In the first half of the paper, it is argued that while the prospects for a criterion for demarcating scientific theories from pseudoscientific ones are exceedingly dim, it is a mistake to fall back to the position that these differ only with regard to how well they are confirmed. One may admit that different pseudoscientific theories are flawed in different ways yet still insist that their flaws are structural rather than empirical in character. In the second half of the paper, (...) this view is extended to cover the cases of pseudoscientific correlations and therapies, and it is suggested that the pseudosciences are best thought of as radically flawed practices. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to a pattern of development, the significance of which has not been generally recognized. This pattern is characterized by an initial occurrence of what I shall call an overdetermined problem - i.e. a problem with no solution compatible with accepted belief and practice - followed by a resolution of the problem which relies on and exploits a change in what was previously taken as given.

Discussion of William Whewell on Kepler on the orbit of Mars. A paper in *An Intimate Relation*, a volume presented to Robert E. Butts on his 60th Birthday.

A study of the origins of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour detailing when and why it was written.

Abstract:Russell (in Principles of Mathematics) and Wittgenstein (in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) largely agree on the twin questions of why pairs of congruent objects cannot always be made to coincide and why surfaces can never be uniformly two colours at once. Both philosophers take space and colour to be mathematically representable, construe the relevant impossibilities as mathematical and hold that mathematical impossibility is at root logical. It is not by chance that Russell says nothing about the phenomena in his Introduction to the (...) Tractatus or surprising that Wittgenstein was unmoved by the objection that his account of colour incompatibility puts paid to his early philosophy. (shrink)

Chapter in Wittgenstein at the Movies, an in-depth explorations of two experimental films on Wittgenstein: Derek Jarman's Wittgenstein and Péter Forgács' Wittgenstein Tractatus.

The problem of colour exclusion is not fatal to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, nor was it the catalyst for his later philosophy. The remarks in the Tractatus about the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two colours at a point in the visual field sit comfortably with the remarks in the rest of the book, the discussion of mathematical physics above all. Furthermore Wittgenstein’s second thoughts about the impossibility were a consequence, not the cause, of the subsequent turn in his (...) philosophy. (shrink)

There is nothing in Wittgenstein's philosophical writings remotely approaching an unambiguous expression of right-wing or left-wing sentiments. The words "politics" and "political" do not figure in his work and politicians are referred to only in passing. All that can reasonably be argued is that his philosophy has indirect implications for how we should collectively live our lives, approach political problems or think about political theory. In this paper I critically examine claims that have been made regarding the significance of his (...) writings for politics with an eye to showing they are textually dubious or otherwise misleading. (shrink)

Review of David Faust, The Limits of Scientific Reasoning.

A response to Graham Stevens’s response to Lugg, ‘Russell as a Precursor of Quine’ (Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, nos. 128-129, pp. 9-21). Stevens challenges the argument of this paper that from 1912, if not earlier, Russell was “a naturalistically-minded epistemologist in the Quinean mould”. He maintains that to the contrary “Russell cannot be accurately characterized as an empiricist” and “Russell’s greatest influence on Quine’s naturalistic project did not stem from his epistemology but from his semantics”. In the present note it (...) is argued Stevens overlooks that Russell is in the empiricist camp as well as the naturalist camp and the empiricist elements of Russell’s philosophy are secondary to his naturalism. (shrink)

Criticism of Larry Laudan's views on disagreement and progress in science.

Critical notice of Tom Sorell's Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science.

On Russell's and Quine's "naturalism".

Review of Wesley Salmon's Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.

Discussion of centred on Kuhn's Essential Tension.

Although Wittgenstein maintains that there are no theses in philosophy, he is regularly interpreted as advancing or committed to such theses. In this paper I consider a striking case in point, Merrill Ring’s discussion of §19(b), §20(a) and §20(b) of the Philosophical Investigations. I compare Ring's account of the text with Wittgenstein's actual words and stress the importance of refraining from taking Wittgenstein to be engaged in an explanatory or theoretical enterprise.

Grumpy short discussion of Nicholas Maxwell's From Knowledge to Wisdom.

In diesem Beitrag liefere ich eine Interpretation und Verteidigung der These Thomas Kuhns von der Priorität von Paradigmen. Ich behaupte, daß Kuhns Argument für diese These wichtiger, als gewöhnlich angenommen wird, ist, und zwar sowohl für die Klärung seiner Ideen als auch für die Wissenschaftstheorie im allgemeinen. Anerkennt man seine Kritik an der üblichen Auffassung, daß Regeln den Paradigmen vorausgehen, so erscheint vieles von dem, was er über andere Gegenstände sagt, in einem neuen Licht, und viele Schwierigkeiten, die Philosophen bei (...) ihren Versuchen zur Erklärung des Wissenschaftswandels angetroffen haben, erweisen sich als unbegründet. (shrink)

Analysis of how intellectual historians and sociologists of science differ.

Critical Notice of Alan Garfinkel's Forms of Explanation.

Critical notice of Images of Science by P. M. Churchland and C. A. Hooker.

Putnam argues that reductionism, “the doctrine that the laws of such ‘higher level’ sciences as psychology and sociology are reducible to the laws of lower-level sciences - biology, chemistry, ultimately to the laws of elementary particle physics”, is wrong. In this note, I take issue with some of Putnam’s arguments.

Brief response to Brian Baigrie's "The Justification of Kepler’s Ellipse" (1990).

There is no satisfactory way of distinguishing the parodies of science from the genuine thing. Philosophers tend to think science and pseudoscience differ in kind, but the fact is they differ mostly in degree.

Review of G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker's Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, the second volume of their analytical commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

Review of T. Nickles (ed), Scientific Discovery: Case Studies.

Critical discussion of Larry Laudan's problem-solving approach to scientific progress and rationality as presented in his Progress and Its Problems.

Review of BERTRAND RUSSELL: THE SPIRIT OF SOLITUDE, the first volume of Ray Monk's biography of Russell.

Review of a reissue of Russell's My Philosophical Development.

Review of the third edition of Paul Feyerabend's Against Method.

Review of Michael Potter's Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic.

Review of Roger M. White, Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: A Reader's Guide.

Review of David Stove's Popper and Beyond.

Review of Antony Flew's God and Philosophy.

Review of a collection of letters to and from Wittgenstein.

Review of Roger Gibson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Quine.

Review of Rush Rhees's Wittgenstein's On Certainty: There Like Our Life.

Critical review of Michael Dummett's The Nature and Future of Philosophy.

Critical notice of Paul Feyerabend's Farewell to Reason. The basic difficulty with Feyerabend's argument is not that he goes too far in rejecting traditional philosophical views but that he does not go far enough. We should indeed dismiss philosophical attempts to forge a "direct line to heaven" and forswear introducing "caricatures" of the rationalist's conception of reason to accommodate the complexities of history. But we should also shun the temptation to regard tradition as a surrogate for reason and to elevate (...) freedom and democracy to the status of explanatory philosophical principles. It is no less a mistake to follow the relativist and fetishize cultural diversity than it is to follow the rationalist and fetishize reason. To recognise that we are on our own is not to repudiate rationalism in favour of relativism, but to bid farewell as firmly and as finally to both. (shrink)

Review of M. Audi, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

Review of Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn, eds. , The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Comments on some of the articles in this huge collection.

Review of Nuno Venturinha, ed. , Wittgenstein after his Nachlass.

Review of Serge Robert, Les révolutions du savoir, 1979.

Review of L. Laudan, Science and Hypothesis. Treats Laudan on the history of methodology (and the history of epistemology) focusing on the method of hypothesis.

Comments on a collection of papers published in the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science presented between 1973 and 1980. The authors' arguments are held to be shaped in the main by positivist presuppositions and aims.