In a preceding publication a fundamentally oriented and irreversible world was shown to be de- rivable from the important principle of least action. A consequence of such a paradigm change is avoidance of paradoxes within a “dynamic” quantum physics. This becomes essentially possible because fundamental irreversibility allows consideration of the “entropy” concept in elementary processes. For this reason, and for a compensation of entropy in the spread out energy of the wave, the duality of particle and wave has to be (...) mediated via an information self-image of matter. In this publication considerations are extended to irreversible thermodynamics, to gravitation and cos- mology with its dependence on quantum interpretations. The information self-image of matter around particles could be identified with gravitation. Because information can also impose an al- ways constant light velocity there is no need any more to attribute such a property to empty space, as done in relativity theory. In addition, the possibility is recognized to consider entropy genera- tion by expanding photon fields in the universe. Via a continuous activation of information on matter photons can generate entropy and release small energy packages without interacting with matter. This facilitates a new interpretation of galactic redshift, emphasizes an information link between quantum- and cosmological phenomena, and evidences an information-triggered origin of the universe. Self-organized processes approach maximum entropy production within their constraints. In a far from equilibrium world also information, with its energy content, can self- organize to a higher hierarchy of computation. It is here identified with consciousness. This ap- pears to explain evolution of spirit and intelligence on a materialistic basis. Also gravitation, here identified as information on matter, could, under special conditions, self-organize to act as a su- per-gravitation, offering an alternative to dark matter. Time is not an illusion, but has to be understood as flux of action, which is the ultimate reality of change. The concept of an irreversible physical world opens a route towards a rational understanding of complex contexts in nature. (shrink)

Scientific inquiry takes onward course from the point where previous scientists had reached. But philosophical analysis initiates from scratch. Philosophy questions everything and chooses starting point for itself after having ruled out all the unsubstantiated and doubtful elements of the topic under study. Secondly, known realities must make sense. If a theory is officially 'counterintuitive', then either it is mere fiction or at the most; a distorted form of truth. This book's analysis is based on the philosophical principle that knowledge (...) is empirical and does not arise magically in absence of observational grounds. With philosophical approach, it was doubtful to accept that Georges Lemaître already knew Hubble's law in year 1927 that was yet to be found by Edwin Hubble in year 1929. Therefore this book started with denial of the claim that Lemaître already knew this law. But analysis of section I.III forced author to look the matter from original source and it came to surface that Lemaître knew this law in year 1927. But contrary to mainstream claim, Lemaître had not derived that law from general relativity (GR) equations rather had deduced from a method given by Hubble himself. Whereas whole case of the Big Bang Theory rests on misleading claim that Lemaître had derived this law solely from GR equations. The basis of this claim happened to be a manipulated translation (1931) of Lemaître's original 1927 article. People regard Big Bang Theory as truth because authoritative sources deceived them by presenting a manipulated translation in year 1931. This book is a philosophical analysis of original papers of Alexander Friedmann (1922), Georges Lemaître (1927), Edwin Hubble (1929) and Albert Einstein (1917) thus covers actual roots and origins of the Big Bang Model. In this book, only the core elements of the Big Bang Model i.e. 'Expansion of Universe' and 'CMBR' are covered. It has been sufficiently shown that 'expansion' is an illusion whereas CMBR is a proof that we live in a non-expanding infinite universe. If these two core elements of the standard Big Bang Model are precisely refuted then there is nothing crucial left with the standard model. For readers of this book at least, Big Bang Theory shall become a story of past mistakes. Author is not an authoritative source on science topics therefore readers must download all the above mentioned original papers and check all the points outlined in this book from relevant original papers. Unlike reading from an authoritative source that makes readers relaxed and careless but enables authorities to deceive them in worst way possible, this book requires readers to remain alert on all the points discussed in the book and verify everything from original sources whose links are given at the end of this description and also provided in footnotes section of the book. This book is not a judgment of the topic rather it is like a case presented by an advocate while readers are the judges. Readers are required to apply their own critical judgment to conclude the matter by themselves. After carefully reading this book, readers will also start taking 'authoritative sources' with due care and it will become difficult for the 'authorities' to deceive them again. (shrink)

According to the standard interpretation of Einstein’s field equations, gravity consists of mass-energy curving spacetime, and an additional physical force or entity—denoted by Λ (the ‘cosmological constant’)—is responsible for the Universe’s metric-expansion. Although General Relativity’s direct predictions have been systematically confirmed, the dominant cosmological model thought to follow from it—the ΛCDM (Lambda cold dark matter) model of the Universe’s history and composition—faces considerable challenges, including various observational anomalies and experimental failures to detect dark matter, dark energy, or (...) inflation-field candidates. This paper shows that Einstein’s Equivalence Principle entails two possible physical interpretations of General Relativity’s field equations. Although the field equations facially appear to support the standard interpretation—that gravity consists of mass-energy curving spacetime—the field equations can be equivalently understood as holding that gravitational effects instead result from mass-energy accelerating the metric-expansion of a second-order spacetime fabric superimposed upon an absolute, first-order Euclidean space, resulting in the observational appearance of spacetime curvature. This alternative interpretation of relativity is shown to be empirically equivalent to the standard interpretation of relativity, albeit with a changing value for Λ (which is similar to how Λ is understood in the conception of Λ as ‘quintessence’, but in this case takes Λ to be gravity). The reconceptualization is then shown to potentially resolve major observational anomalies for the ΛCDM model, including recent observations conflicting with ΛCDM predictions, as well as failures to directly detect dark matter, dark energy, and inflation field/particle candidates. (shrink)

We review the spiritual cosmology of the 20th-century Indian mystic and yogi Sri Aurobindo. Our aim is twofold. First to furnish a basic philosophical understanding of Aurobindo’s vision, and secondly, that of making a comparative analysis with present scientific knowledge that could furnish an alternative metaphysical interpretation of the physical world. The rationale of our study is to question whether the observation of the physical world from the standpoint of the mystic experience could suggest some new theoretical framework (...) for the metaphysical ontology of the world itself. Taking perspectives from the states of consciousness described by mystics may furnish us with a deeper understanding of the material and metaphysical character of physical categories such as matter, energy, force, space, time, and space-time. This is an introductory overview of Aurobindo’s relevance for physical sciences and the conceptual foundations of physics, with particular attention paid to quantum physics. (shrink)

The main foundations of the standard \CDM model of cosmology are that: the redshifts of the galaxies are due to the expansion of the Universe plus peculiar motions; the cosmic microwave background radiation and its anisotropies derive from the high energy primordial Universe when matter and radiation became decoupled; the abundance pattern of the light elements is explained in terms of primordial nucleosynthesis; and the formation and evolution of galaxies can be explained only in terms of gravitation within a inflation (...) + dark matter + dark energy scenario. Numerous tests have been carried out on these ideas and, although the standard model works pretty well in fitting many observations, there are also many data that present apparent caveats to be understood with it. In this paper, I offer a review of these tests and problems, as well as some examples of alternative models. (shrink)

When this article was first planned, writing was going to be exclusively about two things - the origin of life and human evolution. But it turned out to be out of the question for the author to restrict himself to these biological and anthropological topics. A proper understanding of them required answering questions like “What is the nature of the universe – the home of life – and how did it originate?”, “How can time travel be removed from fantasy and (...) science fiction, to be made scientific and practical?”, and “How can the proposed young age of genus Homo be made to actually be reasonable – when simply stating it would be solid ground for instant rejection and dismissal?” The result is that the article also talks about subjects like Artificial Intelligence, General Relativity, and cosmology. -/- From where did life originate? God? Evolution? Panspermia? If the tendency of humans and scientists to regard undiscovered science as pseudoscience can be overcome, Einstein gave another alternative to consider when he introduced General Relativity. Time isn’t linear – progressing in a straight line from past to present to future. That assumption ignores Relativity which states that space AND TIME are curved. Where did life and the genetic code come from? Can the answer build AI? -/- The first question can be answered by the section of this article titled SETI, Evolution, and Time which says life (possibly multicellular and intelligent) and the genetic code came from humans acquiring knowledge of these things over the centuries, then applying that knowledge – via terraforming, accumulation of raw materials like amino acids and nucleic acids, genetic engineering - to a time in the past when life didn’t exist. From that origin, life evolved through innumerable mutations and adaptations, with humans once again acquiring knowledge of it in cyclic (nonlinear) time. -/- The second question is answered by saying artificial intelligence (AI) as the product of life is only half of the equation. The other half refers to Relativity’s curved space-time and violation of the notion that time always travels from past to future. We have always lived in an artificially intelligent, non-probabilistic universe where everything in time and space is connected into one thing by quantum entanglement – making the brain and genes products of binary-digit activity or artificial intelligence (life is not merely dependent on biology’s “lock and key” mechanisms but also possesses AI). -/- The earliest documented representative of the genus Homo is Homo habilis, which evolved around 2.8 million years ago. Scientists used to believe there was a straight line from H. habilis to us, Homo sapiens. This article will use the “advanced” waves loved by Physics Nobel laureate Richard Feynman, view the history of science through the lens of Conic Sections applied to Relativity’s curved space-time, and incorporate the necessity of so-called imaginary time * – popularized by Prof. Stephen Hawking. While the evolutionary proposals are more in agreement with this early straight line than with modern theories, Albert Einstein’s General Relativity is used to transform the straight line into a curved line, ultimately concluding that Homo habilis (H. habilis) originated only (and unbelievably, as far as today’s science and technology is concerned) ~250,000 years ago. Other branches and dead ends of Homo – e.g. Neanderthals – are the result of mutations and adaptations, with the resultant modifications to anatomy and physiology. The surprisingly young age of H. habilis allows nearly 200,000 years for habilis, or one of its descendants, to reach Australia … if this country’s indigenous Aboriginal population did, as claimed, reach this “island continent” 60,000 years ago. -/- * The ultraviolet catastrophe, also called the Rayleigh–Jeans catastrophe, is a failure of classical physics to predict observed phenomena: it can be shown that a blackbody - a hypothetical perfect absorber and radiator of energy - would release an infinite amount of energy, contradicting the principles of conservation of energy and indicating that a new model for the behaviour of blackbodies was needed. At the start of the 20th century, physicist Max Planck derived the correct solution by making some strange (for the time) assumptions. In particular, Planck assumed that electromagnetic radiation can only be emitted or absorbed in discrete packets, called quanta. Albert Einstein postulated that Planck's quanta were real physical particles (what we now call photons), not just a mathematical fiction. From there, Einstein developed his explanation of the photoelectric effect (when quanta or photons of light shine on certain metals, electrons are released and can form an electric current). So it appears entirely possible that another supposed mathematical trickery (imaginary time and the y-axis of Wick rotation) will find practical application in the future. -/- The article includes mathematical references to cosmology (spoiler alert – you’ll read about things like Vector-Tensor-Scalar Geometry, topology, the “eternal present”, Einstein’s Unified Field, the inverse-square law, and there being no Big Bang and no multiverse - but there will also be no equations). -/- The other subheadings in this essay are – -/- NONLINEAR TIME AND ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (about a 2009 electrical engineering experiment at America’s Yale University, and cosmic wormholes) -/- BITS AND TOPOLOGY (base-2 maths aka Binary digiTS, Mobius strips, and figure-8 Klein bottles) -/- WICK ROTATION, CAUSALITY, AND UNITING TIME (do past, present and future co-exist in an “eternal present”?) -/- DIGITAL BRAIN, DIGITAL UNIVERSE (if the brain and the universe are ultimately composed of binary digits, we'll someday be able to do the same things with the brain and universe that we now do with computers) -/- PROPOSAL: HUMAN AND ANIMAL INSTINCTS ARE THE RESULT OF THE UNIVERSE BEING UNIFIED BY BINARY DIGITS (AND TOPOLOGY) (If everything in the universe is ultimately composed of electronic BITS, then the universe must possess Artificial Intelligence - some prefer the term Cosmic Consciousness) -/- INFORMATION THEORY CONQUERS A RED GIANT (preserving Earth by keeping the Sun near today’s level of activity forever). 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This article’s conclusion is that the theories of Einstein are generally correct and will still be relevant in the next century (there will be modifications necessary for development of quantum gravity). Those Einsteinian theories are Special Relativity, General Relativity, and the title of a paper he published in 1919 which asked if gravitation plays a role in the composition of elementary particles of matter. This paper was the bridge between General Relativity and the Unified Field Theory he sought during the (...) last 25 years of his life. In an article published in the "Annals of Physics" in 1957, Charles Misner and John Wheeler claimed that Einstein's latest equations demonstrated the unified field theory. But Einstein himself felt he had not fully succeeded. The present article begins with Olbers’ paradox (why is the sky dark at night?) Then it briefly proceeds to the subjects of Newtonian gravity, quantum entanglement, gravitational waves, E=mc^2, dark energy, dark matter, cosmic expansion, redshift, blueshift, the cosmic microwave background, the 1st Law of Thermodynamics, and explanation of advanced waves travelling back in time. The section “vector-tensor-scalar geometry” touches on mass, quantum spin, the Higgs boson and Higgs field, stellar jets, the pervasiveness of photons and gravitons, and supersymmetry. Then come half a dozen paragraphs referring to formation of planets, black holes, and bosons of the weak and strong nuclear forces. They end with Descartes’ space-matter relation. Also added are paragraphs about simply-connected mathematics, non-orientability, consciousness, the Law of Falling Bodies, the multiverse, space-time travel developed from maths’ Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem and from an experiment in electrical engineering performed at Yale University, development from future space-time travel of human flight in the manner of fiction’s Superman and Supergirl, as well as downloaded band-gap implants in the brain that could deal with forms of matter. They could add or delete anything and everything we choose by emulating computers’ copy/paste function to add things; as well as their delete function, to remove things. To complete my seemingly unusual ideas, 6 sections are added – 1) “Advanced and Retarded Waves” is extended to include dinosaurs, ageing, and photography, 2) there’s a bit about space-time warping and “imaginary” computers, 3) several paragraphs about restoring health (even gaining immortality) by using gravity, 4) a section about superconductivity and the electric or magnetic fields of planets (this section mentions Mercury, Planet 9 and precession), 5) a section titled EXPLAINING OCEAN TIDES WHEN GENERAL RELATIVITY SAYS GRAVITY IS A PUSH CAUSED BY THE CURVATURE OF SPACE-TIME (this has subsections about M-Sigma, Geysers on Saturn’s Moon Enceladus, and A Brief History of Gravity), plus 5) the potential of COVID-19 to create the Golden Rule, world peace, eternal life, and a non-economic world that doesn’t use any form of money (no cash, credit cards, digital currency, etc.) The final section is called DISTANT-FUTURE SCIENCE INTERPRETED BY RELIGIONS AS SUPERNATURAL and introduces an idea for becoming immortal in these physical bodies. If the Theory of Everything sought by physicists applies to all space-time, then every person’s brain must be entangled with the 22nd century (and far beyond that time too). (shrink)

In this paper I propose an interpretation of classical statistical mechanics that centers on taking seriously the idea that probability measures represent complete states of statistical mechanical systems. I show how this leads naturally to the idea that the stochasticity of statistical mechanics is associated directly with the observables of the theory rather than with the microstates (as traditional accounts would have it). The usual assumption that microstates are representationally significant in the theory is therefore dispensable, a consequence which (...) suggests interesting possibilities for developing non-equilibrium statistical mechanics and investigating inter-theoretic answers to the foundational questions of statistical mechanics. (shrink)

This essay analyzes two diverse interpretations of Christian love in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard and Josiah Royce. Through the comparison of these two positions, I attempt to show not only the embeddedness of a conception of love in an entire theological vision but its usefulness as a lens for examining that position. I argue that Kierkegaard's interpretation of love tends to foster social inequality, a tendency rooted in his basic ontology. The Roycean view of love, resting upon a (...) radically different ontology, avoids such problematic ethical implications. (shrink)

From the beginning of time, humans believed they were the center of the universe. Such important beings could be nowhere else than at the very epicenter of existence, with all the other things revolving around them. Was this an arrogant position? Only time will tell. What is certain is that as some people were so certain of their significance, aeons later some other people became too confident in their unimportance. In such a context, the Earth quickly lost its privileged position (...) at the center of the universe and along with this, the ideas of absolute motion and time became unbearable for the modern intellect, which saw nothing but relativeness in everything. After years of accepting the ideas of relativity at face value without doubting them, scientists are now mature enough to start questioning everything as any true scientist would do, including their own basic assumptions. And one would be surprised to see that the basic assumptions of today’s science in physics (and cosmology alike) are based on philosophically dogmatic beliefs that humans are nothing more than insignificant specks of dust. These specks cannot be in any privileged position in the cosmos, nor can their frames of reference. These specks cannot be living on a planet that is not moving while everything else is. There can be no hint of our importance whatsoever. Hence, the Copernican principle that has poisoned scientific thinking for aeons now. When one analyzes the evidence provided by science to support the idea of relativity though, he would see that the same evidence can more easily and simply fit into a model where the Earth stands still. Yet, scientists preferred to revamp all physics by introducing the totally unintuitive ides of relativity – including the absolute limit of the speed of light – than even admitting the possibility of humans having any notion of central position in the cosmos. True scientists though should examine all possible explanations, including those that do not fit their beliefs. To the dismay of so many modern scientists who blindly believe the validity of the theory of relativity at face value, the movement towards a true and honest post-modern science where all assumptions are questioned, necessarily passes through a place where the Earth we live in stands still. Non-relativistic explanations of the Michelson Morley experiment, related to a motionless Earth or to ether, are viable alternatives that deserve their place in modern scientific thought. (shrink)

I discuss the formal implementation, interpretation, and justification of likelihood attributions in cosmology. I show that likelihood arguments in cosmology suffer from significant conceptual and formal problems that undermine their applicability in this context.

In this paper we elaborate on the neo-Confucian interpretation of the Yi-Jing system. Based on a further exploration of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity of Zhou Dunyi, we develop a cosmological-anthropological model in constructive engagement with Western thoughts and views on systems and on the universe. The vital energy and the pattern play central roles in this model and also in the interpretation of the images and forces of the trigrams. This leads to a comparative model, (...) based on a quadrant system with four perspectives: naturality, rationality, humanity and morality. This model fits in the quadrant system of Wilber, and also corresponds to the cosmic ring of duograms. The natural YI Ba-Gua, a cycle of trigrams where Heaven and Earth are seen as elements of the production cycle, supplies an alternative interpretation of the King Wen Ba-Gua. When extending the quadrant system to octants we observe a cycle of trigrams, the cosmic YI Ba-Gua, as a spiralling sequence, following the order of the Five elements. Heaven and Earth are seen, as in the elaborated Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, as instigator and receiver respectively of the production cycle. It forms the framework for an alternative interpretation of the Fu Xi Ba-Gua. In addition to the images, we can display the forces of the trigrams in the octant system of the cosmic YI Ba-Gua as concentric circles. In the YI Ba-Gua we combine both the cosmic and the natural YI Ba-Gua, and compare this with the Ba-Gua of King Wen and of Fu Xi. Finally we present some hypotheses for further analysis of the matrix of hexagrams based on the cosmic YI Ba-Gua. The comparison of the different philosophical views in one framework may lead to further engagement of these ways of seeing. We already conclude that there is so much structure in the Yi-Jing that it is possible to use the wisdom of the Yi-Jing without applying a divination system. (shrink)

Philosophers, and students of philosophy, are often advised to interpret other philosophers charitably. In this paper, I present an alternative to interpreting charitably. I call it “the simple-model technique” and use H.L.A. Hart responding to John Rawls to illustrate it.

Paul Feyerabend argued that theories can be faced with experimental anomalies whose refuting character can only be recognized by developing alternatives to the theory. The alternate theory must explain the experimental results without contrivance and it must also be supported by independent evidence. I show that the situation described by Feyerabend arises again and again in experiments or observations that test the postulates in the standard cosmological model relating to dark matter. The alternate theory is Milgrom’s modified dynamics. I (...) discuss three examples: the failure to detect dark-matter particles in laboratory experiments; the lack of evidence for dark-matter sub-haloes and the dwarf galaxies that are postulated to inhabit them; and the failure to confirm the predicted orbital decay of Milky Way satellite galaxies and other systems due to dynamical friction against the dark matter. In each case, Feyerabend’s criterion directs us to interpret the experimental or observational results as an indirect refutation of the standard cosmological model in favor of Milgrom’s theory. (shrink)

Many physicists have thought that absolute time became otiose with the introduction of Special Relativity. William Lane Craig disagrees. Craig argues that although relativity is empirically adequate within a domain of application, relativity is literally false and should be supplanted by a Neo-Lorentzian alternative that allows for absolute time. Meanwhile, Craig and co-author James Sinclair have argued that physical cosmology supports the conclusion that physical reality began to exist at a finite time in the past. However, on their view, (...) the beginning of physical reality requires the objective passage of absolute time, so that the beginning of physical reality stands or falls with Craig's Neo-Lorentzian metaphysics. Here, I raise doubts about whether, given Craig's NeoLorentzian metaphysics, physical cosmology could adequately support a beginning of physical reality within the finite past. Craig and Sinclair's conception of the beginning of the universe requires a past boundary to the universe. A past boundary to the universe cannot be directly observed and so must be inferred from the observed matter-energy distribution in conjunction with auxilary hypotheses drawn from a substantive physical theory. Craig's brand of Neo Lorentzianism has not been sufficiently well specified so as to infer either that there is a past boundary or that the boundary is located in the finite past. Consequently, Neo Lorentzianism implicitly introduces a form of skepticism that removes the ability that we might have otherwise had to infer a beginning of the universe. Furthermore, in analyzing traditional big bang models, I develop criteria that Neo-Lorentzians should deploy in thinking about the direction and duration of time in cosmological models generally. For my last task, I apply the same criteria to bounce cosmologies and show that Craig and Sinclair have been wrong to interpret bounce cosmologies as including a beginning of physical reality. (shrink)

The standard model of cosmology is acclaimed in physics as accurate, robust, well-tested, our best scientific theory of the cosmos, but it has had serious anomalies for a while, including the Hubble tension, anomalous galaxies, and the completely unexplained nature of dark energy and dark matter. And lurking behind it all is the lack of a unified theory: General Relativity (GR) and quantum mechanics (QM) are inconsistent. Now startling new observations by the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) in 2022 of (...) the early universe present the strongest challenge yet to the standard model, and whispers have started that this shows there is something wrong with the fundamental theory, General Relativity itself. This would be a crisis for cosmology. But haven’t they tested this theory already, and shown it is correct? How could it turn out wrong at this late stage? Here we compare the standard cosmology with an alternative fundamental theory, that has a strikingly different overall cosmological behavior: a simple cyclic expansion function. It is simple and deterministic. There are only two or three general parameters. The interesting result is that this alternative cosmology: (A) closely matches the expansion observed and modelled through the CDM standard model, now going back to red-shifts of 5-15; and (B) it also predicts unexpected early galaxy formation now being reported by the JWST. The point here is not to try to prove this alternative theory however, but rather show how it compares to the conventional cosmology. This show us clearly how weak the empirical evidence for the standard model really is against a counterfactual fundamental theory. Some results established in science are robust against theory change, but we find the standard cosmological model and the implications drawn from it are not robust at all. (shrink)

What constitutes a scientific discovery? What role do discoveries play in science, its dynamics and social practices? Must every discovery be attributed to an individual discoverer (or a small number of discoverers)? The paper explores these questions by first critically examining extant philosophical explications of scientific discovery—the models of scientific discovery, propounded by Kuhn, McArthur, Hudson, and Schindler. As a simple, natural and powerful alternative, we proffer the “change-driver model”: in a nutshell, it takes discoveries to be cognitive scientific (...) results that have epistemically advanced science. The model overcomes the shortcomings of its precursors, whilst preserving their insights. We demonstrate its intensional and extensional superiority, especially with respect to the link between scientific discoveries and the dynamics of science, as well as the award system of science. Both as an illustration, and as an application to a recent scientific and political controversy, we apply the considered models of discovery to one of the most momentous discoveries of science: the expansion of the universe. We oppose the 2018 proposal of the International Astronomers’ Union as too simplistic vis-`a-vis the historical complexity of the episode. The change- driver model yields a more nuanced and circumspect verdict: (i) The redshift-distance relation shouldn’t be named the “Hubble-Lemaître Law”, but “Slipher-Lundmark-Hubble-Humason Law”; (ii) Its interpretation in terms of an expanding universe, however, Lemaître ought to be given credit for; but (iii) The establishment of the expansion of the universe, as an evidentially sufficiently warranted result, is a communal achievement, emerging in the 1950s or 1960s. (shrink)

Modern cosmology treats space and time, or rather space-time, as concrete particulars. The General Theory of Relativity combines the distribution of matter and energy with the curvature of space-time. Here space-time appears as a concrete entity which affects matter and energy and is affected by the things in it. I question the idea that space-time is a concrete existing entity which both substantivalism and reductive relationism maintain. Instead I propose an alternative view, which may be called non-reductive relationism, by (...) arguing that space and time are abstract entities based on extension and changes. (shrink)

For well over a century the dominant narrative covering the major thinkers and themes of early modern British philosophy has been that of “British Empiricism”, within which the great triumvirate of Locke-Berkeley-Hume are taken to be the dominant figures. Although it is now common to question this schema as a way of analyzing and understanding the period in question, it continues to command considerable authority and acceptance. (One likely reason for this is that no credible or plausible alternatives structures or (...) schemas of analysis have suggested themselves.) Be this as it may, the analysis of the rival systems of Clarke, Berkeley and Hume makes clear that this narrative, however deeply entrenched it may be, is wholly misleading and both distorts and obscures key themes and figures in the period in question. (shrink)

I investigate the role of stability in cosmology through two episodes from the recent history of cosmology: Einstein’s static universe and Eddington’s demonstration of its instability, and the flatness problem of the hot big bang model and its claimed solution by inflationary theory. These episodes illustrate differing reactions to instability in cosmological models, both positive ones and negative ones. To provide some context to these reactions, I also situate them in relation to perspectives on stability from dynamical systems theory (...) and its epistemology. This reveals, for example, an insistence on stability as an extreme position in relation to the spectrum of physical systems which exhibit degrees of stability and fragility, one which has a pragmatic rationale, but not any deeper one. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the late 1970s the big bang model of cosmology was widely accepted and interpreted as implying the universe had a beginning. At the end of that decade William Lane Craig revived an argument for God known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument based on this scientific consensus. Furthermore, he linked the big bang to the supposed biblical concept of creation ex nihilo found in Genesis. I shall critique Craig's position as expressed in a more recent update and argue that (...) contemporary cosmology no longer understands the big bang as the ultimate beginning, seriously undermining the KCA. I will further contend that book of Genesis should not be understood as describing creation ex nihilo anyway. (shrink)

The Schwarzschild solution (Schwarzschild, 1915/16) to Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR) is accepted in theoretical physics as the unique solution to GTR for a central-mass system. In this paper I propose an alternative solution to GTR, and argue it is both logically consistent and empirically realistic as a theory of gravity. This solution is here called K-gravity. The introduction explains the basic concept. The central sections go through the technical detail, defining the basic solution for the geometric tensor, (...) the Christoffel symbols, Ricci tensor, Ricci scalar, Einstein tensor, stress-energy tensor and density-pressure for the system. The density is integrated, and some consistency properties are demonstrated. A notable feature is the disappearance of the event horizon singularity, i.e. there are no black holes. So far this is for a single central mass. A generalization of the solution for multiple masses is then proposed. This is required to support K-gravity as a viable general interpretation of gravity. Then the question of empirical tests is discussed. It is argued that current observational data is almost but not quite sufficient to verify or falsify K-gravity. The Pioneer spacecraft trajectory data is of particular interest, as this is capable of providing a test; but the data (which originally showed anomalies that match K-gravity) is now uncertain. A new and very practical experiment is proposed to settle the matter. This would provide a novel test of GTR, and a novel test of the cause of the Pioneer anomalies. In conclusion, K-gravity has extensive ramifications for gravitational physics and for the philosophy of GTR and space-time. (shrink)

FROM THE HISTORY OF PHYSICS TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS By Antonino Drago, formerly at Naples University “Federico II”, Italy – drago@unina,.it (Size : 391.800 bytes 75,400 words) The book summarizes a half a century author’s work on the foundations of physics. For the forst time is established a level of discourse on theoretical physics which at the same time is philosophical in nature (kinds of infinity, kinds of organization) and formal (kinds of mathematics, kinds of logic). (...) This double side of the two dichotomies assures a deep comprehension of theoretical physics by avoiding both a purely philosophical analysis and a purely formal analysis, each manifestly insufficient for representing all the aspects of theoretical physics. Among the many formulations of a physical theory, e.g. Mechanics, also Mach(1) recognized technical differences only, Instead my suggestion is to consider their differences as revealing the characteristic features of their foundations. No more radical differences may exist than those concerning both their kinds of Mathematics and their kinds of Logic. As a fact, after the 20th Century within each of these sciences there exist two antagonist foundations, within Mathematics either the classical one or the constructive one(2); within Mathematical Logic either the classical logic or the intuitionist one(3). Let us take Mechanics as an instance. Being the choices of the Newton’s formulation respectively the actual infinity of the differential equations relying on the infinitesimals and the classical logic, a formulation based on the alternative choices is Lazare Carnot’s,(4) whose mathematics is no more than algebraic-trigonometric and the logic is the intuitionist one, because this formulation makes use of doubly negated propositions, whose corresponding affirmative propositions are idealistic or false; i.e. in these cases the law of double negation fails, as in intuitionist logic occurs. By considering these two dichotomies as the foundations of the physical theories, each couple of choices upon them fashions one out four models of scientific theory, which are baptized through the authors of their most representative theories: Newtonian, Carnotian, Lagrangian, Descartesian. In correspondence four versions of the principle of inertia are recognized, as suggested by respectively: Descartes. Lazare Carnot, Enriques and Cavalieri.(5) All that suggests that the four models of scientific theory may be graphically represented as a compass orientating our minds amid the so numerous physical theories. By taking these dichotomies as interpretative categories, a new interpretative history of Physics including both classical and modern physics results according to a quadrilinear development. The birth of modern physics is characterized by the two theories - Einstein’s paper on special relativity and Einstein’s first paper on quanta - whose choices are the alternative ones to those of the previously dominant physical theory, Newtonian mechanics: in the latter paper Einstein i) declares the dichotomy on the kinds of mathematics (“Introduction”) and then he chooses the discrete mathematics; ii) by using doubly negated propositions he organizes his theory in an alternative way to the deductive-axiomatic one.(6) Moreover, a new history of Philosophy of knowledge results. Kant’s first two a priori transcendental categories represent the physical interpretation of the two choices out of the four pairs of choices on the two dichotomies, i.e. the choices of the dominant theory of mechanics, Newton’s. Hegel’s dialectic was a misleading attempt of anticipating the subsequent intuitionist logic. The book starts by a comparison of different formulations of thermodynamics in order to recognize the first dichotomy on the kind of organization. In chapter 2 the dichotomy on the kind of infinity is recognized through a comparison of Newrton’s mechanics and Lazare Carnot’s. A quickly history of the other classical physical theories is illustrated in chapter 3; it results a foundational conflict between the last two theories, and hence a conflict between their opposite couples of choices. The two main theories of modern physics, special realtivity and quantum mechanics confirm the foundational role played by the two dichotomies which gives reason for the radical change in the history of theoretical physics. Indeed, the opposition of the two main pairs of choices gives reason of the crisis in theoretical physics in the early 1900s. As a global result, the book represents the first interpretation of the entire history of Physics, both classical and modern; This fact proves that the four models of scientific theories can works as a compass (that of the front cover) suggesting a direction among the many physical theories. This new history of physics leads to re-visit both Koyré’s and Kuhn’s historiographies. Their interpretative categories are interpreted and explained through the two dichotomies so that it is possible to suggest à la Koyré categories based on the alternative choices theories to Newton’s as the suitable categories for interpreting the alternative theories to Newton’s mechanics. All that suggests a new interpretation of the crucial step in the history of Western philosophy of knowledge, i.e. the passage from Leibniz to Kant: Leibniz’s suggestion of the two labyrinths of human minds may be seen as a close anticipation of the two above dichotomies. Kant applied them in order to construct the well-known four cosmological proofs, which however he misinterpreted as leading to contradictions, instead to tow different methods of investigation corresponding to the two different kinds of logic.(7) Bibliography 1. Mach E. (1883), Die Mechanik, Leipzig: Brockhaus, Chap. IV, Sect. III. 2. Bishop E. (1967), Constructive Analysis, New York: Mc Graw-Hill. 3. Heyting A. (1962), Intuitionism. An Introduction, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 4. L. Carnot (1783), Essai on the Machines en général, Defay, Dijion (Enlish translation: Springer, Berlin, 2020). Drago A. (2004), “A new appraisal of old formulations of mechanics”, Am. J. Phys., 72(3), pp. 407-9. 5. Vella M.R. (2007), “Le quattro versioni del principio di inerzia”, in M. Leone et al. (eds.), L’eredità di Fermi, Majorana e altri Temi. Napoli: ESI, pp. 147-151. 6. Drago A. (2014), “The emergence of two options from Einstein°s first paper on Quanta”, in Pisano R., Capecchi D., Lukesova A. (eds.), Physics, Astronomy and Engineering. Critical Problems in the History of Science and Society, Scientia Socialis P., Siauliai, 2013, pp. 227-234. 7. This and all in the above points are illustrated by the book Drago A. (2017), Dalla Storia della Fisica ai Fondamenti della Scienza, Roma: Aracne. (shrink)

In the contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness studies, views such as panpsychism or theories of universal consciousness, have enjoyed a recent renaissance of metaphysical speculations in Western philosophy. Its similarities with Eastern philosophical traditions went not unnoticed. However, the potential contribution that the evolutionary cosmology of the Indian poet, mystic and philosopher Sri Aurobindo can offer to these ontologies, remains largely unknown or unexplored. Here, consciousness, mind, life, matter and evolution are interpreted in an extended metaphysical framework, uniting Western (...) and Eastern traditions inside a modern philosophical system where materialism, panpsychism, cosmopsychism and philosophical idealism are not seen as irreconcilable exclusives, but different points of view that can be reconciled in a synthesis of knowledge, as envisioned from higher states of consciousness. This integral view of reality offers a conceptual platform that can complement and incorporate current theoretical approaches in modern philosophy, where their present internal inconsistencies do not emerge, and can be suggestive for scientists as well, especially in the fields of biology and physical sciences. (shrink)

[For an updated version of this thesis, see Frederik A. Bakker, Epicurean Meteorology: Sources, Method, Scope and Organization, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016] This dissertation consists of three studies dealing with various aspects of Epicurean cosmology. The first study discusses the Epicurean practice of explaining astronomical and meteorological phenomena by multiple alternative theories. The second study compares the meteorological accounts of Epicurus and Lucretius with other ancient meteorologies as regards the scope and order of their subject matter. The third one examines (...) the claim that Epicurus and Lucretius held the earth to be flat. (shrink)

Penrose's conformal cyclic cosmology describes the cosmos as a collection of successive universes, the so-called aeons. The beginning and ending of our universe are directly connected to two other, anterior and posterior, universes. Penrose considers but rules out a different interpretation of conformal cyclic cosmology: that the beginning of our universe is connected to its own end in a cosmic loop. The paper argues that the view, aeon monism, should be regarded as a natural interpretation of conformal cyclic (...) cosmology and discusses its implications for the concept of eternal return in light of the most popular metaphysics of time. (shrink)

In a beautiful recent essay, the philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explains the reasons for his departure from evangelical Christianity, the religious culture in which he was brought up. Sinnot-Armstrong contrasts the interpretive methods used by good philosophers and fundamentalist believers: Good philosophers face objections and uncertainties. They follow where arguments lead, even when their conclusions are surprising and disturbing. Intellectual honesty is also required of scholars who interpret philosophical texts. If I had distorted Kant’s view to make him reach a conclusion (...) that I preferred, then my philosophy professor would have failed me. The contrast with religious reasoning is stark. My Christian friends seemed happy to hide serious problems in the Bible and in their arguments. They preferred comfort to intellectual honesty. I couldn’t. To what extent can we, historians of philosophy, claim the virtue of intellectual honesty? Speaking frankly, I do not find the practice criticized by Sinnot-Armstrong’s philosophy professor rare or unusual at all. We very frequently distort the views of past philosophers in order to reach the conclusions we prefer. We just call it “Charitable Interpretation.” In this essay, I discuss and criticize the logic behind so-called charitable interpretations in the history of philosophy. This phenomenon is ubiquitous and is not at all restricted to a particular philosophical strand or ideology. Analytic philosophers and post-modernists, Marxists, liberals, secularists, and fundamentalists, we all engage in the very same domestication project. Even more disturbing than the sheer ideological pervasiveness of this phenomenon is the fact that, on many occasions, superb philosophers and historians take part in this fairly childish endeavor. In the first part of this essay, I discuss the general logic of charitable interpretations in the history of philosophy, mostly by addressing discussions in metaphysics and epistemology. In the second part, I focus on the somewhat less noticed use of charitable interpretations in the study of political philosophy, and point out the quintessential role ideology plays in these discussions. In both parts, I concentrate mostly on the interpretation of Spinoza’s thought. I do so not because I have special fondness for Spinoza (“guilty as charged,” I admit), but because Spinoza is such a beast (and may I add, an enchanting beast) and attracts a disproportionate share of the domestication efforts from historians and philosophers of all creeds and persuasions. In the third and final part of the paper, I will begin to outline an alternative methodology, which suggests that past philosophers can be most relevant to our current philosophical discussion, to the extent that they provide us with well-motivated challenges to our common-sense beliefs. Such challenges have the invaluable virtue of being able to undermine our most fundamental and secure beliefs, and force us to engage with the most fundamental questions. What more can we expect from good philosophy? (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a quasi-transcendental argument to justify Kant’s infamous claim “man is evil by nature.” The cornerstone of my reconstruction lies in drawing a systematic distinction between the seemingly identical concepts of “evil disposition” (böseGesinnung) and “propensity to evil” (Hang zumBösen). The former, I argue, Kant reserves to describe the fundamental moral outlook of a single individual; the latter, the moral orientation of the whole species. Moreover, the appellative “evil” ranges over two different types of moral failure: (...) while an “evil disposition” is a failure to realize the good (i.e., to adopt the motive of duty as limiting condition for all one’s desires), an “evil propensity” is a failure to realize the highest good (i.e., to engage in the collective project of transforming the legal order into an ethical community). This correlation between units of moral analysis and types of obligation suggests a way to offer a deduction of the universal propensity on behalf of Kant. It consists in tracing the source of radical evil to the same subjective necessity that gives rise to the doctrine of the highest good. For, at the basis of Kant’s two doctrines lies the same natural dialectic between happiness and morality. While the highest good brings about the critically acceptable resolution of this dialectic, the propensity to evil perpetuates and aggravates it. Instead of connecting happiness and morality in an objective relation, the human will subordinatesmorality to the pursuit of happiness according to the subjective order of association. If this reading is correct, it would explain why prior attempts at a transcendental deduction have failed: interpreters have looked for the key to the deduction in the body of Kant’s text, where it is not to be found, for it is tucked, instead, in the Preface to the first edition. (shrink)

The relationship between mind and necessity is one of the major points of difficulty for the interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus. At times Timaeus seems to say the demiurge is omnipotent in his creation, and at other times seems to say he is limited by pre-existing matter. Most interpretations take one of the two sides, but this paper proposes a novel approach to interpreting this issue which resolves the difficulty. This paper suggests that in his speech Timaeus presents two hypothetical (...) models of creation, one with an omnipotent demiurge and one where he is limited by matter, so as to investigate their theoretical and empirical validity. Further, he shows that each model is ultimately an inadequate explanation of the first principles of the cosmos. Timaeus’ speech is therefore properly understood to be aporetic: it leaves its listeners aware of the difficulties inherent in the two models of creation, but without a more viable alternative. (shrink)

We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated.

This paper examines the Kalam Cosmological Argument, as expounded by,William Lane Craig, insofar as it pertains to the premise that it is metaphysically impossible for an infinite set of real entities to exist. Craig contends that this premise is justified because the application of the Cantorian theory to the real world generates counterintuitive absurdities. This paper shows that Craig’s contention fails because it is possible to apply Cantorian theory to the real world without thereby generating counterintuitive absurdities, provided one (...) avoids positing that an infinite set of real entities is technically a set within the meaning of such theory. Accordingly, this paper proposes an alternative version of the application of Cantorian theory to the real world thereby replacing the standard version of such application so thoroughly criticized by Craig. (shrink)

Some people -- including the present author -- have proposed and defended alternative restricted causal principles that block Robert Koons’s ’new’ cosmological argument without undermining the intuition that causation is very close to ubiquitous. In "Epistemological Foundations for the Cosmological Argument", Koons argues that any restricted causal principles that are insufficient for the purposes of his cosmological argument cause epistemological collapse into general scepticism. In this paper I argue, against Koons, that there is no reason to (...) suppose that my favourite restricted causal principle precipitates epistemological collapse into general scepticism. If we impose the ’same kinds’ of restrictions on causal epistemological principles and on principles of general causation, then we cannot be vulnerable to the kind of argument that Koons develops. (shrink)

We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated.

ABSTRACT: Mullā Ṣadrā’s (c 1571-1640) commentary on Uṣūl al- Kāfī is one of the more famous commentaries on this significant Shi‘i hadith collection. For his philosophical and Sui background, Ṣadrā’s approach to the hadith is slightly different and in some ways contrary to the earlier commentators such as`Allāma Majlisī in Shi'a and Ibn Taymīyya in Sunni Islam. This paper aims to shed light on the way, Ṣadrā interprets al-Kāfī and particularly to determine his understanding of the ʿaql (intellect) at the (...) cosmic (as first created being) and human levels as presented in the Kitāb al-ʿAql wa al-Jahl (The Book of Intellect and Ignorance). Ṣadrā, already well-versed in the philosophical discourses on ontology and cosmology find al-Kāfī as a fertile ground to develop and extend his vision of cosmos and existence. This paper, furthermore, investigates and reviews some later and contemporary scholars’ critiques of Ṣadrā’s view on hadith and intellect. (shrink)

This is a defense of Kant against the allegedly neglected alternative in his formulation of transcendental idealism. What sets it apart from the contributions of others who have spoken for Kant in this regard is the construction of a general interpretive framework — a reconstruction of the one Kant provides for transcendental idealism — as opposed to the development of an ad hoc defensive strategy for refuting the charges. Hence, comprehensive clarification instead of pointed rebuttal. The difference is between (...) focusing on the text and focusing on the problem. No doubt, doing both is not only possible but also required, as the problem is supposed to be in the text, but the point is that it is not there, and further, that we need not go anywhere else to show that it is not there. Thus, the approach is constructive rather than defensive, or more accurately, constructive as well as defensive. And the construction rests on what Kant actually said rather than on what he might have meant or on what he should have said instead. (shrink)

Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...) undecided between these simple hypotheses about the causal shape of reality: contrary to the proponents of cosmological arguments, there are no decisive objections to any of these simple hypotheses. (I argue this case in detail in connection with objections offered by William Lane Craig; however, I believe that the case holds quite generally.). (shrink)

Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...) undecided between these simple hypotheses about the causal shape of reality: contrary to the proponents of cosmological arguments, there are no decisive objections to any of these simple hypotheses. (I argue this case in detail in connection with objections offered by William Lane Craig; however, I believe that the case holds quite generally.). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Newton's Metaphysics: Essays by Eric SchliesserMarius StanEric Schliesser. Newton's Metaphysics: Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 328. Hardback, $99.90.Newton owes his high regard to the quantitative science he left us, but his overall picture of the world had some robustly metaphysical threads woven in as well. Posthumous judgment about the value of these threads has varied wildly. Christian Wolff thought him a metaphysical rustic, as did Hans (...) Reichenbach some two centuries later ("Die Bewegungslehre bei Newton, Leibniz und Huygens," Kant-Studien 29 [1924]: 416–38). In the 1960s, the tide would turn, as Howard Stein and James Edward McGuire separately began to show that Newton's metaphysics was not just sophisticated, but often more compelling than its early modern alternatives (see respectively "Newtonian Spacetime," Texas Quarterly 10 [1967]: 174–200; and Tradition and Innovation: Newton's Metaphysics of Nature [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995]). Eric Schliesser's book unfolds in that same register of appreciative, high scholarship, and it attests to the enduring attraction of its subject.The book grew out of previous discrete papers, to which he added a few more for this occasion. Accordingly, it does not come with a master argument. Rather, it is an in-depth exploration of some key metaphysical themes in Newton. As such, it befits its subject figure, who reflected on themes and concepts while stopping short of working out systems.The first major theme is Newton and Spinozism. The latter does not denote Spinoza's metaphysics. In fact, Schliesser explains, Newton shared with Spinoza some weighty commitments, for example, to space being actually infinite, and to substance monism: "for Newton, there is strictly speaking only one genuine substance," namely, God (33). Rather, "Spinozism" is an interpreter's category for a bundle of three theses: identifying God and nature; denying final causation in the physical world; and the assumption of "blind" metaphysical necessity. Some counted Hobbes and John Toland as Spinozist in this sense, and even Epicurus, avant la lettre. Newton and his followers argued vehemently against this package, as Schliesser shows in chapters 4, 5, and 8. Their chief complaint was that Spinozism is unable to account for the "origin of motion," for a certain type of order, and for the stability of cosmological structure—and to do so in a way that "meets the standards of Newtonian mechanics" (122). This interpretive lens allows Schliesser to draw Kant in, by reading his youthful Theory of Heaven as a possible Spinozist reply to their objections (chapter 3). [End Page 157]A second theme is the metaphysics of mechanics, where Schliesser weaves together several strands. One is the ontology of gravity, for which he offers a novel construal: for Newton, gravity counts as real, but in a qualified sense. Namely, it is not essential and not intrinsic: "even after creation, a lonely partless particle of matter in the universe would not be said to gravitate." And gravity is relational: a "shared quality" of two or more bits of matter, which obtains in virtue of their sharing a nature (19). Another strand is Newton's ontology of time—really, a subtle, difficult topic long neglected. Famously, Newton in Principia defends absolute, true, and mathematical time. The question is what these three qualifiers denote, and whether Newton thought they were synonymous. Schliesser in chapter 7 argues for the provocative view that "absolute" and "true" time are not identical concepts; rather, they pick out different entities. These entities share a common structure, namely, metric and topological. That makes them species of "mathematical" time (179). But, Schliesser contends, Newton has unequal warrant for his two concepts of time.Yet another theme is formal causation. It comes to the fore in chapter 5, which grapples with Newton's opaque idea that space is an "emanative effect." Schliesser explains that here, "emanation picks out a species of formal causation" (147), but in a novel, early modern sense that comes from Bacon, not Aristotle. If space has a formal cause, then so has its twin brother, time, the topic of chapter 7. God is their common formal cause. Then in chapter 6 (coauthored with Zvi Biener) Schliesser adds that, for Newton, laws... (shrink)

In a rather old paper, Mario Liu described a hydrodynamic Maxwell equations. While he also discussed potential implications of these new approaches to superconductors, such a discussion of electrodynamics of superconductors is made only after Tajmar’s paper. Therefore, in this paper we present for the first time a derivation of fluidic Maxwell-Proca equations. The name of fluidic Maxwell-Proca is proposed because the equations were based on modifying Maxwell-Proca and Hirsch’s theory of electrodynamics of superconductor. It is hoped that this paper (...) may stimulate further investigations and experiments in superconductor. It may be expected to have some impact to cosmology modeling too, for instance we consider a hypothetical argument that photon mass can be origin of gravitation. Then, after combining with the so-called chiral modification of Maxwell equations (after Spröessig), then we consider chiral Maxwell-Proca equations as possible alternative of gravitation theory. Such a hypothesis has never considered in literature to the best of our knowledge. (shrink)

For Anaxagoras, both before the beginning of the world and in the present, “all is together” and “everything is in everything.” Various modern interpretations abound regarding the identity of this “mixture.” It has been explained as an aggregation of particles or as a continuous “fusion” of different sorts of ingredients. However—even though they are not usually recognized as a distinct group—there are a number of other scholars who, without seemingly knowing each other, have offered a different interpreta- tion: Anaxagoras’ mixture (...) as an “interpenetration” of different ingredients, which are as far-extended as the whole mixture is. As a result, there are different entities occupying the same place at the same time. This explanation assigns to Anaxagoras the same model of mixture which was later used by the Stoics. A new book by Marmodoro helps us to clarify this position. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7, Aristotle gives a definition of the human good, and he does so by means of the “ ergon argument.” I clear the way for a new interpretation of this argument by arguing that Aristotle does not think that the ergon of something is always the proper activity of that thing. Though he has a single concept of an ergon, Aristotle identifies the ergon of an X as an activity in some cases but a product (...) in others, depending on the sort of thing the X is—for while the ergon of the eye is seeing, the ergon of a sculptor is a sculpture. This alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of an ergon allows the key explanatory middle term of the ergon argument to be what, I argue, it ought to be: “the best achievement of a human.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Hud Hudson's compatibilistic interpretation of Kant's theory of free will, which is based on Davidson's anomalous monism. I sketch an alternative interpretation of my own, an incompatibilistic interpretation according to which agents qua noumena are responsible for the particular causal laws which determine the actions of agents qua phenomena. Hudson's interpretation should be attractive to philosophers who value Kant's epistemology and ethics, but insist on a deflationary reading of things in (...) themselves. It is in an incompatibilist interpretation of Kant's theory of free will that a "positive" conception of noumena is at its most important. If a compatibilistic interpretation is acceptable, one might suppose that we can do without a "positive" conception of noumena throughout Kant's philosophy. I demonstrate, however, that there are central elements of Kant's theory of free will that cannot be accommodated within Hudson's interpretation. (shrink)

Context is a concept used by philosophers and scientists with many different definitions. Since Dummett we speak of "context principle" in Frege and Wittgenstein: "an expression has a meaning only in the context of a sentence". The context principle finds an extension in some of Wittgenstein's ideas, especially in his famous passage where he says that "to understand a sentence is to understand a language". Given that Wittgenstein believes that "the" language does not exist but only language games exist, we (...) should conclude that he is speaking of the need to consider any sentence always in the context of a language game1. This general attitude is certainly attuned with the contemporary tendency to place contextual restrictions to the interpretations of our sentences. However we find so many kinds and forms of restrictions that this general attitude is not enough to give us a viable tool to find an order in the web of so many different theories of context. To look for an order or, at least a clarification, we may start with two contrasting paradigms of theories: the "objective" theory of contexts, where context is a set of features of the world, and the "subjective" theories of context, where context is the cognitive background of a speaker or agent in respect to a situation2. We have here not only two different ways of using the term "context" but also two different conceptions of semantics and philosophy. The different conceptions are normally associated, respectively, with the classical paradigm of model theoretic semantics (Kaplan, Lewis Stalnaker) on one hand and with the A.I. paradigm (McCarthy, Buvac, Giunchiglia) on the other hand. For sake of simplicity I will restrict my attention3 mainly to Kaplan 1989 and to McCarthy 1993 and Giunchiglia 1993. The two different conceptions can be summarised with the following schema: a) context as: set of features of the world.. (shrink)

In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. Then I sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. If we start with Karl's conscious experiences, we can appeal to Lewisian ideas to explain his other intentional states. This account (...) develops the multistage Lewisian approach presented at the end of my earlier "Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?" (2013). (shrink)

Four different interpretations of measurement are distinguished that are compatible with the formal frame of the representational theory of measurement: (1) the classical interpretation, the additive, (3) the operationalis, (4) the correlative one.

We present an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The basic difference is that the new inter- pretation is formulated in the language of epistemological realism. It involves a change in some basic physical concepts. Elementary particles are considered as extended objects and nonlocal effects are included. The role of the new concepts in the problems of measurement and of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations is described. Experiments to distinguish the proposed interpretation from (...) the Copenhagen one are pointed out. (shrink)

Jonathan Lear argues that the established purgation, purification, and cognitive stimulation interpretations of Aristotle’s concepts of catharsis and tragic pleasure are off the mark. In response, Lear defends an anti-cognitivist account, arguing that it is the pleasure associated with imaginatively “living life to the full” and yet hazarding nothing of importance that captures Aristotle’s understanding of catharsis and tragic pleasure. This analysis reveals that Aristotle’s account of imagination in conjunction with his understanding of both specific intellectual virtues and rational emotions (...) of an educated citizen not only tells against Lear’s anti-cognitivist construal, but also divulges an alternative cognitive stimulation reading. (shrink)

The chapter considers two semantic issues concerning will-sentences: Stalnaker’s Asymmetry and modal subordination in Karttunen-type discourses. The former points to a distinction between will and modal verbs, seeming to show that will does not license non-specific indefinites. The latter, conversely, suggests that will-sentences involve some kind of modality. To account for the data, the chapter proposes that will is semantically a tense, hence it doesn’t contribute a quantifier over modal alternatives; a modal feature, however, is introduced in the interpretation (...) of a will-sentence through a supervaluational strategy universally quantifying over possible futures. That this is not part of will’s lexical semantics is shown to have consequences that ultimately contribute to explain Stalnaker’s Asymmetry. Furthermore, that a modal quantification is present in the interpretation of a will-sentence is shown to imply the availability of modal subordination in Karttunen-type discourses. (shrink)

Art interpretation in practice, not theory. -/- How do people make sense of works of art? And how do they write to make others see the same way? There are many guides to looking at art, histories of art history and art criticism, and accounts of various ‘theories’ and ‘methods’, but this book offers something very unlike the normal search for difference and division: it examines the general and largely unspoken norms shared by interpreters of many kinds. -/- Ranging (...) widely, though taking writing within the Western tradition of art history as its primary focus, Interpreting Art highlights the norms, premises, and patterns that tend to guide interpretation along the way. Why, for example, is the concept of artistic ‘intention’ at once so reviled and yet so hard to let go of? What does it really involve when an interpretation appeals to an artwork’s ‘reception’? How can ‘context’ be used by some to keep things under control and by others to make the interpretation of art seem limitless? And how is it that artworks only seem to grow in complexity over time? -/- Interpreting Art reveals subtle features of art writing central to the often unnoticed interpretative practices through which we understand works of art. In doing so, the book also sheds light on possible alternatives, pointing to how writers on art might choose to operate differently in the future. -/- ‘It's wonderful to have a book that focuses on what art historians actually do when we interpret art, as opposed to the claims we make about our methods and their histories… Interpreting Art shows how apparently well-understood paths of interpretation are actually half-articulated ideals that are as likely to run away with our texts as support them, and for that reason it should be on the desk of every doctoral student when they set out to write.’ – James Elkins, School of the Art Institute of Chicago ‘In this lucid, sensible and insightful book, Sam Rose investigates interpretive practices common to almost all professional art historians, regardless of their objects of study, their professed "methods" and their schools of historical thought. Anyone curious about the “how” of art history as an intellectual and aesthetic endeavour will find Rose to be an invaluable guide.’ – Whitney Davis, University of California at Berkeley. (shrink)