme form of relativism, but should be understood instead as the view that all rules of method may be violated in some circumstances. The latter brings Feyerabend’s view into line with Kuhn’s later view. (shrink)

According to Kuhn’s account of the nature of scientific paradigms, how one experiences the world varies drastically from one context to another depending on the accepted paradigm of the context in question. In other words, one’s pre-existing conceptual structure concerning the world not only acts as an epistemological framework for its possible understanding, but also fundamentally affects the phenomenological observations of the world as something; this latter function of the conceptual structure motivates the view that mature scientific paradigms/theories and (...) the data of scientific observation/experimentation are essentially two sides of the same coin. What is interesting, then, is that even between different historical eras that generally regarded the world in clearly incompatible ways, albeit still informed by paradigms, Kuhn still attributes scientific knowledge to each. To make sense of this, the explanatory resources of epistemological contextualism are used to specify potentially one way in which epistemic standards for knowledge must change between different historical eras for one to justifiably claim scientific knowledge within these different contexts. As we shall see, the argument for Kuhn’s account of paradigm being contextualist in character is apparently best made through the notion of doubt-driven context-shifts as actualising change in the form of P between different contexts in which “S knows that P” is asserted. As such, this paper first explores Kuhn’s account of scientific knowledge and paradigms before considering how the account can be considered contextualist in nature. Moreover, other context-concerned systems, such as Traditional, and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, are briefly investigated to substantiate claims of what cannot be accurately ascribed to Kuhn’s epistemology. (shrink)

Despite his enormous influence on the philosophy of science, Kuhn seems to have been unfairly treated by philosophers. His work was often oversimplified, misinterpreted, and quickly dismissed. The legacy of Kuhn for contemporary philosophy of science seems to be unfortunately thin. This book revisits his legacy for the history and philosophy of science and reflects on the prospect of the Kuhnian philosophy of science. It explores Kuhnian or neo-Kuhnian approaches to central issues in twenty-first philosophy of science. It (...) also rereads Kuhn's published and unpublished work and reassesses its philosophical significance and historical context. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn explicitly states that the paradigm shift implies a change of the world. This is because the paradigm is seen as constitutive of nature itself. In this paper, I will try to interpret this thesis by inscribing Kuhn's theory in the larger Kantian theoretical framework. As the last chapter of the „Critique of pure reason” shows, Kant thought that reason is inherently historical and evolves through revolutions. This dynamical perspective on reason comes clearly to light especially (...) in the „Appendix” to the „transcendental Dialectic”, where the Idea of reason is seen as an abstract theoretical framework that makes possible and guides the understanding. It will be shown that the Kuhnian paradigm and the Kantian transcendental Ideea function in similar ways. Both serve as an orientation for scientific research, they make rules possible, and constitute nature in a weak, indirect, way. The relation between Ideea and understanding in the first „Critique” parallels in many ways the kuhnian relation between paradigm and normal science. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientific revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the consideration (...) of epistemic authority.The mistake of Kuhn was to emphasize and clarify insufficiently the role of the epistemic authority of experts; his critics failed for ignoring it altogether. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there is neither valid deductive support nor strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. There is no valid deductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis because, from the fact that the reference of the same kind terms changes or discontinues from one theoretical framework to another, it does not necessarily follow that these two theoretical frameworks are taxonomically incommensurable. There is no strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, since there are rebutting (...) defeaters against it in the form of episodes from the history of science that do not exhibit discontinuity and replacement, as Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis predicts, but rather continuity and supplementation. If this is correct, then there are no compelling epistemic reasons to believe that Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is true or probable. (shrink)

Some comments on descriptive and normative aspects of Kuhn's account of science.

This chapter examines the legacy of Kuhn’s Structure for normative philosophy of science. As an argument regarding the history of 20th century philosophy of science, I contend that the main legacy of Structure was destructive: Structure shifted philosophy of science away from addressing general normative philosophical issues (e.g., the demarcation problem, empirical testability) towards more deflationary and local approaches to normative issues. This is evident in the first generation of post-Structure philosophers of science in the 1980s and 1990s, who (...) adopted a pluralist approach to HPS. As a metaphilosophical argument regarding the methods adopted in HPS, I argue that there are a plurality of legitimate philosophical methodologies for inferring normative claims from historical cases. I frame this argument as a response to Pitt’s dilemma of case studies. I reject Pitt’s dilemma for its presupposition of an unrealistic and unfruitful standard (viz., epistemic certainty) for assessing HPS arguments and its analysis of philosophical methodology at the level of individual arguments. Pitt’s dilemma is most usefully understood as identifying potential points of criticism for HPS arguments. -/- The chapter begins with an examination of Kuhn’s normative philosophy of science in Structure and his position that historical cases provide evidence for philosophical claims. Kuhn’s philosophical methodology is insufficiently articulated, and his utilization of case studies is subject to objections (viz., interpretative bias, hasty generalization) implied by Pitt’s dilemma. I subsequently examine four post-Kuhnian methodological perspectives: (1) Ian Hacking’s particularism, (2) Helen Longino’s practice-based approach, (3) Michael Friedman’s neo-Kantianism, and (4) Hasok Chang’s complementary science. These views suggest alternative methodological strategies in HPS for addressing normative issues. I conclude by articulating some outstanding methodological challenges for the pluralist tradition of HPS—associated with the Stanford and Minnesota schools of philosophy of science—that emerged in the 1980s and remains influential. (shrink)

“Bilimsel Devrimlerin Yapısı” adlı kitabıyla Thomas Kuhn'un bilim felsefesi çalışmalarında yeni bir çığır açtığı bilinmektedir (Öztürk, 2012: 171). Bu çalışma, Kuhn’un “Bilimsel Devrimlerin Yapısı (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions)” adlı eseri başta olmak üzere, bu eser üzerine yapılan çeşitli çalışmalar referans alınarak sunulmaktadır. Tüm bu çalışmalarda bilimin ilerleme tarzının ele alındığı, fakat bilimin ilerleme tarzı hakkında farklı sıralamaların yer aldığı görülmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, bilimin ilerleme tarzı hakkında daha önce ele alınanlardan farklı bir sıralama sunmaktır. Ulaşılan bu (...) farklı sıralama ile Kuhn’un anlaşılır kılınması mümkün olabilecektir. Çalışmanın amacı doğrultusunda, bilimin ilerleme tarzı hakkında farklı bir sıralama sunarak beş aşamalı bir sıralama ortaya konulacak olup, literatüre de bir katkı sağlanmaktadır. Sıralamaya ilişkin aşamalar, olağan bilim öncesi dönem (paradigma öncesi), olağan bilim dönemi (paradigma ve bilmece), bunalım dönemi (bilimsel kuramların ortaya çıkması), bilimsel devrim dönemi (olağanüstü araştırma ve olağanüstü bilim) ve bilimsel devrim sonrası dönem (yeni paradigma ve yeni olağan bilim) olarak ayrı ayrı ve detaylı bir şekilde incelenmektedir. (shrink)

Bilime ve onun bilgisine akademik, politik, ekonomik ve kamusal alanlar olmak üzere birçok alanda diğer bilgi iddialarına kıyasla daha fazla güven duyulmaktadır. Bilime duyulan bu güvenin temelinde büyük ölçüde bilimsel süreçlerin ve yöntemlerin nesnel bir şekilde yürütülmesi ve bu nesnel sürecin bir ürünü olarak bilimsel bilginin tarafsız bilim insanları tarafından ortaya konulduğu düşüncesi yatmaktadır. Bu bakımdan toplum tarafından bilimin tartışılmaz statüsünün ve bilimsel bilgiye verilen değerin belirleyicisi olarak nesnellik özelliği ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bilhassa doğa bilimleri söz konusu olduğunda bilimsel yöntemin (...) olgulara ve dış dünyaya ilişkin nesnel bilgiler sağladığı düşünülmektedir. Bu bakımdan doğa bilimleri, bilimde nesnelliğin paradigmatik örnekleri olarak kabul görmektedir. Beşeri ve sosyal bilimler alanında ise doğa bilimlerine kıyasla nesnellik algısı düşük olmasına rağmen, yöntemlerinin bilimsel yöntemle çalışılmaya uygun olmasından dolayı en azından ilke olarak nesnel olduğu değerlendirilmektedir. Bilimin değerler alanından ziyade olgu alanına ilişkin çalışmalar yürütmesi, bilim insanlarının değerler, anlamlar ve ideallerinden de kendisini izole ederek bilimsel nesnelliği temin edilebileceği konusunda genel bir kavrayışa yol açmaktadır. Bu görüşün önde gelen düşünürü Karl Popper’dır. Popper bilimsel nesnelliğin, olgusal içerikli önermelerin – protokol önermeleri – öznelerarası sınanabilir olması ile temin edilebileceğini ve böylece bilim insanlarının çalışmalarında kültür, değer ve inanç gibi öznel kanılarının bilimsel bilginin temellendirilmesi ve sınanması noktasında kullanılamayacağını ifade etmiştir. Ancak bilimin doğasına yönelik bir soruşturma bilimsel bilginin düşünüldüğü kadar nesnel bir sürece sahip olmadığını, bilim faaliyetini gerçekleştiren bilim insanlarının kişisel çıkarlarının, değerlerinin ve içinde yaşamış oldukları kültürel faktörlerin bilimsel bilginin elde edilmesi sürecinde etkili olabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bakımdan bilimin doğasını doğru bir şekilde anlayabilmenin yolu bilimlerde nesnellik ölçütünün sosyolojik ve kültürel unsurlarla yakından ilişkili olduğunu bilmekten geçmektedir. Thomas Kuhn bilimsel değerlendirmelerde değer yargılarının ve kültürel unsurların kaçınılmaz olduğu düşüncesindedir. Kuhn, Popper’ın aksine sosyolojik etmen ve değerleri de işin içerisine katarak bir bilimsel nesnellik değerlendirmesi yapmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, o bilimde fazlasıyla öznel unsurları vurguladığı eleştirilerine imkân vermeyecek şekilde bilim insanlarının takip etmesi gereken ve tavsiye niteliğinde olan belirli değerler neticesinde bilimsel nesnelliğin ve rasyonalitenin sağlanabileceğini ifade etmektedir. Bu kapsamda çalışmada, bilimin en bilinen özelliği olarak göze çarpan nesnellik kavramı ve düşüncesine yönelik kavramsal bir belirlemenin ardından kültür ve değer gibi sosyolojik unsurların bilimsel objektifliğin ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu argümanı, Popper ve Kuhn’un çalışmaları göz önünde bulundurularak serimlenecektir. (shrink)

The paper takes off from the suggestion of Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen that Kuhn’s account of science may be understood in coherentist terms. There are coherentist themes in Kuhn’s philosophy of science. But one crucial element is lacking. Kuhn does not deny the existence of basic beliefs which have a non-doxastic source of justification. Nor does he assert that epistemic justification only derives from inferential relationships between non-basic beliefs. Despite this, the coherentist interpretation is promising and I develop it (...) further in this paper. I raise the question of whether Kuhn’s account of science can deal with the input objection to coherentism. I argue that the role played by problems in Kuhn’s theory of science ensures that there is input from the external world into scientists’ belief-systems. I follow Hoyningen-Huene in pointing to the causal role played by the external world in determining perceptual states. I next turn to the question of whether Kuhn’s rejection of foundationalism implies coherentism. I argue that Kuhn’s rejection of the one-to-one relation between object and experience is compatible with a foundationalist account of justification. Nor does Kuhn’s rejection of the given entail the same coherentist implications as Sellars’ critique of the myth of the given. (shrink)

My purpose is to examine how Kuhn and Polanyi might be mutually supportive and corrective so as to join forces in providing a more comprehensive understanding of the progress of science. My presentation will be divided into three parts: (I) The common ground Kuhn shares with Polanyi; (II) Four soft spots in Kuhn and their remedy; (III) Clarifying and upgrading Polanyi appeal to "objective reality.".