In the first half of the paper, it is argued that while the prospects for a criterion for demarcating scientific theories from pseudoscientific ones are exceedingly dim, it is a mistake to fall back to the position that these differ only with regard to how well they are confirmed. One may admit that different pseudoscientific theories are flawed in different ways yet still insist that their flaws are structural rather than empirical in character. In the second half of the paper, (...) this view is extended to cover the cases of pseudoscientific correlations and therapies, and it is suggested that the pseudosciences are best thought of as radically flawed practices. (shrink)

Discussion of William Whewell on Kepler on the orbit of Mars. A paper in *An Intimate Relation*, a volume presented to Robert E. Butts on his 60th Birthday.

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to a pattern of development, the significance of which has not been generally recognized. This pattern is characterized by an initial occurrence of what I shall call an overdetermined problem - i.e. a problem with no solution compatible with accepted belief and practice - followed by a resolution of the problem which relies on and exploits a change in what was previously taken as given.

Study of Wittgenstein's claim in the Preface of the Tractatus that his thoughts are unassailably true and his declaration at the end of the work that his propositions are nonsensical.

Critical discussion of the claim that Wittgenstein was a conservative thinker.

The problem of colour exclusion is not fatal to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, nor was it the catalyst for his later philosophy. The remarks in the Tractatus about the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two colours at a point in the visual field sit comfortably with the remarks in the rest of the book, the discussion of mathematical physics above all. Furthermore Wittgenstein’s second thoughts about the impossibility were a consequence, not the cause, of the subsequent turn in his (...) philosophy. (shrink)

Chapter in Wittgenstein at the Movies, an in-depth explorations of two experimental films on Wittgenstein: Derek Jarman's Wittgenstein and Péter Forgács' Wittgenstein Tractatus.

A study of the origins of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour detailing when and why it was written.

There is nothing in Wittgenstein's philosophical writings remotely approaching an unambiguous expression of right-wing or left-wing sentiments. The words "politics" and "political" do not figure in his work and politicians are referred to only in passing. All that can reasonably be argued is that his philosophy has indirect implications for how we should collectively live our lives, approach political problems or think about political theory. In this paper I critically examine claims that have been made regarding the significance of his (...) writings for politics with an eye to showing they are textually dubious or otherwise misleading. (shrink)

A response to Graham Stevens’s response to Lugg, ‘Russell as a Precursor of Quine’ (Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, nos. 128-129, pp. 9-21). Stevens challenges the argument of this paper that from 1912, if not earlier, Russell was “a naturalistically-minded epistemologist in the Quinean mould”. He maintains that to the contrary “Russell cannot be accurately characterized as an empiricist” and “Russell’s greatest influence on Quine’s naturalistic project did not stem from his epistemology but from his semantics”. In the present note it (...) is argued Stevens overlooks that Russell is in the empiricist camp as well as the naturalist camp and the empiricist elements of Russell’s philosophy are secondary to his naturalism. (shrink)

Review of David Faust, The Limits of Scientific Reasoning.

Criticism of Larry Laudan's views on disagreement and progress in science.

On Russell's and Quine's "naturalism".

Critical notice of Tom Sorell's Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science.

Discussion of Thomas Kuhn's remarks about paradigms.

Discussion of centred on Kuhn's Essential Tension.

Review of Wesley Salmon's Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.

Although Wittgenstein maintains that there are no theses in philosophy, he is regularly interpreted as advancing or committed to such theses. In this paper I consider a striking case in point, Merrill Ring’s discussion of §19(b), §20(a) and §20(b) of the Philosophical Investigations. I compare Ring's account of the text with Wittgenstein's actual words and stress the importance of refraining from taking Wittgenstein to be engaged in an explanatory or theoretical enterprise.

Philosophical Investigations §§19–20 have received little critical attention and their importance has mostly gone unappreciated. In this paper these sections are examined a few sentences at a time in the order they were written with an eye to determining what Wittgenstein does and does not say and how he has been and can be misinterpreted. In addition it is suggested that the material deserves careful consideration because it sheds light on Wittgenstein’s way of tackling philosophical problems, illuminates his pronouncements about (...) philosophy later in the Investigations, and serves as a valuable antidote to the widely-held view that whenever he discusses a philosophical problem he ends up advancing a philosophical thesis. (shrink)

Grumpy short discussion of Nicholas Maxwell's From Knowledge to Wisdom.

In diesem Beitrag liefere ich eine Interpretation und Verteidigung der These Thomas Kuhns von der Priorität von Paradigmen. Ich behaupte, daß Kuhns Argument für diese These wichtiger, als gewöhnlich angenommen wird, ist, und zwar sowohl für die Klärung seiner Ideen als auch für die Wissenschaftstheorie im allgemeinen. Anerkennt man seine Kritik an der üblichen Auffassung, daß Regeln den Paradigmen vorausgehen, so erscheint vieles von dem, was er über andere Gegenstände sagt, in einem neuen Licht, und viele Schwierigkeiten, die Philosophen bei (...) ihren Versuchen zur Erklärung des Wissenschaftswandels angetroffen haben, erweisen sich als unbegründet. (shrink)

Analysis of how intellectual historians and sociologists of science differ.

Critical Notice of Alan Garfinkel's Forms of Explanation.

Critical notice of Images of Science by P. M. Churchland and C. A. Hooker.

There is no satisfactory way of distinguishing the parodies of science from the genuine thing. Philosophers tend to think science and pseudoscience differ in kind, but the fact is they differ mostly in degree.

Putnam argues that reductionism, “the doctrine that the laws of such ‘higher level’ sciences as psychology and sociology are reducible to the laws of lower-level sciences - biology, chemistry, ultimately to the laws of elementary particle physics”, is wrong. In this note, I take issue with some of Putnam’s arguments.

Brief response to Brian Baigrie's "The Justification of Kepler’s Ellipse" (1990).

Review of G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker's Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, the second volume of their analytical commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

Review of T. Nickles (ed), Scientific Discovery: Case Studies.

Critical discussion of Larry Laudan's problem-solving approach to scientific progress and rationality as presented in his Progress and Its Problems.

Review of Rush Rhees on Ludwig Wittgenstein on certainty and knowledge.

Review of Gibson (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Quine.

Review of Wesley C. Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.

Review of Raymond L. Wilder, Mathematics as a Cultural System.

Review of BERTRAND RUSSELL: THE SPIRIT OF SOLITUDE, the first volume of Ray Monk's biography of Russell.

Review of a reissue of Russell's My Philosophical Development.

Review of a reprint of Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development.

Review of Antony Flew, God and Philosophy.

Review of the third edition of Paul Feyerabend's Against Method.

Review of Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude.

Review of David Faust's The Limits of Scientific Reasoning.

Review of Paul Feyerabend, Against Method.

Review of Roger M. White, Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: A Reader's Guide.

Review of David Stove's Popper and Beyond.

Review of Michael Potter's Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic.

Review of Antony Flew's God and Philosophy.

Review of a collection of letters to and from Wittgenstein.

Review of Roger Gibson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Quine.

Review of Larry Laudan, Science and Hypothesis.