El análisis del concepto de heterotopía, explicado por Michel Foucault en su conferencia “Los espacios otros”, tiene importancia dentro del proyecto general de una historia crítica del pensamiento. Las heterotopías pertenecen a un tipo específico de espacio, que tiene dentro de sí poderes, fuerzas, ideas, regularidades o discontinuidades, se pueden clasificar según el tiempo o el lugar al que pertenecen y abren la posibilidad de crear nuevos espacios con sus propias lógicas.

Filósofos como Marcuse han subrayado las propiedades liberadoras del quehacer artístico. Pero si hemos de pensar el arte como el Gran Rechazo, es necesario mostrar qué rechaza el arte y con qué busca sustituirlo. Respecto a estas preguntas, existen dos respuestas antagónicas. Mientras una busca en la experiencia artística rechazar lo dado en nombre de una verdad intemporal, la otra también reniega de lo dado, pero admite el carácter provisorio de toda verdad. Aunque en apariencia sutil, esta distinción es sustancial. (...) A partir de una lectura de Platón, muestro por qué en la primera posición no hay cabida para lo humano, y por qué de ella se desprenden implicaciones totalitarias. Para caracterizar a la segunda posición, me sirvo de la concepción estética de Octavio Paz y de la propuesta escultórica de Alexander Calder. Ambas propuestas permiten conciliar la insatisfacción que palpita en el arte con la alteridad que caracteriza a lo humano. (shrink)

Desde la formulación geométrica de la gravedad, según la ecuaciones de Einstein-Grosmann-Hilbert, de noviembre de 1915, como el movimiento geodésico en la variedad semirimenniana de curvatura positiva, espaciotiempo, donde por ausencias de simetrías, no es posible la conservación de la energía-impulso tomando en conjunto los procesos materiales y el del campo geométrico gravitacional, sin embargo, dadas esas simetrías en el espaciotiempo plano de Minkowski, usando el modelo de De Sitter, Einstein linealizando la gravitación, por supuesto, realmente en ausencia de gravedad, (...) en 1916, depuradas de algunos errores matemáticos en 1918, introdujó las "ondas gravitacionales" como perturbaciones en la curvatura del espacio, y en ausencia de saber físicamente qué es el espaciotiempo y filosoficamente en pleito, que previamente en 1936 y definitivamente en 1937, Einstein demostró no existían. Fue por parte de los trabajos surgidos de la dinámica del discurrir académico, desde la perspectiva no de Einstein sino de Weyl, que Bondi, Pirani, Robinson y Trautman, en la década de 1950, posterior al fallecimiento de Einstein, las "ondas gravitacionales" fueron reintroducidas y motivaron que experimentalmente se buscaran. En el 2002, a partir del experimento de VLBI de Sergei Kopeikin fue establecida su supuesta velocidad, sin que obtuviera el reconocimiento unánime de la comunidad de científicos sino diviéndolos. Y fue en febrero de 2016, que la colaboración aLIGO-aVirgo anunciaran haberlas detectado por primera vez. En este trabajo se presenta la historia que conllevo a este supuesto descubrimiento y se plantea que las ondas detectadas son realmente del vacío cuántico en el cual está inmerso todo lo existente, tésis del autor expuesta inmediatamente como respuesta a ese anunció de 2016. (shrink)

From the geometric formulation of gravity, according to the Einstein-Grosmann-Hilbert equations, of November 1915, as the geodesic movement in the semirimennian manifold of positive curvature, spacetime, where due to absence of symmetries, the conservation of energy-impulse is not possible taking together the material processes and that of the gravitational geometric field, however, given those symmetries in the flat Minkowski spacetime, using the De Sitter model, Einstein linearizing gravitation, of course, really in the absence of gravity, in 1916, purged of some (...) mathematical errors in 1918, he introduced "gravitational waves" as disturbances in the curvature of space, and in the absence of knowing physically what spacetime is and philosophically in dispute, that previously in 1936 and definitively in 1937, Einstein showed they did not exist. It was through the works arising from the dynamics of academic discourse, from the perspective not of Einstein but of Weyl, that Bondi, Pirani, Robinson and Trautman, in the 1950s, after Einstein's death, "gravitational waves" were reintroduced and led to experimental search. In 2002, from Sergei Kopeikin's VLBI experiment, its supposed speed was established, without obtaining unanimous recognition from the community of scientists but rather dividing them. And it was in February 2016 that the aLIGO-aVirgo collaboration announced that they had detected them for the first time. In this work, the history that led to this supposed discovery is presented and it is stated that the waves detected are really from the quantum vacuum in which everything that exists is immersed, the author's thesis exposed immediately in response to that 2016 announcement. (shrink)

Este artículo examina la dimensión política del concepto de mesianismo. Se sostiene que el recurso a este concepto en ciertos filósofos contemporáneos, sobre todo Agamben, es deudor de las tesis de Schmitt, Benjamin y Taubes sobre el pensamiento paulino. Desde estas premisas, se examina la relevancia filosófico-política del mesianismo a partir de su cuestionamiento de todo nomos, justificando su carácter impolítico. El mesianismo impolítico es la antítesis de la teología política.

Con base en los varios papeles, 1989-2002, mediante los textos originales, se presenta la crítica, de los matemático-físicos A. Logunov y M. Mestvirishvil, de la “general relatividad” de A. Einstein, paso previo para la elaboración de la teoría relativista de la gravitación de estos autores. Se demuestra concluyentemente que desde las ecuaciones de Einstein-Grossman-Hilbert la gravedad es absurdamente un campo métrico carente de realidad física.

En el marco de los estándares profesionalizantes de la academia, con sus “rankings” y productividad científica, las humanidades subsisten. Una explicación de este fenómeno es que, según la ontología social, las razones para la acción independiente de deseos son piezas clave en la educación. Por ello, dichas razones, que constituyen obligaciones, también serían claves para el desarrollo de las humanidades. Aquí examino de qué forma el individualismo y la competencia tensionan la dinámica entre deseos y obligaciones. Ciertamente, el mercado valora (...) más la satisfacción de deseos que la teorización sobre la intencionalidad colectiva y su producto: la civilización humana. (shrink)

I will review the argument from complexity of the phenomena represented by Hayek (1967) that asserts that the human phenomena are, in some way, inherently complex, thus, that the laws in social sciences are not available in principle; and by Scriven (1956), who asserts a more elaborate version of the argument from complexity, given space for the possibility that the complexity is not intrinsic to the social phenomena, but that they are constitutive to the level of description that we are (...) interested in. Against both, following McIntyre (1993) I will hold that they would be, by one hand, idealizing the scientific practice and, by the other hand, not being able to explain the social phenomena to the level that we are interested in because they end up by eliminating it. Then, in a second part, I will expose the role of explanation in historical materialism (from an analytical marxist perspective) trying to conciliate the functionalism exposed by Cohen (2001) and the methodological pluralism of Little (1991). Historical materialism, by modifying the conception of the constitution of society (substituting the methodological individualism for a structural analysis with a primacy of the socio-economical social relations) allows us even to lay the necessary foundations for identifying, in a non-abstract nor idealized way, the rational agency of individuals that constitute the social classes. This proves an advantage over methodological individualism in that it does not eliminates the phenomena that are being explained. (shrink)

Presentamos lo básico de la teoría relativista de la gravitación, con la inclusión de textos originales, de varios papeles, publicados entre 1987 y 2009, por sus autores: S. S Gershtein, A. A Logunov, Yu. M Loskutov y M. A Mestvirishvili junto con las introducciones, resúmenes y conclusiones elaborados por el autor de este papel. Esta es una teoría gauge, compatible con las teorías de la física cuántica de las fuerzas electromagnética, débil y fuerte, que define la gravedad como la cuarta (...) fuerza existente en la naturaleza, como campo estático dotada de la partícula transmisora del gravitón virtual de espines 2 y 0, dentro del espíritu del principio de relatividad de Galilei, en su generalización de la relatividad especial de Poincaré que le permitió a los autores la universalización de que las leyes físicas de la naturaleza se cumplen con independencia de los marcos de referencia donde se apliquen. No obstante, integrada a la teoría Entwurf de Grossmann-Einstein, en su desarrollo ulterior, por parte de estos autores, por lo tanto, preserva las leyes de conservación de la energía-impulso y del impulso angular conjuntamente del campo gravitacional y los demás campos materiales existentes en la naturaleza, en el espaciotiempo efectivo de Riemann, mediante su identidad con el espaciotiempo pseudo Euclídeo de Minkowski. (shrink)

Se presenta una técnica de bits clásicos, esto es, que solo pueden tomar un valor binario de 0 o 1, soportada en el entrelazamiento cuántico, para el teletransporte de datos superluminalmente, desde un emisor a un receptor, colocados en teoría a cualquier distancia.

In this article I present the conception of syntax emerging from the “dynamic approach” to syntax and semantics, developed in the last few decades, moving from the critic to the static theories of language, either those developed in the Chomskian framework or those based on Montague’s grammar. I will suggest that this view can be fruitfully compared with Saussure’s position on syntax.

This review provides an overview of the ethics of extinctions with a focus on the Western analytical environmental ethics literature. It thereby gives special attention to the possible philosophical grounds for Michael Soulé’s assertion that the untimely ‘extinction of populations and species is bad’. Illustrating such debates in environmental ethics, the guiding question for this review concerns why – or when – anthropogenic extinctions are bad or wrong, which also includes the question of when that might not be the case (...) (i.e. which extinctions are even desirable). After providing an explanation of the disciplinary perspective taken (section “Introduction”), the concept of extinction and its history within that literature are introduced (section “Understanding extinction”). Then, in section “Why (or when) might anthropogenic extinctions be morally problematic?”, different reasons for why anthropogenic extinctions might be morally problematic are presented based on the loss of species’ value, harm to nonhuman individuals, the loss of valuable biological variety and duties to future generations. This section concludes by also considering cases where anthropogenic extinctions might be justified. Section “How to respond to extinctions?” then addresses a selection of topics concerning risks and de-extinction technologies. Finally, the section on “Extinction studies” introduces other viewpoints on the ethics of extinction from the extinction studies literature, followed by the “Conclusion”. (shrink)

Desde un enfoque epistemológico se busca hacer la crítica de la relatividad general en el momento en que se formula una teoría cuántica sobre la gravedad (año 1967). Como consecuencia de la restauración de la concepción física sobre la geométrica de la gravedad, en una física de partículas-ondas, se plantea, mediante un análisis formal de estructura, que el gravitón-onda gravitatoria tendrá una velocidad mayor que c.

This paper argues that many of the conceptual controversies in evolutionary biology are due to the use of different operational definitions. Since the set of operations is not consistent, then there are many ways to understand, in practice, how concepts should be investigated. In this paper we introduce a formal analysis to study the scope of operationalism and we conclude that the controversial concepts are in fact umbrella variables, that is, a single term can be referring to different processes, phenomena (...) or entities linked by a large ontological commitment driving operationalism. If this is correct, then many of the controversies in evolutionary biology are due, in part, to the operationalization of the objects of study. (shrink)

El nihilismo y el eterno retorno son conceptos centrales en el intento nietzscheano por comprender el surgimiento y la crisis de los valores, desde el advenimiento de la metafísica y la moral cristiana. Sin embargo, la valoración de estos conceptos dista de ser unívoca en la obra del filósofo alemán, ya que su sola enunciación no es suficiente para alcanzar una de las metas máximas de su pensamiento: la transvaloración. El presente artículo tiene por objetivo examinar los sentidos en los (...) que se habla de nihilismo en algunos pasajes de la obra de Nietzsche y la necesidad conceptual de llegar al pensamiento del eterno retorno como condición necesaria para efectuar la transvaloración; en este sentido, se sustentará la tesis de que el eterno retorno implica tanto la perfección como la superación del nihilismo, en la medida en que logra apartar de sí el resentimiento. Para ello, se mostrará el camino recorrido por el autor para superar la ambivalencia de la debilidad y la fuerza que acompaña el desarrollo de estos conceptos, en parte de la Ciencia Jovial y el tercer libro de Así habló Zaratustra. (shrink)

En este ensayo el autor supera la contradicción teórica existente entre la Relatividad General que define el campo gravitacional como un aspecto geométrico del espaciotiempo, bien como potencial o curvatura, y la Gravedad Cuántica que lo define como una fuerza de interacción fundamental, con el cambio de la concepción del espaciotiempo de propiedad geométrica estructural del campo gravitacional, a la concepción del espaciotiempo propiedad geométrica estructural de la materia en movimiento. El espaciotiempo no es continente de la materia (Substancialismo) sino (...) que por el contrario está contenido en la materia en cuanto constituye la estructura geométrica que le da su forma y permite sus cambios, a la cual como espacio le confiere su capacidad de contener y como tiempo su capacidad de devenir. Tampoco, el espaciotiempo es la categoría de las relaciones geométricas de los cuerpos materiales y sus eventos (Relacionismo), puesto que, no es una propiedad relacional de la materia sino la propiedad estructural espacio-temporal geométrica de la materia, a la cual la dota con sus capacidades de auto contenerse y transformarse. La teoría del autor sobre el espaciotiempo es la de la materia intrínsecamente dinámica, dotada estructuralmente de las cuatro dimensiones de espaciotiempo, autocontenida espacialmente y auto deviniendo temporalmente, puesto, que la materia en su capacidad de contener dinámicamente ésta ensimisma contenida y transformándose. La partícula-onda, de la materia y del campo, no existe en el espaciotiempo, sino que éste es la propiedad geométrica intrínseca estructural de la partícula-onda, por lo tanto, adherida a su propia naturaleza interna, como su propiedad geométrica dimensional intrínseca, que con fuerza de ley se manifiesta en sus mediciones cuantitativas, bien cuando es tomada la partícula-onda en sí o en relación con otras. Así, sólo son posibles las teorías sobre la gravedad provenientes de la Gravedad Cuántica, aunque, deben reformularse renunciando a integrarlas con la visión geométrica derivada de las ecuaciones de la llamada “General Relatividad”. (shrink)

En una primera parte expondré la crítica pragmatista a la visión tradicional del lenguaje; luego, contrastaré las visiones dentro de las que critican a la tradición: contextualismo y contextualismo radical. En una segunda expondré el tipo de semántica que se podría sostener bajo esta concepción del lenguaje: una semántica no proposicionalista. Finalmente, quisiera proponer que, así como en las ciencias sociales el localismo metodológico plantea la emergencia de entidades colectivas (ya sean las clases o instituciones) —sin ser meramente epifenomenales, que (...) no obstante son realizadas y en principio deben poder ser reducidas a la agencia de actores racionales—, para el caso del lenguaje sería similar. Esto llama a recoger cierto espíritu en Saussure, que buscó otorgar a la ciencia lingüística un objeto de estudio con autonomía. (shrink)

El autor presenta la historia de las ondas gravitacionales según Einstein, uniéndola a su biografía y a su época con el fin de comprenderla en su conexión con la historia de los semitas, la personalidad de Einstein en el manejo de sus circunstancias generadoras de conflicto en sus relaciones de competencia con sus colegas y en la formulación de la llamada teoría general de la relatividad. Recaeremos en las vicisitudes que vivió Einstein en el tránsito de que su trabajo científico (...) pasara a la ciencia normal como un pilar de la física teórica. Trataremos como Einstein introdujo el éter relativístico confiriéndole un “olor de materialidad” a su explicación geométrica de la gravedad, donde indudablemente, no cabe, pero que él tuvo que ceder ante la presión eso sí justificada de sus más connotados colegas, liderados por Lorentz. Einstein lo tuvo que hacer para mantenerse en la cola que lo llevaría al Nobel. Fue así, como desarrollando el hilo del éter relativista, en junio de 1916, introdujo las ondas gravitacionales de las que, en un acto de liberación personal y honradez científica, cuando pudo, en 1938, demostró como no podían existir, dentro del escenario de su relatividad, para de inmediato también darle fin al éter relativista. (shrink)

Reseña al libro de María Rosa Palazón Mayoral titulado "La estética en México. Siglo XX. Diálogo entre filósofos". El libro reseñado es de gran importancia al compilar las propuestas teóricas sobre el tema de pensadores tan destacados como Antonio Caso, José Vasconcelos, Alfonso Reyes, Samuel Ramos, Eduardo Nicol, María Zambrano, Ramón Xirau, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, Joaquín Sánchez Mcgrégor, Bolívar Echeverría, Néstor García Canclini, María Noël Lapoujade, Ana María Martínez de la Escalera, Silvia Durán Payán y muchos otros.

In a recent paper, Berger and Nanay consider, and reject, three ways of addressing the phenomenon of unconscious perception within a naïve realist framework. Since these three approaches seem to exhaust the options open to naïve realists, and since there is said to be excellent evidence that perception of the same fundamental kind can occur, both consciously and unconsciously, this is seen to present a problem for the view. We take this opportunity to show that all three approaches considered remain (...) perfectly plausible ways of addressing unconscious perception within a naïve realist framework. So far from undermining the credibility of naïve realism, Berger and Nanay simply draw our attention to an important question to be considered by naïve realists in future work. Namely, which of the approaches considered is most likely to provide an accurate account of unconscious perception in each of its purported incarnations? (shrink)

Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions, in spite of their central role in analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing, cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a skilled, practiced, component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical context of (...) professional philosophy. If this analysis is correct, this should lead to a reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise. (shrink)

Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson argue that, to reflect an agent’s limited awareness, the algebra of propositions on which that agent’s credences are defined should be relativised to their awareness state. I argue that this produces insurmountable difficulties. But the project of relativising the agent’s algebra to reflect their partial perspective need not be abandoned: the algebra can be relativised, not to the agent’s awareness state, but to what we might call their subjective modality.

During emerging public health crises, both policymakers and members of the public are looking to scientific experts to provide guidance. Even in cases where there are significant uncertainties, there is pressure for experts to “speak with one voice” to avoid confusion, allow officials to make evidence-based decisions rapidly, and encourage public support for such decisions. This can lead experts to engage in masking of information about the state of the science or regarding assumptions involved in policy recommendations. Although experts might (...) have good reasons for masking disagreements, uncertainties, or assumptions when offering policy advice, we argue that this strategy can result in epistemic harms. Using the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that public health authorities masked two types of information necessary for laypersons to evaluate public health recommendations: (1) experts’ disagreements about the scientific evidence and (2) the role of values in making inferences from the science to policy positions. We contend that this resulted in epistemic harms against laypeople that provide a pro tanto case against masking information. We further argue that when the science is in flux and policies need to be implemented despite significant uncertainties, there is an all-things-considered case against masking the types of information discussed. (shrink)

Casgevy, the world’s first approved CRISPR-based cell therapy, has been priced at $2.2 million per patient. Although this hefty price tag was widely anticipated, the extremely high cost of this and other cell and gene therapies poses a major ethical issue in terms of equitable access and global health. In this Perspective, we argue that lowering the prices of future CRISPR therapies is an urgent ethical imperative. Although we focus on Casgevy as a case study, much of our analysis can (...) be extrapolated to the controversies over affordable access to other gene and cell therapies. First, we explain why this first-of-its-kind CRISPR therapy might be so expensive. We then analyze the ethical issues of equity and global health of early CRISPR treatments. Next, we discuss potential solutions to lower the prices of CRISPR gene therapies. We conclude that the approval of CRISPR transforms our obligations of justice and compels us to bring future gene therapies to the maximum possible number of patients with serious genetic diseases at affordable prices. (shrink)

Current theories of the division of cognitive labor are confined to the “context of justification,” assuming exogenous theories. But new theories are made from the same labor that is used for developing existing theories, and if none of this labor is ever allocated to create new alternatives, then scientific progress is impossible. A unified model is proposed in which theories are no longer given but a function of the division of labor in the model itself. The interactions of individuals balancing (...) the exploitation of existing theories and the exploration of new theories results in a robust cyclical pattern. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a set-theoretical interpretation of the logical square of opposition, in the perspective opened by generalized quantifier theory. Generalized quantifiers allow us to account for the semantics of quantificational Noun Phrases, and of other natural language expressions, in a coherent and uniform way. I suggest that in the analysis of the meaning of Noun Phrases and Determiners the square of opposition may help representing some semantic features responsible to different logical properties of these expressions. I will (...) conclude with some consideration on scope interactions between quantifiers. (shrink)

Natural theology is the branch of theology and philosophy that attempts to gain knowledge of God through non-revealed sources. In a narrower sense, natural theology is the discipline that presents rational arguments for the existence of God. Given that these arguments rarely directly persuade those who are not convinced by their conclusions, why do they enjoy an enduring appeal? This article examines two reasons for the continuing popularity of natural theological arguments: (i) they appeal to intuitions that humans robustly hold (...) and that emerge early in cognitive development; (ii) they serve an argumentative function by presenting particular religious views as live options. I conclude with observations on the role of natural theology in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In this article I trace some of the main tenets of the struggle between nominalism and realism as identified by John Deely in his Four ages of understanding. The aim is to assess Deely’s claim that the Age of Modernity was nominalist and that the coming age, the Age of Postmodernism — which he portrays as a renaissance of the late middle ages and as starting with Peirce — is realist. After a general overview of how Peirce interpreted the nominalist-realist (...) controversy, Deely gives special attention to Thomas Aquinas’s On being and essence and the realism it entails. A subsequent discussion of the Modern Period shows that the issue of nominalism and realism is very much tied up with di¤erent conceptions of the intellect. Deely credits the theory of evolution with bringing us a conception of the intellect that is closer to that of the Middle Ages and that opens the way for a truly realistic ‘‘fourth age’’ of the understanding. (shrink)

A number of experiences have demonstrated how digital solutions are effective in improving quality of life (QoL) and health outcomes for older adults. Smart Health Age-Friendly Environments (SHAFE) is a new concept introduced in Europe since 2017 that combines the concept of Age-Friendly Environments with Information Technologies, supported by health and community care to improve the health and disease management of older adults and during the life-course. This chapter aims to provide an initial overview of the experiences available not only (...) in Europe, based on the research work of the participants of the International Interdisciplinary Network on Health and Well-being in an Age-Friendly Digital World (NET4Age-Friendly), which could be of interest to preventive, health and social authorities. The chapter reports good practices, pain points, and bottlenecks that may require a collaborative, interdisciplinary research approach to facilitate the transformations towards smart, sustainable, health and age-friendly cities and communities. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a (...) Guarding Condition as addendums to historicism that are necessary to accommodate our cases of group responsibility. (shrink)

The relationship between topological explanation and mechanistic explanation is unclear. Most philosophers agree that at least some topological explanations are mechanistic explanations. The crucial question is how to make sense of this claim. Zednik (Philos Psychol 32(1):23–51, 2019) argues that topological explanations are mechanistic if they (i) describe mechanism sketches that (ii) pick out organizational properties of mechanisms. While we agree with Zednik’s conclusion, we critically discuss Zednik’s account and show that it fails as a general account of how and (...) when topological explanations are mechanistic. First, if topological explanations were just mechanism sketches, this implies that they could be enriched by replacing topological terms with mechanistic detail. This, however, conflicts how topological explanations are used in scientific practice. Second, Zednik’s account fails to show how topological properties can be organizational properties of mechanisms that have a place in mechanistic explanation. The core issue is that Zednik’s account ignores that topological properties often are _global_ properties while mechanistic explanantia refer to _local_ properties. We demonstrate how these problems can be solved by a recent account of mechanistic completeness (Craver and Kaplan in Br J Philos Sci 71(1):287–319, 2020; Kohár and Krickel in Calzavarini and Viola (eds) Neural mechanisms—new challenges in the philosophy of neuroscience, Springer, New York, 2021) and use a multilayer network model of Alzheimer’s Disease to illustrate this. (shrink)

At the heart of the Stoic theory of modality is a strict commitment to bivalence, even for future contingents. A commitment to both future truth and contingency has often been thought paradoxical. This paper argues that the Stoic retreat from necessity is successful. it maintains that the Stoics recognized three distinct senses of necessity and possibility: logical, metaphysical and providential. Logical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a priori. Metaphysical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a posteriori, a (...) world order according to certain metaphysical principles and natures that god crafts within the constraints of matter. Finally, what is providentially necessary is what occurs according to the chain of fate, but only once it is in process or past. -/- The method of the paper is a close reading of Diogenes Laertius 7.75, adducing broad textual evidence along the way, to show that the Stoic theory of modality embraces Philonian possibility, both that which is capable of being true as a matter of logical consistency, and that which is possible according to the bare fitness of the entity. What differentiates the Stoics from Philo is their additional commitment to possibility as opportunity, resisting the collapse of determinism into necessity. (shrink)

This paper discusses opposite philosophical approaches to the body and its position in the ethical discussion; in particular, the perception of the body's capability of achieving ethical excellence. One of the viewpoints in question advocates for the body-spirit duality and the spiritual superiority over mere physical existence. According to this view, the spirit can either achieve its fulfillment apart from the physical word or guide the latter to its maximum accomplishment. Conversely, the alternative perspective posits that the notion of excellence (...) and its practice can only be conceived and put in motion by living beings in a dynamic relationship among themselves. Implicated in the former is the diminishment of the body in relation to its counterpart and its subsequent mortification and (not rarely) annihilation. Implicated in the latter is the elevation of living beings and the understanding of them being the sole performers of virtuous conduct. (shrink)

In his Lectures on Fine Art (1835), Hegel emphasizes the grotesque character of Indian art. Grotesqueness results, in his view, from a contradiction between meaning and shape due to the incongruous combination of spiritual and material elements. Since Hegel's history of art is teeming with examples of inadequacy between meaning and shape, this paper aims to distinguish the grotesque from other types of artistic dissonance and to problematize Hegel's ascriptions of grotesqueness to ancient Indian art. In the first part of (...) the paper, I characterize the grotesque by the unnatural distortion of natural shapes with the purpose of achieving a direct sensuous manifestation of an indeterminate and impersonal divinity, Brahman. Such an attempt is, in Hegel's view, self-contradictory and self-defeating, leading to an exaggeration of the conflict between nature and spirit instead of the intended reconciliation between the two parts. In the second part of the paper, I compare Hegel's account of Indian art to the ‘monstrous myths’ of early modern Europe. Unlike his predecessors, Hegel legitimizes the grotesque representations of Hindu gods as endowed with profound meaning and the result of a universal human need, yet he describes them as ultimately irrational and repulsive based on a prejudiced view of the Indian people(s). In this sense, Hegel's assessment of Indian art functions as a reflection of modern European culture, its fascination and horror in the face of what Enlightenment could not entirely purge, rather than as a truthful and objective account of Indian art and culture. By questioning Hegel's characterization of Hindu iconography and mythology, this paper contributes to underexplored areas of Hegelian aesthetics, namely Hegel's account of symbolic art, especially Indian art, as well as his views on negative aesthetic experiences and values. (shrink)

Digitalisation is attracting much scholarly attention at present. However, scholars often take its benefits for granted, overlooking the essential question: “Does digital technology make us better?” This paper aims to help fill this gap by examining digitalisation as a form of government (digitocracy) and the way it shapes a new kind of man: _animal digitalis_. I argue that the digitalised man is animal-like rather than machine-like. This man does not use efficient and cold machine-like language, but is rather emotionalised through (...) digital technology. If those who are ruled acted like machines, data would not be produced on a mass scale, and machine learning would stop learning. Digital man has animal features and is ruled by his brain’s reward system. We need to abandon this new form of government and the resulting man. To overcome digitalisation, we need a humanism that recovers the proper place of man over animals and artefacts, but maintains respect for the value of nature. (shrink)

It is often assumed that moral questions ask for answers in the way other questions do. In this article, moral and non-moral versions of the question ‘Should I do x or y?’ are compared. While non-moral questions of that form typically ask for answers of the form ‘You should do x/y’, so-called ‘narrow answers’, moral questions often do not ask for such narrow answers. Rather, they ask for answers recognizing their delicacy, the need for a deeper understanding of the meaning (...) of the alternatives and the fact that moral decisions are, as Gaita formulates it, ‘non-accidentally and inescapably’ the agent’s to make. In short, moral questions often ask for a kind of answer that is highly different from the kind of answer non-moral questions ask for. In presupposing the ideal answer to a moral question to be a narrow answer, moral philosophers have tended to overlook this. (shrink)

Open-content communities that focus on co-creation without requirements for entry have to face the issue of institutional trust in contributors. This research investigates the various ways in which these communities manage this issue. It is shown that communities of open-source software—continue to—rely mainly on hierarchy (reserving write-access for higher echelons), which substitutes (the need for) trust. Encyclopedic communities, though, largely avoid this solution. In the particular case of Wikipedia, which is confronted with persistent vandalism, another arrangement has been pioneered instead. (...) Trust (i.e. full write-access) is ‘backgrounded’ by means of a permanent mobilization of Wikipedians to monitor incoming edits. Computational approaches have been developed for the purpose, yielding both sophisticated monitoring tools that are used by human patrollers, and bots that operate autonomously. Measures of reputation are also under investigation within Wikipedia; their incorporation in monitoring efforts, as an indicator of the trustworthiness of editors, is envisaged. These collective monitoring efforts are interpreted as focusing on avoiding possible damage being inflicted on Wikipedian spaces, thereby being allowed to keep the discretionary powers of editing intact for all users. Further, the essential differences between backgrounding and substituting trust are elaborated. Finally it is argued that the Wikipedian monitoring of new edits, especially by its heavy reliance on computational tools, raises a number of moral questions that need to be answered urgently. (shrink)

The aim of this paper has been to present a new reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism. I have considered several different targets of the Refutation, five of them mentioned by Kant himself. I believe that I have shown that the Refutation of Idealism is best considered only as a sound argument against Mendelssohnian subjectivist idealism, against Mendelssohnian immaterialism, and against Mendelssohnian realist idealism. First, Kant’s Refutation is a sound argument in favor of the claim that the outer things represented (...) in our minds are real rather than ideal; that is, they exist mind-independently as noumena. And second, Kant’s refutation is a sound argument for a fundamental ontology of noumena: the ultimate nature of reality and of our minds is neither material nor mental but made up of things in themselves. (shrink)

This paper aims to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism.” I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the (...) relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations.” The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations.” In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

Moral philosophy has traditionally aimed for correct or appropriate moral judgments. Consequently, when asked for moral advice, the moral philosopher first tries to develop a moral judgment and then informs the advisee. The focus is on what the advisee should do, not on whether any advice should be given. There may, however, be various kinds of reasons not to morally judge, to be ‘morally modest’. In the first part of this article, I give some reasons to be morally modest when (...) moral advice is asked for. Second, I show how Wittgenstein radicalizes these reasons to such an extent that the very possibility of giving moral advice seems threatened. Third, I argue that taking Wittgenstein and the need for moral modesty seriously does not make moral advice impossible, but rather asks for a notion of moral advice in which moral advice is not necessarily linked to the ideal of a moral judgment. Fourth, I highlight some advantages of a Wittgensteinian notion of moral advice over traditional notions. (shrink)

Content nonconceptualism and State conceptualism are motivated by different readings of what I want to call here Bermúdez’s conditions on content-attribution (2007). In one read- ing, what is required is a neo-Fregean content to solve problems of cognitive significance at the nonconceptual level (Toribio, 2008; Duhau, 2011). In the other reading, what is required is a neo-Russellian or possible-world content to account for how conspecifics join attention and cooperate, contemplating the same things from different perspectives in the same perceptual field. (...) The solution to this apparent contradiction is the rejection of the real content view and the adherence to what I call here Content-pragmatism: there is no such thing as the content of experience. According to content pragmatism, “proposition” is not as real as a mental state, but rather, it is a term of art that semanticists use, as a matter of theoretical convenience, to classify mental states. What follows from Content-pragmatism is Content- pluralism: there are so many contents that are required to meet Bermúdez’s condition on content attribution. Because both criticism and the defense of State conceptualism overlook the real scope of Bermúdez’s condition on content attribution, they are ineffective. In this paper, I will argue that the opposition between State and Content nonconceptualism is a real one, but only a relative one, that is, relative to the opposite constraints to be met. If we want to solve the problems of cognitive significance, the best we can do is to let the content of experience be modeled as neo-Fregean content, namely, a compound of nonconceptual modes of presentation of objects and properties. In this case, Content-nonconceptualism prevails. In contrast, if we want to account for how conspecifics join attention to the same entities in the same perceptual field from different perspectives, the best we can do is let the content of experience be modeled either as a structured Russellian proposition or as a function from possible worlds to truth-values. In this case, State-nonconceptualism prevails. (shrink)

Empirical research in the psychology of nature appreciation suggests that humans across cultures tend to evaluate nature in positive aesthetic terms, including a sense of beauty and awe. They also frequently engage in joint attention with other persons, whereby they are jointly aware of sharing attention to the same event or object. This paper examines how, from a natural theological perspective, delight in natural beauty can be conceptualized as a way of joining attention to creation. Drawing on an analogy between (...) art and creation, we propose that aesthetic appreciation of nature may provide theists with a unique phenomenological insight into God's creative intentions, which are embodied in the physical beauty of creation. We suggest two directions in which this way of looking at the natural world can be fleshed out: in a spontaneous way, that does not take into account background information, and with the help of science. (shrink)

According to the brain drain argument, there are good reasons for states to limit the exit of their skilled workers (more specifically, healthcare workers), because of the negative impacts this type of migration has for other members of the community from which they migrate. Some theorists criticise this argument as illiberal, while others support it and ground a duty to stay of the skilled workers on rather vague concepts like patriotic virtue, or the legitimate expectations of their state and co-citizens. (...) In this article, on the contrary, we suggest that the liberal conception of states’ legitimate political authority demands, and not just permits, that developing states from which migration of skilled workers occurs set up contractual mechanisms. These mechanisms will ensure that state-funded training in the health sector is provided against a commitment on the part of future professionals to reciprocate with their services for the benefits obtained. If one of the conditions for the state to maintain legitimate political authority is to provide basic services such as healthcare to its subjects (while respecting at the same time their autonomy and freedom), then this is what developing states affected by the brain drain ought to do. What we call the authority-based approach to the brain drain also helps to clarify the obligations that other states have not to interfere with these contractual mechanisms when they exist, and not to profit from their absence. Inspired by FIFA’s legal instruments of training compensation and solidarity mechanism for the transfer of players, we conclude by suggesting a plausible global policy to complement this authority-based approach. (shrink)

It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterises the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make (...) phenomenological predictions of the required sort. So, as a result, opponents must resign themselves to attacking specific incarnations of naïve realism, or approach matters quite differently. (shrink)

If you’ve got millions of dollars to donate, don’t donate them to academic philosophy. Producing philosophical articles and books faces diminishing returns and diverts money and attention from more important causes. Many philosophy books and articles contradict each other; at best, only some can be correct. Philosophy classes are poor at instilling critical thinking skills. Resources that would be spent on philosophy would be better spent elsewhere.