Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more natural choice in developing (...) an expressivist account of moral discourse. We close by showing how to adapt ordinary formality-based accounts of logicality to define a B-type account of logical inconsistency and distinguish it from both semantic and pragmatic inconsistency. In sum, we provide a roadmap of how to develop a successful B-type expressivism. (shrink)

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)

Behaviorism was a peculiarly American phenomenon. As a school of psychology it was founded by John B. Watson (1878-1958) and grew into the neobehaviorisms of the 1920s, 30s and 40s. Philosophers were involved from the start, prefiguring the movement and endeavoring to define or redefine its tenets. Behaviorism expressed the naturalistic bent in American thought, which came in response to the prevailing philosophical idealism and was inspired by developments in natural science itself. There were several versions of naturalism in American (...) philosophy, and also several behaviorisms. Most behaviorists paid homage to Darwinian functionalism; all forswore introspection and made learned changes in behavior the primary subject matter and explanatory domain of psychology. They differed in their descriptions of behavior, modes of explanation, and attitudes toward mentalistic concepts. Watson was a strict materialist who wanted to eliminate all mentalistic talk from psychology. Edward Chace Tolman (1886-1959) regarded mind as a biological function of the organism. He permitted mentalistic terms such as 'purpose' in behavioral description, and posited intervening processes that included 'representations' of the environment, while requiring such processes be studied only as expressed in behavior. Clark L. Hull (1884-1952) developed a hypothetical-deductive version of behaviorism, akin to Tolman's functionalism in positing intervening variables but without his cognitivist constructs. B. F. Skinner (1904-90) rejected intervening variables and developed his own account of the behavior of the whole organism, based on the laws of operant conditioning. The naturalism in American philosophy of the early twentieth century showed respect for the natural sciences, especially biology and psychology. John Dewey (1896, 1911), George Santayana (1905, 1920), and F. J. E. Woodbridge (1909, 1913) expressed this attitude. It animated the neorealism of E. B. Holt and Ralph Barton Perry, who gave special attention to psychology, and the evolutionary naturalism and critical realism of Roy Wood Sellars. This naturalism differed from Watson's in regarding mind as part of nature from a Darwinian and functionalist perspective, and treating behavior as the product of the mental functioning. It fed Tolman's version of behaviorism. It was not materialistic or physical-reductionist. Only later, with Quine and logical empiricism, was behaviorism seen as essentially physicalistic. (shrink)

Predication is a lingual relation. We have this relation when a term is said (λέγεται) of another term. This simple definition, however, is not Aristotle’s own definition. In fact, he does not define predication but attaches his almost in a new field used word κατηγορεῖσθαι to λέγεται. In a predication, something is said of another thing, or, more simply, we have ‘something of something’ (ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνὸς). (PsA. , A, 22, 83b17-18) Therefore, a relation in which two terms are posited (...) to each other in a way that one is said (predicated) of the other is a predication. The term of which the other term is said is called a subject (ὑποκειμένον) and the other, which is said about the subject, is called the predicate. Thus, in a predication the predicate is predicated of the subject; given that being predicated is almost as the same as being said. The relation between being said and being predicated is so close that ‘if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject.’ (Cat., 5, 2a19-26) This, however, is true only about the second genera and not the accidents. a) Nature of relation in predication What is Aristotle’s theory about the nature of the relation in a predication? How does he fundamentally understand this relation? Phil Corkum distinguishes between predication logic and traditional term logic and argues that the relation between subject and predicate in Aristotle is of the latter kind. While in predicate logic, subjects and predicates have distinct roles, they have the same role in traditional term logic. In predication logic, subjects refer, but predicates characterize. Thereupon, a sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. In traditional term logic, both subjects and predicates refer and a sentences expresses a truth if both name one and the same thing. He concludes that Aristotle ‘problematically conflates prediction and identity claims’ because while he thinks both subjects and predicates refer, he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and the predicate name one and the same thing. Based on this, Corkum believes that Aristotle’s core semantic is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution, which is a mereological interpretation: ‘All men are mortal’ is true just in case the mereological sum of humans is part of the mereological sum of mortals. b) Aristotle’s theory of predication: one or two theories? Frank Lewis finds an inconsistent gap between the theory of predication in the Categories and that in the later books of the Metaphysics VII, 6. So too Joan Kung, Terry Irwin, Daniel Graham. c) Distinction of ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ Owen enumerates the texts in which Aristotle’s distinction between ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ is asserted: OI. 11b38-12a17; To., 127b1-4; Cat. 1a20-b9; 2a11-14; 2a27-b6; 2b15-17; 3a7-32; 9b22-24 d) Predication in Aristotle and the standard ‘S is P’ Marie De Rijk Lambertus thinks that the ‘S is P’ pattern is misleading when it comes to express predication in Aristotle. In his view, ‘The Aristotelian procedure should be described in terms of appositively assigning an attribute (κατηγορούμενον) to a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), rather than ascribing a predicate to a subject by means of a copula…. The comment should be considered an attribute which is said to fall to a substrate, without understanding this procedure in terms of sentence predication.’ e) Aristotle’s predication: bipartite or tripartite? It is a difficulty to make Aristotle’s theories of name-verb predication and tripartite predication consistent. The reason is that tripartite is not consistant with his name-verb structure based on which he says that the predicate term is the ‘verb.’ (20a31; 20b1-2; 16a13-5) The problem is that in a tripartite form like ‘Socrates is white’ we cannot take ‘is white’ as the verb because, based on Aristotle himself, no part of a verb can be significant itself. (16b6-7) However, his assertions about the equivalences between the two structures (OI. 12, 21b9-10; PrA. 51b13-16; Met., 1017b22-30) must mean that they are not inconsistent in his own view. Thus, as Allen Bāck points, ‘Aristotle seems to think that he has a single, consistent theory.’ The sense of saying or speaking as the root sense of rhema makes the relation between predication (saying something of something) and verb more interesting. The use of rhema in the sense of a long expression approves this. In Plato’s work (399ac) where Socrates claims that the name anthropos derives from anthron ha opopen (‘he who examines what he has seen’) we have an onoma from, or in place of, a rhema. 1) Subject The subject (ὑποκειμένον) is that of which another term is said or predicated. Aristotle’s own definition is of a much more philosophical value: ‘By subject I mean that which is expressed by an affirmative term (λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ κάταφάσει δηλούμενον).’ (Met., K, 1067b18) Throughout Aristotle’s work, three kinds of subjects can be found: possible, prime and absolute subject. a) Possible subject Those things that can take the position of a subject in a predication we call possible subjects, no matter they can or cannot take the position of predicate in any predication. All terms except the ultimate predicates are possible subjects because they can take the position of subject. b) Prime subject Those that in any predication can only take the position of a subject and not the position of a predicate are prime subjects. (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2; Met., Z, 1028b36-1029a1) This is the truest sense of subject and belongs only to substances. (Met., Z, 1029a1-2) In fact, ‘that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated’ is a substance. (Met., Z, 1029a7-9) In Categories, besides primary substances (Cat., 2, 1b3-6), individual qualities are also said not to be able to be said of anything else. (Cat., 2, 1a23-29) Aristotle’s examples are a certain ‘knowledge-of-grammar’ (τὶς γράμματικὴ) and ‘an individual white’ (τὸ τὶ λευκὸν). Thus, although substances are indeed in the truest sense individuals and, thereby, in the truest sense primary subjects, other individuals can take the position of subject as well. c) Absolute subject While substances are prime subjects of all other things, there is still something of which substances can be predicated and this predication is not an accidental predication: matter. (Met., Z, 1029a21-24) This predication is, indeed, the predication of a ‘form or this’ on matter and material substance. (Met., Θ, 1049a34-36) The only thing that is absolutely a subject, therefore, and can be a predicate is prime matter (πρώτη ὓλη). (Met., Θ, 1049a24-27) d) Subject and substance The most important thing in being a substance is being a subject: ‘It is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all.’ (Cat., 5, 2b15-17) And what is nearer to this position is more a substance as a species is more a substance than a genus.’ (Cat., 5, 2b7-8) e) Primary versus accidental subject A subject is a primary subject in a predication when the predicate is predicated of it as itself. In such a case, the subject is the subject of the predicate qua itself and not qua something else. A subject, on the one hand, is an accidental subject when it is not the primary subject of the predicate that is predicated on it. It means that a subject is an accidental subject when the predicate is predicated of it not qua itself but qua something else. An accidental subject is, therefore, anything other than a substance. 2) Predicate as universal It is evident from our discussion of kinds of subjects that except matter, primary substances (if we ignore both accidental predication and cases of absolute subjects) and other individuals, everything else can take the position of a predicate. Since primary substances are individuals, it results that everything except matter and individuals are capable to take the position of predicate. The immediate consequence of this is that the predicate must be a universal. When individuals cannot take the position of predicate, this position cannot be taken by any particular. Therefore, only universals can be predicated of others. Moreover, albeit universals can be a simple subject (for another universal), they are not prime subjects. The closeness of universal and predicate is to the extent that Aristotle differentiates universal from subject. (Met., Θ, 1049a27-30) 3) Categories or classes of predicates Aristotle distinguishes ten highest classes into one of which each predicate must necessarily fall: substance (or what a thing is), quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity. (Cat., 4, 1b25-27; To., I, 9, 103b20- ; PsA., A, 22, 83b13-23) The substance counted among predicates must refer to secondary and not primary substances not only because Aristotle insists that primary substances cannot be predicated but also from his own examples of the category of substance: man and animal. (To., I, 9, 103b25) However, if a predicate be asserted of itself or its genus be asserted of it, the predicate signifies substance or what is; but if ‘one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind,’ it signifies one of the other nines. (To., I, 9, 103b30) These categories are so comprehensive that no predicate can remain outside them so that even non-being has as many senses as categories. (Met., M, 1089a26-30) a) That whether Aristotle’s categories are merely linguistic or fundamentally ontological is a so much controversial dispute. Some like G. E. R. Lloyd believe that ‘categories are primarily intended as a classification of reality … rather than of the signifying terms themselves.’ b) Although Aristotle’s categories have been historically regarded as a classification of predications, there are some recent commentators like Jonathan Barnes that think it is classifying predicates and not predications. 4) Kinds of predicates In his introduction of Categories, as J. W. Thorp truly points out , Aristotle distinguishes between the category of substance and the other categories using μὲν ... δὲ construction. This construction illustrates that beside tenfold classification of categories, there is an even more crucial differentiation between two kinds of predicates: substance or what is on the one hand and the other nine ones on the other hand: the distinction between what is predicated of the subject as what it is and what is predicated of it as an accident. Therefore, we have three kinds of classification - a twofold, a fourfold and a tenfold-complicatedly classifying the same thing, viz. the predicate. Predicates can be divided also to four kinds: property, definition, genus and accident. (To., I, 4, 101b11-20) A property is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and does not signify its essence. A definition is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and signifies its essence. It is a genus if it is not predicated convertibly and is contained in the definition of its subject. And it is an accident if it is neither convertible nor contained in the definition of its subject. (To., I, 8, ^103b3) All of these four kinds are among categories. (To., I, 9, 103b20) It seems that there might be some kind of relation between the twofold and the fourfold distinction: whereas genus and definition are predicated as what it is, accidents are not so predicated. There seems to be some rules that determine to each of these four kinds each predicate belongs. At To., IV, 123b30ff. Aristotle asserts: ‘If B has a contrary and A does not, then B does not belong to A as its genus.’ There is a dispute around per se accidents (τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα) (Topics., 102a18) whether they must be regarded as either of the four kinds or as a fifth kind. Barnes (1970) argued that they ‘do not fit at all neatly into the fourfold classification.’ He argues that based on the definition of accidents at A, 5, 102b4-5, they must be accidents but based on another definition, A, 5, 102b6-7, they cannot be accidents. He also defends the view that they are not properties. Barnes concludes: ‘This shows that the two definitions are not equivalent, and hence that the ‘predicables’ are not well-defined.’ Demetris J. Hadgopoulos defends the view that the two definitions of accidents are equivalent and per se accidents are properties. 5) Five types of predications We have five kinds of predications based on our division of subjects and our discussion of predicates: simple, primary (itself divided to substantial and accident), accidental (itself divided to primary and secondary), aoincidental and absolute predication. a) Simple predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of either a particular or a universal subject. This sense of predication includes all other senses except the first kind of accidental predication. b) Primary predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of a primary subject, namely a substance. A primary predication is of two kinds: i) Substantial predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is part of, or is included in, the definition of the subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the definition or the genus or the species or the diferentia of the subject. It is this predication that Aristotle calls a unity: ‘A statement may be called a unity … because it exhibits a single predicate as inhering not accidentally in a single subject.’ (PsA., B, 10, 93b35-37) It is only substantial predicates that can be predicated of each other: ‘Predicates which are not substantial are not predicated of one another.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b18-19) Aristotle defines a substantial predication also in another way. A predication in which a higher genus is predicated on a lower genus, species, a substance or an individual, (or a species is predicated on an individual) is a substantial predication. Therefore, a substantial predication is a predication in a series that has individuals on one of its ends and a general category on its other end. In fact, only substantial predicates can be predicated of one another. (PsA., A, 22, 83b17-19) This series cannot be an infinite series because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) -/- ii) Accident predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is not part of, or is not included in, the definition of its subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the property or the accident of the subject. c) Accidental predication. This is a predication in which the subject is not a primary subject and its predicate is a substance. This predication is of two kinds: i) Primary accidental predication. This is a predication in which an accident is predicated of substance. Such a predication can go ad infinitum, which is inferable from Aristotle’s assertion that the secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum. ii) Secondary accidental predication. It is a predication in which an accident is predicated of another accident. Such a predication, Aristotle asserts, cannot go ad infinitum because even more than two accidents cannot be combined. Now what is the meaning of Aristotle’s assertion that we cannot continue this ad infinitum? Does it mean that we cannot continue the predication ‘The musician is white’ and say ‘The white is Athenian?’ But why not? Or maybe he means that by adding any predication, we are still in a condition of predicating two accidents of a substance on each other. -/- As primary subjects, substances can also take the position of predicate though not essentially but accidentally. In propositions like ‘the white is a log’ or ‘That big thing is a log’ we observe substance taking the position of predicate but this is only accidentally: ‘When I affirm ‘the white is a log,’ I mean that something which happens to be white is a log- not that white is the subject in which log inheres (οὐχ ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ ξύλῳ τὸ λευκόν ἐστι), for it was not qua white or qua a species of white that the white (thing) came to be a log (οὔτε λευκὸν ὄν οὔθ᾿ ὃπερ λευκόν τι ἐγἐνετο ξύλον), and the white (thing) is consequently not a log except incidentally.’ (PsA., 22, 83a3-9) Aristotle compares this accidental use of substance in the position of predicate with the substantial use of it in the place of a subject: ‘On the other hand, when I affirm ‘the log is white,’ I do not mean that something else, which happens to be a log, is white (οὐχ ὃτι ἓτερόν τί ἐστι λευκόν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμβέβηκε ξύλῳ εἶναι), (as I should if I said ‘the musician is white,’ which would mean ‘The man who happens also to be a musician is white’); on the contrary, log is here the subject- the subject which actually came to be white, and did so qua wood or qua a species of wood and qua nothing else.’ (PsA., 22, 83a8-14) Aristotle asks us not to call propositions like ‘The white is a log’ a predication at all or at least call them accidental predication instead of simple (ἁπλως) predication. (PsA., A, 22, 83a14-17) An accidental predication, in which we have a substance in the place of predicate, is different from an essential predication in that while the subject of an accidental predication is said to be the predicate not by itself but as something different with which it coincides, the subject of an essential predicate is said to be the predicate by itself and not because it is something else: ‘Since there are attributes which are predicated of a subject essentially and not accidentally- not, that is, in the sense in which we say ‘That white (thing) is a man,’ which is not the same mode of predication as when we say ‘The man is white’: the man is white not because he is something else but because he is man, but the white is man because ‘being white’ coincides with ‘humanity’ within one subject. Therefore, there are terms such as are essentially subjects of predicates. (PsA., A, 19, 81a24-29) This capability of ‘non-essentially and only accidentally’ being a subject does belong, in fact, to all sensible things. (PsA., A, 27a32-36) d) Coincidental predication. this is a predication in which none of the subject and predicate are a substance or an individual. In this predication, one of the accidents of a substance or individual is predicated of one of the other accidentals of the same substance or individual. For example, when it is said that ‘The white is musical,’ there is an individual, say Socrates, for which both of white and musical are accidents. e) Absolute predication. This is a predication in which a form or a substance is predicated of a matter or a material substance. Some commentators like Loux and Lewis regarded this predication as close to accident predication, both based on inherence. As R.M. Dancy points out, these predications make Aristotle’s theory of predication immanentist: not only accident predications are explained by the immanence of accidents in substances, some of the substantial predications, which were not explained in Categories, are also explained by the immanence of form in matter. It is interesting that in this kind of predication, it is the predicate and not the subject, which is in the strictest sense substance. As the central books of Metaphysics claim, the form is the substance. Thus, in this predication, substance gets away from the sense of ὑποκείμενον. Corkum mentiones 68a19 as the only instance where Aristotle explicitly claims that a term may be predicated of itself, a passage that is, in Corkum’s view, problematic. 6) Demonstrable predicates Those predicates are demonstrable that are so related to their subjects that there are other predicates prior to them predicable of their subjects (ἔτι δ᾿ ἄλλος, εἰ ὧν πρότερα ἄττα κατηγορεῖται). (PsA., A, 22, 83b32-34) 7) Series of predications Since it is possible for a predicate to be itself the subject of another predication, we can have a series of predications in which the predicate of a predication is the subject of the next predication. This series has the following features: a) It has a limit (in number) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) on the side of subjects: there are subjects that cannot themselves be predicated (PsA., A, 27, 43a39-41), which are, as we noted, prime subjects: particulars, i.e. prime substances and other individuals. (PsA., A, 19-22) Aristotle calls them ultimate (ὓστατον). (PsA., 21, 82a36-b1) b) It has a limit (in number of kinds) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) also on the side of predicates: there must be predicates that cannot be subjects. (PsA., A, 19-22; PsA., A, 27, 43a36-39) Aristotle calls them primary (πρῶτον). (PsA., A, 21, 82b1-4) These are the highest categories or the highest genera of categories. (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) c) The series has an escalating shape from mere subjects at its downside to mere predicates at its upside. It is Aristotle himself whos uses the words up and down in this sense. (e.g. PsA., A, 22, 83b2-3) d) The predications that lie between lowest and highest ones must be finite in number. (PsA., A, 19-22 especially: 20, 82a21-35) These have subjects and predicates, each capable of both of the roles of being subject and being predicated. A result of this fitness is that neither demonstration can go to infinity nor everything is demonstrable, the two points Aristotle always insist on. e) The upward side includes the more universal ones and the downward the more particular ones. (PsA., 20, 82a21-23) f) It follows from the above features that ‘neither the ascending nor the descending series of predications … are infinite.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b24-25) g) Reciprocation and convertibility. Except in case of terms (i.e. subjects and predicates) that are at each of the ends of series of predications, namely ultimates and primaries, it is possible to reciprocate (ἀντιστρέφειν) terms and convert the predication. (PsA., A, 19, 82a15-20) h) Antipredication. Antipredication means that in a predication (S is P), the subject becomes the predicate of its predicate (P is S) in the same category its predicate was predicated on it. For example, if P is in the category of quality, antipredication means that S be predicated of P in the category of quality. In other words, P is a quality of S and S is a quality of P. Aristotle rejects this. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-b3) i) Self-predication versus other-predication. Aristotle distinguishes between a predication in which a term is said of itself and a predication in which a term is said of another. (Phy., Δ, 2, 209a31-33) j) Predicablity (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2): 1) Primary substances and individuals are not predicable. 2) Secondary substances are of two kinds: genus and species i) Genus is predicable able both of the species and of the individuals. ii) Species is predicable of the individual. 3) Differentiae are predicable both of the species and of the individuals. 8) Predication as classification a) Richard Patterson believes that Aristotle’s so repeated construction using hoper (estin A hoper B) in Topics (120a23 sq., 122b19, 26sq., 123a, 124a18, 125a29, 126a21, 128a35. Also in Posterior Analytics (83a24-30) (Brunschwig’s list. ‘expresses the fact that A is a kind of B (esti A B tis), that A is a species of the genus B.’ 9) Universal predication Aristotle defines universal predication (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι) as such: ‘wherever no instance of the subject (τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμέμνου) can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted.’ (PrA., A, 24b27-29) In this predication, the subject is included in another as in a whole (ἐν ὃλῳ εἶναι) and the predicate is predicated of all of the subject (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι). (PrA., A, 24b26-27) Attach another discussion we had about ἐν ὃλῳ here. 10) Quantity of predication A predication, truly stated, has a quantity, which is the number of objects under the name of the subject of which the predicate is predicated. The quantity of subject can be stated in four ways: a. Indefinite: when the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject without any mark to show to haw many of the particulars under the name of the subject it does or does not belong. E.g. ‘Man is white’; ‘Man is not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a20; OI., I, 7, 17b8-12) b. Universal quantity: When the predicate belongs to all or none of the subject. E.g. ‘Every man is animal’; ‘No man is animal.’ (PrA., A, 24a18-19; OI., I, 7, 17b5-6) The contrary of a predication of a universal quality is a predication of a universal quality. E.g. the contrary of ‘Every man is white’ is ‘No man is white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b20-23) c. Particular quantity: When the predicate belongs (or does not belong) to some of the subject. E.g. ‘Some men are white’; ‘Some men are not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a19-20) d. Single quantity: when the subject is a proper name of only one object. E.g. ‘Socrates is white’; ‘Socrates is not white.’ The contrary of this predication is of a single quantity: ‘Socrates is not white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b38-18a4) 11) Convertibility of predication. Some predications are convertible, that is, it is possible to change the place of subject and predicate in a true proposition so that the converted proposition remains true. This is supposed to mean that given the truth of a predication, the truth of the converted predication is inferable. The convert form of a predication depends on its quantity. a. Indefinite quantity: This predication has no strictly true convert because its quantity is not stated. b. Universal quantity: It can be converted in two ways: i) A negative universal can be converted to a negative universal in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘No pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘No good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a5-8 and a14-19) ii) An affirmative universal can be converted to an affirmative particular in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘Every pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a7-9) c. Particular quantity: If it is negative, it cannot be converted but if it is affirmative, it can be converted to an affirmative predication with particular quantity. E.g. ‘Some pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a10-13 and a20-24) d. Single quantity: It cannot be converted. 12) Characteristics of relations between subject and predicate 1. A predicate is of a wider range than its subject. It is based on this fact that Aristotle: a) Prevents individuals to be predicate because there is nothing of which an individual be of a wider range. In other words, it is due to the fact that since an individual is only ‘one particular’ thing and, thus, cannot be of a wider extent than anything that Aristotle prevents them of being a predicate. Matthews, however, thinks we cannot use Socrates, a substance and an individual, in the place of predicate and say it of Socrates because ‘Socrates does not classify Socrates: it names him.’ b) Prevents differentia, species and things under species to be predicated of genus. (To., Z, 6, 144a27-) c) Prevents the species and the things under it to be predicated of the differentia. (To., Z, 6, 144b1-4) d) Also about the effect because it is wider than its subject. (PsA., B, 17, 99a) e) Each attribute is wider than every individual it is predicated on, though several attributes, collectively considered, might not be wider but exactly the substance of a thing. (PsA., B, 13, 96a32-b1) 2. The predicate of a predicate of a subject will be predicated of the subject too: ‘whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject too.’ (Cat., 3, 1b10-15) In fact, it is due to its predication of the subject that it is predicated of its predicate. (Cat., 5, 2a36-b1) Moreover, what is not predicated of the predicate of a subject cannot be predicated of it as well. (PrA., A, 27, 43b22-27) Thus, what, for example, is not predicated of animal, cannot be predicated of man. 3. The predicate of a subject can be predicated of its predicates as well. (Cat., 5, 3a1-6) For example, you call the individual man grammatical and, thence, you call both a man and an animal grammatical. Nonetheless, the predicate of a subject belongs to it more properly than to its higher predicates. (PrA., A, 27, 43a27-32) 4. It is only the subject that can be distributed and not the predicate. (PrA., A, 27, 43b16-22; OI, I, 7, 17b12-16) Therefore, we can say e.g. ‘Every man is animal’ but we cannot say ‘Every man is every animal.’ 5. It is the reason of the relation between subjects and predicates, that is the reason of predication, which is the subject of inquiry. (Met., Z, 1041a20-24) In other words, since it is a meaningless inquiry to ask why a thing is itself (Met., Z, 1041a14-15), the only remaining meaningful inquiry is to ask why something is something else, i.e. to ask about the reason of predication. 6. A subject cannot categorize its predicate in the same category in which it is categorized by it. If e.g. A is a quality of B, B cannot be a quality of A. Therefore, there is no reciprocation in the same category. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-39) 13) Characteristics of series of predications 1. A series of secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum for not even more than two terms can be comnbined. For an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. (Met., Γ, 1007b1-4) 2. Infinite series cannot be traversed in thought. (PsA., A, 22, 83b6-7) 3. The predications of genera on each other must be ended and cannot go to infinity because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) Therefore, a series of predication of genera on each other must be limited on both sides. There must be an upward limit in general categories as well as a downward limit in individual because they cannot be predicated of others. Whatever lies between these limits can both be predicated of others and others be predicated of them. (PrA., A, 27, 43a36-43) 4. The order of predicates matters: it makes a difference whether the series be ABC or BAC. (PsA., B, 13, 96b25-32) . (shrink)

OBJETIVO A gestação nos mamíferos domésticos é um processo fisiológico que implica mudanças físicas, metabólicas e hormonais na fêmea, que culminam com o nascimento de um novo indivíduo. Desta forma, a compreensão de tais mudanças e como estas favorecem um ambiente ideal de desenvolvimento embrionário inicial, até a placentação e a fisiologia envolvidas durante esses processos é fundamental na tomada de decisões quanto à saúde reprodutiva da fêmea, na seleção de futuras matrizes e até mesmo para a saúde fetal e (...) sanidade do novo animal. Neste capítulo, o estudante compreenderá de forma clara, concisa, didática e objetiva, as adaptações maternas e fetais para o estabelecimento da gestação após a fecundação, o desenvolvimento desta e também identificará as diferenças existentes entre as espécies de interesse zootécnico. INTRODUÇÃO O estabelecimento da gestação nos mamíferos domésticos inclui três etapas fundamentais: o reconhecimento materno da gestação ou prenhez (RMP), a implantação e a placentação. Dentro da fisiologia da reprodução nos mamíferos, a implantação e a placenta- ção constituem processos essenciais na nutrição do embrião e do feto e, portanto, para seu desenvolvimento; devido a isso, são etapas críticas para a produção animal já que possuem um efeito direto sobre a eficiência reprodutiva. Nos bovinos leiteiros, por exemplo, estima-se uma taxa de fertilização perto de 95%, embora apenas 55% desses zigotos se desenvolvam e cheguem ao parto, o qual representa uma perda de gestações perto de 35%. Entre 70% e 80% das mortes embrionárias ocorrem durante as três semanas seguintes à ovulação, o que coincide com o período no qual se estabelecem os processos de implantação e placentação supracitados. O desenvolvimento embrionário precoce depende da sincronia de eventos entre o oviduto-útero e o embrião. Foi determinado que a presença do embrião pode modificar as secreções ovidutais e uterinas durante as fases iniciais de desenvolvimento. O ambiente endócrino materno (predominância de progesterona) também modula as características das secreções ovidutais e uterinas para assegurar a sobrevivência embrionária no caso da fertilização ter sido bem sucedida. Se este último ocorrer, então o embrião deverá indicar à mãe a sua existência para que sejam mantidas as condições adequadas ao seu desenvolvimento. Como supracitado, o embrião em seu curso pelo oviduto requer certas secreções para sobreviver e desenvolver-se, no entanto, graças à fertilização in vitro, têm-se dispensado a importância das secreções ovidutais, já que se observou que um embrião é capaz de se desenvolver em condições laboratoriais fora do aparelho reprodutor materno durante as suas fases iniciais, e consegue estabelecer uma gestação normal que chega a termo após a sua reintrodução no útero. Em estágios mais tardios de desenvolvimento o embrião necessita necessariamente do meio uterino para sobreviver e continuar o seu crescimento. No bovino, por exemplo, o embrião só é capaz de alongar-se estando dentro do útero, indicando a presença de fatores específicos necessários para que o embrião se desenvolva de maneira normal. Um meio endócrino no qual predomina a progesterona materna durante a gestação induz a secreção do histiotrofo (ou leite uterino) que permite a nutrição e a sobrevivência do embrião antes da implantação e da formação da placenta, através do qual obterá a maioria do fornecimento e intercâmbio necessários para continuar o seu desenvolvimento intra-uterino. SEGMENTAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO EMBRIONÁRIO PRECOCE O desenvolvimento embrionário precoce, conhecido como período de pré- -implantação, é essencial; inclui processos de divisão e diferenciação celular que são realizadas no início com uma elevada sincronização para garantir o desenvolvimento correto do indivíduo dentro do útero. Esta fase envolve a passagem do zigoto (unicelular), a embrião (multicelular) e, por fim, em concepto (quando se distingue o embrião com suas membranas extraembrionárias). O desenvolvimento precoce é o estágio mais dinâmico e vulnerável na formação de um indivíduo. Investigações recentes demonstraram que alterações nesta etapa podem modificar características produtivas ou reprodutivas durante a vida adulta. É por isso que é necessário conhecer as etapas fisiologicamente normais envolvidas neste processo (figura 1). Em fases mais tardias de desenvolvimento, o embrião se converterá em um feto com todos os sistemas e tecidos diferenciados observados num animal adulto. Após a fertilização, o zigoto resultante é capaz de dar origem a um novo organismo completo, de modo que se considera como uma célula totipotencial. O desenvolvimento embrionário começa e se consegue graças a uma série de divisões mitóticas conhecidas como segmentação ou clivagem (cleavage, em inglês). A primeira divisão mitótica dá origem a duas células filhas idênticas (figura 1), e ocorre por volta das 20 às 30 horas depois da fertilização, com divisões subsequentes a cada 12 a 24 h, dependendo da espécie. As células resultantes destas divisões são conhecidas como blastômeros. A orientação da divisão inicial que dá origem aos dois primeiros blastô- meros, parece ser guiada pela posição dos corpos polares. As divisões iniciais das células embrionárias são sincrônicas, no entanto, conforme o desenvolvimento se torna assincrônicas. Assim, a divisão mitótica inicial dá origem a um embrião de duas células (dois blastômeros), a segunda a um embrião de quatro células, a terceira a um de oito células e a quarta a um com 16 células, onde passa a ser chamado de mórula. Estas divisões são realizadas sem o aumento do volume do citoplasma, para que seja restabelecida uma proporção celular mais adequada à das células somáticas, já que o ovócito é a célula mais grande do organismo (um ovócito mede entre 100 e 150 μm do ovócito, enquanto uma célula somática mede de 10 a 20 μm); e porque o embrião ainda está contido dentro da zona pelúcida (figura 1). Um dos pontos críticos durante o desenvolvimento embrionário precoce é a ativação do genoma embrionário. Durante as etapas iniciais após a fertilização, as proteínas e RNAs “herdados” do ovócito são responsáveis pelo metabolismo e desenvolvimento inicial do embrião. É apenas até o estágio de quatro (ratos) ou oito blastômeros (espécies domésticas e humanas) em que o embrião começa a sintetizar o seu próprio RNAm (mensageiro) e as proteínas específicas necessárias para controlar o seu crescimento e metabolismo. A qualidade do ovócito que é fertilizado, consequente- mente, tem um grande impacto sobre a sobrevivência inicial do embrião. Quando o embrião atinge uma média de 16 a 32 células é conhecido como mórula (tabela 1) (do latim morus: mora), e nesta fase o embrião começa a compactar-se, o que ocorre porque começam a estabelecer-se diferentes uniões celulares, de acordo com a relação espacial entre os blastômeros. As células centrais desenvolvem-se incluindo entre elas junções comunicantes, conhecidas também como junções GAP, enquanto as que se encontram na periferia estabelecem uniões estreitas, dando origem a duas subpopulações distintas de blastômeros: periféricos e centrais. Cabe mencionar que os blastômeros que compõem a mórula ainda são células capazes de dar origem a um novo indivíduo completo, ou seja, são totipotenciais. À medida que a mórula continua a dividir-se e a crescer, as células localizadas na periferia começam a liberar sódio para os espaços intercelulares, criando uma diferença na pressão osmótica seguida pela entrada de água ao embrião. O líquido se acumula e provoca a separação das células, distinguindo ainda mais as duas subpopulações de células mencionadas (periféricas e centrais) e forma-se uma cavidade cheia de líquido. Esta cavidade é conhecida como blastocele; com a sua formação o embrião entra em fase de blastocisto (figura 1, tabela 1). Da subpopulação celular da periferia se origina do trofoblasto (trofoectoderma) que formará a maioria das membranas extraembrionárias (placenta), e da subpopulação central é estabelecida a massa celular interna ou embrioblasto, que dará origem ao embrião propriamente dito, ou seja, ao feto. Ao continuar a multiplicação e crescimento do trofoblasto à medida que o blastocisto se desenvolve, as células da massa interna se diferenciam novamente em dois segmentos distintos: a endoderme primitiva ou hipoblasto e o epiblasto (figura 1), em que todos os tecidos do organismo (saco vitelino) são originados e as células germinativas primordiais. Uma vez formado, o epiblasto continua a dividir-se e a diferenciar-se para dar origem às três placas ou camadas germinativas conhecidas como endoderme, mesoderme e ectoderme. Este processo é conhecido como gastrulação, e durante este diferem-se no embrião as porções craniais, caudais, dorsais e ventrais, processo conhecido como polaridade do embrião, que orienta o desenvolvimento dos diversos tecidos e órgãos do indivíduo. À medida que o blastocisto continua crescendo e diferenciando-se, vai-se acumulando mais líquido no blastocele, com o que a pressão interna aumenta e a zona pelúcida começa a ficar mais fina. Este fato, juntamente com a ação de proteases produzidas pelo embrião, leva à ruptura da zona pelúcida e à saída do blastocisto (eclosão), pelo que, uma vez liberado, o embrião é conhecido como blastocisto eclodido. O trofoblasto embrionário entra, então, em contato direto com o endométrio, o que é considerado como o início da implantação. IMPLANTAÇÃO O trofoblasto embrionário, também conhecido como trofoectoderma, dá origem à maioria das membranas fetais ou placenta fetal. O processo no qual o trofoblasto se une ao endométrio materno é conhecido como implantação; para isso ocorre uma série de processos altamente sincronizados envolvendo secreções embrionárias e maternas, e interações físicas, durante um período limitado conhecido como janela de receptividade. A implantação é considerada um processo gradual que genericamente se divide em cinco fases, algumas das quais podem sobrepor-se parcialmente e diferir segundo a espécie: 1. Eclosão do blastocisto da zona pelúcida (figura 2); -/- 2. Pré-contato e orientação do blastocisto. É o contato inicial entre as células do trofoblasto e do epitélio endometrial, bem como a orientação da massa celular interna e do trofoectoderma, que assume especial importância em espécies cuja implantação é invasiva, como em roedores e primatas; 3. Aposição - refere-se ao posicionamento do blastocisto numa determinada área e de uma forma específica no útero. Começa a interdigitação das vilosidades coriônicas com o epitélio luminal do endométrio. 4. Adesão - requer sistemas de sinalização que envolvem glicoproteínas de adesão, como integrinas, selectinas e galectinas, com os seus ligantes, tanto no epitélio luminal como no epitélio trofoectoderma. 5. Invasão endometrial - este termo se relaciona ao tipo de placentação e é pertinente sobretudo para aquelas espécies onde existe uma fusão entre células do trofoblasto e do epitélio do endométrio durante a formação da placenta, ou que as células trofoblásticas penetrem as camadas endometriais e até modifiquem as células do endométrio que as rodeiam. Existem três tipos de implantação ou nidação. Na nidação central ou não invasiva, a vesícula embrionária ocupa uma posição central na luz do útero e, na sua relação com a mucosa uterina, unicamente através das vilosidades coriônicas (projeções das células trofoblásticas dentro das quais crescem capilares do feto), há adesão mas não invasão da mucosa. Este tipo ocorre nos ungulados domésticos, mas não em carnívoros. Na nidação excêntrica a vesícula embrionária está inserida num canal profundo da mucosa, parcialmente isolada da luz principal, e se apresenta na rata, cadela e gata. A nidação intersticial é própria dos primatas, rato e cobaia, e nesta produz-se a destruição do epitélio e do tecido conjuntivo do útero, de modo que a vesícula embrionária se afunda na própria lâmina mucosa e se desenvolve em um espaço intersticial. Até o momento da implantação, a nutrição do embrião é histotrófica, sendo as substâncias necessárias absorvidas através do trofoblasto, como foi mencionado anteriormente. A partir deste momento, o trofoblasto começa o desenvolvimento de uma série de membranas extraembrionárias que permitirão finalmente a troca de nutrientes e metabólitos entre o sangue materno e o do embrião, constituindo a placenta. Um fato necessário na implantação é a perda de receptores para progesterona no epitélio luminal do endométrio, e pré-sensibilização do mesmo pelos estrógenos. Apesar de parecer um efeito contraditório, este requisito permite o desaparecimento de uma camada de mucina e outros compostos proteicos, que revestem o endométrio e que atuam como uma película antiaderente que inicialmente não permite a aposição e adesão do embrião. O desaparecimento desta camada ocorre durante a janela de receptividade, seja em toda a superfície do endométrio (ruminantes, suínos e roedores) ou nas zonas específicas onde o blastocisto será implantado (humano e coelho). Por esta razão, a interação física entre o embrião e o endométrio desempenha um papel importante na implantação. Uma vez que a camada de glicoproteínas desaparecer, é possível a aposição do trofoectoderma embrionário e das células epiteliais do endométrio, iniciando assim a implantação propriamente dita através da intercomunicação entre os dois tecidos. A implantação pode ser considerada como a fixação do embrião ao útero a partir do ponto de vista físico e funcional. No entanto, como se trata de um processo progressivo e gradual, em que algumas das suas fases podem ser parcialmente sobrepostas, não existe consenso sobre o período em que se inicia e termina. Na borrega, por exemplo, estima-se que ocorra entre o dia 10 e o dia 22, enquanto na vaca entre os dias 11 e 40 pós-ovulação. Nas espécies polítocas, isto é, fêmeas que parem várias crias como as porcas, os blastocistos se distribuem ao longo dos cornos uterinos como resultado de movimentos musculares da parede uterina, aparentemente regulados por prostaglandinas e outros fatores secretados pelo útero. Por exemplo, nas porcas, os blastocistos se movem livremente entre os cornos, e a distribuição dos embriões ao implantar-se é mais uniforme do que poderia ser esperado se ocorresse meramente ao acaso. Tem observado que a deficiência na produção de ácido lisofosfatídico 3 (LPA3) e/ou seu receptor, ocasiona uma falha na distribuição dos embriões no útero. Por outro lado, não há evidência de que um blastocisto implantado exerça alguma influência inibitória sobre a implantação de outro blastocisto próximo a ele. Como supracitado, o processo de implantação inclui uma complexa interação entre o embrião e o útero, e cada um deles provê de estímulos essenciais para favorecer a progressão do outro, apresentando-se diferenças em tempos e particularidades dentro das diferentes espécies. -/- Porca O período de adesão situa-se entre os dias 12 e 24 após a fertilização. Ao redor do dia sete, o blastocisto é eclodido, porque o trofoblasto está em contato direto com o epitélio uterino e começa a proliferar com rapidez. O endoderme se forma e o blastocisto muda de uma pequena vesícula esférica para um tubo muito alongado que chega a medir cerca de um metro em poucos dias, ele que lhe proporciona uma superfície muito ampla para a absorção de nutrientes. Cadela Os embriões migram entre os dois cornos uterinos do dia 12 ao 17 após a fertilização, distribuindo-se de maneira uniforme. Estes embriões aderem ao endométrio entre os dias 16 e 18, e alcançam sua implantação final entre o dia 17 e 20 da gestação. Cabe ressaltar que nos caninos o período de pré-implantação é o mais longo das espécies domésticas, o que ocorre porque a cadela ovula ovócitos imaturos (ovócitos primários) que precisam amadurecer por dois a três dias, para formar ovócitos secundários, antes que a fertilização seja possível. Por isso, o zigoto canino chega à junção útero-tubárica entre o sétimo e o décimo dia após o pico pré-ovulatório de LH (a ovulação ocorre, em média, dois dias após o pico de LH), entrando no útero em estágio de mórula ou blastocisto em torno dos dias 10 a 12 depois do referido pico. Ovelha O desenvolvimento precoce do blastocisto é muito semelhante ao da porca. Observa-se certo grau de adesão desde o dia 10 da gestação, mas o alongamento do embrião é menos extenso do que em suínos e tem início entre o dia 11 e 12. Para a terceira semana o embrião ovino chega a medir até 30 cm de comprimento. O processo de implantação é concluído aproximadamente entre a quarta e quinta semana de gestação (figura 3). Vaca O processo de implantação é semelhante ao da borrega, mas tem início mais tarde. A zona pelúcida se perde por volta do dia 9 a 10 (blastocisto eclodido) e o embrião começa a alongar-se ao redor do dia 12 a 14, atingindo um comprimento de cerca de 60 mm para o dia 16, embora possa haver uma grande variação individual. A partir do dia 33, o córion é formado e existe uma adesão inicial que inclui dois ou quatro cotilédones, que se interdigitam rapidamente com o tecido materno de modo que o embrião começa a nutrir-se através deles. Égua O blastocisto atinge um diâmetro de cinco centímetros aos dois meses e pratica- mente não se alonga. Entre os dias seis e sete após a ovulação, o embrião começa a revestir-se de uma camada glicoproteica que se forma entre o trofoectoderma e a zona pelúcida e que contém e mantém o embrião esférico depois de ter eclodido. Esta cápsula é uma estrutura única nos equinos (cápsula embrionária), afina-se no dia 18 e se perde entre os dias 21 e 23 de gestação. Na décima semana as microvilosidades do córion se interdigitam com a mucosa da parede uterina e na semana 14 é completada a implantação. Espécies não domésticas Em algumas espécies como os marsupiais, os ursos, focas, doninhas e alguns tipos de cervídeos, pode interromper-se temporariamente o desenvolvimento do embrião in utero e adiar a sua implantação, como estratégia evolutiva para favorecer o nascimento das crias em condições ambientais favoráveis para a sua sobrevivência. Esta estratégia é conhecida como diapausa e pode ser uma condição obrigatória ou facultativa para cada gestação, dependendo da espécie. Os mecanismos que a desencadeiam e a concluem não estão totalmente explicados e são espécie-específica. RECONHECIMENTO MATERNO DA GESTAÇÃO (RMG/RMP) O estabelecimento da gestação em mamíferos domésticos requer a presença de um corpo lúteo CL funcional que produz progesterona em quantidades adequadas para manter o desenvolvimento embrionário inicial e permitir mudanças necessárias durante o período de peri-implantação. Para que o corpo lúteo seja mantido e a fêmea seja impedida de reiniciar um novo ciclo estral, o embrião deve sinalizar sua presença para a mãe. O sinal para o reconhecimento materno da gestação (RMG) provém então do embrião e podem ser de dois tipos: luteotrópico ou anti-luteolítico. No primeiro, a(s) substância(s) produzida(s) pelo embrião que atua(am) sobre o corpo lúteo para manter sua funcionalidade, por exemplo a gonadotrofina coriônica humana (hCG) e a prolactina em roedores. O segundo tipo de sinal previne ativamente a luteólise, e é o mecanismo presente nas espécies domésticas em que o embrião produz substâncias como o interferon-τ (IFN-τ) em ruminantes ou os estrógenos em suínos. Ruminantes Como supracitado, o IFN-τ é responsável pela sinalização para o reconhecimen- to materno da gestação neste grupo que engloba cabras, ovelhas e vacas (figura 4). É um fator produzido pelas células do trofoblasto do embrião, e pode ser detectado a partir dos dias 11 a 12 em ovinos e de 14 a 15 em bovinos. Uma vez secretado, o IFN-τ impede a lise do corpo lúteo (efeito anti-luteolítico) por meio do bloqueio indireto da síntese de prostaglandina F2 alfa (PGF2α). No trabalho acerca do ciclo estral foi explicado que a luteólise requer a presença de receptores de ocitocina (OTR) no endométrio, que ao unir-se ao seu ligante, a ocitocina (proveniente inicialmente do hipotálamo e posteriormente de origem lútea), estimulam a produção de PGF2α e estabelecem um feedback positivo, que culminará na destruição do CL. Para que os OTRs sejam sintetizados, é necessária uma estimulação prévia do endométrio com estradiol, que ocorre através da ligação com seus receptores (ER-1). O mecanismo pelo qual o IFN-τ impede a lise do corpo lúteo é bloqueando, direta ou indiretamente, a síntese de OTR e, consequentemente, a produção pulsátil de PGF2α. Suínos No caso dos suínos, considera-se que o sinal embrionário para o reconhecimento materno da gestação são os estrógenos, produzidos pelos embriões em torno do dia 11 a 12 pós-ovulação. O endométrio suíno produz PGF2α que, quando não há gestação, é secretado na circulação uterina (secreção endócrina), de onde é transportada em direção ao CL para causar luteólise. Se há embriões no útero produzindo suficiente quantidades de estradiol, isso redireciona a secreção de PGF2α para o lúmen uterino (secreção exócrina), evitando que seja liberado para a circulação e, portanto, é sequestrado impedindo que chegue ao corpo lúteo (figura 5). É importante enfatizar que a produção de PGF2α não é inibida, mas sua secreção é redirecionada. Este mecanismo é conhecido como teoria endócrino-exócrina. Vale ressaltar que para o sinal de reconhecimento materno da gestação na porca ser eficiente, é necessário a presença de pelo menos quatro embriões, dois em cada corno, uma vez que se não houver dois embriões, um em cada corno, ocorre luteólise e reinicia a atividade cíclica. Embora os estrógenos sejam identificados como o sinal de reconhecimento materno nesta espécie, o embrião suíno também produz outros fatores, como a PGE2 e o ácido lisofosfatídico, considerado necessário para o estabelecimento adequado da gestação. A PGE2 ocasiona uma redução na produção de PGF2α em favor da PGE2 no endométrio e favorece a contração do miométrio para permitir a migração de embriões. O ácido lisofosfatídico, juntamente com seu receptor, é um fator crítico que favorece a migração intra-uterina, e permite uma distribuição adequada dos embriões ao longo dos cornos. Outras substâncias produzidas pelo embrião suíno são o IFN-delta (IFN-δ) e IFN-gama (IFN-γ), que não possuem ação anti-luteolítica, mas poderiam intervir no processo de implantação. Equinos Na égua é essencial que o embrião, ainda rodeado pela sua cápsula embrionária, migre de 12 a 14 vezes por dia através do útero, entre os dias 12 e 14 após ovulação, a fim de distribuir o fator de reconhecimento materno (figura 6). Embora seja sabido que existe, este último ainda não foi identificado, mas foi estabelecido que é da natureza proteica e seu principal efeito é a inibição da produção endometrial de PGF₂α, mediante a redução na formação do receptores de ocitocina; desta forma, evita-se o início do sinal luteolítico. É interessante notar que nesta espécie a ocitocina não é de origem lútea e sim endometrial. Primatas Ao contrário das espécies domésticas mencionadas, o mecanismo de ação do sinal de reconhecimento materno em primatas é luteotrópico. No humano, o embrião produz gonadotrofina coriônica humana (hCG) após o início da implantação (dias 6 a 8). A hCG estende a vida funcional do CL por meio de sua ligação a receptores lúteos para LH, estimulando assim a liberação de progesterona. Este efeito permite a “sobrevivência” do CL pelo menos até o momento em que a produção de progesterona é transferida para a placenta para levar a gestação a termo. Carnívoros Na cadela não é necessário o reconhecimento da gestação, já que normalmente o corpo lúteo tem uma vida média maior que a duração da gestação. Como na égua, a migração dos embriões através do útero antes da implantação pode favorecer o reconhecimento materno. Adicionalmente, tem sido descrito que durante o período antes da implantação (< 10 dias depois da ovulação), há um aumento na expressão de genes relacionados com a imunomodulação local (IFN-γ, IL-4 e CD8+), que não estão presentes em cadelas durante o diestro. A produção de IFN-γ por parte do embrião canino, como em outras espécies, pode estar envolvida na implantação ou o reconheci- mento da gestação, mas até o momento não foi demonstrado de forma inequívoca. Na gata doméstica, o fator que favorece o reconhecimento materno da gestação ainda não foi descrito. Temos que lembrar que seja qual for o mecanismo envolvido, a produção do sinal embrionário de reconhecimento materno da gestação é importante, já que a contínua presença de progesterona na circulação materna, faz possível que ocorra o desenvolvimento precoce do embrião e eventualmente a implantação, com a formação do órgão temporal mais importante para o desenvolvimento fetal: a placenta. Resumindo, o sinal enviado pelo embrião deve ser dado antes do útero começar a secretar PGF2a, hormônio que causa a destruição do corpo lúteo produtor da progesterona necessária para a gestação. O embrião deve secretar algumas substâncias (denominadas EPF: Early Pregnant Factors/fatores de gestação precoce) que capte o endométrio materno e sirva para evitar a ação luteolítica da PGF2a. Na porca, em vez de ser evitada a secreção de PGF2a, o referido hormônio é “sequestrado na luz do útero” e, desta forma, passa a secretar-se em forma exócrina, sem ter efeito sobre o corpo lúteo. No bovino, o reconhecimento materno da gestação é o processo fisiológico no qual o embrião, por meio de sinais moleculares como a secreção de interferon-τ (IFN-τ), anuncia sua presença no trato reprodutivo materno a fim de evitar que seja desencadeado o mecanismo luteolítico exercido pela PGF2a sobre o corpo lúteo. PLACENTAÇÃO Nos mamíferos domésticos, o processo de implantação é gradual e prolongado, e ocorre paralelamente a processos como a gastrulação e a formação de membranas extra- embrionárias: saco vitelino, âmnio, alantóides e córion. A formação das membranas extraembrionárias nos mamíferos eutérios, ou seja, aqueles que formam uma placenta completa, é um processo indispensável que permite ao embrião aderir-se ou implantar-se ao endométrio materno. As quatro membranas extraembrionárias mencionadas são formadas a partir do trofoblasto, mesoderme e endoderme embrionários. O saco vitelino fornece nutrientes no desenvolvimento inicial do embrião e se converte em vestigial quando a gestação progride; tem origem no endoderma primitivo, estrutura que junta com o trofoblasto e o mesoderma, formam o córion e âmnions. O âmnion contém o líquido amniótico que está em contato direto com o embrião e é a membrana mais interna; ademais, protege o feto, proporciona lubrificação para o parto e serve como um depósito para urina e resíduos fetais. O córion, por outro lado, é a membrana mais externa do embrião e, portanto, é a que entra em contato direto com o endométrio uterino materno; se fixa ao útero, absorve nutrientes do útero, permite a troca gasosa materno/fetal e produz hormônios. O alantóide se origina de uma evaginação do intestino primitivo e é de onde surge o sistema vascular da placenta fetal; a fusão com o córion (placenta cotiledonária), carrega os vasos sanguíneos do cordão umbilical, que liga o feto com o alantóide e é um reservatório de nutrientes e resíduos. Conforme o embrião se desenvolve, o saco vitelino regride e o alantóide se enche de líquido, pelo que este último se funde com o córion para formar o corioalantóides, que se torna a membrana mais externa e, portanto, a porção fetal do placenta. A placenta é um órgão temporário que representa uma interface através da qual realiza a troca bidirecional de nutrientes, gases, hormônios e outras substâncias entre a mãe e o feto. A unidade funcional da placenta são as vilosidades corioalantóicas, as quais são projeções pequenas dos corioalantóides que se interdigitam com o endométrio uterino, cuja superfície de absorção permite essa troca. A placenta é um órgão endócrino capaz de produzir uma gama de hormônios que ajudam a controlar o ambiente uterino, favorecendo o desenvolvimento do feto, além disso possui um papel importante no momento do parto. Nas diferentes espécies a placenta tem características particulares, pelo qual existem várias classificações, de acordo com a sua posição uterina, a distribuição das vilosidades corioalantóicas e a sua histologia. Posição uterina Refere-se à posição do concepto em relação ao lúmen uterino (figura 7). Central: O concepto ao ser implantado permanece em contato com o lúmen do útero. A maioria das espécies domésticas de importância veterinária estão dentro desta classificação. Excêntrica: O concepto penetra parcialmente o endométrio materno, mas mantém um certo contato com o lúmen uterino. Os roedores (ratos e ratos) e a coelha possuem este tipo de placentação. Intersticial: O embrião invade o endométrio, perde contato com o lúmen uterino, e ao crescer o lúmen uterino se oblitera. Os humanos e a maioria dos primatas mostram este tipo de placenta. Distribuição das vilosidades As vilosidades que formam a interface materno-fetal podem estar distribuídas de maneira diferente ao longo da superfície dos corioalantóides, pelo qual a placenta pode ser classificada como (figura 8): Difusa: Neste tipo de placenta as vilosidades estão distribuídas ao comprimento de toda a superfície do córion (corioalantóides) de maneira uniforme. As placentas de suínos e equinos se enquadram nesta classificação, embora, nesta última espécie, as vilosidades formem estruturas mais ramificadas, que são chamadas microcotilédones (figura 10). Zonal: Esta placenta se apresenta nos carnívoros domésticos, tanto caninos como felinos. As vilosidades que determinam a zona de troca de nutrientes e resíduos, e de ligação com o endométrio são delimitadas de forma a formar uma cintura central em torno do feto (figura 9). Distingue-se também uma segunda região chamada paraplacenta, que se localiza em ambos lados deste “cinto”, e do qual a função não é inteiramente conhecida, embora sabe-se que desempenha um papel importante na troca de ferro da mãe para o feto. As extremidades laterais dos corioalantóides nestas placentas não possuem vilosidades por isso não se ligam ao endométrio. Uma terceira região é a zona transparente nas extremidades distais do córion que tem pouca vascularização. Esta zona pode estar envolvida na absorção de materiais diretamente do lúmen uterino (figura 11). Cotiledonária: É o tipo de placentação que se encontra presente nos ruminantes (ovinos, caprinos e bovinos). As vilosidades coriônicas nestas espécies são agrupadas em pequenas áreas do córion chamadas cotilédones, que se interdigitam e fundem-se parcialmente com locais delimitados no endométrio chamados carúnculas, formando, em conjunto, estruturas conhecidas como placentomas. Cabe destacar que as carúnculas carecem de glândulas endometriais, que só estão presentes nas porções inter-carun- culares do endométrio. Os placentomas, por sua vez, são altamente vascularizados e são remodelados com o progresso da gestação, ramificando-se para aumentar a superfície de troca e o fluxo sanguíneo para aumentar os requisitos do feto em crescimento. Nas zonas inter-carunculares, a placenta é ligada ao endométrio por meio de sistemas de adesão superficial que envolvem glicoproteínas. Acredita-se que a adesão do concepto com o endométrio (carúnculas) é estabelecida em torno de 30 dias em ovinos e 40 dias em bovinos. (figuras 13 a 17). Discoidal: Nestas placentas, as vilosidades agrupam-se numa área circular ou oval, formando uma estrutura discoidal. Este tipo de placenta é encontrada principal- mente em coelhas, roedores e primatas, incluindo os humanos. Histologicamente Esta classificação considera o número de camadas de tecido que compõem a placenta e que separam a circulação materna da circulação fetal (tabela 3). O número máximo é de seis camadas, três do lado fetal (córion, tecido intersticial e endotélio do vaso sanguíneo) e três do lado materno (epitélio endometrial, tecido intersticial e endotélio vascular) (figura 19 e tabela 3). O modo de distinguir e nomear os diferentes tipos de placenta nesta classificação é usando como prefixo a camada materna que está em contato com o córion fetal. As diferentes placentas baseados em sua histologia são as seguintes (figura 19): Epiteliocorial: É o menos íntimo entre os tipos de placentas (figura 20). Estas placentas conservam intactas as seis camadas de tecido, portanto que mantêm as circulações materna e fetal mais separadas, e consideradas como as mais impermeáveis. Este tipo de placenta está presente na porca e égua. Lembre-se de que as placentas da porca e da égua são diferentes e as vilosidades ocupam uma grande proporção da área de superfície do córion (figura 19 A). Também apresenta-se nos ruminantes, no entanto, as placentas dos ruminantes apresentam algumas características particulares que as colocam como um subgrupo e se chamam sinepiteliocorial ou sindesmocorial (figura 19 B). Na vaca, este tipo apresenta-se nos primeiros 2-3 meses de gestação. Além da característica de erosão parcial do epitélio endometrial, um tipo de célula único é encontrado na placenta de ruminantes. Essas células são chamadas células gigantes binucleadas. Como o nome indica, elas são caracterizadas como bastante grandes e com dois núcleos. Na placenta dos ruminantes, algumas células do epitélio coriônico conhecidas como células binucleadas, se fundem com algumas células do epitélio endometrial, criando inicialmente células gigantes trinucleadas e mais tarde placas ou sincícios multinucleados. Estes sincícios têm em consequência uma origem tanto fetal como materna, que criam lugares delimitados nos quais em vez de existir intacta uma camada de epitélio coriônico e outra de epitélio endometrial, encontra-se uma só camada que combina as duas origens. As células gigantes binucleadas migram e mudam seu número ao longo da gestação em forma dinâmica. Este tipo celular é importante porque secretam uma variedade de hormônios. Células gigantes binucleadas aparecem por volta do dia 14 na ovelha e entre os dias 18 e 20 na vaca. Endoteliocorial: 5 camadas. Neste tipo de placentação o córion fetal está em contato direto com o endotélio vascular do endométrio graças à erosão do epitélio e do tecido conectivo endometrial (tecido intersticial) durante a implantação (figura 19 C). De modo que o intercâmbio de substâncias e resíduos só requer atravessar quatro camadas de tecidos. Este tipo de placenta é presente principalmente em cães e felinos. Nota-se nas figuras 19 C e 21 que este tipo de placenta é mais íntimo do que a placenta epiteliocorial porque o epitélio endometrial não existe mais. Hemocorial: 3 camadas (figura 22). Aqui o epitélio coriônico está intacto e entra em contato direto com o sangue materno em regiões onde formam reservatórios de sangue semelhantes a poços (figura 19 D). O intercâmbio de substâncias e resíduos entre a mãe e o feto é mais direto uma vez que é necessário atravessar apenas três camadas para chegar até à circulação fetal. Algumas espécies de primatas, incluindo o ser humano e os roedores possuem este tipo de placentação. MEMBRANAS EXTRAEMBRIONÁRIAS EM AVES Ao mesmo tempo que se estabelece o corpo embrionário e os esboços de cada um dos órgãos começam a gerar-se, torna-se imperioso garantir a sobrevivência do embrião. Tenha-se em conta que nas aves todo o necessário para o desenvolvimento é encontrado no ovo pelo que deve-se reforçar a eficácia das estruturas criadas para garantir o objetivo a que se destina. O exterior é fornecido apenas com o O2; emite CO2 e vapor de água no exterior (perda de 15% da água durante a incubação inicial). Além disso, o neonato não é imaturo, como nos anfíbios, mas está em um estádio maduro juvenil. Como indicado, são quatro as problemáticas a que deve fazer frente o embrião: prover-se de um meio que garanta o desenvolvimento volumétrico, amortecendo os movimentos físicos excessivos que possam traumatizá-lo e evitar a dessecação; assegurar que os nutrientes (vitelo e albúmen) sejam incorporados de forma correta no interior do embrião; assegurar o intercâmbio de gases; e eliminar substâncias tóxicas derivadas do metabolismo proteico. Para atender estas necessidades são desenvolvidas uma série de membranas extrambrionárias que se vão expandindo progressivamente pelo interior do ovo. A dureza da casca e sua relativa impermeabilidade protege-o igualmente da intempérie terrestre. -/- Figura 23: Evolução das membranas extraembrionárias de galinha (3 e 10 dias de incubação). -/- Saco vitelino: o saco vitelino é a primeira membrana extraembrionária em formação. Aparece como consequência direta da gastrulação: as camadas germinativas que se formam ao nível do disco embrionário expandem-se progressivamente contornando o vitelo. Assim, as células provenientes da área opaca (equivalente ao trofoblasto dos mamíferos) migram sobre o vitelo, terminando quase por cobrir, o mesmo ocorre com o endoderma mais internamente, formando-se assim um saco bilaminar. Posteriormente, o mesoderma se interpõe entre ambos, progredindo igualmente no sentido distal, rodeando o endoderma e aderindo-se ao mesmo e ao equivalente de trofoblasto. Ao estabelecer-se o celoma, o saco é constituído pelo endoderma e folha esplâncnica do mesoderma lateral. Este mesoderma vai progredindo no sentido distal e se vasculariza profunda- mente; os vasos distais se anastomosam formando um anel vascular denominado seio terminal, que marca o limite do mesoderma em expansão. Assim, sobre o vitelo é distinguível um área distal não vascularizada (área vitelina) e uma área proximal vascularizada (área vasculosa) que vai ficando progressivamente maior. Ao sexto dia de incubação mais da metade da superfície do vitelo foi envolvido pelo mesoderma. Os nutrientes do vitelo são absorvidos e desdobrados a componentes mais simples por enzimas produzidas pelo endoderma, sendo incorporados aos vasos vitelinos que os veicularão até o coração, que os impulsionará a todo o embrião. Durante a fase embrionária (até ao sexto dia de incubação), o oxigênio do exterior chega até a área vasculosa por difusão, incorporando-se daqui ao embrião; além disso, durante a primeira semana, as alterações na composição e volume do vitelo fazem que se disponha flutuando sobre o albúmen, o que faz com que a área vasculosa fique em contato com a casca, favorecendo-se assim a respiração. O intestino primitivo se instaura a partir das porções mais proximais do saco vitelino à vez que o corpo é fechado (2º-3º dia). O saco vitelino vai regredindo à medida que se vão esgotando os nutrientes do vitelo que aloja. Pouco antes do nascimento é incorporado à cavidade corporal como divertículo vitelino que fica unido ao jejuno; o divertículo vitelino persiste até seis dias após o nascimento, constituindo uma fonte adicional de nutrientes. -/- Figura 24: Feto de galinho ao fim, perto de ser eclodido. -/- mnios: no segundo dia (-30 horas) de incubação se formam as dobras amnióticas na somatopleura extraembrionária, perto do disco embrionário. Progridem dorsalmente, terminando por convergir e fundir-se cerca de 72 horas de incubação, coincidindo com o fechamento corporal, assim sendo constituído o âmnios, que terminará perdendo todo o contato com o córion. A cavidade amniótica que limita está cheia de um líquido seroso que garante que o embrião seja desenvolvido em um meio aquoso; este líquido é secretado pelo âmnios, mas também composto por substâncias formadas pelos rins, cavidade oral e aparelho respiratório. Córion: após a formação do celoma e o estabelecimento e fusão das dobras amnióticas, a parte da somatopleura extraembrionária que fica mais periférica constitui o córion (também denominado serosa nas aves); permanece formada pela área opaca expandida e mesoderma somático. Progressivamente vai aderindo-se à membrana testácea interna deslocando o albúmen; sobre o dia 12 termina por cobrir toda a superfície interna da casca. Intervém na troca gasosa com o meio ambiente através dos poros da casca e na captação do cálcio desta. Alantóides: o alantóide inicia a sua formação no dia 3 de incubação. Cresce rapidamente, ocupando o espaço exocelômico, terminando por cobrir o âmnios e saco vitelino. Progressivamente, entre os dias 4 a 10, sua parte mais externa se funde com o córion, formando-se o alantocórion, membrana trilaminar que cobrirá a superfície interna da casca, aderindo-se à membrana testácea interna, cujo mesoderma (esplâncnico) se vasculariza intensamente. A partir do dia 7 substitui completamente a área vasculosa como órgão respiratório, sendo garantido o aumento gradual das necessidades de troca gasosa na fase fetal do desenvolvimento (desde o dia 8), de rápido crescimento. A capacidade de capilarização desta membrana é muito maior do que a do saco vitelino. Na cavidade alantóica acumula-se a urina produzida pelos rins, afastando os produtos tóxicos do embrião; a membrana também age sobre este fluido intervindo na manutenção do equilíbrio hídrico e mineral do embrião. -/- Figura 25: Formação do saco vitelino. Limite entre a área vascular e avascular. Seio terminal. -/- O albúmen perde água rapidamente e torna-se menos volumoso e mais viscoso, terminando por desaparecer progressivamente. A ligação do alantocórion à membrana testácea interna faz com que seja marginalizado para uma posição periférica, no polo agudo do ovo. Aqui, o alantocórion que o rodeia constitui o saco do albúmen. O albúmen é a principal fonte de água e proteínas. A água é incorporada ao vitelo, o que, ao tornar-se mais volumoso, provoca que, entre os dias 3 e 4, se rompa a membrana vitelina; apenas restos mortais devem permanecer entre o saco vitelino e o albúmen. Dentro do saco vitelino, a água se acumula principalmente sob o embrião -fluido subembrionário-; este fluido atinge o seu volume máximo (15 ml) no dia 6. As proteínas serão incorporadas principalmente a partir de no dia 12, seja através do saco vitelino, do saco do albúmen ou por ingestão de líquido amniótico, dada a comunicação seroamniótica que se estabelece. Na galinha, a eclosão ocorre aos 21 dias de incubação. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- Anotações de aulas de Embriologia Básica, Prof. Dr. Edson João da Silva, UFRPE, 2021. BAZER, Fuller W. et al. Novel pathways for implantation and establishment and maintenance of pregnancy in mammals. MHR: Basic science of reproductive medicine, v. 16, n. 3, p. 135-152, 2009. CARTER, Anthony M. Evolution of placental function in mammals: the molecular basis of gas and nutrient transfer, hormone secretion, and immune responses. Physiological Reviews, 2012. CARTER, A. M.; ENDERS, A. C. Placentation in mammals: Definitive placenta, yolk sac, and paraplacenta. Theriogenology, v. 86, n. 1, p. 278-287, 2016. CONSTANTINESCU, G.M.; SCHATTEN, H. Comparative reproductive biology. Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 402p. Avicultura: Formação do Ovo. Desenvolvimento Embrionário e Diferenciação Sexual nos Animais Domésticos. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Dezembro de 2021. Diferenciação e Determinação Sexual dos Animais. Fisiologia do Ciclo Estral dos Animais Domésticos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. Manejo na Avicultura: Postura, Iluminação e Incubação dos Ovos. Transporte de Gametas, Fertilização e Segmentação. FERRER‐VAQUER, Anna; HADJANTONAKIS, Anna‐Katerina. Birth defects associated with perturbations in preimplantation, gastrulation, and axis extension: from conjoined twinning to caudal dysgenesis. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Developmental Biology, v. 2, n. 4, p. 427-442, 2013. GALINA, Carlos; VALENCIA, Javier. Reproducción de los animales domésticos. 2006. GEISERT, Rodney D.; SPENCER, Thomas E. Placentation in Mammals. Springer, 2021. GINTHER, O. J. Reproductive Biology of The mare: Basic and Applied Aspects. 2. ed. Cross Plains, Wisconsin: Equiservices, 1992. GUILLOMOT, Michel. Cellular interactions during implantation in domestic ruminants. Journal of Reproduction and Fertility-Supplements only, n. 49, p. 39-52, 1995. KLEIN, C.; TROEDSSON, M. H. T. Maternal recognition of pregnancy in the horse: a mystery still to be solved. Reproduction, Fertility and Development, v. 23, n. 8, p. 952-963, 2011. MIGLINO, Maria Angelica et al. The carnivore pregnancy: the development of the embryo and fetal membranes. Theriogenology, v. 66, n. 6-7, p. 1699-1702, 2006. MOFFETT, Ashley; LOKE, Charlie. Immunology of placentation in eutherian mammals. Nature Reviews Immunology, v. 6, n. 8, p. 584-594, 2006. PRETZER, S. D. Canine embryonic and fetal development: A review. Theriogenology, v. 70, n. 3, p. 300-303, 2008. SENGER, Phillip L. et al. Pathways to pregnancy and parturition. Current Conceptions, Inc., 1615 NE Eastgate Blvd., 2012. SOZEN, Berna; CAN, Alp; DEMIR, Necdet. Cell fate regulation during preimplantation development: a view of adhesion-linked molecular interactions. Developmental biology, v. 395, n. 1, p. 73-83, 2014. SPENCER, Thomas E. et al. Pregnancy recognition and conceptus implantation in domestic ruminants: roles of progesterone, interferons and endogenous retroviruses. Reproduction, fertility and development, v. 19, n. 1, p. 65-78, 2006. VERSTEGEN-ONCLIN, K.; VERSTEGEN, J. Endocrinology of pregnancy in the dog: a review. Theriogenology, v. 70, n. 3, p. 291-299, 2008. WOODING, Peter; BURTON, Graham. Comparative placentation: structures, functions and evolution. Springer Science & Business Media, 2008. FIXAÇÃO DO ASSUNTO -/- 1. Defina e diferencie os processos de desenvolvimento embrionário precoce, alonga- mento e gastrulação. -/- 2. O que é implantação? Caracterize as fases do processo de implantação. -/- 3. Qual a importância do acúmulo de líquido no interior do blastocele? Qual a importân- cia da eclosão do blastocisto? -/- 4. Caracterize os três tipos de implantação e, depois, explique e diferencie os meios de implantação nas fêmeas domésticas. -/- 5. Defina e caracterize os meios de reconhecimento materno da gestação (RMG) nos animais domésticos. -/- 6. O que diferencia o RMG em ruminantes e suínos? -/- 7. Qual o papel do estradiol no RMG em porcas? O que ocorre quando a porca não fica gestante? -/- 8. Explique o RMG em cães e gatos. -/- 9. Defina placentação e sua importância para a reprodução dos animais domésticos. -/- 10. Quais são as classificações da placentação? Classifique a placentação das fêmeas domésticas. -/- 11. Caracterize e diferencie o processo de placentação em fêmeas domésticas. -/- 12. Observe a figura e responda o que se pede:. (shrink)

Das Themengebiet der Psychopathie hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten vor allem durch Filme, die sich mit (vermeintlich) psychopathischen Charakteren beschäfti- gen, ein breites gesellschaftliches Interesse erfahren (vgl. Swart 2016). Holly- woods Blockbuster zeigen hier Beispiele hochintelligenter (z. B. Hanibal Lector in „Das Schweigen der Lämmer“) oder sexuell devianter (z. B. Patrick Bateman in „American Psycho“) Serienkiller, welche aus klinischer Sicht tatsächlich hoch psy- chopathische Tendenzen aufweisen. Demgegenüber werden psychisch andersartig beeinträchtigte Filmcharaktere, wie z. B. Norman Bates („Psycho“) oder Travis Bickel (...) („Taxi Driver“) wohl aufgrund ihrer schreckenseinflößenden Wirkung im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch oft als Psychopathen bezeichnet, obwohl ihre Symptome aus forensisch-psychiatrischer Sicht eher schizoiden Wahnvorstellungen ähneln und keine Anzeichen einer klas- sischen Psychopathie darstellen (vgl. Leistedt / Linkowski 2014). Auch Medienbe- richte über tatsächlich existierende, brutale (z.B. Serienkiller Ted Bundy) oder dreiste (z.B. Anlagebetrüger Bernard Madoff) Figuren der Zeitgeschichte haben die konzeptionelle Unübersichtlichkeit des in der Öffentlichkeit wahrgenommenen Bildes der Psychopathie befeuert. Und sogar in medizinischen bzw. psychiatri- schen Kreisen scheint eine uneinheitliche Sichtweise die Konfusion um das Stö- rungsbild Psychopathie weiter anzufachen (vgl. Berg et al. 2013). (shrink)

Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sanction for violations. This chapter develops a novel account of the normativity of (...) formal standards where the role they play in our practical lives explains a distinctive kind of reason to obey them. We have this kind of reason to be polite because etiquette is important to us. We also have this kind of reason to be moral because morality is important to us. This parallel suggests that the importance we assign to morality is insufficient to justify it being substantive. (shrink)

Sometimes a fact can play a role in a grounding explanation, but the particular content of that fact make no difference to the explanation—any fact would do in its place. I call these facts vacuous grounds. I show that applying the distinction between-vacuous grounds allows us to give a principled solution to Kit Fine and Stephen Kramer’s paradox of ground. This paradox shows that on minimal assumptions about grounding and minimal assumptions about logic, we can show that grounding is reflexive, (...) contra the intuitive character of grounds. I argue that we should never have accepted that grounding is irreflexive in the first place; the intuitions that support the irreflexive intuition plausibly only require that grounding be non-vacuously irreflexive. Fine and Kramer’s paradox relies, essentially, on a case of vacuous grounding and is thus no problem for this account. (shrink)

I distinguish two ways of developing anti-exceptionalist approaches to logical revision. The first emphasizes comparing the theoretical virtuousness of developed bodies of logical theories, such as classical and intuitionistic logic. I'll call this whole theory comparison. The second attempts local repairs to problematic bits of our logical theories, such as dropping excluded middle to deal with intuitions about vagueness. I'll call this the piecemeal approach. I then briefly discuss a problem I've developed elsewhere for comparisons of logical theories. Essentially, the (...) problem is that a pair of logics may each evaluate the alternative as superior to themselves, resulting in oscillation between logical options. The piecemeal approach offers a way out of this problem andthereby might seem a preferable to whole theory comparisons. I go on to show that reflective equilibrium, the best known piecemeal method, has deep problems of its own when applied to logic. (shrink)

Philosophical arguments usually are and nearly always should be abductive. Across many areas, philosophers are starting to recognize that often the best we can do in theorizing some phenomena is put forward our best overall account of it, warts and all. This is especially true in esoteric areas like logic, aesthetics, mathematics, and morality where the data to be explained is often based in our stubborn intuitions. -/- While this methodological shift is welcome, it's not without problems. Abductive arguments involve (...) significant theoretical resources which themselves can be part of what's being disputed. This means that we will sometimes find otherwise good arguments which suggest their own grounds are problematic. In particular, sometimes revising our beliefs on the basis of such an argument can undermine the very justification we used in that argument. -/- This feature, which I'll call self-effacingness, occurs most dramatically in arguments against our standing views on the esoteric subject matters mentioned above: logic, mathematics, aesthetics, and morality. This is because these subject matters all play a role in how we reason abductively. This isn't an idle fact; we can resist some challenges to our standing beliefs about these subject matters exactly because the challenges are self-effacing. The self-effacing character of certain arguments is thus both a benefit and limitation of the abductive turn and deserves serious attention. I aim to give it the attention it deserves. (shrink)

Moore’s paradox, the infamous felt bizarreness of sincerely uttering something of the form “I believe grass is green, but it ain’t”—has attracted a lot of attention since its original discovery (Moore 1942). It is often taken to be a paradox of belief—in the sense that the locus of the inconsistency is the beliefs of someone who so sincerely utters. This claim has been labeled as the priority thesis: If you have an explanation of why a putative content could not be (...) coherently believed, you thereby have an explanation of why it cannot be coherently asserted. (Shoemaker 1995). The priority thesis, however, is insufficient to give a general explanation of Moore-paradoxical phenomena and, moreover, it’s false. I demonstrate this, then show how to give a commitment-theoretic account of Moore Paradoxicality, drawing on work by Bach and Harnish. The resulting account has the virtue of explaining not only cases of pragmatic incoherence involving assertions, but also cases of cognate incoherence arising for other speech acts, such as promising, guaranteeing, ordering, and the like. (shrink)

I defend normative subjectivism against the charge that believing in it undermines the functional role of normative judgment. In particular, I defend it against the claim that believing that our reasons change from context to context is problematic for our use of normative judgments. To do so, I distinguish two senses of normative universality and normative reasons---evaluative universality and reasons and ontic universality and reasons. The former captures how even subjectivists can evaluate the actions of those subscribing to other conventions; (...) the latter explicates how their reasons differ from ours. I then show that four aspects of the functional role of normativity---evaluation of our and others actions and reasons, normative communication, hypothetical planning, and evaluating counternromative conditionals---at most requires our normative systems being evaluatively universal. Yet reasonable subjectivist positions need not deny evaluative universality. (shrink)

Warfare is becoming increasingly automated, from automatic missile defense systems to micro-UAVs (WASPs) that can maneuver through urban environments with ease, and each advance brings with it ethical questions in need of resolving. Proponents of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) provide varied arguments in their favor; robots are capable of better identifying combatants and civilians, thus reducing "collateral damage"; robots need not protect themselves and so can incur more risks to protect innocents or gather more information before using deadly force; (...) robots can assess situations more quickly and do so without emotion, reducing the likelihood of fatal mistakes due to human error; and sending robots to war protects our own soldiers from harm. However, these arguments only point in favor of autonomous weapons systems, failing to demonstrate why such systems need be made *lethal*. In this paper I argue that if one grants all of the proponents' points in favor of LAWS, then, contrary to what might be expected, this leads to the conclusion that it would be both immoral and illegal to deploy *lethal* autonomous weapons, because the many features that speak in favor of them also undermine the need for them to be programmed to take lives. In particular, I argue that such systems, if lethal, would violate the moral and legal principle of necessity, which forbids the use of weapons that impose superfluous injury or unnecessary harm. I conclude by highlighting that the argument is not against autonomous weapons per se, but only against *lethal* autonomous weapons. (shrink)

According to Schopenhauer’s compensation argument for pessimism, the non-existence of the world is preferable to its existence because no goods can ever compensate for the mere existence of evil. Standard interpretations take this argument to be based on Schopenhauer’s thesis that all goods are merely the negation of evils, from which they assume it follows that the apparent goods in life are in fact empty and without value. This article develops a non-standard variant of the standard interpretation, which accepts the (...) relevance of the negativity thesis but rejects that the argument assumes that life’s goods are all empty and valueless. Instead, it argues that whatever value negative goods might possess, they do not have the kind of value to compensate for positive evils. This involves additional development of the negativity thesis and a defence of it against objections from Byron Simmons (2021). (shrink)

I argue that certain species of belief, such as mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, are insulated from a form of Harman-style debunking argument whereas moral beliefs, the primary target of such arguments, are not. Harman-style arguments have been misunderstood as attempts to directly undermine our moral beliefs. They are rather best given as burden-shifting arguments, concluding that we need additional reasons to maintain our moral beliefs. If we understand them this way, then we can see why moral beliefs are vulnerable (...) to such arguments while mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs are not—the very construction of Harman-style skeptical arguments requires the truth of significant fragments of our mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, but requires no such thing of our moral beliefs. Given this property, Harman-style skeptical arguments against logical, mathematical, and normative beliefs are self-effacing; doubting these beliefs on the basis of such arguments results in the loss of our reasons for doubt. But we can cleanly doubt the truth of morality. (shrink)

It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can’t get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer’s and Gillian Russell and Greg Restall’s accounts of Hume’s dictum, is of (...) a general type arising for the use of model-theoretic structures in cashing out substantive philosophical claims: the question of whether an abstract model-theoretic structure successfully interprets something often involves taking a stand on non-trivial issues surrounding the thing. In the particular case of Hume’s dictum, given reasonable conceptual or metaphysical claims about the ethical, Singer’s and Russell and Restall’s accounts treat obviously ethical claims as descriptive and vice versa. Consequently, their model-theoretic characterizations of Hume’s dictum are not metaethically neutral. This encourages skepticism about whether model-theoretic machinery suffices to provide an illuminating distinction between the ethical and the descriptive. (shrink)

The principal thesis in this review-essay is that the key linguistic terms in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre especially have two main meanings that appear at first sight to be almost in contradiction or opposed to each other. The reader of Fichte therefore has to work hard to overcome any apparent conflicts in the “double sense” of his philosophical terminology. Accordingly, I argue that Fichte’s linguistic method and use of language should be seen as part of his chief philosophical method of synthesis, where (...) we have to carry out a similar procedure and attempt to reconcile opposites using the power of the imagination. This thesis is put forward by means of a number of practical examples and in the context of some critical reflections on the recently published Cambridge Companion to Fichte, eds. David James and Günter Zöller. Review essay published in Volume 15 (December, 2017) of the journal Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte (ed. Emiliano Acosta). (shrink)

Expressivists explain the expression relation which obtains between sincere moral assertion and the conative or affective attitude thereby expressed by appeal to the relation which obtains between sincere assertion and belief. In fact, they often explicitly take the relation between moral assertion and their favored conative or affective attitude to be exactly the same as the relation between assertion and the belief thereby expressed. If this is correct, then we can use the identity of the expression relation in the two (...) cases to test the expressivist account as a descriptive or hermeneutic account of moral discourse. I formulate one such test, drawing on a standard explanation of Moore's paradox. I show that if expressivism is correct as a descriptive account of moral discourse, then we should expect versions of Moore's paradox where we explicitly deny that we possess certain affective or conative attitudes. I then argue that the constructions that mirror Moore's paradox are not incoherent. It follows that expressivism is either incorrect as a hermeneutic account of moral discourse or that the expression relation which holds between sincere moral assertion and affective or conative attitudes is not identical to the relation which holds between sincere non-moral assertion and belief. A number of objections are canvassed and rejected. (shrink)

This is an opinionated overview of the Frege-Geach problem, in both its historical and contemporary guises. Covers Higher-order Attitude approaches, Tree-tying, Gibbard-style solutions, and Schroeder's recent A-type expressivist solution.

Despite the recent proliferation of scientific, clinical, and narrative accounts of auditory verbal hallucinations, the phenomenology of voice hearing remains opaque and undertheorized. In this article, we outline an interdisciplinary approach to understanding hallucinatory experiences which seeks to demonstrate the value of the humanities and social sciences to advancing knowledge in clinical research and practice. We argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH utilizes rigorous and context-appropriate methodologies to analyze a wider range of first-person accounts of AVH (...) at 3 contextual levels: cultural, social, and historical; experiential; and biographical. We go on to show that there are significant potential benefits for voice hearers, clinicians, and researchers. These include informing the development and refinement of subtypes of hallucinations within and across diagnostic categories; “front-loading” research in cognitive neuroscience; and suggesting new possibilities for therapeutic intervention. In conclusion, we argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH can nourish the ethical core of scientific enquiry by challenging its interpretive paradigms, and offer voice hearers richer, potentially more empowering ways to make sense of their experiences. (shrink)

I argue that we can and should extend Tarski's model-theoretic criterion of logicality to cover indefinite expressions like Hilbert's ɛ operator, Russell's indefinite description operator η, and abstraction operators like 'the number of'. I draw on this extension to discuss the logical status of both abstraction operators and abstraction principles.

Allies of those experiencing injustice or oppression face a dilemma: to be neutral in the face of calls to solidarity risks siding with oppressors, yet to speak or act on behalf of others risks compounding the injustice. We identify what we call ‘a normative demand for deference’ (NDD) to those with lived experience as a response to this dilemma. Yet, while the NDD is prevalent, albeit sometimes implicitly so, in contemporary solidarity theory and activist practice, it remains under-theorised. In this (...) article, we analyse the potential benefits of adhering to the NDD, highlighting both a commonly accepted epistemic benefit, and a neglected but important good in bearing witness. Yet adhering to the NDD also raises real challenges. While the literature focuses on a gold standard model of direct engagement, we defend a valuable role for a second-order form of engagement through reading, films, and similar media, which, we argue, is particularly salient for global and transnational solidarity, an important element of contemporary global politics. (shrink)

Why do promises give rise to reasons? I consider a quadruple of possibilities which I think will not work, then sketch the explanation of the normativity of promising I find more plausible—that it is constitutive of the practice of promising that promise-breaking implies liability for blame and that we take liability for blame to be a bad thing. This effects a reduction of the normativity of promising to conventionalism about liability together with instrumental normativity and desire-based reasons. This is important (...) for a number of reasons, but the most important reason is that this style of account can be extended to account for nearly all normativity—one notable exception being instrumental normativity itself. Success in the case of promises suggests a general reduction of normativity to conventions and instrumental normativity. But success in the cases of promises is already quite interesting and does not depend essentially the general claim about normativity. (shrink)

The current literature suggests that the use of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s approaches to phenomenology is still practiced. However, a clear gap exists on how these approaches are viewed in the context of constructivism, particularly with non-traditional female students’ study of mathematics. The dissertation attempts to clarify the constructivist role of phenomenology within a transcendental framework from the first-hand meanings associated with the expression of the relevancy as expressed by interviews of six nontraditional female students who have studied undergraduate mathematics. Comparisons (...) also illustrate how the views associated with Husserl’s stance on phenomenology inadvertently relate to the stances of the participants interviewed as part of the study. The research questions focus on the emotional association with studying mathematics and how pre-conceived opinions regarding the study of mathematics may have influenced the essences of the experiences of the participants who have studied collegiate-level mathematics. The essences of the experiences of the participants are analyzed using bracketing and epoché to ensure personal biases of the researcher do not affect the interpretation of the expressed essences of the participants. Data collection is accomplished through two series of qualitative interviews seeking the participants’ firsthand impressions of how they view the way instructional design is oriented with regard to mathematics. Additional questions seek to illuminate the participants’ point of view regarding their emotional association with mathematics as well as their opinions and theoretical perspectives on the study of mathematics. (shrink)

It is plausible that there are epistemic reasons bearing on a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there are a range of practical reasons bearing on what to believe. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. Most significantly for our purposes, it is obscure how epistemic reasons and practical reasons might interact in the explanation of what one ought to believe. We draw an analogy with a similar distinction between (...) types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. The analogy motivates a two-level account of the structure of normativity that explains the interaction of correctness-based and other reasons. This account relies upon a distinction between normative reasons and authoritatively normative reasons. Only the latter play the reasons role in explaining what state one ought to be in. All and only practical reasons are authoritative reasons. Hence, in one important sense, all reasons for belief are practical reasons. But this account also preserves the autonomy and importance of epistemic reasons. Given the importance of having true beliefs about the world, our epistemic standard typically plays a key role in many cases in explaining what we ought to believe. In addition to reconciling (versions of) evidentialism and pragmatism, this two-level account has implications for a range of important debates in normative theory, including the interaction of right and wrong reasons for actions and other attitudes, the significance of reasons in understanding normativity and authoritative normativity, the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ normativity, and whether there is a unified source of authoritative normativity. (shrink)

Fichte-Studien, volume 49 (Leiden: Brill/Rodopi Publishers, 8 April 2021), edited by David W. Wood, 471pp. -/- Presenting new critical perspectives on J.G. Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, this volume of articles in English by an international group of scholars addresses the topic of first principles in Fichte’s writings. Especially discussed are the central text of his Jena period, the 1794/95 Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, as well as later versions like the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (1796-99) and the presentations of 1804 and 1805. Also (...) included are new studies on the first principles of the particular sub-disciplines of Fichte’s system, such as the doctrines of aesthetics, nature, right, ethics, and history. The volume also contains a number of miscellaneous essays on Fichte research, as well as several book reviews. (shrink)

In this thesis I offer an interpretation of Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimism. I argue against interpreting Schopenhauer’s pessimism as if it were merely a matter of temperament, and I resist the urge to find a single standard argument for pessimism in Schopenhauer’s work. Instead, I treat Schopenhauer’s pessimism as inherently variegated, composed of several distinct but interrelated pessimistic positions, each of which is supported by its own argument. I begin by examining Schopenhauer’s famous argument that willing necessitates suffering, which I defend (...) against the misrepresentative interpretation advocated by Ivan Soll. I also offer a metaphysical reading of Schopenhauer’s claim that no amount happiness can compensate for the mere fact of suffering, based upon his negative conception of happiness. I proceed by analysing Schopenhauer’s criticisms of two prominent optimists, Leibniz and Rousseau. I attempt to salvage something of Schopenhauer’s counterargument against Leibniz that this is the worse of all possible worlds, and I also examine Schopenhauer’s claim that the optimistic metaphysics of a priori rationalistic philosophy cannot cope with the evidence of meaningless suffering. In the case of Rousseau, I interpret Schopenhauer’s brief objection to Rousseau’s assumption of original goodness, by means of an examination of Schopenhauer’s conception of the contrary doctrine, original sin. Next I consider the metaphysics of Schopenhauer’s account of eternal justice. After defending it against a number of objections, I argue that the nature of his version of eternal justice, which he admits constitutes a justification for suffering, does not conflict with the fact that he so strongly condemns Leibniz’s and Rousseau’s optimistic justifications for suffering. Finally I assess whether and to what extent Schopenhauer’s ethics of salvation are either pessimistic or optimistic. I conclude that the mere fact that salvation is possible is not necessarily a cause for optimism, but that Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation is made partly optimistic by the higher form of cognition that he describes as part of it. I also argue that Schopenhauer’s views on the essentially mystical nature of the state of salvation ultimately commit him to being neither positively optimistic nor positively pessimistic about salvation. I conclude overall with some brief remarks about the meaning of Schopenhauer’s pessimism, and how in spite of its diverse nature, it is able to lay down a singular challenge to all future philosophers concerned with the question of suffering. (shrink)

"FICHTEANA Review of J.G. Fichte Research" is an online publication in English devoted to new scholarship on the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. It publishes information and reviews of the latest Fichte editions, books, publications, conferences, and Calls for Papers. Originally founded by Daniel Breazeale in 1993, since issue 22 (2022), FICHTEANA has appeared in an expanded form with book reviews. It is co-edited by Daniel Breazeale and David W. Wood, with associate editor Kienhow Goh. -/- .

This issue 23 of FICHTEANA is dedicated to Daniel Breazeale, who passed away on 30 December 2023. -/- "FICHTEANA Review of J.G. Fichte Research" is an annual online publication in English devoted to new scholarship on the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. It publishes information and reviews of the latest Fichte editions, books, publications, conferences, and Calls for Papers. Originally founded by Daniel Breazeale in 1993, since issue 22 (2022), FICHTEANA has appeared in an expanded form with book reviews. Editors: Daniel (...) Breazeale (†) and David W. Wood; with associate editors Kienhow Goh and Gesa Wellmann. -/- . (shrink)

Contemporary proponents of republican political theory often focus on the concept of freedom as non-domination, and how best to promote it within a state. However, there is little attention paid to what the republican conception of freedom demands in the international realm. In this essay I examine what is required for an agent to enjoy freedom as non-domination, and argue that this might only be achieved for individuals if one of two possibilities is pursued internationally: either (1) all nations are (...) made equally powerful, such that none may arbitrarily impose its will on another without penalty, or (2) all nations are joined under a global sovereign which guarantees that the weaker states are not subject to the whims of the stronger. I further argue that the first condition cannot suffice for achieving true non-domination, and as a result, republicanism must prescribe working toward the establishment of a global state. This paper provides an important contribution to the literature by addressing the international implications of the republican conception of freedom. (shrink)

W. Matthews Grant's "Dual Sources Account" aims at explaining how God causes all creaturely actions while leaving them free in a robust libertarian sense. It includes an account of predestination that is supposed to allow for the possibility that some created persons ultimately spend eternity in hell. I argue here that the resources Grant provides for understanding why God might permit created persons to end up in hell are, for two different reasons, insufficient. I then provide possible solutions to these (...) two problems, compatible with Grant's account overall, that help show why God might allow hell. (shrink)

I examine Hume’s ‘construal of the basic structure of human agency’ and his ‘analysis of human agency’ as they arise in his investigation of causal power. Hume’s construal holds both that volition is separable from action and that the causal mechanism of voluntary action is incomprehensible. Hume’s analysis argues, on the basis of these two claims, that we cannot draw the concept of causal power from human agency. Some commentators suggest that Hume’s construal of human agency is untenable, unduly skeptical, (...) or uniquely entailed by the limits of empiricism. However, as I argue, these criticisms depend either on a misunderstanding of Hume’s analysis of human agency or on a neglect of the historical context of his view. (shrink)

I show that the model-theoretic meaning that can be read off the natural deduction rules for disjunction fails to have certain desirable properties. I use this result to argue against a modest form of inferentialism which uses natural deduction rules to fix model-theoretic truth-conditions for logical connectives.

Background Retraction is a mechanism for alerting readers to unreliable material and other problems in the published scientific and scholarly record. Retracted publications generally remain visible and searchable, but the intention of retraction is to mark them as “removed” from the citable record of scholarship. However, in practice, some retracted articles continue to be treated by researchers and the public as valid content as they are often unaware of the retraction. Research over the past decade has identified a number of (...) factors contributing to the unintentional spread of retracted research. The goal of the Reducing the Inadvertent Spread of Retracted Science: Shaping a Research and Implementation Agenda (RISRS) project was to develop an actionable agenda for reducing the inadvertent spread of retracted science. This included identifying how retraction status could be more thoroughly disseminated, and determining what actions are feasible and relevant for particular stakeholders who play a role in the distribution of knowledge. -/- Methods These recommendations were developed as part of a year-long process that included a scoping review of empirical literature and successive rounds of stakeholder consultation, culminating in a three-part online workshop that brought together a diverse body of 65 stakeholders in October–November 2020 to engage in collaborative problem solving and dialogue. Stakeholders held roles such as publishers, editors, researchers, librarians, standards developers, funding program officers, and technologists and worked for institutions such as universities, governmental agencies, funding organizations, publishing houses, libraries, standards organizations, and technology providers. Workshop discussions were seeded by materials derived from stakeholder interviews (N = 47) and short original discussion pieces contributed by stakeholders. The online workshop resulted in a set of recommendations to address the complexities of retracted research throughout the scholarly communications ecosystem. -/- Results The RISRS recommendations are: (1) Develop a systematic cross-industry approach to ensure the public availability of consistent, standardized, interoperable, and timely information about retractions; (2) Recommend a taxonomy of retraction categories/classifications and corresponding retraction metadata that can be adopted by all stakeholders; (3) Develop best practices for coordinating the retraction process to enable timely, fair, unbiased outcomes; and (4) Educate stakeholders about pre- and post-publication stewardship, including retraction and correction of the scholarly record. -/- Conclusions Our stakeholder engagement study led to 4 recommendations to address inadvertent citation of retracted research, and formation of a working group to develop the Communication of Retractions, Removals, and Expressions of Concern (CORREC) Recommended Practice. Further work will be needed to determine how well retractions are currently documented, how retraction of code and datasets impacts related publications, and to identify if retraction metadata (fails to) propagate. Outcomes of all this work should lead to ensuring retracted papers are never cited without awareness of the retraction, and that, in public fora outside of science, retracted papers are not treated as valid scientific outputs. (shrink)

This chapter examines the ethical matters that arise from Schopenhauer’s discussions of sexual love and sexual practices. It presents Schopenhauer's remarks on “pederasty”, among other “unnatural lusts”, and attempts to disentangle Schopenhauer’s judgements on these practices from the principles that guide them. It considers these practices in the light of Schopenhauer's ethics of asceticism and his ethics of compassion and concludes that Schopenhauer’s objections to them are not always moral in nature, strictly speaking, and where they are moral, they are (...) not always based on the “unnaturalness” of the practices, but rather the harm that he supposes they may cause. (shrink)

I respond to an interesting objection to my 2014 argument against hermeneutic expressivism. I argue that even though Toppinen has identified an intriguing route for the expressivist to tread, the plausible developments of it would not fall to my argument anyways---as they do not make direct use of the parity thesis which claims that expression works the same way in the case of conative and cognitive attitudes. I close by sketching a few other problems plaguing such views.

This paper has two related goals. First, we develop an expressivist account of negation which, in the spirit of Alan Gibbard, treats disagreement as semantically primitive. Our second goal is to make progress toward a unified expressivist treatment of modality. Metaethical expressivists must be expressivists about deontic modal claims. But then metaethical expressivists must either extend their expressivism to include epistemic and alethic modals, or else accept a semantics for modal expressions that is radically disjunctive. We propose that expressivists look (...) to Amie Thomasson’s work for a general strategy for offering a unified expressivist account of modality. Modals in general, we propose, are devices for expressing metalinguistic commitments within the object language, with deontic, epistemic, and metaphysical modals all expressing different kinds of metalinguistic commitments. (shrink)

The following articke studies the definitions of sarcasm, its usage in literature, in educational system, and its pros and cons.

This chapter argues that Schopenhauer’s political philosophy, on the one hand, is conservative in character, while his moral philosophy, on the other, has progressive applications to social and political life. While this is not inconsistent in itself, it does confound Schopenhauer’s expectation that the norms of political justice converge on the same set of outwards behaviors as the norms of moral justice.

It is one thing for a given proposition to follow or to not follow from a given set of propositions and it is quite another thing for it to be shown either that the given proposition follows or that it does not follow.* Using a formal deduction to show that a conclusion follows and using a countermodel to show that a conclusion does not follow are both traditional practices recognized by Aristotle and used down through the history of logic. These (...) practices presuppose, respectively, a criterion of validity and a criterion of invalidity each of which has been extended and refined by modern logicians: deductions are studied in formal syntax (proof theory) and coun¬termodels are studied in formal semantics (model theory). The purpose of this paper is to compare these two criteria to the corresponding criteria employed in Boole’s first logical work, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847). In particular, this paper presents a detailed study of the relevant metalogical passages and an analysis of Boole’s symbolic derivations. It is well known, of course, that Boole’s logical analysis of compound terms (involving ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘except’, etc.) contributed to the enlargement of the class of propositions and arguments formally treatable in logic. The present study shows, in addition, that Boole made significant contributions to the study of deduc¬tive reasoning. He identified the role of logical axioms (as opposed to inference rules) in formal deductions, he conceived of the idea of an axiomatic deductive sys¬tem (which yields logical truths by itself and which yields consequences when ap¬plied to arbitrary premises). Nevertheless, surprisingly, Boole’s attempt to imple¬ment his idea of an axiomatic deductive system involved striking omissions: Boole does not use his own formal deductions to establish validity. Boole does give symbolic derivations, several of which are vitiated by “Boole’s Solutions Fallacy”: the fallacy of supposing that a solution to an equation is necessarily a logical consequence of the equation. This fallacy seems to have led Boole to confuse equational calculi (i.e., methods for gen-erating solutions) with deduction procedures (i.e., methods for generating consequences). The methodological confusion is closely related to the fact, shown in detail below, that Boole had adopted an unsound criterion of validity. It is also shown that Boole totally ignored the countermodel criterion of invalid¬ity. Careful examination of the text does not reveal with certainty a test for invalidity which was adopted by Boole. However, we have isolated a test that he seems to use in this way and we show that this test is ineffectual in the sense that it does not serve to identify invalid arguments. We go beyond the simple goal stated above. Besides comparing Boole’s earliest criteria of validity and invalidity with those traditionally (and still generally) employed, this paper also investigates the framework and details of THE MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF LOGIC. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that self-awareness is intertwined with one's awareness of possibilities for action. I show this by critically examining Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self. I argue that the distinction Zahavi makes among 'pre-reflective minimal', 'interpersonal', and 'normative' dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call 'pre-reflective self-understanding'. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person’s (...) pre-reflective absorption in the world. After reviewing Zahavi's multidimensional account and revealing this gap in his explanatory taxonomy, I draw upon Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Frankfurt in order to sketch an account of pre-reflective self-understanding. I end by raising an objection to Zahavi’s claim for the primitive and foundational status of pre-reflective self-awareness. To carve off self-awareness from the self’s practical immersion in a situation where things and possibilities already matter and draw one to act is to distort the phenomena. A more careful phenomenology of pre-reflective action shows that pre-reflective self-awareness and pre-reflective self-understanding are co-constitutive, both mutually for each other and jointly for everyday experience. (shrink)

Autonomous weapons systems (AWS), sometimes referred to as “killer robots”, are receiving evermore attention, both in public discourse as well as by scholars and policymakers. Much of this interest is connected with emerging ethical and legal problems linked to increasing autonomy in weapons systems, but there is a general underappreciation for the ways in which existing law might impact on these new technologies. In this paper, we argue that as AWS become more sophisticated and increasingly more capable than flesh-and-blood soldiers, (...) it will increasingly be the case that such soldiers are “in the power” of those AWS which fight against them. This implies that such soldiers ought to be considered hors de combat, and not targeted. In arguing for this point, we draw out a broader conclusion regarding hors de combat status, namely that it must be viewed contextually, with close reference to the capabilities of combatants on both sides of any discreet engagement. Given this point, and the fact that AWS may come in many shapes and sizes, and can be made for many different missions, we argue that each particular AWS will likely need its own standard for when enemy soldiers are deemed hors de combat. We conclude by examining how these nuanced views of hors de combat status might impact on meaningful human control of AWS. (shrink)

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I identify the mentions of Schopenhauer in À la recherche du temps perdu. I use an implicit reference to Schopenhauer by Swann to open a discussion of Schopenhauer’s theory of music. I attempt to downplay its identification, suggested by some commentators, with both the views about music expressed in the novel and the form of the novel itself. In the second section, I discuss Proust’s references to Schopenhauer in his essay (...) on reading. I confirm that Proust well understood Schopenhauer’s relationship with his own erudition and suggest that Schopenhauer’s influence on Proust may take the form of an incitement to think for oneself. In the third and final section, I consider several potential points of convergence between Proust and Schopenhauer concerning states of the will. However, in all cases I find, as I do throughout the chapter, that below the surface Proust and Schopenhauer often part ways. (shrink)

A summary of Schopenhauer's reception in British philosophy, culture, literature, and scholarship.

Worsening energy crises and the growing effects of climate change have spurred, among other things, concerted efforts to tackle global problems through what the United Nations calls Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These are in turn argued to be best achieved via the adoption of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) as the vehicle for guiding our efforts. However, though these things are often presented as the solution to global issues, they are increasingly being used as a means to centralize power (...) and exacerbate growing authoritarian trends. This article aims to demonstrate how the narratives surrounding ESG mask this reality, taking as a solution one of the foundational causes of global wealth and power disparity. (shrink)

As algorithms have become ubiquitous in consequential domains, societal concerns about the potential for discriminatory outcomes have prompted urgent calls to address algorithmic bias. In response, a rich literature across computer science, law, and ethics is rapidly proliferating to advance approaches to designing fair algorithms. Yet computer scientists, legal scholars, and ethicists are often not speaking the same language when using the term ‘bias.’ Debates concerning whether society can or should tackle the problem of algorithmic bias are hampered by conflations (...) of various understandings of bias, ranging from neutral deviations from a standard to morally problematic instances of injustice due to prejudice, discrimination, and disparate treatment. This terminological confusion impedes efforts to address clear cases of discrimination. -/- In this paper, we examine the promises and challenges of different approaches to disambiguating bias and designing for justice. While both approaches aid in understanding and addressing clear algorithmic harms, we argue that they also risk being leveraged in ways that ultimately deflect accountability from those building and deploying these systems. Applying this analysis to recent examples of generative AI, our argument highlights unseen dangers in current methods of evaluating algorithmic bias and points to ways to redirect approaches to addressing bias in generative AI at its early stages in ways that can more robustly meet the demands of justice. (shrink)

Both Martin Heidegger and Harry Frankfurt have argued that the fundamental feature of human identity is care. Both contend that caring is bound up with the fact that we are finite beings related to our own impending death, and both argue that caring has a distinctive, circular and non-instantaneous, temporal structure. In this paper, I explore the way Heidegger and Frankfurt each understand the relations among care, death, and time, and I argue for the superiority of Heideggerian version of this (...) nest of claims. Frankfurt claims that we should conceive of the most basic commitments which practically orient a person in the world and define his identity (“volitional necessities”) as naturalistic facts, foundational for and located completely without the normative space of reasons. In support of this he appeals to the supposedly foundational role played in human life by the instinct for self-preservation, what Frankfurt calls the “love of living.” The claim is that in questions of practical identity there is a definite priority of the factual over the normative. Frankfurt’s naturalistic model of volitional necessity is motivated by a misunderstanding of the temporal structure of care, a misunderstanding that helps lead him to an implausible conception of the basic structures of human identity. Heidegger advances an anti-naturalistic conception of caring, one bound up with his way of understanding how human beings relate to their own future. I argue that the existential, temporal, and normative significance that Frankfurt attributes to the naturalized “love of living” is better captured by the Heideggerian claim that human identity is defined by being “for-the-sake-of” certain projects and commitments, a way of being lived out in the way Heidegger calls “being-towards-death.”. (shrink)

In this position paper, we introduce a new epistemic lens for analyzing algorithmic harm. We argue that the epistemic lens we propose herein has two key contributions to help reframe and address some of the assumptions underlying inquiries into algorithmic fairness. First, we argue that using the framework of epistemic injustice helps to identify the root causes of harms currently framed as instances of representational harm. We suggest that the epistemic lens offers a theoretical foundation for expanding approaches to algorithmic (...) fairness in order to address a wider range of harms not recognized by existing technical or legal definitions. Second, we argue that the epistemic lens helps to identify the epistemic goals of inquiries into algorithmic fairness. There are two distinct contexts within which we examine algorithmic harm: at times, we seek to understand and describe the world as it is, and, at other times, we seek to build a more just future. The epistemic lens can serve to direct our attention to the epistemic frameworks that shape our interpretations of the world as it is and the ways we envision possible futures. Clarity with respect to which epistemic context is relevant in a given inquiry can further help inform choices among the different ways of measuring and addressing algorithmic harms. We introduce this framework with the goal of initiating new research directions bridging philosophical, legal, and technical approaches to understanding and mitigating algorithmic harms. (shrink)

A evidência textual primária confirma que Schopenhauer estava ciente da adoção generalizada do confinamento solitário no sistema penitenciário americano e alguns de seus efeitos prejudiciais. Ele entende sua perniciosidade no que diz respeito ao tédio, fenômeno pelo qual é conhecido por ter nele pensado e analisado extensivamente. Neste artigo, eu interpreto o relato de Schopenhauer sobre o tédio e sua relação com o confinamento solitário. Defendo Schopenhauer contra a objeção de que os casos de confinamento servem apenas para ilustrar a (...) inadequação geral de sua explicação do tédio como a falta de coisas para se querer. Esta defesa chega à conclusão de que, ao contrário, alguém pode muito bem sofrer da falta de coisas para querer como resultado direto de estar confinado; e que o tédio, entendido como a privação de vontade — fenômeno que sugiro poder ser chamado de privação conativa — faz uma contribuição esclarecedora para a nossa compreensão teórica da nocividade do confinamento solitário. (shrink)